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ABSTRACT 
 
In line with Carl Schmitt‘s characterization of the sovereign as ‗he who decides on the state 
of exception‘, Giorgio Agamben argues that the exception is not only central to 
contemporary security developments but is increasingly becoming the rule. Starting from a 
critical exploration of biopolitics and sovereignty in the works of both Agamben and 
Foucault, through a theoretically informed discursive analysis, this thesis explores three 
important instances of securitization discourse, whose conceptualizations of sovereignty and 
security it uses to explain how exactly ‗the (state of) exception‘ is generalized in the context 
of the war on terror. These are two US National Security Strategies (2002; 2006) and the 
European Security Strategy (2004).  
 
What the analysis of these documents, and in particular of the NSSs, demonstrates is that, as 
Agamben suggests, the exception is indeed essential to an articulation of sovereign power at 
the national level. It is through the decision on the exception exemplified by the decision on 
the enemy (i.e., terrorism) and the best means to combat it that the US tries to secure its 
status as a powerful state, legitimize a global leading role for itself in the war on terror. 
However, what it also shows is that whilst the theme of emergency is constitutive in different 
ways of both the US and EU (bio)political foreign policy and sovereignty, the attempt to 
‗generalize the (state of) exception‘ also relies on other mechanisms of (bio)power or 
(bio)security. These mechanisms of (bio)security, I argue, are operationalized differently 
from the logic of exception, but are not unconnected to it. They permit the globalization of 
(the state of) exception in the form of what I have called a ‗global (bio)emergency-State‘, 
whose primary enabler is the US state and of which the EU is an active, if ‗indirect‘, 
participant. 
 
This thesis argues that the logic of exception and security are in fact coextensive. However, 
contrary to Agamben, it claims that they are not coextensive in the absolute sense of being 
one and the same as his understanding of biosovereignty implies. They are coextensive in the 
very specific senses of the logic of exception finding its continuation in the transformation of 
security into strategic objective at both US national and European level. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the Exception Becomes the Rule in International Politics 
 
 
The September 11
th
 terrorist attacks and the subsequent war on terror were said to mark a 
turning point in world history (see, for instance, Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: xiii; Ignatieff, 
2002; Held, 2003; see also the National Strategies analysed here, and the 2010 NSS
1
). After 
the attack, many newspapers referred to 9/11 as ‗the day that changed everything‘ (quoted in 
Solomon, 2007: 137) and many articles, reports, and books were written to prove or disprove 
the way in which the attacks signal reconfigurations and novelties in the current world and to 
assess the impact of 9/11 on politics and various disciplines.
2
 My own enquiry takes a 
different path. Rather than probing whether the attacks of 9/11 represented an unprecedented 
phenomenon, I start from the presupposition that 9/11 is an important moment in history, not 
because of its novelty
3
 but because of its instrumentalization by the United States government 
and, subsequently, by the ‗coalition of the willing‘ as a watershed moment for geopolitical, 
social-economic and national reasons. By naming the attacks as unprecedented and by 
elevating them to the status of military threats, the Bush administration was able to make the 
waging of the ‗war against terrorism‘ – a war whose name4 and some of whose 
presuppositions have been questioned but that de facto continues in many ways to this day – 
appear legitimate to much of its population and some of its allies. Framing the attacks as acts 
of war has helped to create a certain environment of fear, which in turn has provided a fertile 
                                                             
1
 The 2010 NSS, which is not an object of analysis but would form an interesting point of comparison 
for future research, does not refer to the September 11 attacks as unprecedented. However, it does refer 
to them as ‗transformative‘, as ‗demonstrating just how much trends far beyond our shores could 
directly endanger the personal safety of the American people‘ (US NSS, 2010: 8).   
2
 See, the Macmillan series edited by Matthew J. Morgan, The Day That Changed Everything? The 
impact of 9/11 (6 Volume set).   
3
 On this topic, I refer readers to the findings of the Challenge report, which show that the 11 
September 2001 attacks as well as the11 March 2004 and 07 July 2005 attacks do not represent 
unprecedented events that radically changed the course of history. To argue that they do, the authors of 
the report in my view rightly suggest, downplays continuities between present and past forms of 
terrorism as well as ignore the fact that it was not the first time that America had experienced a 
terrorist attack; although, of course, not as radically or brutally ‗spectacular‘ (Baudrillard, 2001). 
4
 The Obama administration has renamed ‗the war on terror‘ ‗Overseas Contingency Operation‘ 
(Leonard, 2009) and has promised to rebalance America‘s general approach to foreign policy (see 
Williams and Covarrubias, 2009: 261; Stokes and Raphael, 2010: 9), while other authoritative 
politicians, who previously endorsed it, have also started to question it (see, for instance, Miliband, 
2009). Despite this, it does not seem that the new locution has caught on – newspapers and analysts 
continue to refer to it as the war on terror – nor are there clear signs that an end to all its various 
ramifications is in sight (again see Stock and Raphael, 2010; Elden, 2007). Neal sees ‗the language of 
the war on terror‘ as ‗a grid of intelligibility‘ upon which multiple positions are possible‘, therefore, 
‗beyond the control of those governmental elites who promulgated‘ (Neal, 2009: 62).   
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ground for the implementation of a number of emergency legislations and securitization 
practices. Drawing on Giorgio Agamben‘s theory of the state of exception and Michel 
Foucault‘s conceptualization of biopolitics, through a critical discourse analysis of three 
major securitization documents that I regard as emblematic of the type of security discourses 
being given voice today, this thesis aims to expose some of the mechanisms of (bio)security 
and exception subtending these practices. The starting point of this investigation into 
practices of exception and of security could be expressed in the following terms: in what 
specific sense are we to understand Agamben‘s claim – a claim that, as we will see, is not 
unique to Agamben – that what we are witnessing today is a situation in which the exception 
has become the rule? Is it to be grasped in terms of the extension of the state of exception in 
various countries where it has become easier for governments and their agencies to derogate 
from law? Or something more? How should we understand the relation between the state of 
exception and biopower? What role do mechanisms of biopower play in the 
operationalization and generalization of the state of exception? What is the role of discourse 
and ideology? Are the ideas of ‗global civil war‘ and of ‗the camp‘ the best ways of 
conceptualizing ongoing transformations of world order?   
 
From international and critical security theorists to geographers and sociologists, Agamben‘s 
works, especially his books Homo Sacer and State of Exception, have gained much 
popularity. While approaches and interpretations of Agamben‘s political and philosophical 
theory have varied, his ideas, together with those of Foucault, are amongst the most cited in 
current sociological analyses of the causes and, especially, the consequences and effects of 
the war on terror. To cite their works in relation to the war on terror and contemporary 
securitization developments that have been enabled by the US has become something of a 
commonplace. In particular, interest in Agamben‘s work has arisen from concerns about law 
in the aftermath of September 11, and especially over the impact of the war on terror on 
rights and civil liberties in contemporary democracies. With a few exceptions,
5
 the tendency 
has been to apply his understanding of the state of exception, sometimes critically, others 
times less so, to an analysis of particular US emergency legislations, such as the Patriot Act 
and/or to spatio-political phenomena, such as Guantánamo Bay.
6
 However, little attention has 
been given to the more problematic aspects of his theory, such as his tendency to engage in 
                                                             
5
 See, for instance, Bigo and Guild, 2005; Zagato, 2006; Bigo, 2007a, 2009; Gregory, 2007; Amoore 
and de Goode, 2008; Neocleous, 2008.  
6
 See, for instance, Butler, 2004; Campbell, 2005; Paye, 2005 (in the book, Paye also applies 
Agambe‘s theory of the state of exception to others states); Diken and Lausten, 2005. On Guantánamo 
see, for instance, van Munster, 2004; Aradau, 2007; Santiago, 2006; Reid-Henry, 2007; Motha, 2006; 
again Gregory, 2007.   
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epochal rhetoric whereby, by way of analogy, the paradigm of the exception enlisted to 
account a disparity array of socio-historical and political phenomena. More precisely, while 
the existing literature has tended to deal with these issues in the abstract
7
 or to limit an 
application of Agamben‘s ideas to the US, there has been little attempt to address what I 
regard as an unspecified account of the connection between the state of exception and global 
mechanisms and dynamics. This has prevented a more critical reflection on the (state of) 
exception as operationalized and generalized through biopolitical, securitization, ‗legal‘, 
imperial, and warfare discourses and practices that go beyond the national level.  
 
Rather than focusing exclusively on the national scale of the US, or on the US in its imperial 
role, as most contemporary literature on the exception and securitization tend to do, I will 
investigate and compare the US with the emerging ‗state-like‘ security projects of the 
European Union. In this way my analysis goes beyond approaches that are effectively centred 
on the national state and its geopolitical projection. It is undeniable that what initiated the war 
on terror was a decision on the exception, and more specifically the decision by President 
George W. Bush that the 9/11 terrorist attacks constituted an act of war. To this extent, 
Agamben‘s theory of the state of exception provides invaluable resources to understand and 
analyse post-9/11 developments. But the war on terror cannot be reduced to a question of 
sovereignty nor can sovereignty be reduced to a question of a decision on the exception. 
While not downplaying the role of law and of the sovereign (state) power, especially that of 
the US, in current geopolitical configurations, I want to consider the possibility that there is 
more to state of exception than the suspension of constitutional laws. My aim is to go beyond 
such an understanding of permanent state of exception by empirically analyzing examples of 
both ‗traditional‘ and ‗new‘ state-like formations. The questions ‗who decides?‘ and ‗on 
what?‘ are fundamental. However, my claim is that in order to understand how practices of 
security and war relate to the state of exception it is not enough to theorize the paradoxical 
relation of the state to the law, as Agamben does, but it is necessary to look beyond sovereign 
power and constitutional law. Following a Foucauldian emphasis on how mechanisms other 
than sovereign power work, I also want to analyse: 1) how mechanisms of (bio)power, which 
are difficult to place within an Agambenian understanding of sovereignty contribute to the 
continuation of the war on terror; 2) some of the discursive and ideological conditions that 
have allowed the US to present itself as the ‗decider‘ of the exception and how these 
conditions set the terms of the EU‘s participation in the war on terror. In order to do so, I 
analyse two US National Security Strategies (US NSSs henceforth) and the European 
                                                             
7
 See, for instance, Norris, 2005; Kisner, 2007; Deranty, 2008; LaCapra, 2004; Neal, 2009.   
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Security Strategy (ESS henceforth), which is the first of its kind. In this way, I elucidate the 
variety of ways in which, as Biersteker and Weber suggest, ‗practices construct, reproduce, 
reconstruct, and deconstruct both state and sovereignty‘ (1996: 11). 
 
Of course, an objection may be raised that analyzing and comparing the US and the European 
security strategies is impracticable on the basis that the EU is not a state and that, therefore, 
the terms for comparison are simply not present. Clearly, the EU is not a state in any 
traditional sense. Nevertheless, as Balibar has argued, it is ‗in principle open to indefinite 
expansion without pre-established limit, and its formation is very much in process‘ (Balibar, 
2004: 5). We might also add, following Balibar‘s latest reflections, that it is very much in 
question (Balibar, 2010).
8
 As an ‗in process construction‘ (Balibar, 2004), no one can know 
with certainty what form Europe will take, and, although not a state, the EU possesses, or 
aspires to posses, some ‗state-like‘ features.9 At the symbolic level, as Nugent and Peterson 
note, for instance, ‗[the EU] has a flag, an anthem, and virtually a common passport‘ (Nugent 
and Paterson, 2003: 102). At the more concrete level, the EU has a single currency for most 
countries and can take economic and social decisions that can overrule the preferences of 
governments and citizens of one or a group of states. Most importantly for my thesis, 
although moves to create a European defence capability has not yet fully actualized, the 
drafting of a common European Security Strategy, together with other securitization practices 
– including policies of policing and border control10 – are indicative of efforts to construct the 
EU as ‗state-like‘, and more specifically as a unitary geopolitical agent. In addition, although 
authors such as Weiss argue that the EU is a weak entity and that consequently it has to 
‗conform to the new strategic view of the US‘ (2006: 23); the EU is an agent or actor with a 
certain influence or weight in the international arena. This weight, other theorists suggest, 
renders the EU a potential, if not an already credible alternative to the US (Biscop, 2003; 
Kaldor, 2005). If we understand the state as constructed through processes of securitization 
and technologies of power, rather than as ahistorical and metaphysical, as Agamben is prone 
to do, it is essential to explore exactly how it is constituted. In this respect to analyse the role 
of the US as well as of the EU in the war on terror is a significant contribution to sociological 
analysis of Agamben‘s theory of the generalization of the state of exception. By being based 
                                                             
8
 In light of the current economic crisis and what he regards as an insufficient EU‘s answers to it 
driven almost entirely by the interests of dominant forces, Balibar makes a stark claim: ‗Europe is a 
dead project‘  (2010: [n.p.]).   
9
 The metaphor state-like is preferred to that of ‗Fortress Europe‘ because while the latter tends to 
place too much emphasis on borders as external boundary and on the ability of the EU to control them 
(Bigo, 1998), the former is in line with the discourse of the state and new forms of the state as 
constructed through technologies of power, discourses etc.  
10
 On policing and border control or what these authors as the Europeanization of internal security see, 
for instance, Bigo, 2001; Bigo and Guild, 2005; Huysmans, 2006.  
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on an in-depth analysis of mechanisms of power and logics of the state, my contribution goes 
beyond Agamben, at the same time as it foregrounds the ways in which the state maintains 
and reproduces itself through the war on terror, albeit in a transformed way – that is to say, in 
terms of the ‗global (bio)security emergency-state‘.   
 
THESIS STRUCTURE   
 
Chapter 1, the longest chapter in this thesis, will outline the theoretical framework for the 
subsequent analysis of US and EU security documents. First, I examine how Agamben 
understands sovereignty and biopolitics in relation to Foucault‘s prior analyses. I then move 
on to explore Foucault‘s notion of state racism and Agamben‘s conceptualizations of homo 
sacer and of the Muselmann. Issues of racism are central to the war on terror, and in particular 
to the production and reproduction of particular ‗racialized‘ subjects, but are often neglected 
in the literature. On the other hand, it is the figure of the Muselmann, together with that of the 
refugee, which for Agamben brings into question the ethical character of law, including 
human rights law, and provides the starting point for a new politics beyond law and violence. 
Although I argue against drawing a too easy comparison between these types of figures and 
contemporary forms of ‗inclusive exclusion‘, my own subsequent analysis will look into how 
the US and the EU deal with the problem of terrorism as exception and approach the question 
of law. It is for this reason that clarifying what Agamben means by the term Muselmann and 
how he conceptualizes its relation to law is unavoidable. In the final part of my discussion of 
Agamben, his conceptions of the camp as new nomos and ‘global civil war‘ will be 
introduced, relying on insights from Carl Schmitt, especially the latter‘s conceptualization of 
the enemy and of the United States as imperial power, before critically reinterpreting 
Agamben‘s idea of the state of exception in light of current geopolitical, securitization and 
international developments. Although not without its problems, the idea of nomos is important 
because it forces us to think beyond the state toward the generalization of the exception, 
whilst that of ‗global civil war‘, although often mentioned in the literature is inadequate to 
explain current developments because of its reliance on a reductive Hobbesian framework. 
The last two sections of the chapter will be dedicated to introducing my two case studies – the 
US and the EU as securitization actors. Particular attention will be given to exploring how 
specific ideas of security, human or biopolitical security, are central to both of them.  
 
The methodological approach taken in this study will be outlined in Chapter 2. The 
methodological concepts of ‗paradigm‘ and ‗dispositif‘, which are most important to 
Agamben and Foucault‘s interpretative frameworks in this area, and which I adopt for my 
own sociological exegesis, will be critically reviewed and discussed. A section will be 
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devoted to explaining how the selected documents are to be understood as both discursive in 
the Foucauldian sense and at the same time as ideological. I will explain the rationale for 
selecting particular documents, discussing how they were produced, for what audiences, and 
how they are intended to function politically. In this same section, I will also show how the 
NSSs and the ESS will be analysed. I will be attentive to themes that emerge from the 
documents themselves as well as use concepts previously developed in my literature review, 
such as the notions of biopolitics and exception. The aim would be to uncover and challenge 
the ideological premises on which these texts are based, their idealized views, and some of 
their hegemonic effects. 
 
Chapter 3 and 4 will be dedicated to analyzing how the US and the EU as different forms of 
‗state‘ respond to terrorism (as exception) and how a particular notion of security is central to 
those responses. Chapter 3 will trace how an attempt was made by the US administration to 
construct what I describe as a ‗global (bio)security emergency-state‘. I argue that this 
construction is essential to the generalization of the state of exception because it acts as a 
precondition for it and that it is fundamentally ‗imperial‘. I suggest that through the war on 
terror the Bush administration was trying to globalize the US state to make it appear as that 
which guarantees the security of people around the world. I demonstrate the discursive and 
ideological mechanisms by which these endeavours were framed, and how the paradigms of 
exception and security are central to them. I further suggest that it was through an 
instrumental appeal to international law that the US attempted to place itself beyond the 
purview of law. My analysis is supported by two concrete examples of how what I have 
called the ‗unilateral internationalism‘ of the United States functioned at times when the law 
was ‗in force without significance‘.  
 
Chapter 4 will use the case of Europe as a way to go beyond what I refer to as 
‗methodological statism‘. I begin by arguing that a particular notion of (bio)security is also 
central to how the EU constitutes itself and further demonstrate how the EU is also being 
constructed as global (security) actor. In the ESS, differences between member states are 
implicitly played down and state-like features are ascertained. Far from being constructed as 
a ‗new type of power‘ (Balibar, 2003a; 2003b, 2004) that provides a security alternative to 
the US, in the ESS Europe is being framed in very similar terms to how the US is framed in 
the NSSs. I conclude by suggesting that, even though the idea of terrorism presented in the 
ESS is different from that given in the NSSs, the ESS‘ political rationality is close to the 
strategy of pre-emptive warfare constructed in the NSSs. 
 
 7 
 
In the conclusion, I demonstrate how a sociological analysis of the discourses and ideologies 
of security strategies provides a better understanding of the relationship between ‗new‘ forms 
of ‗exceptionalism‘ and changing forms of sovereign authority at national and European level 
than studies that simply focus on the national scale or on the international role of the US. In 
keeping with Agamben‘s understanding of sovereign power, I argue that the war on terror 
cannot be understood outside of the ability of the US to decide on the exception. However, I 
add to this by specifying the exact mechanisms that enable the generalization of the (state of) 
exception. The notion of ‗global (bio)security emergency-state‘ introduced in Chapter 3 will 
be explored further and it will be shown that this concept is invaluable as it brings attention to 
the global, securitization dimensions of the US state. The affirmation of a ‗global 
(bio)security emergency-state‘ on the part of the US involved the qualification of terrorism as 
global exception, an appeal to international law as well as the transformation of security as 
traditionally defined – from the security of borders to  human or biopolitical security. At the 
same time, I suggest that far from representing a security alternative to US NSSs, the EU 
security strategy is itself conducive to the generalization of the state of exception and is, 
therefore, not immune from similar critiques.               
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CHAPTER 1 
Sovereignty, Biopolitics, Geopolitics: The Global War on Terror 
 
 
Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and on the Pentagon in 2001, a large 
amount of literature has been published on post-9/11 securitization practices, discourses, and 
their relationship to sovereign power and ‗biopolitics‘.11 In this chapter, I will explore how 
the notions of biopolitics and sovereignty are developed (or not developed) in the works of 
Michel Foucault, especially his Society Must Be Defended (2003), and of Giorgio Agamben,12 
whose conceptualizations have become an important point of reference, albeit to different 
degrees and forms, for all this emerging literature. The influence of Carl Schmitt‘s decisionist 
theory and especially his conception of a ‗new nomos‘ on Agamben‘s framing of the problem 
of security, sovereignty and exception will also be considered. Despite their differences 
(which will become apparent) and limitations (which, I believe, are best dealt with rather than 
ignored), both Foucault and Agamben have engaged with the problem of the relation between 
sovereignty and biopolitics. Their original and erudite contributions, especially Agamben‘s 
conception of the state of exception and Foucault‘s notion of biopolitics and state racism, 
provide important theoretical resources for understanding American ‗exceptionalism‘ and 
today‘s politics of security in the context of the war on terror. These contributions will 
become the main subjects of this chapter.   
 
The chapter will be divided in ten sections. The main objective of the following sections will 
be to reconstruct what both Foucault and Agamben say and mean by the terms ‗biopower‘ 
and ‗sovereignty‘ and how they conceptualize the relation between the two by exploring their 
accounts systematically. Rather than remaining on a mainly expository level, in this chapter, I 
will assess both the usefulness and some of the limitations and aporias with both Foucault‘s 
and Agamben‘s concepts of biopolitics, sovereignty and the exception. In particular, I will 
raise some questions in relation to Foucault‘s understanding of biopolitics and Agamben‘s 
periodizations of sovereign power. Thus, on the one hand, Foucault‘s conceptualization of 
biopower will be challenged in view of what many see as the resurgence, but what I will 
argue is best  understood as the persistance, of sovereign power in the name of combatting 
terrorism, and in particular of US sovereign power. On the other hand, Agamben‘s notion of 
sovereignty as always and already biopolitical will be questioned for paradoxically missing 
                                                             
11
 See, for instance, Bigo, 2005, 2007a; Huysmans, 2004, 2006; Paye, 2005; Reid, 2004; Dillon, 2002; 
2007; Dillon and Reid, 2001; 2007; Butler, 2004 to name just a few. 
12
 Agamben explicitly draws on Foucault‘s work and, as we will see, the similarities between the two 
abound.  
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what is specific about our present conjuncture. In particular, it will be reviewed through the 
lens of Foucauldian concepts, such as those of biopower, governmentality, and state racism or 
‗bio-racism‘. I will also be making use of other critical insights from the literature on 
imperialism, Europe, and critical security studies, which, I believe, can enhance Agamben‘s 
understanding of the state of exception and especially of how to understand its generalization. 
The generalization of (the state of) the exception is often taken to indicate a broadening of the 
definition of what constitutes an exception and a drastic increase in the scope of emergency 
power in various countries. By it I mean both this and the way in which the logic of exception 
appears to have become dominant to the point where it is not even necessary any longer to 
declare an emergency for emergency measures to be implemented. My main concern is with 
the way in which this logic has become globalized through security, international law, 
‗imperial‘ and warfare practices.   
  
To begin with, the term ‗biopower/biopolitics‘ as used by Michel Foucault13 (2003; 1978) 
will be expounded (section 1.1). Theoretical tools developed through the concepts of 
biopower and biopolitics can, and have indeed been used, to analyse a number of apparently 
unrelated facts, such as antiterrorist legal and penal developments, securatization polices and 
practices, including those related to ‗the problem of migration‘ and technologically-advanced 
surveillance methods based on biometrics, to cite only a few examples (see, for instance, 
Huysmans, 2004; Amoore, 2006; Bigo et al., 2007, Dillon and Neal, 2009). In relation to my 
own interest into the development of specific US and European securitization strategies post-
9/11, the idea of biopower can contribute to their understanding by showing how the 
development of security, and in particular of ‗human security‘, in the words of de Larrinaga 
and Doucet, ‗informs the current biopolitical networks of global governmentalities‘ (2008: 
519). The concept of human security, a very important notion for this thesis, will be analysed 
in section 1.9 when the US case will also be discussed. The reason for postponing the 
introduction of this fundamental concept is that the concept of human security cannot be 
understood simply through the Foucauldian notion of biopower but needs to be supplemented 
by an understanding of sovereignty as exception. It is only appropriate, therefore, to analyse 
the concepts of biopower and sovereignty first before introducing that of human or 
biopolitical security. The centrality of this concept to the ‗state‘, in particular to the US but 
also to the EU and the war on terror will become apparent in the course of this and later 
discussions. While section 1.1 will be mainly expository, section 1.2 will explore Foucault‘s 
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 Foucault did not coin the term ‗biopolitics‘. The Swiss political scientist Rudolph Kjellen first 
introduced it in 1911 (Esposito, 2004: 3-16). 
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argument that ‗biopower‘ cannot be understood within a normative or sovereign 
understanding of power. It will ask: how is the persistence of sovereign power to be 
understood? One of the main aims of this thesis is exactly to explore what makes the 
persistence of sovereign power possible within the field of governmentality understood here 
in terms of securitization and anti-terrorism and how biopower and sovereign power are 
articulated in the context of the war on terror. The answer offered by Foucault, and the 
problem that his answer raises, will be dealt with in section 1.3. Foucault‘s notion of ‗state 
racism‘ as that which explains how the exercise of killing (‗sovereignty‘s old right‘) is 
possible within a ‗normalizing society‘ whose basic biopolitical function is to improve and 
prolong life (Foucault, 2003) will be analysed and criticized for contradicting his 
understanding of biopower. While creating a useful line of enquiry – it is upon this line of 
argument, albeit with less attention to the problem of racism, that Agamben seems mainly to 
draw for its own understanding of the coincidence of sovereign power and biopower – 
Foucault‘s notion of ‗state racism‘ seems to contradict his understanding of biopower as 
moving away from sovereignty‘s old right.   
 
After having explored Foucault‘s notion of biopower, readers will be introduced to the work 
of Giorgio Agamben, whose understanding of the state of exception also plays a very 
important role in this thesis. To adopt Agamben‘s theory in relation to the war on terror is 
commonplace. He himself has applied his conceptual framework to post-9/11 developments, 
and many authors have adopted his theory to explain various aspects of the war on terror, 
from emergency legislations and securitization practices
14
 to what some would see as 
exemplary sites of contemporary exceptionalism, such as Guantánamo Bay.
15
 In line with 
these authors, I too suggest that, although not unproblematic, his notion of the state of 
exception can provide useful resources to understand  the logic behind US state securitization 
practices in the war on terror. In particular, it can help to conceptualize the securitization 
discourses and practices analysed in this thesis as securitization practices that bear a specific 
relation to the US state as the initiator of the war on terror, at the same time as these practises 
themselves help make intelligible how the generalization of (the state of) exception is 
constructed. Contrary to how Agamben‘s theory has often been employed to explain certain 
national features of the war on terror, I will investigate it with the aim of going beyond 
‗methodological nationalism‘ or ‗statism‘. That is to say, after having presented his theory 
and argued that inadvertently it ends up reintroducing the state as the subject of history, I will 
                                                             
14
 See, for example, Edkins et al., 2004; Butler, 2004; Paye, 2005; Noll, 2003; Minca, 2007; Bigo, 
2007a; 2007b; 2008. 
15
 See, for example, Diken, 2003; Neal, 2006; Edkins et al., 2004; Butler, 2004. 
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explain why, despite its nationalist overtones, the (state of) exception is to be understood as 
part of globalization; as ‗oriented toward global agendas‘ (Sassen, 2006: 3).16      
 
Starting from an analysis of how Agamben‘s notion of biopolitics differs from that of 
Foucault in section 1.4, I will move on to explore in some details Agamben‘s notion of 
sovereignty as based on the paradox of exception. In section 1.6, I explain how Agamben 
makes use of Schmitt‘s theory of the sovereign as ‗he who decides on the exception‘ 
(Schmitt, 1985: 5) to critically expose the paradoxes on which the sovereign‘s decision, 
including the decision to go to war, is ultimately based. Drawing on Schmitt‘s 
conceptualization of sovereignty, in section 1.5 I further focus on what Agamben sees as the 
(non-)relation of the state of exception to the law and show how, similarly to Arendt (1973 
[1951]), for Agamben the rule of law (both national and international) is put into question by 
what he considers to be the paradigmatic figure of modernity par excellence: the refugee. 
However, since the analysis of securitization practices that I offer in Chapter 3 and 4 is 
concerned neither with the securitization of migration
17 nor with the figure of the refugee per 
se,18 I will not delve into the complexity of this paradigm other than in passing. Instead, I will 
raise some questions about Agamben‘s interpretation of the relation between sovereign power 
and law. In particular, I will question Agamben‘s understanding of human rights for failing to 
recognize that, although human rights are in fact part of the articulation of sovereignty in a 
very specific sense, they can and have provided lawyers and human rights activists with 
means to challenge unfair and dehumanizing treatments related to the war on terror.  
 
Through the work of authors such as Zolo (2006) and Gregory (2007), I will moreover 
challenge Agamben‘s powerful critique of law for ignoring how in reality the generalization 
                                                             
16
 On the distinction between dynamics of globalization, involving the explicit formation of global 
institution such as the World Trade Organization and those oriented towards global agendas and 
system, see Sassen, 2006. According to her, the latter includes both ‗specific localized struggles with 
an explicit or implicit global agenda‘, such as human rights and environmental organizations and 
‗particular aspects of the work of states‘ (2003: 3). In this respect, Sassen mentions certain monetary 
and fiscal policies critical for the constitution of global markets. However, her discussion could easily 
be extended to securitization policies critical for the constitution of global apparatuses of control.  
17
 By the securitization of migration is meant a set of practical and interpretative or discursive 
measures, which cast migration as a problem of security (see, for instance, Huysmans, 2000; 2006; see 
also Bigo 2002). In particular, Bigo criticizes security discourses over migration for promoting a 
‗security continuum‘ between immigration, unemployment, crime and terrorism (Bigo, 1994: 164). I 
will return to this in my analysis.   
18
 For a very good collection of essays on the politics of (in)security and protection, see Huysmans, 
2006. See especially the essay by Puggioni, ‗Protection: security, territory and population‘, that 
specifically deals with the figure of the refugee by drawing on Agamben at the same time as it 
challenges the ‗prevailing narratives that overwhelmingly picture ―insiders‖ as silent objects‘ 
(Puggioni, 2006: 76). 
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of (the state) of exception is mediated by the connections between war, military occupation 
and international law. It is true that Agamben‘s conceptualization already seems to point in 
this direction and that his notion of the camp as the new ‗nomos of modernity‘, even as it fails 
to differentiate between different degrees of exception, forces us to think beyond the state 
toward the generalization of the exception. Nevertheless, Agamben‘s analysis ultimately 
remains far too centred on the state as an abstract entity and only offers a critique of Western 
politics in abstraction of its concrete manifestations. Thus, it provides only limited resources 
for an analysis like the one presented in Chapter 3, and especially in Chapter 4, that is not 
concerned with a general critique of power as such, but with both how the US, as a 
hegemonic state, and the EU participate in the state of exception. In section 1.8, I will bring 
to bear theories of ‗globalization‘, and in particular Hardt and Negri‘s theory of Empire 
(2000; 2004), to problematize Agamben‘s analytical framework. Clearly, many other theories 
could have been chosen to discuss what many see as the decline of the nation state in relation 
to Agamben‘s theory of the state of exception. However, Hardt and Negri‘s indebtedness to 
Foucault and his notion of biopolitics, their shared political and theoretical interests, as well 
as explicit and implicit disagreements with Agamben, make their theory a primary site for 
consideration. As McLoughlin (2005) points out, the relation between these authors is not 
straightforward but poses considerable conceptual difficulties – for this very reason, I believe 
to put Hardt and Negri‘s and Agamben‘s theories in a contrastive comparison is quite 
productive. It will provide resources to understand ‗the generalization of the (state of) 
exception‘ – a term which Hardt and Negri also use to describe the state of Empire – in terms 
of the United States actions and of how the EU contributes to it. My own analysis of US 
security strategies and of the European security strategy will further elaborate on this by 
looking at the discursive strategies employed by both to better evaluate the idea of 
generalized state of exception. However, I will not simply accept Hardt and Negri‘s (or, 
indeed, Agamben‘s) claim that nation states‘ functions have been supplanted by supra- or 
transnational networks of power. Instead, in the same section, I will ask whether the war on 
terror can be understood in terms of regression, as Hardt and Negri seem to suggest when 
they depict it as a backlash inside and against Empire.19 Or, alternatively, whether it is more 
appropriate to understand it through the prism of imperialism, understood here not simply in 
economic terms but also as political and cultural imperialism,
20
 whose relationship to security 
is key.  
 
                                                             
19
 Negri quoted in Boron, 2005; Negri, 2002; Hardt, 2004 
20
 Harvey, 2003; Wood, 2004; Boron, 2005. 
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Finally, in section 1.10, I will consider positions, in particular Étienne Balibar‘s 
conceptualization of Europe, that see Europe as a valuable alternative to US unilateralism. I 
will also explore how an idea of collective or human security with strong affinities with the 
one analysed in section 1.9 in relation to the US state, is central to these claims. I will suggest 
that these understanding of the EU rely on a model of human or biopolitical security that 
ignores the extent to which in making ‗life‘ the object of security this model prepares the way 
for an increasing number of pre-emptive and preventive interventions. I will further argue 
that even though Balibar is fully aware that the EU emerged due to geopolitical and economic 
reasons and that at present European mediating capacities are limited, thus, that his own idea 
challenges simplistic conceptualizations of Europe to an extent, it still risks creating a 
disjunction between Europe as an idea and Europe as reality.
21
 His emphasis on Europe‘s 
virtual mediating and protecting capacities risks downplaying the extent to which mediating 
and protecting capacities are part of a securitization agenda that plays a key part in 
constituting the European Union as a ‗state-like‘ entity. That is to say, as an agent endowed 
with the capacity to choose, to influence and direct that can play a fundamental role in the 
geopolitical arena.  
 
1.1 Biopower  
 
The term ‗biopower‘ was first used by Foucault in the last of his College de France lectures 
of 1975-6, Society Must Be Defended (Foucault, 2003).22 Since then the term has provoked 
the interest of contemporary theorists. It has been employed by many of them with great 
attention ‗to the moments of rupture and divergence that Foucault's historiography sought to 
foreground‘ and with the intent to develop the idea of biopower further (see Agamben, 1998; 
but also Lazzarato, 2006a; Hardt and Negri, 2000). According to Golder, there has been ‗a 
marked resurgence of interest in Foucault‘s work‘23 and in particular in his notion of 
biopower, which, he argues, ‗is partly attributable‘ to the translation into English of Society 
Must Be Defended but also, and perhaps more importantly, ‗to a confluence of certain 
                                                             
21
 As noted in the introduction, however, Balibar is increasingly despondent as to the prospects of 
Europe being capable of providing alternative means to today‘s economic crisis and, consequently, he 
suggests that the only way for Europe to survive is to find the capacity to start again on radically new 
bases (Balibar, 2010).  
22
 In Britain, however, the major source for Foucault‘s notion of biopower before the publication of 
Society Must Be Defended in 2003 has been The Will To Knowledge (1978) [1976] originally published 
as Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, An Introduction – see also Lemke‘s summary 
of biopolitics (Lemke, 2001). This thesis focuses mainly on ‗Society Must Be Defended‘ because, as ‗a 
work in transition‘, it allows us to better understand the opposing interpretations of Foucault‘s notion 
of biopolitics (Montag, 2002: 112) as well as to see his own perplexities and moments of hesitation, 
especially in relation to his notion of biopower as substituting versus complementing sovereign power.   
23
 Following Eduardo Mendieta and Jeffrey Paris (2004), Golder talks of ‗[a] Michel Foucault 
renaissance‘ (2005: 121). 
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political and historical events […] – to which a Foucauldian biopolitical analysis is 
particularly germane‘ (Golder, 2005: 121, 122 emphasis original).24 Foucault defines 
‗biopower‘ as the right to ―make‖ live and to ―let‖ die‘ (Foucault, 2003: 241). By this he 
means governments‘ ability to regulate and control subjects – or to be more precise ‗bodies‘ 
and ‗populations‘ – by optimizing the productivity of their lives in terms of optimizing their 
health, welfare and labour productivity
25
 through a number of technologies or mechanisms of 
power. Biopower, says Foucault, is ‗an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for 
achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations‘ (Foucault, 1978: 140). In 
particular, Foucault discusses the use of statistics and probabilities. However, in line with 
Lemke we can add ‗indirect techniques for leading and controlling individuals without at the 
same time being responsible for them‘ (Lemke, 2001: 12). Biopower relates to governments‘ 
concern with raising productivity and fostering the life of the population by controlling all 
those factors that could put it at risk. The aim of biopower increasingly becomes that of 
mastering risk.  
 
In The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, Foucault offers a bipolar diagram of power whereby 
biopolitics comes to be conceived as one of the poles of biopower, the other being 
‗discipline‘ (Foucault, 1978; see also Rabinow and Rose, 2003: 2).26 More specifically, he 
distinguishes between two mechanisms of power. On the one hand, there is ‗disciplinary 
power‘ (‗an anatomo-politics of the human body‘), whose emergence he traces back to the 
seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth, and whose primary application 
concerns the individual ‗human‘ body. On the other, there is ‗biopower‘ (‗a biopolitics of the 
population’), which, in his words, ‗is not applied to man-as-body but to the living being; 
ultimately, if you like, to man-as-species‘ (Foucault, 2003: 242). Biopower, Foucault argues, 
emerged during the second half of the eighteenth century in Europe and it is at that time that 
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 Among other things, Golder mentions the re-election of George W. Bush, the global war on terror, 
‗the prevalence of racism (particularly Islamophobia and the vilification of asylum‐seekers) and its 
articulation in the form of state practices‘ as factors that contributed to an increase interest in 
Foucault‘s work. Golder also points to the influence of contemporary philosophy, particularly that of 
Giorgio Agamben, in the English-speaking world. He says, ‗[a] renewed interest is also no doubt 
attributable to the influence of contemporary philosophers who have continued, extended or adapted 
Foucault‘s biopolitical analysis (of whom perhaps the most important is Giorgio Agamben)‘ (Golder, 
2005:122 footnote number 7).    
25
 As Hardt and Negri note, in fact, Foucault explicitly links biopower and capitalism ‗in several 
works‘, although he does not develop this (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 27; see also Lazzarato, 2006a; 
2006b). The reasons why Foucault does not are complex. Perhaps, one of the most important is his 
belief that, although biopower is concerned with raising productivity, thus, ‗an indispensable element 
in the development of capitalism‘ (Foucault (1978): 141), it is not reducible to economic factors.   
26
 Here Foucault seems to make a distinction between biopower and biopolitics, wherein the former is 
a broader term that encompasses both biopolitics and discipline, the latter term refers to ‗the 
constitution and incorporation of the population as a new subject of governance‘ (Mills, 2007: 272, 
note 4). However, this is a distinction, which Foucault does not rigorously follow through.   
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it started to ‗dovetail into, integrate, modify to some extent, and above all, use by sort of 
infiltrating, embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques‘ (2003: 242). Put differently,  
according to Foucault, this new technology of power, centred on regulatory control, is 
superimposed onto disciplinary mechanisms to deal with populations as such and not just 
with individual bodies. Biopolitics acts in a preventive fashion to deal with a multiplicity of 
aleatory and often ‗unpredictable‘ phenomena. Among these Foucault cites: all phenomena 
related to ‗birth-control‘, ‗problems of morbidity‘, not so much epidemics but ‗endemics‘ or 
illnesses that are routinely prevalent in a particular population, ‗public hygiene‘, ‗problems of 
reproduction‘, the problems ‗of old age‘, ‗accidents‘ and ‗the effects of the environment‘ 
(Foucault, 2003: 243, 244, 245). Biopower is thus not just about disciplining bodies through 
regulative mechanisms but also about using ‗overall [security] mechanisms and acting in such 
a way as to achieve an overall equilibrium or regularity‘ (Foucault, 2003: 246). It works at 
the level of generality (or at the level of the population) with the aim of identifying 
abnormalities, risk groups, and potential risk factors in order to prevent, contain, and manage 
them (Rose, 1999: 235).  
 
Unlike sovereignty‘s old right (‗to take life or to let live‘), biopower‘s aim is to preserve a 
healthy society by administering it through micro-mechanisms and ‗tactics‘ of power. It 
works both as ‗governing of the self‘ and as ‗conduct of conduct‘; as forms of governance or 
‗governmentality‘ (Foucault quoted in Gordon, 1991; also in Lemke, 2002) – a crucial 
concept developed by Foucault in his later works, which refers to a historically specific 
economy of power and government, that is, neo-liberalism
27
 (Dean, 1999). Foucault defines 
governmentality as 
 
‗[t]he ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, 
and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise 
of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its 
target population, as its principal form of knowledge political 
economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of 
security‘ (Foucault, 2001a: 220). 
 
It is a ‗tendency‘ or ‗line of thought‘ that ‗for a very long time, throughout the West, has 
constantly led toward pre-eminence over all types of power‘ (Foucault, 2001a). How and to 
what extent, biopower as a form of governmentality differs from sovereign power will be the 
subject of the following two sections. 
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 According to Foucault, neoliberalism is a form of governmentality, we might even say ‗the‘ form of 
governmentlaity par excellance (see also Foucault, 2007). Here, however, I do not discuss the question 
of neoliberalism in details for the reason that, though certainly linked to it, the form of 
governamentality I focus on this thesis is not superimposable to it.   
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1.2 Sovereign Power in Question 
 
The importance of the question of sovereignty to social theory in general, and an 
understanding of today‘s situation cannot be underestimated. Sovereign power has never 
ceased to make itself felt (past wars, political restructuring and violence imposed through 
military intervention are a constant reminder of it). However, it seems to have ‗returned‘ with 
a vengeance. The war on terror makes it all the more urgent to investigate how sovereign 
power works in today‘s context and what its relation to biopower is. In this section, I will 
explore why Foucault thinks a theory of sovereignty is no longer sufficient to explain how 
contemporary mechanisms of power work. I will also raise some questions in relation to what 
is seen by some as a resurgence of sovereign power (see, for instance, Butler, 2004) but what 
I think is best conceptualized as the persistence of sovereignty within the field of 
governmentality.   
 
Foucault‘s genealogical critique does not attempt to deny the importance of sovereignty as ‗a 
problem‘. However, instead of treating the problem of sovereignty as ‗the central problem of 
right in Western societies‘, Foucault attempts to move away from a classical understanding of 
power as top-down domination in order to study how technologies of power, which are no 
longer presented exclusively in terms of legality and sovereignty, function in modern 
societies (Foucault, 2003: 26, 27). According to Foucault, in fact, both disciplinary power and 
biopower are different types of power that cannot be explained in terms of sovereignty. The 
theory of sovereignty, he argues, dates back from the Middle Ages – from the reactivation of 
Roman law (Foucault, 2003: 34). Whatever the reason for utilizing the theory of sovereignty 
in the past, in modern times, sovereignty, as a general category of the nation or of the people, 
is no longer sufficient to explain the operations of power. This is because power works in 
different ways than it did before. It is also because the theory of sovereignty fails to address 
how power is embodied in a number of ‗local, regional, and material institutions‘ rather than 
in a central figure (2003: 27). Specifically, it fails to account for how modern mechanisms of 
power associated with systems of governance work at the local, micro and lowest level ‗to 
exclude the mad‘, ‗control infantile sexuality‘ and ‗control, punish and reform the 
delinquent‘, among other groups of people (Foucault, 2003: 33). Foucault‘s questioning of 
sovereign power is both historical (based on the problematization of its past uses) and 
methodological (based on a choice on how to investigate it).  
  
According to Foucault, power is never simply a matter of intentions or decisions (as it was 
for Schmitt, for instance (Schmitt, 1996)), or ‗a phenomenon of mass and homogeneous 
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domination‘,28 but it circulates in networks and individuals ‗are in a position to both submit 
and exercise this power‘. (Foucault, 2003: 28, 29). For him, power ‗is never localized here 
and there; it is never in the hands of some […]‘ (2003: 29). It ‗is not something that is 
acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is 
exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations‘ 
(Foucault, 1978: 94). It is not negative and repressive but diffused through society. Power 
functions, says Foucault. Thus, according to him, it should not be analysed as a question of 
sovereignty or as a legal matter but from its infinitesimal mechanisms upwards. Rather than 
trying to trace power back to a single source, such as the state or the state‘s sovereign 
representative, a class, a group of people etc., Foucault wants to analyse how phenomena, 
techniques, and procedures of power work at the level of subjectivity and how ‗they are 
invested or annexed by global phenomena‘ (Foucault, 2003: 31). In the last instance, for 
Foucault, power is positive and productive because it has unintended effects – a point that is 
crucial to his understanding of biopolitics and that, as we will see later, also problematizes 
Agamben‘s conceptualization of it – and because subjects are both subjected and constituted 
by power (2003: 29-30).
29
 
 
Nevertheless, although Foucault‘s theory of power has proved very fertile – as de Larrinaga 
and Doucet (2008: 3) observe, ‗the mid-1990s saw the emergence of a growing body of 
literature that attempted to theorize global governance through Foucauldian understandings of 
governmentality and biopower‘30 and, clearly, continues to raise interest – it elicits problems 
of no easy resolution. In particular, I think Foucault‘s theory can be contested on two main 
fronts. First, although Foucault‘s conceptualization of power as productive clearly helps to 
grasp how certain mechanisms of power/knowledge, such as for instance those centring on 
sex and sexuality, are not merely repressive and/or reducible to a representation of 
sovereignty and law (2003: 32), it is more difficult to see how it helps to account for the type 
                                                             
28
 Although, as the editors of Society Must Be Defended say, it is difficult to know which works exactly 
Foucault is referring to because no references are given in the book, Foucault‘s reference and 
opposition here is probably some tenets of Marxism, especially Marxist-Leninist theories of the state 
as instrument of class violence. Foucault in fact was certainly influenced by Marxist authors, especially 
‗unorthodox‘ ones, such as Althusser (Montag, 2002; Olssen, 2004; Balibar, 1992) but, as Montag 
suggests, Foucault‘s relation to Marxism is far from straightforward (Montag, 2002; see also Satre, 
1971).   
29
 In Foucault‘s own words ‗[t]he individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to 
the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation‘ (1978: 98). Subjects are both 
effects (they are constructed by it) and vehicles of power (it is because of these same constructions that 
they start to speak and to make demands in their own behalf). For an example, see Foucault‘s 
discussion of ‗perversity‘ from the same book (1978). See also his discussion of delinquency in 
Discipline and Punish (1980).  
30
 See, for instance, Gordon, (1991); Dean, (1999); Rose, (1999); Miller & Rose, (1990); Burchell, 
Gordon and Miller (1991); Dillon (1995); Hardt & Negri (2000). 
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of ‗discourses‘ of security, terrorism and war being given voice today. One of the questions 
that will guide my analysis will be: how well does Foucault‘s conceptualization of bio-power 
as ‗strategic‘ account for the types of subjectivity produced in the two NSSs and the ESS? 
Second, and more importantly, Foucault‘s periodization – a periodization that, as we shall see 
in the next section, Foucault himself implicitly problematizes through his conception of state 
racism – of biopower as modern and of sovereign power as an old type of power raises the 
problem of how to explain the persistence of sovereign forms of power in contemporary 
societies.
31
 While, as we shall see, to treat sovereignty as always and already biopolitical as 
Agamben does is contestable, on the other hand, to configure sovereign power as old fails to 
address how sovereign power sustains itself in its present form. Given what Judith Butler 
calls the ‗forceful resurgence of sovereignty in the midst of governmentality‘ (Butler, 2004: 
59) – which I think is best thought of in terms of a continuation and which also concerns the 
issue of imperialism – I believe that a theoretical as well as empirical examination and 
possible solution of this problem is particularly urgent. This is why in this thesis I will assess, 
both theoretically and through a critical discursive analysis of the NSSs and ESS, how 
sovereign power persists within the field of governmentality, and how the  relation between 
biopower and sovereign power is articulated in the context of today‘s war on terror.  
 
1.3 State Racism and the Paradox of Biopower 
 
As mentioned above, through his concept of biopower, Foucault attempts to move away from 
the problem of sovereign power. Yet, he cannot simply leave that problem behind. In 
particular, reflection on Nazism forces him to return to the problem of sovereign power to 
explain how state killing continues to be possible, and actually takes on new and extreme 
forms, in modern times. His answer is that racism is that which makes sovereignty‘s old right 
‗to take life or let live‘ possible within the field of governmentality in contemporary societies. 
This is important, not only because racism provides an answer, however partial, to the 
problem of sovereign power, and more specifically of its persistence, but also because it 
alerts us to a fundamental dimension of power, which is left un-theorized in Agamben.
32
 
                                                             
31
 Although, it is also important to point out that there are times when Foucault is less blunt in his 
peridodization. Thus, for instance, in Governmentality, Foucault says, ‗[w]e need to see things not in 
terms of the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a disciplinary society and the subsequent 
replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of government; in reality one has a triangle, 
sovereignty-discipline-government‘ (1978: 219). 
32
 Agamben discusses briefly the question of racism in an interesting paper given in 2005 titled 
‗Movement‘ where he directly tackles this question in relation to Schmitt‘s articulation of the Nazis 
Reich as exposed in his 1933 essay ‗State, Movement, People‘ (2005c). However, it is fair to say that 
he does so quite dismissively, in a way that does not seem to do justice to the complexities that the 
question of race poses, especially with regard to how the ‗race‘ and/or ‗cultural difference card‘ might 
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Foucault‘s conceptualization of ‗state racism‘ or ‗bio-racism‘ provides insights on how to 
comprehend the way in which states continue to use ‗race‘, albeit, perhaps, in a new form,33 
as a means of deciding over the life and death of people and of legitimizing and making 
killing with impunity a customary practice of imperial population control (see Kelly, 2004; 
Mbembe, 2003). To this extent, Foucault‘s understanding can help us to explore some of the 
racialized dimensions of the war on terror. In particular, it can enable us to explain state 
practices enabled by the war on terror as practices that dehumanize alleged ‗terrorists‘ (now 
‗enemy combatants‘) – ‗them‘ – on the basis of their assumed innate ‗evilness‘ as opposed to 
‗our‘ innate virtues. 
 
In the last essay of Society Must Be Defended, Foucault considers the question of racism in 
order to explain how killing was possible despite the apparent gradual replacement of 
sovereign power with biopower. He starts from an analysis of ‗race war‘, or war between 
what were regarded as irreducible distinct races in the seventeenth-century, as furnishing the 
model for the notion of ‗class war‘, and moves toward an idea of modern racism as that 
which ‗makes killing acceptable‘ (Foucault, 2003: 256, 60). He says that racism is ‗a way of 
introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power‘s control: the break within 
what must live and what must die‘ (2003: 254). By this, Foucault means two things. First, 
that it is through racism that ‗the hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are described as 
good and that others, in contrast, are described as inferior‘ is established; that the absolute 
worth of certain groups within a population and the complete insignificance of others is 
decided. Second, that it is racism that renders killing not only possible but also acceptable 
because it works in a way that makes it compatible with the exercise of biopower (2003: 
255). 
 
By declaring ‗[i]f you want to live, the other must die‘, racism transforms the relationship of 
war (i.e., a relationship based on the destruction of enemies) into a ‗biological-type 
relationship‘, which renders the death of certain groups acceptable to the extent that, in 
Foucault‘s words, it ‗will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer‘ (2003: 255). In 
other words, racism is that which permits killing, at the same time as, it makes the 
relationship of war – ―if you want to live, you must take lives‖ – functions ‗in a way that is 
completely new and that is quite compatible with the exercise of biopower‘ (2003: 255). In 
                                                                                                                                                                              
be used today by political parties, states and ‗state-like‘ entities to legitimize pre-emptive and 
preventive securitization practices. For a critique of Agamben on this question, see Mbembe, 2003. 
33
 ‗Neo-racism‘ works by maintaining that cultural or religious as opposed to biological differences are 
somehow ‗natural‘ (Balibar, 1991). 
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particular, what makes racism function in a way that is different from how the relationship of 
war does is its treatment of political adversaries. ‗In the biopower system‘, where racism 
becomes inscribed as one of the basic mechanisms of power in the modern State, argues 
Foucault, enemies are no longer treated as political adversaries (and here Schmitt is clearly a 
very important point of reference for Foucault) but as threats (2003: 256, 254, 255). This, 
says Foucault, is what justifies the murderous function of the State (2003: 256) in modern 
times. The construction of security threats is essential to the modern state (see also Agamben, 
2001). But what does it mean to say that racism works in a way that is totally new and 
compatible with the exercise of biopower? What are the consequences of this 
conceptualization of racism for Foucault‘s understanding of the relation between biopower 
and sovereignty? Before we can discuss this issue, however, it will be necessary to look in 
some details at the case of State racism offered by Foucault in his discussion of racism as 
making ‗killing or the imperative to kill‘ acceptable (2003: 256). 
   
The case that Foucault cites in his Society Must be Defended as an example of State racism – 
where the word ‗example‘ is, I believe, to be read in the Agambenian sense of something that 
because of its exemplarity can teach us about the modern state in general (Agamben, 2002)
34
 
–  is that of the Nazi regime. It is during the Nazi regime, Foucault argues, that State racism 
became first and foremost ‗biological racism‘,35 establishing an exact coincidence between 
the power to kill or sovereign power and biopower. In his words: 
 
‗The Nazi State makes the field of the life it manages, protects, 
guarantees, and cultivates in biological terms absolutely 
coextensive with sovereign right to kill anyone, but also its own 
people‘ (Foucault, 2003: 260, emphasis added).  
 
In other words, during the Nazi regime, race became the pivot around which the state came to 
exert its (bio)-power both in a sovereign and biopolitical (administrative, preventive) fashion. 
The Nazi State took up the theme of ‗State racism‘ and developed it ‗in the legend of warring 
races‘ for the biological protection of the German race (Foucault, 2003: 82). As a matter of 
fact, even though as noted above and as stated by Foucault himself at the beginning of his 
Collège de France lectures, one of his main concerns was to move away from the question of 
sovereignty, Foucault did acknowledge the persistence of the old sovereign power ‗to take 
life or to let live‘. Foucault‘s analysis of State racism can be considered as a response to the 
                                                             
34
 More will be said about Agamben‘s example in my methodology chapter. 
35
 Foucault also refers to ‗Soviet State racism‘ in which, according to him, ‗what revolutionary 
discourse designated as the class enemy becomes a sort of biological threat‘ (2003: 83). For a counter-
view, see Losurdo, 2004.  
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problem of how sovereign power is able to persist within contemporary societies. Through 
racism, Foucault investigates how the exercise of killing (‗sovereignty‘s old right‘) is 
possible within a ‗normalizing society‘ whose basic biopolitical function is to improve and 
prolong life (Foucault, 2003: 254, 60). 
 
However, how Foucault sustains this coextensivity between biopower and sovereign power 
within his system of thought is another matter, which, perhaps, cannot be fully resolved 
within a Foucauldian biopolitical framework. It could be argued that this coextensivity is a 
historical singularity related to the Nazi regime rather than a generalisable position. In other 
words, that it does not create any problems for Foucault‘s claim about his analytics of power 
as given above. This is a plausible and, to the extent that it allows one to look at Nazism as 
historically specific, a quite reasonable reading. However, if my claim about Foucault using 
the Nazi case as an example from which to draw lessons about the modern state in general is 
correct – a claim that seems to find confirmation in Foucault‘s suggestion that it is at the time 
when biopower emerges and inscribes racism in the mechanisms of the State that racism 
becomes ‗the basic mechanism of power, as it is exercised in modern States‘ (2003: 256)  – 
then we are forced to recognize that Foucault cannot completely circumvent the problem of 
sovereign power. In order to explain killing in modern states, he is compelled to return to it. 
In this respect, is Genel‘s assertion that there is no contradiction in Foucault‘s idea about 
biopower and sovereign power being coextensive and at the same time heterogeneous (Genel, 
2005) satisfying? Or should we acknowledge, as Esposito suggests, that in reality in 
Foucault‘s text, we do not find an absolute answer to the problem of sovereignty but a 
continuous oscillation between an interpretation of biopolitics as irreducible to sovereign 
power, and another for which biopolitics is part of the articulation of sovereignty (Esposito, 
2004: 49)?  
 
Indeed, in Foucault there seems to be a tension between, on the one hand, an idea of 
biopolitics as representing a radical break with old forms of sovereign power and, on the 
other, an idea of biopolitics as coextensive to it, as constituting part of the articulation of 
sovereignty. This is clearly made evident by his discussion of Nazism but also, as Esposito 
rightly notes, by the fact that Foucault uses both the term ‗replace‘ and ‗complement‘ to 
explain the workings of biopower in relation to sovereignty, sometimes in the same sentence. 
Thus, for instance, Foucault says, ‗[...] one of the greatest transformations political right 
underwent in the nineteenth century was precisely that, I wouldn‘t [sic] say exactly that 
sovereignty‘s old right – to take life or let live – was replaced, but it came to be 
complemented by a new right […]. This is the right, or rather precisely the opposite right. It is 
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the power to ―make‖ live and ―let‖ die‘ [or biopower] (see Foucault, 2003: 241 emphasis 
added; Esposito, 2004: 34). What this shows is that Foucault‘s text maintains a level of 
ambiguity with respect to the question of the relation between biopower and sovereign power.  
 
By bringing the question of sovereignty to the fore, the example of Nazism seems to 
contradict one of Foucault‘s methodological starting points: ‗the idea that the sovereign does 
not exist‘ (Foucault quoted in Toscano, 2007a); thus, to put into question Foucault‘s own 
understanding of biopolitics and its non-relation to sovereign power. This is a point that 
Agamben makes explicit when he says that even though Foucault‘s analysis has shown how 
these two faces of power work, it has failed to elucidate the points at which sovereign power 
(political techniques) and modern techniques of power (technologies of self) converge 
(Agamben, 1998: 5; see also Esposito, 2004). Agamben‘s notion of sovereignty as 
biopolitical can be seen as an attempt to readdress the problem of sovereignty in terms of 
what is for him ‗a logically implicit line of thinking‘ in Foucault (Agamben, 1998: 7) in order 
to account for mechanisms of state power that, although arguably more prevalent in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, continue, in different forms, to permeate contemporary 
societies.
36
 In particular, in the context of an alleged resurgence of sovereign power of the 
United States as part of the war on terror, it seems even more fundamental to analyse the 
problem of sovereignty; a problem that Foucault wants to move away from but cannot 
completely abandon. 
 
1.4 Agamben’s Biopolitical Return to Sovereign Power  
 
Taking up Foucault‘s suggestion about the coincidence between sovereign power and 
biopower, Agamben suggests that biopolitics is not only absolutely coextensive with 
sovereign power but that biopolitics is also, both historically and conceptually, the original 
activity of sovereignty. In other words, according to him, sovereignty is founded on 
biopolitics (Agamben, 1998: 6). This is why, for Agamben, there is no shying away from the 
question of sovereignty to the extent that, as it will become apparent, according to him, the 
production of a specifically biopolitical body is ultimately dependent on the sovereign‘s 
                                                             
36
 For a differing view see Lazzarato who, in his essay ‗From Biopower to Biopolitics‘ (2006a), 
suggests that it is Agamben‘s notion of biopolitics that oscillates continuously between two 
alternatives. He argues that for both Agamben and Foucault, the introduction of the zoe (or politically 
unqualified ‗life‘) into the sphere of the polis is the decisive event of modernity; it marks a radical 
transformation of the political and philosophical categories of classical thought. Yet, he suggests, 
Agamben is very ambiguous on whether the ‗impossibility of distinguishing between zoe and bios, 
between man as a living being and man as a political subject‘ is ‗the product of the action of sovereign 
power or the result of the action of new forces over which power has ‗no control‘‘ (2006a: 10). 
Although not wrong to the extent that a level of ambiguity does pertain to Agamben‘s texts also, 
Lazzarato‘s suggestion underplays Foucault‘s own ambiguities as analysed here. 
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capacity to exclude through inclusion what he calls ‗bare life‘ or politically unqualified ‗life‘ 
from the juridico-political order.  
 
In the opening pages of his book, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Agamben 
argues that in the classical world ‗to speak of zoē politikē would have made no sense‘ 
(Agamben, 1998: 1, emphasis original).
37
 As Agamben notes, Aristotle, for instance, was 
aware of the idea of zoē and suggested that ‗there is probably some kind of good in the mere 
fact of living itself‘ (Aristotle quoted in Agamben, 1988: 9).38 However, says Agamben, in 
Aristotle, ‗simple natural life is excluded from the polis in the strict sense, and remains 
confined – as merely reproductive life – to the sphere of the oikos, ―home‖‘ (Agamben, 1988: 
2; see also Arendt, 1954
39
). What this suggests, he argues, is that the opposition between zoē 
(i.e., bare, unqualified ‗life‘) and bios (i.e., politically qualified ‗life‘ or ‗form of life‘) is what 
constitutes ‗the Aristotelian definition of the polis‘. He says, ‗[i]n Western politics, bare life 
has the peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city of men‘ (Agamben, 
1998: 7).
40
 Agamben‘s intention is, on the one hand, to show that it is through the exclusion 
of simple natural life or bare life that the polis (or city of men) is defined and, on the other, 
that by producing immediately politicized life this process renders unattainable any attempt to 
understand politics in its classical form (i.e., politics as good ‘life’).41 Politics as eu zēn or 
good ‗life‘, Agamben argues, is unattainable because it presupposes the exclusion of bare 
‗life‘ or zoē  from the political life, where, nevertheless, what is excluded is not excluded in 
the sense of simply being outside. But what is excluded is precisely still included by its 
exclusion. What is excluded is included as an exception. In other words, for Agamben the 
constitution of the political is made possible by the ‗inclusive exclusion‘ of zoē or bare life 
from political life and by its simultaneous politicization. He writes,  
 
                                                             
37
 The reference here is Aristotle‘s Politics (1981). 
38
 See also Aristotle‘s notion of man as politikon zōon (Aristotle, 1981 [1253al]; also quoted in 
Agamben, 1988: 9). However, says Agamben, the ‗―political‖ is not an attribute of the living being as 
such, but rather a specific difference that determines the genus zōon’ (Agamben, 1988: 9). 
39
 In Arendt‘s words, ‗Aristotle‘s definition of man as a zōon politikon was not only unrelated and 
even opposed to the natural association experienced in household life; it can be fully understood only if 
one adds his second famous definition of man as a zōon logon ekhon [political and speaking living 
being]‘ (1958: 27); something which, however, contrary to Agamben, Arendt sees positively. 
40
 Unfortunately, as Mills points out, there is no direct discussion in Agamben‘s theory of biopolitics of 
the gendered dimension of the exclusion of natural life from the realm of the political in his theory of 
biopolitics (Mills, 2004). This is a very important point which would clearly be interesting to develop 
further both in relation to Agamben and the war on terror but which I have nevertheless decided not to 
cover here as this, given restrictions of time and space, would necessarily have meant discussing it in 
such a partial way as to render it meaningless.      
41
 The reference here is again Aristotle and in particular his idea that while the polis ‗comes into 
existence for the sake of life (zēn), it exists for the good life (eu zēn)‘ (Aristotle quoted in Agamben, 
1998: 3, 7). 
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‗the entry of zoē  into the sphere of the polis – the politicization of 
bare life as such – constitutes the decisive event of modernity and 
signals a radical transformation of the political-philosophical 
categories of classical thought‘ (Agamben, 1998: 4). 
 
According to Agamben, it is ‗[i]n the ―politicization‖ of bare life – the metaphysical task par 
excellence – [that] the humanity of living man is decided [si decide]‘ (Agamben, 1998: 5).42 
Thus, from his perspective Foucault is right in arguing that ‗when life begins to be included 
in the mechanisms and calculations of State power, politics turns into biopolitics and that this 
signals the decisive event of modernity‘ (Foucault quoted in Agamben, 1995: 3; Foucault, 
2003). However, Agamben expresses the view that Foucault is wrong to suggest that life only 
becomes a political object in early modern Europe and, consequently, to conceptualize 
biopolitics as an exclusively modern phenomenon. Instead, what Agamben intends to show is 
that from the earliest treaties of political theory, particularly in Aristotle‘s notion of man as ‗a 
political animal‘ (Aristotle, 1981), a notion of sovereignty as power over life or biopower is 
implicit. To this extent, bare life is the condition of modern politics (i.e., essential to its 
constitution). In Agamben‘s words, ‗bare life is the original activity of sovereign power‘ 
(1998: 6). Nevertheless, it is a negated or negative condition; one that only appears as such 
when the topology (or the hidden logic/location) on which it is based (i.e., the topology of 
exception or inclusive exclusion) is fully displaced.
43
 Consequently, according to Agamben, 
no notions of biopolitics
44
 can do away with the question of sovereignty. Specifically, it 
cannot ignore what he calls ‗the paradox of sovereignty‘, whose topology (or hidden logic), 
in line with Schmitt (1996), he identifies in ‗the state of exception‘ (Agamben, 1998: 15).45  
 
Here, however, a parenthesis ought to be briefly open in relation to Agamben‘s periodizations 
of biopolitics. In an interview regarding his research on oikonomia with Gianluca Sacco 
                                                             
42
 Here the Heideggerian legacy is in full display. On this and on how it relates to Agamben‘s nihilism, 
see Chiesa, ‗Giorgio Agamben‘s Franciscan Ontology‘, 2009: 156.    
43
 The word topology derives from the Greek τόπος, topos + λόγος, logos. The Oxford English 
Dictionary gives two definitions: 1) the study of geometrical properties and spatial relations unaffected 
by continuous change of shape or size of the figures involved 2) the branch of mathematics concerned 
with an abstract theory of continuity. In Stanzas: Words and Phantasms in Western Culture, Agamben 
defines philosophical topology as the search for topos or ‗place‘ but not as something simply spatial 
‗but as something more original than place‘; as analogous to ‗what in mathematics is defined as an 
analysis situs (analysis of site) as opposed to an analysis magnitudinis (analysis of magnitude)‘ 
(Agamben, 1993: xviii-xix).    
44
 Note that in Agamben, there is no distinction between biopower and biopolitics (see Agamben, 
1998; 1999a; 2005a).  
45
 Here two objections are worth mentioning. Agamben‘s conception of sovereignty as equivalent to 
state‘s sovereignty, fails to address, on the one hand, the fact that the superimposition of sovereignty 
and the state is not given but constructed (see, Biersteker and Weber, 1996; Weber, 1995) and, on the 
other, the more problematic but nevertheless useful distinction between ‗state sovereignty‘ and 
‗individual sovereignty‘ intended as autonomy (see Brown, 2008). 
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(2004b, all translations are mine), which preceded the publication of Il Regno e la Gloria. Per 
una geneologia teologica dell’economia e del governo (2007, again transaltions are mine),46 
presumably ‗to respond to the obvious critique of the Homo Sacer series as one which 
entirely ignored capitalism as a singular form of (bio)-power‘ (Toscano, 2009a),47 Agamben 
talks about two paradigms. Namely, he speaks about ‗theology, which locates in the one God 
the transcendence of sovereign power, and economic theology, which substitutes the idea of 
oikonomia, conceived as an immanent order – domestic and not political in the strict sense, as 
much a part of human as of divine life‘ (Agamben, 2004b). He then goes on to say that 
whereas, [f]rom political theology derives the political philosophy and modern theory of 
sovereignty; from economic theology derives modern biopolitics, up until the current triumph 
of the economy over every aspect of social life‘ (Agamben, 2004b). Thus, in a somewhat 
surprising move that might leave some of its interlocutors and scholars slightly puzzled, 
Agamben no longer talks about sovereignty as the original activity of biopolitics.
48
 Instead, in 
Il Regno e la Gloria, he refers to it as secondary to governmentality – a governmentality that 
he understands as ‗the political-theological dispositif of angels‘ (i.e., ministers, 
administrators, policemen). He says, the foundation [l‘origine] of politics is not sovereignty, 
but government, it is not the king, but the minister, it is not the law, but the police (2007: 
303), while ‗the modern state‘ is that which for Agamben takes upon itself this ‗double 
structure of the governmental machine‘ (2007: 159).  
 
But what is the relation between political philosophy (sovereignty) and economic theology 
(biopolitics)? And, moreover, does not the affirmation of two distinct paradigms and 
specifically the idea of ‗modern biopolitics‘ contradict his previous claim that biopolitics is 
not only absolutely coextensive with sovereignty‘s power but also, both historically and 
conceptually, its original activity? It is as if Agamben cannot completely go beyond 
Foucault‘s own understanding of biopolitics. The same temporal tension, which is also and at 
the same time theoretical, we have found in Foucault in relation to his notion of biopolitics, 
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 The English translation of this text, by Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini, is forthcoming from 
 Stanford University Press.  
47
 Whether Agamben successfully responds to this critique is, however, uncertain. Toscano responds in 
the negative. He says, ‗[w]hile Il Regno e la Gloria does provide a rich archive for a study of the 
Christian prehistory of ‗management‘ as an increasingly endemic principle of social organization, it is 
entirely mute – arguably because of Agamben‘s banal Heideggerian prejudices about the place of 
labour and productivity in the Marxian critique of political economy – about the ‗anarchic‘ order of 
capital accumulation, and thus has nothing to say about the constitutively unmanageable economies 
(chrematistic) that management (oikonomia) seeks to govern‘ (Toscano, 2009a: [n.p.]).  
48
 See also Agamben‘s ‗Metropolis‘ (2006: [n.p.]) in which he says, ‗I suggest to use this term, 
metropolis, to designate the new urban fabric that emerges in parallel with the processes of 
transformation that Michel Foucault defined as the shift from the territorial power of the ancient 
regime, of sovereignty, to modern biopower, that is in its essence governmental‘. 
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can be discerned in Agamben. That is to say, in Agamben, we find a temporal tension 
between an understanding of biopolitics as new and one as continuative of a type of pre-
modern sovereign power, which is also a theoretical tension between an idea of biopolitics as 
pertaining to the sphere of the economic/social and as constitutive of the legislative, judicial, 
and/or executive sphere. A complete resolution of this question is given neither in Agamben 
nor in Foucault.  
 
However, whereas Foucault is more attentive in identifying how precisely various strategies 
of power are combined at specific historical junctures, and in indicating moments of 
discontinuity between different historical periods, the configuration of knowledge that they 
produce or episteme and events, Agamben‘s periodization(s), or what is, perhaps, best called 
his ontologization
49
 or his ‗quest‘ for historical-ontological continuity, is more problematic. 
Agamben‘s diagnosis of Western50 politics, before his Il Regno e la Gloria (2007), as resting 
on a single bio-political paradigm that stretches from Aristotle to the present risks trumping 
Foucault‘s own historico-epistemological account of it (Lemke 2005, Dillon, 2005; Toscano, 
2007a; Bigo 2009
51
). His explicit move against Foucault‘s own genealogical analysis allows 
him to argue that far from being an exclusively ‗old‘ phenomenon, sovereign power in its 
biopolitical capacity continues to permeate contemporary societies. This insight is, I believe, 
of great value and cannot be dismissed too hastily. It brings attention to the biopolitical power 
of sovereignty today – a power that Foucault himself emphasizes in his discussion of state 
racism. Nevertheless, by bypassing Foucault‘s important genealogical excavation of 
‗governmental practice‘ and the way in which these neoliberal practices have weakened the 
power of the state
52
 – it risks undermining the historical specificity of our present time (and 
indeed of previous ones).
53
  
 
Furthermore, Agamben‘s conceptualization of biopolitics plays on a distinction – the 
distinction between bios and zoē – which some have disputed. Not only, as Arendt has 
shown, do we find in Aristotle more than one definition of man (Finlayson, 2010: 113),
54
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 On the distinction between historicization and ontologization, see Dillon, 2005.  
50
 The term ‗Western‘ is a term that, as Toscano (2009) notes, Agamben uses without much reflection.  
51
 See Bigo‘s preliminary version of a chapter in Policing Insecurity Today Defense and Internal 
Security, which is forthcoming from Palgrave.  
52
 On this see, for instance, Fraser, 2003; Lemke, 2003; Bigo, 2006b; Hardt and Negri, 2001. Foucault 
and Agamben are less useful in this respect.  
53
 As we will seen in more details later, this seems both to be a problem of periodization and of 
framing in Agamben, at least in the Agamben of Remmants and Homo Sacer. Agamben‘s 
understanding of sovereignty within these books risks being anachronistic and limiting. 
54
 Even though, it is fair to say, Arendt herself relies on this same definition of man as politikon zōon in 
her work (see note 20 supra). Also, see Foucault who, in The History of Sexuality, says [f]or millennia, 
man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political 
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which seems to downplay Agamben‘s argument that in Aristotle man is defined simply as 
politikon zōon. More importantly, it could be argued that ‗life‘ is rarely, if ever, bare or 
naked
55
 (Bigo, 2007a; Negri, 2003). In particular, Bigo argues that ‗bare life is never 
obtained, not even in the concentration camp‘ (Bigo, 2007a: 12). Bigo is here referring to 
Agamben‘s discussion of the Muselmann in Nazi camps, whom, following Primo Levi, 
Agamben describes as ‗the weak, the infirm, those who were doomed to be singled out‘ by 
the other prisoners of the camp and in whom he identifies the final biopolitical caesura 
identified by Foucault in the separation of a population from a people (Agamben, 1999a: 69; 
2002: 85).  
 
For Agamben, the Muselmann is a figure between bare life and political life, between life and 
death. It is the ‗political limit and an anthropological concept‘ that brings into serious 
question the ethical character of law. It is the point at which ‗the biopolitics of racism so to 
speak transcends race, penetrating into the threshold in which it is no longer possible to 
establish caesurae‘ (1999a: 69). The Muselmann is ‗the object of an experiment that revokes 
our understanding of morality and of humanity itself‘ (1999a: 69). For Agamben, the very 
notion of an ‗ethical limit‘ loses its meaning when confronted with the Muselmann as, 
according to him, it is precisely that which exceeds the law and ethics that concerns this 
particular figure. By calling into question the moral categories that attend the distinction 
between law and fact, life and death, ‗the human and the non-human‘ (Agamben, 1999a: 55-
63), the Muselmann is what renders redundant any attempt to understand law and ethics as a 
question of ‗the good‘. He says, 
 
‗In Auschwitz ethics begins precisely at the point where the 
Muselmann, the ―complete witness‖, makes it forever impossible to 
distinguish between man and non-man‘ (Agamben, 1999a: 47, 
emphasis added).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
existence (1978: 143). Clearly, Agamben is heavily influenced by both Arendt‘s and Foucault‘s 
readings on this point. For a counter-view on Aristotle on the basis that ‗politikon cannot be the 
specific difference that determines the genus zōon, for the simple reason that the attribute political, as 
Aristotle understands it, is not specific to human beings‘ but attributable ‗to several different kinds of 
―political animal‖‘, see Finlayson, 2010: 13.  
55
 Note that I am here conflating zoe with bare life, a move that may seem unjustified considering that 
Agamben distinguishes them at various points in Homo Sacer. See, for instance at page 90 where he 
explains that homo sacer is not simply zoê but ‗the threshold at which the two spheres [   ] are joined in 
becoming indeterminate‘. This is because Agamben wishes to maintain a distinction between his 
philosophical claim that all Western politics is based on this bios/zoê distinction and his more 
historical claim that the bare life/politics distinction appears with the designation of ‗sacred life‘ in 
Roman law and as the result of sovereign power. However, I believe my decision is justified on the 
basis that in Agamben this distinction is not so clear-cut and that he himself often uses these terms 
interchangeably.       
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Consequently, and contra Arendt for whom the Muselmann is anti-political because deprived 
of what renders him/(her) something more than mere animal,
56
 according to Agamben, only 
by beginning from that point or limit it will be possible to pose the question of another 
politics and ‗another use of law‘ (Agamben, 1999: 47, 48). That is, a politics that no longer 
has sovereign power at its centre and is characterized by a use of ‗law in its deactivation and 
inactivity [inoperosità]‘ (Agamben, 2005a: 64). A use of law, we could say, that is no longer 
linked to a concept of ‗force‘ (or law as force-of-law) but of ‗play‘;57 ‗an endlessness of play 
that allows for the noninstrumental appropriation of law and ultimately its deactivation in 
play‘ (Mills, 2008: 128).  
 
However, what does it mean to deactivate law in play? How can law be deactivated simply 
through play in the present –  and in fact Agamben needs a kind of ‗supplement‘ in the form 
of ‗the messianic‘58 – and how can a figure that is completely subsumed to (absolute) power 
and force-of-law be also and at the same time already a new subject or ‗form-of-life‘?59 
These questions are left unanswered and have lead some authors to argue that in Agamben 
the negative act of destruction is equivalent to the production of a new alternative (Franchi, 
2004; Chiesa, 2009), which, in turn, seems to give credit to Badiou‘s claim that Agamben 
ultimately understands ‗being as weakness‘ (Badiou quoted in Chiesa, 2009). It is not a case 
that as Clemens, Heron and Murray point out, ‗many of Agamben‘s ―heroes‖, whether 
―actual‖ people or literal figure metamorphose, disappear, go mad, commit suicide, flee into 
anonymity and utter weakness, fail miserably, are silenced, incarcerated, or otherwise 
destroyed‘ (Clemens et al., 2009: 11). They are unable to sustain the power and force-of-law 
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 For Arendt, man‘s capacity of political action, and the pursuit of higher ends is what makes him 
something other than mere animal (see Arendt, 1971; see also Norris, 2003).   
57
 Agamben mentions the notion of play in most of his books. More extensive conceptualization of this 
notions can be found in ‗Playland: Reflections on History and Play‘, a chapter of his book Infancy and 
History (1993: 89-106) where he develops it by drawing on Levi-Strauss, and in Profanation, 2007. 
For a critique of play in Agamben developed through Derrida, on which Agamben himself draws, see 
Mills, 2008.   
58
 Agamben is aware of this problem. In The Times that Remains (2005b), he distinguishes his 
understanding of messianic time, which he develops by drawing on Benjamin but goes beyond 
Benjamin‘s non-Christian messianism, from Derrida (1994), accusing the latter of developing the 
concepts of presence and absence into an ‗actual ontology of the trace and the originary supplement‘. 
For Agamben, Christian messianic time should be considered as the ‗―paradigm‖ of historical time, 
―the only real time‖‘ and today‘s generalized state of exception should directly be understood in 
messianic terms (Agamben, 2005b: 102). For some of the problems that this conceptualization raises 
see Chiesa, 2009; Mills, 2008.   
59
 In Agamben‘s words, ‗[t]he Muselmann […] is the guard on the threshold of a new ethics, an ethics 
of a form of life that begins where dignity ends‘ (Agamben, 1999a: 69). ‗To be potential‘, he writes, 
‗means: to be one‘s own lack, to be in relation to one’s own incapacity (Agamben, 1999b: 172). The 
reference here is again Aristotle – in particular Aristotle‘s notion of ‗potency‘ (2001: 820) – and 
Heidegger (1977). For an analysis of how Agamben‘s conceptualizes a form-of-life or being in its 
relation to its own incapacity and the difficulties that this raises, see again Chiesa, 2009. 
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of the state. It also the case that for Agamben the failure of these figures is not dependent on 
their own weakness but attributable to the thanatopolitical expressions of sovereignty, 
epitomized by the Nazis‘ extermination of the Jews (Agamben, 1998: 114). Nevertheless, by 
creating a kind of equivalence between figures whose ‗mystical dissolution‘ has already 
happen or is imminent and ‗form-of lives‘, Agamben‘s response, which as Clemens et al. 
note binds him to such antecedents as Simon Weil and Walter Benajmin (Clemens et al., 
2009: 11), appears truncated in its failure to acknowledge subjects‘ capacity to resist.     
 
Although rare, for example, instances of resistance were not totally uncommon among 
detainees in Nazi camps (see Levi, 2000; Bigo in Rajaram and Grudy-Warr, 2007).
60
 In 
contemporary ‗camps‘, such as Guantánamo (Agamben, 2004a; 2005a), moreover, detainees 
have also engaged in practices of resistance, such as hunger strikes (Scanlan et al., 2008:  
276; McEvoy et al., 2007). It is true that when protests did take place they were met with a 
violence, which was clearly intended to reduce the political influence of the strikers (in the 
case of force-feeding: by reaffirming the biopolitical power of the state to keep them alive at 
all cost). It is also the case that these type of struggles did obtain only minimal results, often 
in the form of promises which were then not kept (Denbeaux and Hafetz, 2009), which, in 
fact, seems to corroborate Agamben‘s point about the convergence of sovereignty and 
modern technique of power. It seems to give credit to what, following Agamben, Minca calls 
‗the (now-meaningless)‘ – meaningless because ethically inadmissible61 (Agamben, 1998: 
101) – scope of the 20th century‘s biopolitical machine‘: no longer the power to make live or 
let die but ‗to allow to survive‘ (Minca, 2007: 93). However, the very fact that these types of 
act took place is significant. These acts point to people‘s capacity to resist even in the most 
difficult circumstances, confirming Negri‘s suggestion that that which ‗lies at the basis of 
exploitation and of Power is not naked: it is powerful‘, and although not always, perhaps, 
‗capable of productivity of the common‘ (Negri, 2003: 197), capable at least of making itself 
heard. It also seems to support Bigo‘s assertion that Agamben confounds the political dream 
of sovereign power for total domination and its actual power (Bigo in Rajaram and Grudy-
Warr, 2007).  
 
One of the main problems with Agamben‘s theory of sovereignty seems to be that, as 
Rancière has argued, it conflates the exception with instances of suffering. Or, in Rancière‘s 
                                                             
60
 Badiou‘s discussion of man as ‗something other than a victim‘ (Badiou, 2001: 12) is also relevant 
here.     
61
 See Agamben‘s discussion in Homo Sacer (1998) of the absurdity of certain dehumanization 
practices whereby subjects are even asked to sign explicit and voluntary consent forms to be submitted 
to experiments.    
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words, Agamben is unable to appreciate that there is not ‗an immediate identity between the 
exception and instances of suffering‘ (Rancière quoted in Hallward, 2006: 122). Instances of 
suffering are not always and only those determined by the sovereign exception – i.e., those 
related directly to the state. For instance, to remain closer to my own problematic, biopolitical 
processes that regulate people through border control, which many argue are being 
exacerbated by the war on terror and are linked to the transnationalization of security and the 
police beyond the state (of which more will be said below) (Bigo, 2006b), also causes 
instances of suffering. Nor are we all from the outset ‗entrapped in the complementarity of 
bare life and exception‘ (Rancière quoted in Hallward, 2006: 122 footnote 122). Rather, as 
Rancière says, ‗[t]here is a place where the power of the people exists and places where this 
power is reputedly ineffective‘ (Rancière, 1999: 88). For Rancière, the shortcoming of 
Agamben‘s conception of the state of exception is that it turns ‗the idea of the purity of 
politics‘ on its head, ‗so as to empty the stage of political invention by sweeping aside its 
ambiguous actors‘ (Rancière quoted in Hallward, 2006: 122, footnote 45). As a result, 
politics ends up being equated with ‗a power that is increasingly taken as an overwhelmingly 
historico-ontological destiny from which only a God is likely to save us‘ (Rancière, 2004: 
302). In other words, according to Rancière, in Agamben‘s theory there is no space for 
politics in the present because his conception of politics relies on a messianic event to come. 
As Žižek explicates with reference to the above criticism by Rancière, ‗[w]hen, in a shift 
from Foucault, Agamben identifies sovereign power and biopolitics (in today‘s generalized 
state of exception, the two overlap), he thus precludes the very possibility of the emergence 
of political subjectivity‘ (Žižek, 2006: 341-42). Even if it is the case that in its most extreme 
forms sovereign power leaves little space for resistance, there are numerous past and present 
examples that prove that ‗people‘ are in reality more resourceful than Agamben seems to 
allow.  
 
Nevertheless, despite these problems, I want to argue that Agamben‘s understanding of 
sovereignty is useful. His idea that biopolitics cannot be understood outside of the problem of 
sovereignty forces us to rethink Foucault‘s own characterization of the relation between 
sovereign power and biopower or the hidden point or place of intersection between the two 
and to acknowledge the tensions that his analysis of state racism raises with respect to this 
relation. It also obliges us to consider what is about sovereign power that makes it so 
persistent. This is not the same as accepting Agamben‘s periodization or method of analysis 
in its totality; quite the contrary. Whereas Agamben explores the relation between 
sovereignty and biopolitics, or more precisely how sovereignty is biopolitical, mainly in the 
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abstract, or more specifically, from the perspective of political philosophy,
62
 what I want to 
provide is precisely a sociological and contextualized exegesis of practices of security and 
exception at a US and European level. What I am mostly concerned with here is to find out 
what is specific in terms of our present times that may account for today‘s ‗generalization of 
the state of exception‘ and how different political entities, the US and EU in this case, make 
use of ‗apparatuses of security‘. This is because I believe that even if we were to accept that 
the ‗foundational‘ logic of the state in its traditional form is that of exception – and there are 
good reasons for arguing that the state has no foundations or essences but is an historical, and 
we might add, discursive product
63
 – it is still necessary to analyse empirically what are the 
discursive and ideological mechanisms that allow ‗the state‘ to claim ultimate authority. Only 
this type of analysis will help to elucidate how the generalization of (the state of) the 
exception is achieved. It is plausible to believe, in fact, that ‗states‘ – including what some 
considered as ‗new state-like formations‘, such as the EU – configure so-called ‗exceptions‘ 
and enforce security differently, depending on their specific history, interests, aims and 
position within the global economy. To do this, I will argue with and beyond Agamben, 
whose conceptualizations of the state and sovereignty risks being ‗essentialist‘64 and his 
conception of the ‗generalization of the state of the exception‘ is suggestive but not clearly 
developed, by critically appropriating conceptual tools from a number of theorists, including 
those given by Foucault as previously expounded.  
 
Following Biersteker and Weber‘s emphasis on the importance of analyzing the constitutive 
link between the state and sovereignty as historically and discursively constructed (Biersteker 
and Weber, 1996), in my first analysis chapter I will explore some of the historical and 
discursive conditions that enabled the US state to declare itself as ‗a global state‘ and how the 
war on terror was functional to this. Further, through an exegesis of US NSSs, I will discuss 
in what sense and how it is possible to talk about a generalization of the (state of) exception. 
                                                             
62
 In his words, his analysis ‗should not be confused with a sociological investigation‘ (2004: [n.p.]). 
63
 In Engels‘ words ‗[t]he state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without; just 
as little as it is ―the reality of the ethical idea,‖ ―the image and reality of  reason‖. Rather, it is a 
product of society at a certain stage of development […]‘ (Engels quoted in Lenin, 1932: 8, emphasis 
original). For different understandings of the state as produced, see, for instance, Biersteker and 
Weber, 1996; Tilly, 1985; Mann 1997; Shaw, 2000. 
64
 Note that the question of whether Agamben‘s theory is essentialist is, however, complicated. His 
discussion of how the nation-states makes ‗nativity or birth‘ the ‗foundation of its own sovereignty’ 
(1995: [n.d.]) points to what we might call a view of sovereignty and of the link between sovereignty 
and the state as discursively constructed. His philosophical enterprise, moreover, is explicitly directed 
toward overcoming Being as essence – see his notion of ‗whatever being‘ in the Coming Community 
(1993). The question, I suppose, is whether in trying to keep the ontological level separate from the 
sociological, economic and historical ones, Agamben ends up smoothing out elements which are 
essential to an understanding of the state and sovereign power.  
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An understanding of the state as produced does not necessarily preclude the modern state 
from following specific logics, such as the logic of exception. However, it does challenge the 
assumption that this logic is unique, immutable, or unaffected by discourses or systems of 
knowledge, by how states ‗interact‘ with each other (Biersteker and Weber, 1996: 11) and by 
the historical, political, geopolitical and geoeconomic circumstances in which a particular 
state finds itself in at a particular point in time. We will see in section 1.8 exactly why 
Agamben thinks that we are now in the presence of a generalized state of exception and how 
he understands it. However, before discussing this, it is essential that we look more closely at 
how Agamben, and before him Schmitt, conceptualizes sovereignty as founded on the state of 
exception and at how, for Agamben, the state of exception is in turn to be understood as 
intrinsically linked to a paradoxical relation to law. The sovereign operates on behalf of the 
rule of law and the exception is codified in law. But the exception, on which sovereign power 
depends, is none other than the suspension of the law itself. From Agamben‘s perspective, 
thus the Schmittian attempt to inscribe the state of exception within a legal context is 
indefensible because in reality it hides the true relation of the sovereign to the law and of the 
law to anomy or to a space devoid of law.   
 
1.5 The Metaphysics of Sovereignty 
 
Theorizing the state of exception is not new. In particular, Agamben refers to Schmitt as the 
one who established the essential proximity between the state of exception and sovereignty. 
Before moving on to analyse how Agamben, while accepting Schmitt‘s understanding of 
sovereignty, also challenges his conception of the political, it is therefore necessary to look at 
Schmitt‘s decisionist theory of the relation between sovereignty, the exception and the 
political.
65
 Although highly contestable, Schmitt‘s thought is not only a very important point 
of reference for Agamben, but also a force to be reckoned with for any thorough 
consideration of the contemporary standing of the problem of politics generally, and of the 
contemporary intensification of US imperial power, specifically. As Toscano aptly puts it, 
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 I concentrate on Schmitt‘s conceptualization of sovereignty and later on his idea of nomos. For lack 
of space, his relation to the Nazi regime throughout the 1930s and ‗40s, whose importance on his own 
framing of these questions and in turn on Nazis theories and practices has been questioned and/or 
deemphasized by some (see, for instance, Piccone and Ulmen, 2002; Bendersky, 1979) including 
Schmitt himself (Scheuerman, 1999; Ulmen, 2003 [1943]: note 59) but is difficult to dismiss 
(Dyzenhaus, 1998,  2-3; Scheuerman, 1999; Wolin, 1990; Huysmans, 1999), cannot be dealt with here. 
On his Nazi years, on which, it is fair to say, there is no clear consensus, with explanations ranging 
from claims that Schmitt subscribed to Nazism in order to defend his notion of ‗total state‘ from 
becoming exclusively founded on Volksgemeinschaft or ‗people's community‘ from within, to mere 
opportunism, bad judgment, enthusiasm, and/or a more profound affinity between his thought and 
Nazis ideology, see, for instance, de Benoist, 2003; Bendersky, 1979; Piccone and Ulmen, 2002; 
Gottfried, 2001; Carrino in Mouffe, 1999; Mouffe, 2005b; Zolo, 2008; Balakrishnan, 2000; Neocleous, 
1996.   
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‗the uses of Schmitt‘s typology and diagnosis for a revitalization of radical politics in a 
geopolitical moment is of course very much an open question‘ (Toscano, 2009b: 240).66 Yet, 
to the extent that Schmitt‘s theory brings to light the link between state sovereignty and the 
designation of the exception or enemy and the limits of law when it comes to limiting and 
controlling sovereign power, it is worth considering, if only briefly, before turning to 
Agamben‘s own conceptualization of the relation between sovereignty and the exception and 
critique of Schmitt. It is worth also remanding ourselves that Schmitt‘s ‗new nomos‘ already 
pointed to ‗the imperial vocation of the United States‘ (Zolo, 2008).67  
 
For Schmitt, sovereignty, the exception and the political are inseparable – the political being 
both the result of a sovereign decision on the exception and its presupposition. In particular, 
in Schmitt, the political takes the form of a distinction between the friend and the enemy, 
where it is a relation of war, or a deadly ‗non-relation‘ in the sense of being based on ‗the real 
possibility of physical killing‘,68 that which paradoxically ‗unites‘ friends and enemies. 
Schmitt says, ‗[t]he distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of 
a union or separation, of an association or disassociations‘ (Schmitt, 1996: 26). In other 
words, only when human beings are united or separated so intensively to form friendship or 
enmity, we can speak of the political. It is this same relation or distinction, analysed by 
Foucault in his Society Must be Defended through the concept of state racism, which, 
according to Schmitt, founds the political entity, at the same time as it ‗substantializes‘ the 
enemy. The friend is not in need of being substantialized – it is that which decides. To this 
extent, Marramao is certainly correct when he says that, in Schmitt, ‗[t]he political cannot be 
circumscribed, confined or topologically delimited [...]. It can only be temporarily localized 
in those set dimensions or circumstances in which, from time to time, it manifest itself 
historically‘ (Marramao, 2000: 1577-78). As Hirst points out, ‗[a]ny entity involved in friend-
enemy relations is by definition political‘ (Hirst, 1999:  9). Thus, for instance, Schmitt says ‗a 
religious community which wages wars against members of other religious communities‘ is a 
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 For a principled negative response to this question, see Peter Hallward, ‗Beyond Salvage‘ (2005). 
For a still critical but less negative response see Danilo Zolo (2008; 2009a). In an interview with 
Claudia Terranova, asked directly whether his thought is Schmittian, Zolo replies by criticizing certain 
aspects of Schmitt, such as his ambivalent stance toward pacifism, his anti-democraticism, his silence 
about colonial war, and his opportunistic adhesion to Nazism, but he defends Schmitt‘s realism and, 
contrary to Hallward, argues that Schmitt‘s diagnostic analyses are of great value. See also Hirst, 1990; 
Mouffe, 1999; Scheuerman, 1999; and, of course, Agamben, 1998; 1999a; 2005a, among others.   
67
 The ‗imperial vocation of the United States‘ will be discussed in more details in section 1.8 through 
more up to date theses.  
68
 In Schmitt words, ‗[t]he friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely 
because they refer to the real possibility of killing. War follows from enmity. War is the existential 
negation of the enemy. It is the most extreme consequence of enmity. It does not have to be common, 
normal something ideal or desirable. But it must nevertheless remain a real possibility for so long as 
the concept of the enemy remains valid‘ (Schmitt, 1996: 33).   
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political entity (Schmitt, 1996: 37). Nevertheless, even though Schmitt claims that his 
‗concept of the political must be defined apart from definitions of the state, he often 
surreptitiously reintroduce the state as the natural subject of political life‘ (Balakrishnan, 
2000: 110). This is because, for Schmitt, ultimately, only secondary political oppositions can 
emerge ‗within states‘ (Balakrishnan, 2000: 110).69 In Schmitt‘s words, ‗[t]he ever present 
possibility of a friend-and-enemy grouping suffices to forge a decisive entity which 
transcends the mere societal-associational grouping‘ (1996; 45). The state is the decisive 
political entity and the distinction between the friend and the enemy is the ‗substance‘ of (or 
that which founds) the political entity (i.e., the state). The state is that which in declaring 
itself as ‗the friend‘ declares also and at the same time ‗the other‘ as its ‗enemy‘. It decides 
itself and its others. In other words, the state is sovereign because only ‗[t]o the state as an 
essentially political entity belongs the jus belli, i.e., the real possibility of deciding in a 
concrete situation upon the enemy [or the exception] and the ability to fight him‘ (Schmitt, 
1996: 46). Schmitt adds, ‗[a]s long as a politically united people [Volk] is prepared to fight 
for its existence, independence, and freedom, on the basis of a decision [on the exception] 
emanating from the political entity, this specifically political question [the question of who 
decides] has primacy over the technical means by which the battle will be waged [...]‘ (1996: 
46).  
 
As a legal-constitutional thinker,
70
 Schmitt was particularly keen in developing a theory 
which was at the same time a legitimation of sovereignty. In particular, Schmitt establishes 
the proximity between the sovereign and the exception over a number of works. In the first 
sentence of Political Theology, he defines the sovereign as ‗he who decides on the state of 
exception‘ and further suggests that ‗it is precisely the exception [or borderline case] which 
makes relevant the question of the subject of sovereignty, that is, the question of sovereignty 
in general‘ (Schmitt, 1985: 5, 6). By this, he means that the question of sovereignty and that 
of exception are inexorably linked and that the former problem cannot be understood 
independently from or outside the latter. ‗The most guidance the constitution can provide‘, 
says Schmitt, ‗is to indicate who is permitted to act in such a case‘ – something which 
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 Contrary to Kelsen, Schmitt saw political parties as disintegrative elements of the political system 
(Marramao, 2000) and continued to have doubts on whether a domestic opposition represented ‗a 
merely ―agonal‖ competition that affirms the common unity‘ or whether it negated ‗the political unity‘, 
meaning that a latent civil war was already present (Schmitt quoted in Balakrishnan, 2000: 110).  
70
Although I believe the two cannot easily be separated – and on this Wendy Brown‘s discussion of 
sovereignty‘s theological dimension is illustrative (see section 1.8 below) – it is Schmitt‘s legal-
political not his religious or theological thought that I am most concerned with here. Depending on the 
author, these two aspects are given more or less importance. See Kervégan, 1999: 54, 71 notes 1 and 2 ). 
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Schmitt does not seem to welcome.
71
 Only the sovereign can decide ‗whether there is an 
extreme case of emergency and what should be done to end it‘, and, if necessary, to suspend 
the constitution in toto (Schmitt, 1985: 7). Modern legal theories tend to reduce sovereignty 
to ‗textbook compilations of abstract formulas from which definitions of sovereignty can be 
extracted‘ (1985: 16). However, he contends that because sovereignty is the one concept 
‗most governed by actual interests‘, it cannot be examined merely formalistically (1985: 17). 
In particular, with references to Kelsen and to his precursor, Hugo Krabbe,
72
 he comments 
that attempts to eliminate the exception or to treat it as pertaining to the sphere of sociology 
as if it was of little merits from a juridical perspective, de facto create a disjunction between 
sociology and jurisprudence where none exists.
73
 This is done in order to eliminate the 
problem of sovereignty and its relation to the exception or the decisionist component, and to 
treat the state as identical with its constitution. However, according to Schmitt, this ignores 
that the state of emergency ‗is always something other than anarchy and chaos: it always 
exists in a juridical order even if it is not the legal order‘ (Schmitt, 1985: 12). This (that is to 
say, ‗the superiority of the state to the validity and value of the legal norm‘) is what confirms 
the existence of the state (Schmitt, 1985: 12). Contrary to liberal constitutional theory, which 
concentrates on the normal and sees the exception as a disturbance or interruption, for 
Schmitt, there is no sovereignty (nor real law) without the exception. It is by deciding on the 
exception that the State, which is thus ‗granted autonomous – and hence decisive – status‘ 
(Delacroix, 2005: 37), substantiates sovereignty and real as opposed to ideal law.  
 
According to Schmitt, therefore, the essence of sovereignty, which, as we have seen, he 
understands as state‘s sovereignty at this point, does not reside with the monopoly to coerce 
or to rule (see Weber, 1991),
74
 but with ‗the monopoly to decide‘ (Schmitt, 1985: 13). 
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 Schmitt regards provisions that limit the power of the sovereign by delegating control to the 
parliament, for instance, as attempts that aims at repressing the question of sovereignty.    
72
 According to Schmitt, Krabbe‘s theory ‗rests on the thesis that it is not the state but law that is 
sovereign‘ (Schmitt, 1985: 2). For an analysis of Schmitt‘s relation to Krabbe, see Kennedy, 2004: 83-
84. 
73
 Schmitt makes use of the term sociology to indicate a particular method of investigation that he calls 
‗a sociology of juridical concepts‘. Contrary to Kelsen‘s theory of pure law, Schmitt believes that law 
is not and cannot be entirely free from history, politics, and the social. He denies the autonomy of 
secular, modern politics and law, and suggests that ‗[a]ll significant concept of the modern state are 
secularized theological concepts‘ (Schmitt, 1985: 36). According to Ulmen, ‗this ―sociology‖ is 
radical because it presupposes that a metaphysical image of a determinate epoch has the same 
structure of the form [...] of its political organization‘ (Ulmen, 1999: 470). This is also interesting in 
relation to Agamben‘s own understanding of the paradigm or image (see Chapter 2). On Schmitt‘s 
relation to sociology as a discipline that was at the time ‗only beginning to emerge‘, see Balakrishnan, 
2000: 4-5. 
74
 Max Weber defines a state as ‗a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber, 1991[1919]: 78 emphasis 
original). Note that Schmitt was an important student of Weber. The relation between the two has been 
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Sovereignty, for Schmitt, is given by its monopoly to decide on the exception. It is given by 
the monopoly to establish when and what constitutes a situation of emergency at any given 
time – a situation that crucially the sovereign creates through a suspension of law to 
guarantee and validate its own existence and, paradoxically, the existence of what Schmitt 
calls real law. ‗Sovereignty‘, says Schmitt, ‗resides in deciding this controversy, that is, in 
determining definitively what constitutes public order and security, in determining when they 
are disturbed, and so on‘ (Schmitt, 1985: 9). For Schmitt, in deciding on the exception, the 
sovereign decides on ‗the situation in its totality‘. Put differently, he decides both what 
constitutes the exception, and therefore, what constitutes the normal case. In a ‗state of 
emergency‘, says Schmitt, ‗the state continues to exists while law is effaced. This is why for 
Schmitt ‗all law is ―situational law‖‘ (Schmitt, 1985: 13).   
 
In accordance with Schmitt, Agamben accepts that sovereignty is given by the monopoly to 
decide on the exception (Agamben, 1998: 15-16) and that the theory of the separation of 
powers, whereby power is shared between the legislative, executive and judiciary branches 
each with its separate and independent areas of responsibility is unsatisfactory.
75
 However, he 
takes issue with Schmitt for ignoring, or more precisely passing over, that the decision on the 
exception is based on a paradoxical impossibility. Schmitt is not concerned in challenging 
sovereign power but, on the contrary, he wants to affirm it. Thus, he takes for granted 
sovereign power‘s ultimate capacity to decide without questioning the hidden logic that 
allows the sovereign to do so. On the other hand, wanting to displace sovereign power as a 
form of power that is the culprit of having produced ‗the most absolute conditio 
inhumana that has ever existed on earth‘ (Agamben 1998: 166), Agamben is adamant to 
prove the paradoxicality on which the sovereign capacity to decide is based. Agamben states, 
‗what is at issue in the sovereign exception is not so much the control or neutralization of an 
excess as the creation and definition of the very space in which the juridico-political order 
can have validity‘ (Agamben, 1998: 19). Thus, it is not only the case that the sovereign and 
the exception are inexorably linked (Schmitt, 1985) but that by determining what constitutes 
the exception, in actual fact, the sovereign suspends the law ‗while it simultaneously 
constitutes the efficacy of the law in that determination‘ (Mills, 2004: 44; Agamben, 2004). 
‗The ―sovereign‖ structure of the law, its peculiar and original ―force‖‘, as Agamben puts it, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
acknowledged by many authors, including Lukács, Arendt (quoted in de Benoist, 2003) and more 
recently Mouffe (1999) among others. Whether the two authors have to be read simply in terms of 
continuity (for instance, Bendersky, 1983: 35; but also and especially, McCormick, 1997: 8) or 
discontinuity (Turner, 1992), or, more probably, in terms of both is, nevertheless, still a matter of 
debate.      
75
 The idea that a fair political system is one based on a separation of power has a long history, from 
Montesquieu, (1989 [1748]) to contemporary political theorists, such as Ackerman (2004).  
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‗has the form of a state of exception in which fact and law [or the exception and the rule] are 
indistinguishable‘, yet must, nevertheless, be decided on (Agamben, 1998: 27). In other 
words, the role of law is given validity though a sovereign decision on the exception where, 
paradoxically, the exception is no other than the suspension of the law itself.  
 
As Agamben suggests in reality, Schmitt is fully aware that the relation between sovereignty 
and the law is paradoxical: by deciding on the exception, the sovereign creates the law at the 
same times as ‗he‘ situates itself both inside and outside of it. Agamben notes that Schmitt 
uses the expression ‗to formulate it paradoxically‘ to describe sovereignty‘s capacity to create 
the law (see Schmitt quoted in Agamben, 1998: 16), implicitly acknowledging sovereignty‘s 
ambiguity and paradoxicality. However, because his ultimate aim is to insert the state of 
exception into a legal context not matter what (Agamben, 2003), or, put differently, to 
maintain the juridical order against the possibility of ‗pure violence‘ – the reference here is 
Walter Benjamin
76
 – he is careful not to substantiate on this inconsistency. Starting from this 
presupposition, Agamben further suggests that what is lacking in ‗public law‘ is a genuine 
critique of the functioning and hidden foundation of sovereignty (Agamben, 2004), which 
would include a critique of law. His aim is to provide such a critique of law because he 
believes that only then the actualization of a new form of politics – that is to say, a form of 
politics that will no longer have sovereign power and its constitutive categories of thought at 
its centre – will be possible.   
 
1.6 Law: part of the Paradox of Sovereignty? 
 
Against the idea that the law can be a distinct sphere of deliberation in which decisions can 
impartially be drawn as the theory of the separation of powers implies, or the guarantor of 
universal justice (in the Kantian sense), Agamben suggests that the law is part of the paradox 
of sovereignty. It is part of the paradox of sovereignty in the sense that it is through its 
suspension that the sovereign acquires unlimited power (or the power to decide over the ‗life‘ 
of others). This is why for Agamben the law cannot become the means through which to 
contain the effect of sovereign power. Trying to contain the effects of sovereign power 
through legal means, which would include the use of human rights law, is bound to fail, 
insofar as, even though any such attempts may succeed in containing specific legislations, 
they risk reproducing rather than challenging the inherent logic of the state of exception on 
                                                             
76
 According to Agamben, Schmitt‘s decisionism is to be read as a ‗strategic inversion‘, a way of 
neutralizing Benjamin‘s anomic and revolutionary violence (Agamben, 2005a: 55). For a critique of 
Agamben‘s reading of Benjamin for in reality eliding what Sinnerbrink calls the ‗anarcho-Marxist 
dimension of Benjamin‘s response to Schmitt‘, see Sinnerbrink, 2009:  89-91. 
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which sovereign power is based. Although there is much to appreciate in Agamben‘s critique 
of law and of human rights law, Agamben‘s characterization of law is limited and limiting, 
especially as it does not delve on the relationship between national law and international law, 
tending simply to conflate two, thus, ending up offering a monistic view of law. 
 
As observed in the section above, for Agamben, the law cannot guarantee universal justice 
because it is part of the paradox of sovereignty. Agamben further suggests that the very 
concepts of guilt, responsibility, innocence and dignity are irredeemably compromised 
(Agamben, 1999a: 66) as concepts whose source is juridical (see his attention to Roman law) 
and were only secondarily exported to an ethical discourse. In his words, ‗[t]o assume guilt 
and responsibility
77
 – which can at times be necessary – is to leave the territory of ethics and 
enter that of law‘ (Agamben 1999a: 22). However, Agamben argues that once we enter the 
realm of law we enter a very ambiguous terrain whose inadequacy and non-ethicality 
becomes evident when confronted with figures, such as the Muselmann, whose acts are in a 
sense beyond law.
78
 Not even international law, and in particular human rights law, can 
guarantee justice for Agamben. According to him, the non-universality and non-
comprehensibility of human rights is given by the fact that the Rights of Man are always 
predicated on others men
79
 or non-citizens not having these same rights (see also Marx 
quoted in McLellan, 2000
80
). Drawing on Arendt, Agamben offers the case of the refugee as 
the example that shows the limits of law, both in its national and international configuration, 
and of invocations of human rights specifically. According to Agamben, what the figure of 
the refugee brings to light is that the declaration of rights in actual fact presupposes an 
originary unity between birth or nativity and nation and citizen that does not do justice to the 
myriad of ‗(in)human beings‘ that do not conform to this fiction (Agamben, 1998: 28). Rather 
than defending human rights, ‗the Rights of Man represent above all the original figure of the 
                                                             
77
 The word responsibility has its origin in the Latin legal term of ‘spondeo’ or sponsor, meaning 
someone who ‗become[s] the guarantor for someone (or oneself) with respect to someone‘ (Agamben, 
1999a: 21).  
78
 Agamben also offers the example of the perpetrators of Nazi crimes, whose crimes could not be 
properly addressed by the law as demonstrated by the Eichmann process, which Agamben describes as 
a ‗liturgy of law‘ (see Agamben, 1999a; 2009; also see Arendt, 1971). 
79
 For early feminist critiques the Rights of Man as male centred, see De Gouges‘ pamphlet titled 
‗Declaration of the Rights of Woman‘, 1791 and Wollestonecraft‘s Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman, 1792. For more recent critiques of human rights as gendered, see, for instance, Holmes, 1983; 
Peterson and Parisi, 1998. For a critical attempt to connect feminist commitment to equality, and in 
particular poststructuralist ‗deconstructive equality‘, to ‗actually existing‘ human rights, see Nash, 
2002. See also the ‗Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women‘ 
(CEDAW) adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly on which Nash draws to develop her 
argument. 
80
 Marx actually goes one step further when he says that ‗it is not man as a citizen but man as 
bourgeois who is called the real and true man‘ in the French Declaration, recognizing that citizens 
themselves can be deprived of rights. For a critique of Marx‘s critique, see Balibar, 1994; Lefort, 1986. 
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inscription of bare natural life in the legal-political order of the nation-state‘ (Agamben, 
1997). This is because,    
 
‗[r]ights are attributed to the human being only to the degree to 
which he or she [in his bare life] is the immediately vanishing 
presupposition (and, in fact, the presupposition that must never 
come to light as such) of the citizen‘ (Agamben, 2000b: 21).  
 
In other words, for Agamben, belonging to a given national identity or being a citizen is the 
precondition for having rights wherein the condition of belonging is guaranteed by the 
vanishing of bare life into the notion of bios (political ‗life‘). Similarly to the constitutive 
split that underscores the term ‗people‘ whereby, on the one hand, we have ‗the People as a 
whole and as integral body politic and, on the other hand, the people as a subset and as 
fragmentary multiplicity of needy and excluded bodies‘ (Agamben, 1998: 31), by being 
predicated on some people not having the same rights of citizens, human rights perform a 
similar split. While they stipulate man as the bearer of rights, rights also presuppose this same 
man to be a citizen. Thus, in presupposing that only citizens have rights, they preclude in 
advance the access of non-citizens to the ‗right to have rights‘ (Arendt, 1973), while 
maintaining a ‗secret solidarity‘ with sovereign power (Agamben, 1998: 133). This is why, 
for him, the point is not to make human rights more inclusive. Nor is it, however, to return to 
an Arendtian idea of pure politics as based on a distinction between the social and the 
political.
81
 For Agamben, the point is to politicize the generalized state of exception. It is to 
leave behind the modern categories of ‗people‘, nation, and sovereignty, inasmuch as they are 
deemed to contain the seeds of their transformation into biopolitical apparatuses of 
destruction, which separate the subject of rights (citizen) from the innocent, and therefore 
sacrificeable, bare life of the refugee or the stateless. According to Agamben (1995), ‗only in 
a land where the spaces of states will have been perforated and topologically deformed, and 
the citizen will have learned to acknowledge the refugee that he himself is‘,82 ‗man‘s political 
survival today is imaginable‘. 
 
However, it is important to note that this line of reasoning is dubious for not totally dissimilar 
reasons than those offered above in relation to the distinction between zoe and bios on which 
Agamben draws for his critique of Western politics. For a start, Arendt‘s critique, on which 
Agamben heavily relies for its argument, is arguably circumscribed to a specific period – 
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 For a critique, see Rancière, 2001. See also Wolin in Hinchman, 1994; Connolly, 1997.  
82
 Here, clearly, the use of third masculine pronoun cannot be justified on the basis of ‗institutionalized 
sexism‘ (see note 27) but it must be attributed to a failure on Agamben‘s part to account for, to use an 
Irigarian expression ‗this sex which in not one‘ (Irigaray, 1985).  
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Arendt was talking about refugees between the World Wars. It is Agamben who generalizes 
or universalizes the refugee to ‗the‘ refugee, where the problem seems to be both 
methodological, or Agamben‘s use of historical analogies, and philosophical. On the one 
hand, his methodological understanding of the refugee as ‗limit-concept‘ risks abstracting 
actual refugees from present practices of resistance and struggle, which sometimes depend on 
an appeal to human rights but, even when they do, do not constitute just ‗an affair of law‘ 
(Nash, 2009). On the other hand, Agamben‘s understanding of the refugee seems to rely on a 
philosophical idea of recognition of ‗sameness‘ that, even as it goes beyond an idea of ethics 
as predicated simply upon the recognition of the ‗other‘ (Levinas, 2003)83 – for Agamben one 
also has to recognizes oneself as refugee – it does not do justice to the fact that in reality we 
are not all refugees. In other words, even if we could ‗all‘ potentially be stripped of our rights 
(we are all virtually homo sacer), we are not all in the present refugees. Although 
symbolically powerful and, perhaps, useful as a solidarity tactic,
84
 to argue that we are all 
refugees, paradoxically, risks undermining the real suffering that refugees and other displaced 
people often endure by juxtaposing what are in fact very different conditions; even as we 
acknowledge the risk of denaturalization for some: those of citizens and non-citizens.
85
  
 
In relation to the war on terror, human rights appear to be a double-edge sword or Janus-like. 
As many authors have rightly suggested, ‗human rights‘ law have been used successfully to 
counter emergency legislations in some instances (Campbell, 2007; Bigo, 2009; Nash, 2009). 
For instance, Campbell argues that the Federal and Supreme Court decisions in the US 
concerning limitations of war-time presidential powers and the detention and treatment of 
Guantánamo detainees demined ‗unlawful combatants‘ by the then President Bush,86  
‗overwhelmingly support the argument that human rights or humanitarian law do apply to the 
‗‗war on terror‖‘ (Campbell, 2007; Nash, 2009).87 This clearly is not a sufficient evidence of 
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 For a critical attempt to develop a ‗dialogic‘ (the reference here is Bakhtin) as opposed to dialectic 
mode of thinking based both on recognition of the Other (Levinas) and impartiality (Ricoeur) in 
‗international‘ relations from a realist perspective, see Roberto Toscano, 1998; 2005. For a post-
structuralist perspective on the same theme, see Campbell, 1994.   
84
 For examples of organizations that use this tactic, see for instance, Liberty, a UK non-party 
organization, whose aim is to protect basic rights and freedoms through the courts, including of those 
seeking asylum. In 2009, Chakrabarti gave an interview in which she stated that ‗we are all foreigners 
somewhere‘ (2009: [n.p.]). Also, see the ‗We are all Boat People‘ campaign in support of asylum 
seekers. Their website can be found at http://www.boat-people.org.  
85
 Arendt‘s discussion of ‗denaturalization‘ in terms of ‗potential statelessness‘ is instructive here (in 
Bar On, 2002: 69-71; Arendt, 1945).   
86
 Prisoners who did not qualify as prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions (see Greenberg and 
Dratel (eds.), 2005). 
87
 Campbell uses the examples of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), and Rasul et al. v. Bush, 
124 S. Ct. 2686 (2007). Also, see Hamndan v. Rumsfeld 126 S. Ct. 2749 and Boumediene v. Bush 128 
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the universality or inviolability of human rights. In spite of the Supreme Court many rulings, 
human rights abuses, and gross injustices continued, and to this day, there are still many 
Guantánamo detainees that have not had court hearings to determine the lawfulness of their 
detention (Ratner and Ray, 2004; Denbeaux and Hafetz, 2009). As Nash has observed, 
moreover, it was ‗citizenship status, combined with diplomatic relations between allies, and 
not claims for human rights‘, which had made possible relief for some British citizens in 
Guantánamo Bay in 2005 (more on the ‗illegality‘ of Guantánamo Bay below). It was only 
much later that non-citizens resident in the UK were also sent back, in part, at least 
confirming Arendt‘s but also Agamben‘s suspicion about human rights as precluding in 
advance non-citizens or ‗statelessness‘ people – where ‗statelessness‘ should be understood 
in its broader sense to include various categories of people
88
 – the ‗right to have rights‘. 
Nevertheless, although ‗[t]he increasing legalization of human rights has led [then] neither to 
guarantees of human rights commitments, nor an end to human rights violations‘ (Nash, 
2007: 10),
89
 successes, even if limited, obtained through the use of these rights should be 
taken into account in discussions of their limits. Despite Agamben‘s claims to the contrary, 
moreover, the idea of rights as that which can, if not put a stop, at least slow down ‗the 
working of the [biopolitical] machine that is leading the West toward a global civil war‘ 
(Agamben, 2005a: 87) is not completely extraneous to his own work. His text against 
‗biopolitical tattooing‘ (2004), for instance, is framed in terms that are not very dissimilar to 
‗liberal‘ critiques on this theme, where the solution to infringements of one‘s rights is given 
by an ‗individual‘ act and articulated in terms of individual rights: in this specific case, by 
Agamben‘s refusal to submit to the practice of fingerprints.90 This, I would suggest, although 
commendable, does seem to contradict Agamben‘s own explicit and implicit critiques of 
liberal legalism and liberal individualism. Agamben‘s piece does include a mild call for 
                                                                                                                                                                              
S. Ct. 2229 (2008), which held that the right to habeas corpus was granted in the Constitution, not 
merely in the federal statute, which could be amended by the Congress (Denbeaux and Hafetz, 2009). 
88
 This would include undocumented migrants, asylum-seekers, or even naturalized and birthright 
citizens whose status, as Gündoğdu says, ‗is precarious because of the ethnic or racial identifiers that 
the dominant majorities attach to them‘ (Gündoğdu, 2006: 7).  
89
 Interestingly, Nash offers the Belmarsh case as an example that shows the way in which ‗when 
cosmopolitan law is relatively successful in abolishing the distinction between citizens and non-
citizens in controversial cases, human rights come under increased political pressure‘ (Nash, 2007: 10).  
Nash argues (2007: 16) that, although it was on the basis of a decision of incompatibility with the 
Human Rights Act 1998 that indefinite detention of foreigners suspected of terrorism without trial was 
declared unconstitutional, it was this same decision that ‗paved the way for the government to remove 
fundamental civil rights from citizens‘ by authorizing indefinite house arrest for both citizens and non-
citizens.  
90
 Agamben was specifically protesting the US Visiting and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 
(US-VISIT) program, a biometric policy requiring automatic fingerprinting and photographing of all 
foreign visitors, except, at the time when Agamben took this decision, nationals of twenty-seven US 
allies. The program went into effect in January 2004. Soon later, the program was extended to these 
countries.  
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collective action. However, his refusal in the end seems implicitly to rely on a conception of 
individual agency, which is very much in line with liberal capitalism‘s investment in certain 
notion of the individual as autonomous or sovereign. Indeed, it is symptomatic that 
Agamben‘s call is addressed to ‗European intellectuals and teachers‘.91 Apart from a 
privileged few, who else could refuse to go to the US when their reasons for wanting to go 
there might in fact be linked to survival in its broadest sense? In the last instance, what the 
aforementioned examples highlight are the usefulness of the concept of human rights in 
certain circumstances and the difficulties of thinking human rights struggles, or for that 
matter, any type of struggles, in the abstract or independently of how the agents of these 
struggles frame them and what they perceive to be their roles within them.
92
 
 
On the other hand, however, to dismiss how states use human rights and how the latter are 
entangled with oppressive contemporary practices of securitization would be mistaken. To 
the extent that Agamben provides a strong critique of human rights, his criticism should not 
be ignored. However, it is also important to point that Agamben says little on actual abuses of 
human rights and on the use of humanitarian language to justify interventions. In one of his 
latest book, titled Victors’ Justice (2009b), in line with Agamben‘s critique, Zolo strongly 
questions the use of human rights on the part of states. But Zolo offers an account based, not 
as in Agamben on an abstract juridico-philosophical dissection of human rights‘ inherent 
ambiguities, but on a critical assessment of their use. Thus, Zolo specifically criticizes the 
manipulation of international law and of human right, offering examples of how powerful 
states use them to suit their interests. Starting from the presupposition that, far from being 
that which limits the power of states, international law is manipulated by powerful states to 
their advantage, Zolo observes, for instance, how the United States habitually manipulates 
international law while it justifies ‗humanitarian wars‘93 in the name of protecting human 
rights. To this extent, according to Zolo, human rights are very much part of the rhetoric of 
the war on terror, especially what appears to be its ‗humanitarian‘ dimension (Zolo, 2006; see 
also Douzinas, 2007). In an article written in 2009, he says, ‗the normative universalism of 
human rights law lend itself very well to funding the ―just‖ character of war and to ensure the 
aggressors with the necessary internal and international consensus to carry out the type of 
imperialist wars‘ we are witnessing in the last years (Zolo, 2009a, my translation). In this 
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 In this respect, Agamben‘s discussion of revolution vs revolt in Times to Remains is also interesting. 
See Agamben, 2005b: 31-33. 
92
 Note, moreover, that as Balibar says the ‗Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen‘ is itself the 
result of a history of struggles; a history which, according to him, has demonstrated the impossibility 
of thinking liberty without equality and vice versa (Balibar, 2004). 
93
 As both Zolo (2006) and Perry Anderson note (2005), we find similar justifications for ‗military 
humanitarian interventionism‘ in authors such as Rawls, Habermans and Bobbio.  
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specific respect, far from challenging sovereign power, human rights rhetoric, like other 
‗justifications for intervention‘, participates in the construction of sovereignty (Weber, 1995). 
 
As Toscano observes, Zolo‘s starting point is Schmitt‘s argument as put forward in The 
Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum (2003) [1943] that 
‗the outlawing of armed state aggression, starting with the ―Wilsonian cosmopolitanism‖ of 
the League of Nations, in reality served as prelude to unlimited and dehumanizing forms of 
warfare‘ (Toscano, 2008: 131). Following Schmitt‘s periodization, Zolo presents a 
genealogical account of 20th-century international law or Jus Publicum Europaeum as 
moving from a system where the concept of justus hostis was central to one of the aggressor 
as criminal, with the expansion of law beyond domestic jurisdictions (Toscano, 2008: 130). 
His work on humanitarian warfare can be seen to pick up on Schmitt‘s insights, especially on 
his idea that ‗whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat‘ (Schmitt, 1996: 54),94 and his 
critique of law,
95
 and to call into question the concealment of political power and interests in 
appeals to abstract universals, such as ‗humanity‘. Contrary to Agamben, however, whose 
powerful critique of Western (i.e. global) politics is also, as we have seen, very much 
influenced by Schmitt – though he rarely discusses particular cases and when he does only 
focuses on suspensions of national law
96
 – Zolo goes into detail to explain how states use 
international law to suit their interests. I will return to the conception of justus hostis in the 
next section and in Chapter 3, where I discuss US foreign security policy through a critical 
discourse analysis of US National Security Strategies. Let me just add here that, as Toscano 
rightly points out, Zolo‘s tendency to treat universalism per se as the problem in an attempt to 
stay clear from ‗cultural imperialism‘ for instance when he denounces all universalisms for 
their ‗intolerance, aggressiveness, [and a] negation of the world‘s cultural diversity and 
complexity‘ (Zolo, 2007: [n.p.]) is dubious (Toscano, 2008). It risks coming too close to 
Huntington‘s thesis about the existence of some essential cultural differences between 
civilizations, albeit in a way that rejects conflict as a matter of principle, without recognizing 
that these differences are also, and some would argue principally, the result of politically and 
economically produced asymmetries in resources and power.
97
 Nevertheless, Zolo‘s point 
about how international law is hypocritically used by states and about how human rights are 
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 The actual quote is Proudhon‘s (Proudhon quoted in Schmitt, 1996: 45).   
95
 See also Zolo‘s previous work Invoking Humanity (2002). 
96
 In particular, in his State of Exception, Agamben discussed the cases of France, Italy, Germany and 
the United States.   
97
 In this respect, Zolo‘s discussion with Ulrich Beck in ‗What Is Globalization? Some Radical 
Questions‘ (1999) is instructive. In it, Zolo challenges Beck‘s notion of ‗new modernity‘ as risking 
being Eurocentric through references to Huntington. 
 44 
 
increasingly becoming a banner for ‗new humanitarian wars‘ (Zolo, 2006; 2002;98 see also 
Beck, 2000
99
) adds a dimension missing in Agamben‘s critique of law and rights as 
expounded above. What Zolo‘s analyses help to understand is how the discourse of 
humanitarian intervention, which might be said to be waning somewhat but has clearly not 
disappeared, although not perhaps the primary justification for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars 
was, and still is,
100
 part of the rhetoric of the war on terror. Whereas, as we shall see in the 
next section, Agamben‘s understanding of a new nomos is quite suggestive but at the same 
time quite elusive, Zolo‘s genealogical account helps to elucidate how Western powers, in 
primis the US, attempt to personalize or individualize international law.101 We might say, in a 
Foucauldian way, that they use international law, which should be understood as both 
intertwined with and distinct from national law, ‗as tactic‘ (Gregory, 2007: 207: Butler, 2004: 
52) or technique of government  – where more specific examples of how the United States 
administration uses international law as tactic will be given in Chapter 3.
102
  
 
1.7 A new nomos of the earth?   
 
Agamben borrows the concept of nomos from Schmitt and uses it to describe the singularity 
of the camp in modernity. Whereas in Schmitt the ‗new nomos of the earth‘ appears as a 
spatial, political and juridical global ordering based on ‗great spaces‘ (Großraum) that ‗will 
eventually put an end to the anarchy which ensued upon the disintegration of the Jus 
Publicum Europaeum’ (Toscano, 2007b: [n.p.]), Agamben suggests that the ‗new nomos of 
the earth‘ is the camp. For Agamben, it is in and through the camp that the juridico-political 
space or anti-space of modernity is created. Agamben‘s conceptualization of the camp 
challenges Schmitt‘s vision of nomos as that which conjoins spatialization (Ortung) and order 
(Ordnung), enabling an understanding of camps, including contemporary ‗camps‘, such as 
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 In dialogue with Antonio Negri.  
99
 In his book, What is globalization? (2000), Beck, whom cosmopolitan framework Zolo clearly is 
very critical of, also raises some doubts about ‗militaristic pacifism‘. Beck‘s fear is that ‗human rights‘ 
could be reduced to the slogan or banner behind which a ‗new crusade‘ marches and that the 
‗cosmopolitan mission‘, as he calls it, could be misused to imperialistic ends (Beck, 2000: 15). For 
critiques of military humanism see also Chomsky, 1999; Chandler, 2001.  
100
 In this regard, it is interesting to note in passing that although not with explicit reference to the 
Afghanistan war, in his peace prize ‗acceptance‘ speech, Obama justifies war on humanitarian 
grounds. He, like his predecessor (Douzinas, 2007: 6), further refers to the Afghanistan war as a ‗just 
war‘. Also of interest is the fact that Obama appointed Samantha Power to the National Security 
Council as Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs. Power is well known for her ‗humanitarian 
interventions‘ stance to prevent human-rights catastrophes. In particular, see her book A Problem From 
Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, 2003. For an analysis, see Madar, 2009. 
101
 Following Schmitt, Zolo argues that this trend started in the wake of World War I and continued 
with the despatialized pacifism of the League of Nations and America‘s Wilsonian ideology (Zolo, 
2002). 
102
 In particular, the focus will be article 51 of the UN Charter. 
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Guantánamo  Bay or Abu Ghraib, not as aberrations but as paradigmatic of the political space 
of modernity in the West. Although clearly suggestive, I argue that his understanding of 
modernity as exemplified by the camp risks to create a too easy equivalence between states of 
emergency and democracy, consequently reducing the latter to an empty general category 
devoid of its ambiguous ‗subjects‘,103 on the one hand, and failing to differentiate between 
different degrees of exception, on the other. Moreover, as we will see in this and the next 
sections, his engagement with geopolitical and strategic aspects of state politics both in 
relation to the establishment of camps specifically, and to the generalization of (the state of) 
exception more generally, as well as to their effects on international law, is lacking.       
 
Very briefly, according to Schmitt, the ‗nomos of the Earth‘ is the originary gesture, the 
founding spatial ontology that binds every juridical-political order to a concrete territory, to 
the ‗sense of the Earth‘ (2003:  29). Nomos, says Schmitt, is not law as usually translated by 
jurists and historians in the sense of tradition or custom but the necessary junction of order 
(Ordnug) and localization (Ortung) (2003: 325). Nomos is about ‗land appropriation‘ – 
Schmitt uses the term Landnahme (2003: 328) – because for Schmitt every legal order is 
based on appropriation. If Foucault wanted to move away from ‗the who‘ to ‗the how‘ of 
power, Schmitt insists on both ‗the who‘ (as its decisionist theory implies) and ‗the where‘ 
(see also Dean, 2007: 245). Schmitt says,  
 
In every stage of social life, in every economic order, in every 
period of legal history until now, things have been appropriated, 
distributed, and produced. Prior to every legal, economic and social 
order, prior to every legal, economic or social theory, there is this 
simple question: Where and how was it appropriated? Where and 
how was it divided? Where and how was it produced?‘ (Schmitt, 
2003: 327–8, emphasis original).  
  
To this extent, for Schmitt, ‗there always has been some kind of nomos of the Earth‘ (2003: 
351). A world without appropriation and, as a consequence, without nomos, would simply be 
equivalent to anarchy. However, according to Schmitt, it was only after the age of ‗great 
discoveries‘ that men started to develop ‗a global concept of the planet in which they lived‘ 
(2003: 351) and to ground ‗their‘ conception of nomos in the earth, the land as ‗the most 
basic, most primordial object of appropriation as such‘ (Hallward, 2005: 238). In particular, 
Schmitt suggests that European civilization exists because of its history of land 
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 That is to say, subjects in terms of those who govern, but also and especially, of those who are 
governed. Agamben‘s tendency to treat the latter as passive, as completely subsumed to state power or, 
in any case, as only minimally equipped with the capacity to resist has been discussed in sections 1.4 
and 1.6. 
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appropriations and territorial expansions in the ‗new world‘ of the Americas first, and of 
Asia, Africa, and Australasia later, and of its ability to confine ‗absolute enmity‘ in the non-
State space. Nomos is the nexus that united equilibrium (between earth and sea, individual 
and state, politics and technology) and disequilibrium (between Europe and the rest of the 
world) in the epoch of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (Galli, [n. d.]). This is why, for Schmitt, 
the disintegration of the Jus Publicum Europaeum – as the European international legal 
system that regulated relations between states based on the Westphalian doctrines of 
sovereignty and non-intervention
104
 in the period between the end of the religious wars of the 
seventeenth century and the onset of World War I – was a matter of great significance. By 
replacing the medieval notion of the justa causa belli (or doctrine of just war) by the formal 
concept of the justus hostis or legally recognized enemy (Schmitt, 2003: 124), the Jus 
Publicum Europaeum limited inter-European warfare. Its end, although not necessarily, could 
lead to a situation of chaos in which barbarism could prevail. It is as a response – a response 
that is both theoretical and based on a partial and, some rightly argue, quite contestable 
analysis of ‗international relations‘105 – to this disintegration that Schmitt envisages the 
possibility, first through his concept of ‗total state‘, and then through his conceptualization of 
‗great spaces‘ as an international order beyond the state (Galli, [n.d.]), of a new nomos that 
could replace the old one and guarantee order in its absence.
106
 Schmitt sees the disintegration 
of the Jus Publicum Europaeum as possibly establishing a new balance among a multiplicity 
of new Großräumea complex ‗macro-organization of political space inspired by the ―Monroe 
Doctrine‖, in which continental or sub-continental areas of influence compete to maintain a 
balance of power between them‘ (Schmitt in Zolo, 2008: [n.p.]; 2002).  
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  The 1648 Peace of Westphalia assumes the authority of states over a territorial domestic order, and 
the autonomy of states in foreign affairs.  
105
 Hallward, for instance, argues that ‗Schmitt‘s book is essentially a rearguard action against‘ the 
possibility of ‗a dis-oriented or egalitarian space‘ as opposed to a territorialized one. As such, says 
Hallward, ‗it can no more explain the past than it can illuminate the present‘ (Hallward, 2005: 239). 
The question of whether his Großraum aligned to some extent ‗Schmitt with Hitlerian foreign policy‘ 
(Miéville, 2006: 131) is also a very important one. But one that, for lack of space, cannot be analysed 
here (for a positive answer see Scheuerman, 1999; Kervegan, 1999: 58-59; 62-64; for a less definite 
response see Koskenniemi, 2002: 241; for a counter-view see Slater, 1999: 69).   
106
 An important text in which the definition of nomos as the passage from a Euro-centric to America-
centric international law is already implicitly present in Schmitt is ‗Die Einheit der Welt‘, 1952. In it, 
Schmitt questions whether ‗human power‘ is ready for a not yet realized unified world structure, which 
he links to, and, therefore, sees as a possible, although not inevitable, result of, tecno-industrial 
development, with a sole central power (Schmitt, 1986). In that text, Schmitt refers to Henry L. 
Stimson as the one who made of ‗the new world unity‘ ideal a ‗true credo‘ (Schmitt quoted in Galli, 
2001). This notion of world unity – as a possible negative outcome of the disintegration of the Jus 
Publicum Europaeum in Schmitt‘s view – is also used by Zolo to explain what he also sees as a 
negative trend toward the unification of the world under the hegemony of the United States (Zolo, 
2002; 2006; 2009b).  
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In an extension and radical re-conceptualization of Schmitt‘s notion of nomos, Agamben 
argues that the new nomos of the earth is the camp. Agamben is specifically referring to the 
concentration camp, although, as we will see later, he also generalizes his own conception of 
nomos to other contemporary ‗camps‘. According to Agamben, the modern camp is created 
exactly at the moment when ‗the political system of the modern nation-state – founded on the 
functional nexus between a determinate localization (territory) and a determinate order (the 
state) which was mediated by automatic regulations of the inscription of life (birth or nation) 
– enters a period of permanent crisis‘ (Agamben, 2000: 42). For Agamben, Schmitt is wrong 
in his discussion of nomos for failing to acknowledge, on the one hand, the element of 
‗nativity‘, with its etymological affinity with ‗nation‘ or the fact that nation-states cannot 
exist without making ‗nativity‘ the foundation of their sovereignty, and, on the other hand, 
that the result of the exception becoming the rule is the camp. In Agamben‘s view, the new 
nomos is produced in the conjunction of localization and order and by ‗the inscription of bare 
life (the birth which thus becomes nation) within the two of them‘ (Agamben, 1998: 175). 
  
Both inside and outside the nation at the same time, according to Agamben, the camp 
represents the space or anti-space of modernity in which ‗every form of life and every rule 
can virtually be taken‘ (Agamben in Vries and Weber, 1997: 115). It corresponds to the 
suspension of law where a zone of anomie is created, which Agamben claims not to be 
unrelated to the juridical order but where normal laws do not apply. In Agamben‘s words, 
‗[t]he suspension of the norm does not mean its abolition, and the zone of anomie that it 
establishes [i.e. the camp] is not (or at least claims not to be) unrelated to the juridical order‘ 
(Agamben, 2004: 23). ‗Whether the first camps to appear were the campos de concentration 
created by the Spanish in Cuba in 1896 […], or the ―concentration camps‖ into which the 
English herded the Boers towards the start of the century‘, for Agamben it is not that 
important (Agamben, 1988: 166). By tracing the origin of state of exception back to the 
Ancient Greece, it is reasonable to suppose that such ‗spaces‘ existed since classical 
antiquity, at least in their latent state. What matters the most, for him, is the fact that camps 
take on specific characteristics, which make them primary site of dehumanization. In other 
words, Agamben is not interested in the chronology of camps, but in explaining how the 
camp, and in particular the Nazi camp, took the form that it took during the Nazi regime, and 
how this form (or anti-form) of exception continues to permeate contemporary societies. For 
him, what counts is not the specificity of different camps
107
 but the fact that it was with the 
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 This could be one of the reasons why Agamben fails to mention what others see as primary sites of 
‗exception‘, such as the slavery plantations (see, for instance, Gilroy, 2000; Mbembe, 2003: 21). Or, 
Agamben‘s focus on the Nazi camp could instead more simply be attributed to his reluctance to see 
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Nazi regime that for the first time a state of emergency was legalized and extended to an 
entire civil population. The Nazi camps relied upon the prior legalization on Schutzhaft 
(protective custody) (1998: 167) and the inhabitants were denaturalized according to legal 
procedures (Agamben 1998: 132). This is what Agamben regards as fundamental. During the 
Nazi regime, the state of exception assumed a juridical configuration insofar as it was 
legalized according to legal procedures, where the imprisonment of an entire civil population 
found its justification in a concern for ‗national security‘ ‗independently of any criminal 
behaviour‘ on the part of Jews and other persecuted groups. He says,  
 
‗Auschwitz is precisely the place in which the state of exception 
coincided perfectly with the rule and the extreme situation 
becomes the very paradigm of daily life‘ (1999a: 49).  
 
Not only did the inclusive (in the camp) exclusion (from society) of the people (the Jews, the 
Romani, the disabled, the homosexuals and other alleged enemies of the state) took place 
within the realm of the law, it was founded upon it. This is what renders the Nazi camp a 
paradigmatic example for Agamben. It is that which exposes the violent underside of 
sovereignty where life becomes indistinguishable from crime and is reduced to the ‗bare life‘ 
of the ‗homo sacer‘.108 In the camp, all traditional distinctions between the human and the 
inhuman, man and non-man become indistinguishable, as the extreme figure of the 
Muselmann makes evident (on the Muselmann see above) (Agamben, 1998: 38).  
 
More importantly, the camp is also that which for Agamben makes the ‗inner solidarity‘ 
between modern democracy and ‗totalitarianism‘ evident109 (Agamben, 1998: 10). Far from 
considering the Nazi camps as aberrations of political modernity or simply as ‗true central 
institution[s] of totalitarian organizational power‘ (Arendt, 1973: 438), Agamben sees the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
and acknowledge other modalities of oppression as well as other ‗parallel histories‘ (Mignolo, 2007: 
32), which could possibly offset his paradigm of exception. Even though the legalization of slavery 
and subsequent biopolitical practices, such as, for instance, the prohibition of mixed marriage 
(Losurdo, 2004), can still be seen as the result to an emergency situation, not all biopolitical racializing 
practices can in fact be linked to ‗bare life‘, the law and/or explained through situation of emergency or 
exception.  
108 As Vogt says in his commentary on Agamben (Vogt, 2005: 79), ‗by means of his etymological 
exercise, Agamben excavates the constitutive ambivalence in the Latin word ―sacer‖‘ as signifying 
somebody who is both sacred and cursed, and as such subjected to a double exclusion. The same 
double exclusion that is associated with the word people in modern times (see the discussion of the 
people above). 
109
 In identifying an inner solidarity between modern democracy and totalitarianism, Agamben clearly 
follows the Frankfurt school. Interesting to note, however, that whereas the concept of totalitarianism 
is central to Arendt‘s work, Agamben only uses the category briefly in his discussion of the camp and 
further takes issue with what he sees as a common theme in both Arendt and Schmitt: their attempt to 
keep ‗the liberal identification of totalitarianism and authoritarianism‘ separate (Agamben, 2004: 74). 
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camp as in some way ‗the hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in which we are 
still living‘ (Agamben, 1997: 108). More precisely, for Agamben, what we are faced with 
today is a topological relation within which ‗to an [juridical-political] order without 
localization (the state of exception, in which the law is suspended) there now corresponds a 
localization without order (the camp as permanent space of exception). The political system 
no longer orders forms of life and juridical rules in a determinate place, but instead contains 
at its very centre a dislocating localization that exceeds it and into which every form of life 
and every norm can be virtually taken‘ (Agamben, 1998: 175, emphasis in the original). It is 
this ‗dislocating localization‘ – which is ‗an inevitably spatial/geographical matrix‘ (Minca, 
2007; Gregory, 2007: 209) – that, for Agamben, constitutes ‗the new matrix of politics 
today‘. Agamben fully endorses Foucault‘s claim that the Nazi state made the management of 
life in biological terms and the sovereign right to kill absolutely coextensive (Foucault, 2003). 
At the same time, he extends Foucault‘s analysis of the concentration camp to include other 
modern spaces of exception, among which Agamben mentions refugee camps and 
Guantánamo but also places like the ‗Arcade Parade near the Paris Airport‘, the ‗gated 
communities of the United States‘ (Agamben, 2000; 2004). This is because he sees these 
places as based on similar biopolitical mechanisms of ‗inclusive exclusion‘ as those 
employed by the Nazis. According to Agamben, what all of these examples have in common 
is that they are based on a logic exclusive inclusion that makes naked life and political life 
‗enter a zone of absolute indeterminacy‘ (Agamben, 2000: 42). To this extent, for Agamben, 
the camp is ‗the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West‘ (Agamben 1998: 181). To 
ignore or dismiss the workings of the camp is to miss fundamental aspects of the Nazi‘s 
regime as well as of modernity and democracy themselves, especially in relation to today‘s 
security developments, which see an increment of measures of exception and of spaces in 
which ‗normal‘ laws do not apply. 
 
Even as Agamben criticizes Schmitt, the centrality of a Schmittian conception of sovereignty 
for his own philosophical and political theory is made evident by his own re-
conceptualization of nomos. The idea of sovereignty as founded on the state of exception and 
as directly linked to the production of bare life is that which allows him to see the camp as 
paradigmatic of modernity and to understand phenomena, such as Guantánamo and Abu 
Ghraib, not as aberrations, but as examples of ‗forms of government‘ that give rise to ‗new 
nomoi of the earth‘. In turn, this perspective helps to challenge the idea that torture abuses 
that happened in Abu Ghraib are a problem of abnormal individuals – a few bad apples – as 
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the Bush administration suggested
110
 and to see abuses as systemic; as the underside of the 
US ‗civilizing‘, ‗liberating‘ and ‗securitization‘ mission. However, as Santiago says, 
Agamben‘s argument is ‗to some degree misleading‘ (Santiago, 2006; Bigo, 2009) in its 
failure to differentiate between the various ‗camps‘ he mentions and in creating a, perhaps, 
too easy equivalence between states of emergency and democracy. Thus, Santiago makes an 
important distinction that, although, arguably, difficult to square within a strictly Agambenian 
point of view because it implies exactly a displacement of the ‗inner solidarity‘ between 
‗totalitarian‘ regimes and democratic ones which, as we have seen is central to Agamben‘s 
understanding of the camp, is useful in attenuating what Negri defines Agamben‘s more 
Heideggerian dimension (Negri, 2003). Santiago points out that while the concentration camp 
is premised on ‗a totalitarian political and legal conception of the state of exception‘, 
contemporary exceptions often rely on ‗juridical-political degrees of exception‘ (Santiago, 
2006: 17). It follows that not all of ‗camps‘ are the same. This, as Santiago suggests, does not 
mean that ‗the use of a narrative of the state of exception in contemporary situations‘ cannot 
lead to a totalitarian – but I would prefer to call it a ‗total‘ for reasons which will become 
clear later – ‗suspension of law in certain political spaces‘ (2006: 18). It does mean, however, 
that one should also be attentive to ‗degrees of exception‘ as to avoid too swift 
generalizations.  
 
Guantánamo, for instance, although apparently ‗beyond the sovereignty of national territory 
and outside the rule of law has also emerged through a long process of legal argument, and it 
subsists through legal formularies‘, involving the United States and Cuba (Kaplan quoted in 
Gregory, 2007: 213; see also Hernández-López, 2009
111
). While still formally under Cuban 
sovereignty, Guantánamo was leased from Cuba in February 1903, two years after the Platt 
Amendment.
112
 In a paradoxical manner, the lease provided Cuba with ‗ultimate sovereignty‘ 
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 See, for instance, Senator John Warner quoted in Schultz, 2004. Rumsfeld himself also tried to play 
torture down (in the same article).  
111
 According to Hernández-López ‗current overseas detention by the United States on Guantánamo‘ 
are facilitated by the legal structures developed through early twentieth century foreign relations 
between ‗Cuba, globally powerful states [the US in particular] and the international system‘ 
(Hernández-López, 2009: 130). Gregory similarly argues that Guantánamo bears the marks of the 
ligatures ‗between colonialism, violence and the law‘ (Gregory, 2007: 211).  
112
 An Act Making Appropriations for the Support of the Army for the Fiscal Year Ending June 13, 
1902, [hereinafter ‗Platt Amendment – US appropriations‘]. The Platt Amendment, drawn during the 
occupation, stipulated the conditions for the withdrawal of United States troops remaining in Cuba 
since the Spanish-American War. It legally implemented protectorate status by limiting Cuba‘s 
sovereignty, prohibiting it from entering into a treaty with another state, controlling Cuba‘s foreign 
relations, and most importantly providing a right to put US bases on its soil (see Hernández-López, 
2009). With the exception of US rights to Guantánamo Bay, the amendment was repealed in 1934 
when the Treaty Between the United States of America and Cuba, 1934 [hereinafter ‗Treaty of 
Relations‘] was negotiated as a part of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s ―Good Neighbor policy‖ 
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and the United States with ‗jurisdiction and complete control‘ over Guantánamo (Hernández-
López, 2009: 126), de facto expropriating Cuba of its authority over the area, while allowing 
the United States to avoid checks on overseas authority in international and constitutional 
law. According to Gregory, what this has produced is ‗a legal impasse: a stand-off between 
the United States (which insists it has a legal right to occupy Guantánamo) and Cuba 
(declaring the continued occupation illegal)‘. For this reason, he suggests, ‗it seems necessary 
to add that the space of Guantánamo also derives from law at a standstill. It is a zone of 
indistinction where the legalized and the extra-legal cross over into one another‘ (Gregory, 
2007: 213). It is an anomic zone where the ‗exceptionalism‘ as well as the imperial power of 
the United States is in full display.  
 
As Agamben seems sometimes to imply as when he talks about the creation of a permanent 
state of exception ‗non declared in the technical sense‘ (see section 1.8 below) but never 
explicitly develops, in some cases, moreover, there seems not even be a need to declare a 
state of exception for emergency measures to be implemented. Thus, whereas the United 
States declared a national emergency after 9/11,
113
 which was followed by a military order in 
November 13, 2001,
114
 many European countries did not. Nevertheless, despite the fact that 
in many cases they did not, a legal framework for dealing with terrorism existing in all 
European constitutions,
115
 international human rights law placing limitations on the use of 
these measures,
116
 after September 11
th
, most European countries did pass a number of 
                                                                                                                                                                              
toward Latin America. The Treaty of Relations is available at <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/dip_cuba001.asp.>, 
while the Platt Amendment can be found at <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1901platt.html.>. 
113
 A national emergency was proclaimed on September 14, 2001 by Proclamation 7463, Declaration of National 
Emergency by Reasons of Certain Terrorist Attacks. It is available at < http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/09/fr091801.html>  
114
 Using the authorization granted to him by Congress (see note above), on November 13, 2001, 
President Bush issued a Presidential Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, which, ‗authorizes ―indefinite detention‖ and trial by ―military 
commission‖ [...] of non citizens suspected involvement in terrorists activities‘ (Agamben, 2005a: 3). 
The order de facto erases any legal status of the individual or more precisely creates a new legal status 
of unlawful enemy combat that which was applied to the Guantánamo prisoners. The order is available 
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html>. In 2006, 
moreover, the US government formally codified the suspension of the habeas corpus in the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA or 2006 MCA). Section 7 of the Act of the MCA was found to be 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court on June 12. The Comissions Act can be found at 
<http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/PL-109-366.pdf> 
115
 Many major European countries have dealt and used emergency measures to deal with terrorism 
(and other matters, including economic ones) before (see Bigo, 2006a; see also Neocleous, 2006; 
Agamben, 2004). Germany (against Baader Meinhof), Italy (against the Red Brigades), Spain (against 
ETA) and the UK (against the Provisional IRA in Ulster), for instance, all made use of emergency 
procedures prior to 9/11 (Bigo, 2006a; Neocleous; 2008). The US too has been using emergency 
measures prior to 9/11 (Agamben, 2005a; Neocleous, 2008).  
116
 All the major conventions on human rights establish conditions of applicability to situations of war 
or other threats that endanger the life of the nation and limitations on emergency measures. Article 4 of 
the ICCPR, article 15 of ECHR and article 27 of the ACHR, part. 1, establishes that emergency 
measures have to be taken to the extent ‗strictly required by the exigencies of the situation‘, which 
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emergency measures, sometimes openly unconstitutional because of the ‗exceptional‘ 
framework that the war on terror has created. Practices of ‗extraordinary rendition‘ (also 
called of torture by proxy), for instance, saw the involvement of the US or US agents, 
intelligence and police operations. Nevertheless, without European countries‘ involvement it 
would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for the US to carry out them.
117
 This has led 
authors, such as Paye, to suggest that these and similar practices
118
 ‗insert European citizens 
into the American system of exceptions to the law‘ and ‗reveal a true imperial structure in 
which the U.S. executive has the right to determine the exception and make it the basis of a 
new legal order‘ (Paye, 2007: [n.d.]). Although some might view the above claim as a bit of 
an overstatement, it is certainly the case that these practices have inserted certain European 
citizens and ‗non-citizens‘ into the American system of exception and law. They, moreover, 
point to ‗a generalization of (the state) of exception‘ that, apart from being based on degrees 
of exception, does not necessarily require to be proclaimed or codified in law to be existent or 
effective. We could say that what we appear to be presented with is not so much the 
emergence of a dictatorship but a generalization, intensification, and proliferation of 
exceptions, decree-laws, and security measures to the point where it becomes increasingly 
difficult to distinguish neatly between democratic and autocratic forms of power.  
 
Following Benjamin‘s critique of violence, in particular his understanding of the relation 
between law-making and law-preserving violence, Agamben seems to make a similar points 
when he says that, ‗the democratic principle of the separation of power is today diminished, 
and the executive has in fact absorbed, at least in part, the legislative power‘ (Agamben, 
2003: 28). Where Agamben seems mistaken, however, is in trying to subsume all laws and 
regulations, as well as laws about deregulations, under the same trend. Is there not a 
difference between the passing of emergency laws or even the proclamation of a national 
emergency and a state of exception or generalized suspension of law? As Schmitt says, ‗[n]ot 
every extraordinary measures, not every police emergency measure or emergency decree is 
                                                                                                                                                                              
implies that measures need to be proportional and limited, while par. 2 of the same articles list those 
rights that are inalienable even in times of emergency. On the procedures and limitations of various 
international Human Rights Treaties with respect to emergency situations, see Zagato, 2006.  
117
 See the European Parliament (EP) Report, Rapporteur: Claudio Fava, (A6-0020/2007) final 30 
January 2007. For an analysis of EU member states‘ involvement in extraordinary rendition and an 
assessment of member states‘ reactions to these two reports and the Parliamentary Assembly of 
Council of Europe report adopted on 8 June 2007, see Toth in Guild and Geyer, 2008. See also 
Murray, 2004. 
118
 In January 2009, President Obama issued an Executive Order 13491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 
banning any interrogation methods not expressly covered in the Army Field Manual 2–22.3. The Order can be found at 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/EnsuringLawfulInterrogations/>, while the Manual is available at 
<http://www.army.mil/institution/armypublicaffairs/pdf/fm2-22-3.pdf.>. The order does not explicitly 
prohibit the use of rendition. For an analysis of what is arguably a very thin distinction between 
extraordinary rendition and rendition, see the House of Commons, Human Rights Annual Report 2008.  
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necessarily an exception‘. ‗What characterizes an exception‘, Schmitt explains, ‗is principally 
unlimited authority, which means the suspension of the entire existing juridical order‘ 
(Schmit, 1985: 8, emphasis added). However tenuous – in practice, as Agamben implicitly 
suggests, the distinction between the suspension of the entire existing juridical order or 
dictatorship and a more limited use of emergency legislations can be problematized on the 
basis that both lead to the establishment of camps
119
 – this distinction is important. It makes 
the distinction between a total suspension of law and degrees of exception as discussed above 
all the more pertinent and further helps to highlight what is specific about today‘s situation. 
Emergency legislations are not exceptional. They do not need to be based on the suspension 
of the entire legal system to function nor do they necessarily lead to dictatorship. They simply 
increasingly are ‗part and parcel of the political administration of contemporary capitalist 
states‘ (Neocleous, 2008: 72; Bigo, 2009). It does not necessarily follow that the word 
exception has to be abandoned. Whether one uses the word ‗exception‘ (Agamben, 2003) or 
‗emergency‘ (Neocleous, 2008) seems less relevant than to distinguish between total 
suspensions of the juridical order, which seem extremely rare, and more partial but no less 
dangerous, and perhaps, more endemic ones.
120
  
 
The increase in the scope of emergency powers and the fact that emergency legislations are 
becoming increasingly endemic is something that Agamben acknowledges – less so the 
broadening of the definition of emergency, especially in relation to industrial disputes, labour 
revolts and social agitations.
121
 However, Agamben‘s reference to ‗a generalization of the 
state of the exception‘ in contemporary societies is too broad and abstract, never clearly 
giving a sense of how this generalization is to be understood in practice; what specific 
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 Agamben is aware of this distinction (Agamben, 2003: 32). However, he intentionally contests the 
idea that the state of exception originates in dictatorship. What most concerns him Agamben is not 
analyzing the specific forms that it takes (e.g., the Roman intitutium, the state of siege, dictatorial 
forms etc.) in different historical times – although he also does that – but pointing out the irreducible 
paradigmatic character of the state of exception: its ability to include by excluding bare life from the 
politico-juridical order.         
120
 This is an argument that Nucleolus makes on the basis that ‗where ―emergency‖ has this sense of 
―emergent‖‘, of emerging from within the rule of law, exception implies a sense of ex capere (being 
taken outside). However, although in a sense correct, this argument seems to ignore that even though 
in Homo Sacer, Agamben does affirm that the ‗exception refers to what is taken out (ex capere)‘, he 
adds that it is ‗not simply excluded‘ and that in Schmitt too the exception is clearly ‗included‘.  
121
 See again Neocleous, 2008. In his book, Critique of Security, Neocleous shows how in the US ‗both 
the history of martial and the state of siege is the history of a shift from regulation of the military 
within the state to regulation by the military of the whole social system‘ (Neocleous, 2008: 47). Martial 
law started to become used during times of ‗peace‘, ‗so that broader moments of crisis, rebellion or 
insurrection could be easily brought under its remit‘ (2008: 48-49). Note, however, that international 
human rights laws explicitly ban the use of emergency legislations for economic reasons (Zagato, 
2006). 
      
 54 
 
mechanisms, apart from those enabled by sovereign power, allow its generalization. Nor is 
there in Agamben a clear examination of how this generalization is to be understood in the 
context of what many see as the decline of the nation-state because of globalization 
processes, including but not simply those related to the increased mobility of people, and how 
it relates to contemporary geopolitical and strategic questions. It will be the aim of the next 
sections (but also of the analysis chapters) to examine in what sense it can be said that ‗the 
state of exception‘ has been generalized and how the state of exception is mediated by the 
connections between war, military occupation, security and international law (Gregory, 
2007).  
 
1.8 The generalization of the (state of) exception 
 
Having looked at how Agamben conceptualizes the state of exception and why he considers 
the camp the new nomos of the earth, I will explain why Agamben‘s characterization of a 
generalized state of exception needs to be integrated with a more extensive analysis of the 
relation between states, security, and the geopolitical. As previously noted, according to 
Agamben, we are today in a situation in which the state of exception is increasingly 
becoming the rule and camps proliferate everywhere. In particular, he links his theory of the 
state of exception to the actions, and in particular, to the ‗legal‘ actions, that the then 
President of the United States, George W. Bush, took after 9/11. This is because Agamben 
saw in President Bush‘s actions an attempt to produce a situation in which ‗provisional and 
exceptional measures‘ were transformed into ‗a technique of government‘ (Agamben, 2005a: 
22; 2). In particular, it is the proximity of the state of exception to the global war on terror – 
which some, including Agamben, have described in terms of ‗global civil war‘ (Hardt and 
Negri, 2004) – that, according to him, renders today‘s situation significant in terms of 
creating the conditions for the generalization of the state of exception (2005a: 2; 87). Also, 
central to this generalization in Agamben‘s view is security, and, in particular, the way in 
which security has become the main form of legitimation of governments. Although highly 
suggestive, this understanding of today‘s conjuncture is unsatisfactory. By privileging the 
state and, more specifically, the Western ‗state‘ (from the Greek polis or city-state to the 
National-Socialist state to the contemporary state-form) as ‗[t]he real subject of history‘122 
                                                             
122
 Note that Agamben actually uses this expression as a critical description of Hegel‘s notion of 
history as the unfolding of ‗the universal Spirit‘ (Agamben, 1993b: 99) and it is not even clear that he 
means a sovereign political entity like the state in this case. Agamben, moreover, would consider a 
notion of the state as motor of history as unacceptably metaphysical or onto-theological (see also his 
discussion of history as discontinuous in History and Infancy, (2007a) [1993]). Nevertheless, my 
argument is that by downplaying the different forms that states take in different historical times as well 
 55 
 
and by treating it as the determinant element of today‘s specific geopolitical configuration, 
Agamben‘s political theory risks to succumb to what I have called ‗methodological 
statism‘.123 That is to say, it risks ignoring how ‗heterogeneous and plural ―forms of 
governance‖‘ (Foucault in Lemke, 2007: 2; see also Hardt and Negri, 2000; 2006) – where 
Europe itself could be considered as a new form of government – work and might in fact 
influence the generalization of the (state of) exception. What an exclusive focus on the state 
as an abstract entity overlooks is how the territory/sovereignty relation is being reconfigured 
because of the war on terror. It fails to pay attention to the way in which, although the war on 
terror was very much initiated by a decision on the exception, and more specifically by 
President Bush‘s decision that the 9/11 terrorist attacks constituted an act of war, the war on 
terror exceeds the paradigm of the state of exception and is linked to global biopolitical 
securitization mechanisms. Even the idea of ‗global civil war‘ (Agamben, 2005a: 3) does not 
get us very far. While, perhaps, valuable as a conceptual framework in other circumstances, it 
is not very useful for analyzing the war on terror.  
 
For a start, it is worth noting that Agamben‘s conceptualization is at odds with certain 
prominent contemporary theories of the state and sovereignty. Whereas other authors suggest 
that state sovereignty is no longer central (see, for instance, Hardt and Negri, 2000; Held, 
1999; Beck, 1992; Castells, 2000; Lash and Urry, 1994), Agamben‘s concern remains on the 
state, and more specifically, on the state as metahistorical-metaphysical-ontological entity. 
Except from the legal dimension of the state, Agamben is not interested in the sociology or 
theory of the state as an apparatus (with its bureaucratic differentiation, group strategies, class 
fractions, political parties, etc.). What interests Agamben is to expose the hidden logic 
governing the state of exception in its production of camps. With regard to today‘s situation, 
however, Agamben does make some very interesting historical observations. In State of 
Exception, for instance, he notices that since Hitler‘s proclamation of the Decree for the 
Protection of the People and the State, which ‗suspended the article of the Weimar 
Constitution concerning personal liberties‘, ‗the voluntary creation of a permanent state of 
emergency (though perhaps not declared in the technical sense) has become one of the 
essential practices of contemporary states, including so-called democratic ones‘ (Agamben, 
2005a: 2). The claim here is not that these practices of exception actually started with the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
as how the territory/sovereignty relation is being reconfigured under globalization, Agamben ends up 
reintroducing an element of transcendence in his thought.  
123
 Although one mode of analysis does not exclude the other, I prefer the expression ‗methodological 
statism‘ to ‗methodological nationalism‘ as that which ‗allowed sociologists to treat societies as if they 
were coherent and bounded entities, distinct from one another, and within the territory of the nation-
state‘ (Beck quoted in Nash, 2010: 63; Beck, 2006) because of the emphasis on the state as opposed to 
society.  
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Hitlerian proclamation, which would contradict Agamben‘s own claim that the exception is 
the hidden topology of power.
124
 Rather, Agamben seems to be suggesting that these 
practices find in constitutional mechanisms, and constitutional law in particular, their 
‗natural‘ substratum.125 It is constitutional law that allows the sovereign to declare a state of 
exception (see also discussion in section 1.6 above).  
 
Agamben then goes on to link his theory to the ‗legal‘ actions of the then President of the 
United States, further introducing what I regard as a fundamental element to an understanding 
of the generalization of the state of exception: security. Agamben says, by deciding to call 
himself ‗the Commander in Chief of the Army‘, G.W. Bush was ‗attempting to create a 
situation in which the emergency [became] the rule, and the very distinction between war and 
peace (and between civil and foreign war) [became] impossible (2005: 22). We should note 
that calling himself the Commander in Chief of the Army is a legitimate and constitutional 
right of the President of the United States. The United States Constitution (1787) affirms that 
the President ‗[…] shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, 
and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United 
States‘.126 As Agamben says, Bush‘s decision to refer to himself constantly as Commander in 
Chief must be considered in the context of presidential claims to sovereign power in 
emergency situations. This decision, for instance, was also taken in 1933 by President 
Roosevelt, who ‗was able to assume extraordinary measures to cope with the Great 
Depression by presenting his actions as those of a commander during a military campaign‘ 
(Agamben, 2005a: 21). There is nothing new or exceptional about this, although, 
interestingly, during the Bush presidency the question about whom the title of ‗Commander 
in Chief‘ applied became a matter of great significance with Secretary of Defense Donald H. 
Rumsfeld announcing that the title would be reserved for the President alone.
127
 Nor was 
Bush‘s declaration of emergencies new. The declaration of national emergencies in the 
United States did not begin with G.W. Bush. Bush continued seven previous National 
                                                             
124
 In particular, see his discussion of Aristotle and of homo sacer above. 
125
 The link between exception and constitution is of course a key Schmittian legacy (not just of 
Schmitt‘s theory but of his practice as a jurist); see the introduction to Constitutional Theory (2007) 
[1928].  
126
 Article II, Section 2, Clause I.  
127
 On October 24, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered that the functional and 
regional commanders be referred to not as ‗CINCs‘ as given the in Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 but as ‗combatant commanders‘ when applied to ‗unified‘ regional 
organizations (e.g., US Central Command or USCENTCOM), or ‗commander‘ when talking about 
‗specified‘ units such as the US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). See, for instance, Morrissey, 
2009: 119: note 36.  
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Emergencies, at the same time as he declared eight more (Relyea, 2006: 4).
128
 What adds a 
new dimension to these declarations is the proximity of these emergencies to a supposedly 
new type of war – a global war fought in the name of combating terrorism through security 
and warfare measures – and ‗the legal formularies that have been mobilized around‘ them 
(Gregory, 2007: 207).
129
 In ‗Security and Terror‘, Agamben declares that  
 
‗[t]oday we face extreme and most dangerous developments in the 
thought of security. In the course of a gradual neutralization of 
politics and the progressive surrender of traditional tasks of the 
state, security becomes the basic principle of state activity. What 
used to be one among several definitive measures of public 
administration until the first half of the twentieth century, now 
becomes the sole criterium of political legitimation‘ (Agamben, 
2001: [n.p.]).  
  
However, Agamben argues that ‗[b]ecause they require constant reference to a state of 
exception, measures of security work towards a growing depoliticization of society‘ and lead 
toward a global civil war ‗which makes all civil coexistence impossible‘ (2001: [n.p.]). 
Although he does not refer to the war on terror in this piece, if read in conjunction with the 
claims made by Agamben above, this understanding of the relation of the state of exception 
and the war on terror does offer a critical framework or ‗grid of intelligibility‘ for analyzing 
the events and aftermath of September 11
th
, while highlighting the importance of security to 
contemporary practices of exception. However, is this framework totally persuasive or 
sufficient? I argue that it is not for a number of reasons.  
 
Firstly, the idea that security is the only source of political legitimation seems overstated. As 
Wendy Brown suggests, the state also draws on other principles for legitimacy (see also 
Weber, 1995; 2006). In Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire, 
Brown explores how in the context of the erosion of state sovereignty, state legitimacy also 
depends on ‗a sustained identification of the state with the principles of equality and liberty‘, 
as well as ‗on the capacity of the state to maintain an unrestive citizenry‘ (Brown, 2006: 102). 
In particular, Brown‘s focus is on tolerance. She focuses on how tolerance discourse becomes 
that which regulates subjectivities within the US, at the same time as it provides a cover for 
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 See Harold Relyea, ‗National Emergency Powers‘, 2006. To contrast terrorism, G. W. Bush passed 
two major national emergencies, namely, the Presidential Proclamation 7463, September 18, 2001: 
Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks; E.O. 13224, September 
25, 2001: Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons who Commit, Threaten to 
Commit, or Support Terrorism. Agamben also mentions the USA Patriot Act signed by Bush in 
October 26, 2001 (PL- 107-56) as being part of what he calls a radically new order (Agamben, 2005a).    
129
 By ‗legal formularies‘, Gregory means ‗the bundles of memoranda and minutes‘, ‗acts and 
amendments‘, etc. that are produced and mobilized around these emergencies.   
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Western supremacy and imperialism. With respect to 9/11 and the war in Iraq, it is interesting 
to observe as Harvey does that it was interpreted by many as an attack on freedom and that 
the war in Iraq was mainly justified in terms of bringing freedom and democracy to those 
countries (Harvey, 2005: 5, 6). Additionally, it could be argued that security has always been 
a very important criterion of political legitimacy. My next section will show exactly this in 
relation to the US – i.e., that the question of security has always been central to the US state – 
while also demonstrating how the paradigm of security has changed to accommodate new 
‗threats‘ and problems.  
 
Secondly, and more to the point, it is undoubtedly the case that protecting the state from the 
threat of terrorism and other threats – terrorism is the number one threat today but, as we 
shall see, the securitization of problems goes well beyond terrorism – is becoming one of the 
main current political justification for the localization of state sovereignty. But what is ‗new‘, 
if anything, about this? Moreover, how is protecting the state from threats to be understood in 
the context of a ‗surrendering of the traditional tasks of the state‘? Agamben seems to suggest 
that this surrendering makes the state more apt to appropriate security for its own ends or 
survival. But because it is legitimate to think that the surrendering processes of which 
Agamben speaks does not simply have an effect on the state but on security itself, a question 
arises as to what type of security does the state draw in its quest for political legitimation. 
According to Duffield, the centrality of a certain conception of security or ‗biopolitical 
security‘ to reinstating the state (Duffield, 2007: 123) as the protector of ‗the people‘ cannot 
be underestimated. But Duffield is indeed talking about a particular type of security, whereas, 
as reflected in the quote above, Agamben seems to proceed as if security was unaffected by 
the surrendering or devolving processes of which he speaks, and as if the logic of the 
exception and security were one and the same. For Agamben, it seems that even if the 
sovereign ban can be said to have some de-territorializing effects, these do not ultimately 
affect the power with which the state affirms its sovereignty. On the contrary, it is by 
deciding on the exception that the sovereign reinforces its authority over a bounded 
geographic area. But how then is the declining of the nation-state to be understood in this 
context? Agamben fails to provide an answer to this and above questions. He also fails to 
provide details on how security, which is certainly crucial to today‘s configuration of 
(sovereign) power, is configured in terms of enabling certain geopolitical localizations and 
possible reconfigurations of sovereignty especially in light of the war on terror. While 
Agamben seems to simply take the waning of the nation state for granted
130
 and does not 
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 See also Agamben‘s discussion of the problem of the refugee in ‗We Refugee‘ (1995) where, 
following Arendt, he directly connects it to the waning of the nation-state. He states that the problem 
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dwell much on the concept of security, other theorists have provided sophisticated, although 
not always convincing, analyses of the relationship between globalizing processes and the 
nation state, on the one hand (Held, 1999; Hardt and Negri, 2000 among others), and 
globalization and security, on the other (again Held, 1999; Held and MeGrew, 2007; Hardt 
and Negri, 2004; but also Kaldor, 2007; Bigo, 2008).  
 
Even the idea of ‗global civil war‘ (Agamben, 2005a: 3), which, following Schmitt (2003 
[1943]), Agamben uses somewhat uncritically, does not provide an adequate framework for 
understanding today‘s situation, precisely for the reasons indicated by Étienne Balibar in his 
2006 ‗Enemies as Strangers‘. According to Balibar, the notion of global civil war is 
inadequate because even as it brings attention to the declining legitimacy of the nation-state 
and ‗accounts for the increasing confusion between police operations and war‘, it risks 
detaching conflicts from their local specificities and presenting them as part of a unified 
phenomenon (Balibar, 2006). As Balibar remarks, ‗the tendency to merge a complex web of 
religious, social, ethnic, political, colonial, and post-colonial bloody conflicts into one single 
―hobbesian‖ state of ―war of all against all,‖ a sort of post-historical state of nature, as it 
were, or an ―Empire of Disorder‖ or Empire du chaos (2002) as Alain Joxe aptly calls it, is 
itself a representation and perhaps a strategy used by a would-be sovereign power which 
seeks global leadership beyond its actual military and economic capacities‘ (Balibar, 2006: 8-
9). In other words, the concept of ‗global civil war‘ risks reinforcing the idea that war and 
violence are not simply an integral part of our present capitalist conjuncture but, in a 
Hobbesian sense, natural and unchangeable,
131
 constitutive of modern politics as such. Thus, 
as Balakrishnan writes, it ‗risks amounting to little more than a slack metaphorics, detracting 
attention from a sober assessment of the capacities and limits of military power in the present 
conjuncture‘ (Balakrishnan, 2005: [n.p.]). What is more, precisely because it uses a very 
similar language as that employed by the US administration, it paradoxically risks reinforcing 
its presuppositions rather than contesting them. To this extent, the idea of ‗global civil war‘, 
while perhaps valuable as a conceptual tool in other contexts, is not very useful for analyzing 
what appears as a ‗reaffirmation‘ of sovereign power, and in particular of military power, 
through the war on terror.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
of the refugee occurs ‗in the context of the inexorable decline of the nation-state and the general 
corrosion of traditional legal-political categories‘ (Agamben, 1995: [n.p.]) And he adds  that ‗at least 
until the process of the dissolution of the nation-state and its sovereignty has come to an end‘, ‗the 
refugee is the sole category in which it is possible today to perceive the forms and limits of a political 
community to come‘ (Agamben, 1994). Whether this affirmed decline is to be comprehended also as 
the result of globalizing processes, which include but are not reducible to the problem of the refugee, 
or solely in terms of pressure put on the structure of national sovereignty by the fact of growing 
numbers of refugees, is left unexplained in Agamben.   
131
 Žižek‘s discussion of politics as violence also seems to go in this direction. See Žižek, 2007.  
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Agamben‘s idea of global civil war lacks specificity, while his theory of the state of 
exception is too focused on the state or on the paradoxical relation between the state as 
sovereign power and constitutional law, to provide an understanding of what role other ‗state-
like‘ actors, such as the EU, and international law, security regimes and geopolitical factors, 
play in the war on terror. This is because even if Agamben‘s Benjaminian theoretical answer 
to the state of exception of a real state of exception in which fact and law coincides does go 
beyond Schmitt‘s vision of the political, his analysis remains too state-centred and, to some 
extent, even more state-centred than Schmitt‘s vision of a ‗new nomos‘ was. Schmitt‘s 
conception of Grossraumen or ‗great spaces‘ can be seen as a profoundly reactionary answer 
to the end of the Jus Publicum Europaeum in the form of  a doctrine and legal theory that 
nevertheless attempted to understand and recognize the power of some nation-states to 
reframe the ‗Westphalian‘ system. As Koskenniemi says, ‗the merit of the Grossraum 
principle lay in the realistic recognition it implied that some powers radiated their culture, 
economy and influence beyond their formal boundaries‘ (Koskenniemi, 20002: 421, emphasis 
original). On the other hand, a focus on internal mechanisms or logics of state power has 
several limitations, such as failing to note what Schmitt argued was an intimate connection 
between the state of exception within a state‘s territory and belligerent occupation where, in 
practice, ‗the population of the occupied territory is not considered to be a legal subject‘, 
thus, outside of the purview of international law (Schmitt, 2003: 207).
132
 This is not to 
suggest that we can simply apply Schmitt‘s approach, which sidesteps all fundamental 
questions ‗of justice, fairness, legitimacy and so on‘ (Hallward 2005: 238), to our 
contemporary situation. However, it does mean that we have to ask, even if it means going 
beyond Agamben, how is the (state of) exception operationalized and generalized? What 
geopolitical factors contribute to it? What logics and mechanisms of (bio)power or 
(bio)security enable its generalization? How is this generalization to be conceived in terms of 
the apparent decline of the nation state and the emergence of ‗new‘ global networks of power, 
which makes it, among other things, increasingly difficult to maintain a strict line of 
demarcation between the internal order and the external or international order; between the 
police and the military?
133
  
 
As noted above, contrary to Agamben‘s ‗methodological statism‘, the idea that the state and 
its mode of government should be the main unit of analysis, authors such as David Held 
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 See also Gregory, 2007: 209; Stirk, 2004. 
133
 The blurring of the distinction between the police and the military has been noted by Gaines, et al., 
1999; Bigo, 2008: 14; Balibar, 2003a, among others.  
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argue (2002: 1-44),
134
 that an analysis of the state cannot afford not to take into account 
processes of globalization, which affect the nation state in its core functions.
135
 Such 
approaches suggest that processes of globalization, such as processes of privatization and 
transnationalization of techniques of governing, which, crucially, include the 
transnationalization of security,
136
 the rise of global social movements and of international 
organizations, such as the WTO, World Bank, and IMF have greatly weakened the power of 
the nation state. In particular, authors such as Held and McGrew suggest that what we are 
observing is a process of relocation of the traditional tasks of the state from the state to ‗the 
international community‘, and the involvement a number of private agencies, which 
increasingly perform functions that were hitherto nation-state specific (Held and McGrew, 
2007; Fraser, 2003; Duffield, 2007; Bigo, 2008). For Nancy Fraser, the military and security 
functions ‗are being disaggregated, relocated and rescaled as a result of ―humanitarian 
interventions,‖ peacekeeping operations,‖ the ―war on terrorism,‖ and a host of multilateral 
security arrangements‘ (Fraser, 2003: 167). Bigo further points to ‗a transversal field of 
processes of (in)securitization, whereby a certain number of professionals from public 
institutions with domains internal to the nation – the police –or external to the nation – such 
as the military and private enterprise selling protection and technologies of control and 
surveillance – occupy the dominant position‘ (Bigo, 2008: 14). 
 
The waning of nation states‘ sovereignty because of globalization processes has even led 
some authors to talk about ‗global sovereignty‘ to indicate today‘s ‗decentered and 
deterritorializing apparatus of rule‘137 (see, for instance, Hardt and Negri, 2000: xii; 
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 See, for instance, Held, 2002; Held and McGrew, 2007; Beck, 1992; Sassen, 2001; Hardt and Negri, 
2000; Elden, 2007; Bigo, 2008.    
135
 However, it is important to notice that debate about globalization and its effects on the nation state 
is a very rich one, involving many different authors and opinions. Not only those (so called the ‗hyper-
globalizers‘) who see processes of globalization as totally novel phenomena (see, for instance, 
Ohmaey, 1996), those (the sceptical) who do not (see, for instance, Hirst and Thompson, 1999) and 
those who contest it. Those who see it as a mainly Western process (see, for instance, Latouche 1996; 
Ritzer, 2000; Amin 1996; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1999) and others, who talk about a less monolithic 
process of contamination between different cultures, people, etc. and of reconfigurations of time and 
space (see, for instance, Giddens, 1991; Robertson, 1992; Held, 2002; Appadurai, 1996; Lash and 
Urry, 1994; Mezzadra and Rahola, 2006; Sassen, 2006). But those who argue that they greatly affect 
the nation state, diminishing its power (again Held, 2002; Lash and Urry, 1994; also Castells, 2000; 
Hardt and Negri, 2000; Fraser, 2009; Harvey, 1990), with some even declaring the end of the nation 
state (see, for instance, Guéhenno, 1995), and those who play this down (see again Hirst and 
Thompson, 1999). For a comprehensive introduction to the debates about globalization, see Held and 
McGrew (eds.) 2000.  
136
 By the transationalization of security is meant the process by which (in)security professionals 
participate in the production of transnational ‗truths‘ or threats through the ‗authority of statistics‘ 
(Bigo, 2008: 11-12).    
137
 It is important to point out that this is somewhat of an oversimplification, in part made to get the 
point across. Negri also says that the concept ‗global sovereignty‘ should not be understood as a 
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Robinson, 2009). Hardt and Negri use the term ‗Empire‘ to describe a new form of 
supranational imperial sovereignty that is irreducible to a particular state or group of states, 
region or place (such as the United States, the ‗West‘ or the ‗North‘). As ‗a new logic and 
structure of rule‘, Empire does not ‗rely on fixed boundaries or barriers‘ but is ‗connected to 
globalization‘ (Weber, 2005: 127), in the sense that it rests upon an expansive logic of 
networks that ‗incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers‘138 
(2000: xi, xii). Empire is a transnational political structure, which serves the interests of 
‗global capital‘. According to Hardt and Negri, from a phase of history based on colonial and 
imperial wars and conquests of regions, we pass ‗to a new phase of capital beyond 
imperialism‘; to a place (or non-place) of imperial sovereignty, no longer based on ‗fixed 
boundaries and distinctions between inside and outside‘ but on ‗capitalism‘s internalization 
of its outside‘ (2000: 187). Classical 19th and early 20th century imperialism, as the ‗extension 
of sovereignty of the European nation-states beyond the borders of its own countries‘, is no 
longer the driving force or principle form of capitalism‘s inherent tendency to expand.139 
Empire represents a qualitative break with the past and all previous forms of imperialist 
expansions. In Hardt and Negri‘s words, ‗[i]mperialism is over‘ (2000: xvi). ‗What used to be 
conflict or competition among several imperialist powers has in important respects been 
replaced by the idea of a single power that overdetermines them all, structures them in a 
unitary way, and treats them under one common notion of right that is decidedly postcolonial 
and postimperialist‘ (2000: 9). Military interventions do continue to take place but they are 
no longer taking place along the lines of national imperialist (i.e., economic and political) 
interests. Rather they take place as global police actions legitimated by universal values 
                                                                                                                                                                              
coherent fully actualized capacity but as a ‗tendency‘. In one of his latest books, moreover, although he 
maintains the transition from imperialism to Empire, he further argues that ‗Empire is not fully realized 
today‘, but ‗an emergent form the power we shall have to confront tomorrow‘ (Negri, 2009: 127). This 
again relates to his notion of tendency. For an understanding of what Negri means by ‗tendency‘, see 
his 1971 work ‗Crisis of the Planner-State‘. For a critique of Negri‘s recent works for having de facto 
flattened the notion of tendency as a non-deterministc ‗adventure of reason‘ that needs verification, 
making it appear as if the tendency has already been realized, see Noys, 2010.    
138
 The tendency of capitalism to incorporate everything within its ‗frontiers‘ was one already noted by 
Marx, and later developed by Luxemburg and Lenin, as Hardt and Negri do not fail to point out (Hardt 
and Negri, 2000: 224). However, while in Lenin an understanding of the disparities and rivalry 
between different states counterbalanced this tendency, Hardt and Negri‘s notion of ‗the end of 
imperialism‘ seems to be closer to Kautsky‘s notion of ‗ultra-imperialism‘ than to Lenin‘s 
understanding of the problem. Accordingly, their notion of Empire can be subjected to similar 
criticisms as Kautsky‘s view, namely that it ignores ‗the unevenness and contradictions‘ inherent in the 
world economy. On this, see Callinicos, 2009.  
139
 The literature on imperialism is enormous. See, for instance, Hobson, 1902; Lenin, 1974 [1917]; 
Luxemburg, 2003 [1913]; Kautsky, 1970; Arendt, 1973; Said, 1993 [1979], among many others. Due 
to its vastness and richness, it would not be possible to do it justice here. Instead, I rely on the 
definition of imperialism offered by Hardt and Negri in Empire. Later on, I will expand a little on this 
theme through ‗new‘ theories of imperialism, and in particular that of Harvey, 2003.    
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(2000: 18),
140
 which have now become ‗imperial‘. According to Hardt and Negri, US 
imperialism ended with the Vietnam War, ‘and indeed no [other] nation state can today form 
the center of an imperial project‘ (2000: 384 and xiii-xiv, emphasis original). 
 
The aforementioned approaches bring attention to other sites or determinations of power than 
the state. In particular, Hardt and Negri‘s multi-leveled approach to the question of capital 
has the advantage of re-introducing the question of governamentality or of a diffuse, 
anonymous network of power of global scope, while delinking it from that of the state; a 
question that, as Bigo suggests, Agamben ‗ends up neglecting‘ (Bigo, 2009).141 Yet strong 
objections can be raised about the extent to which US practices, allegedly enacted to combat 
and prevent terrorism, can be fully accommodated within the theory of Empire. Authors, such 
as Brown (2006, 2008), but also Harvey (2003), accept that the nation-state as a form of 
power is in crisis. Brown, for instance, suggests that the state becomes openly aggressive as a 
consequence of its weakening (Brown, 2008). What in my view they rightly question, 
however, is Hardt and Negri‘s (and other theorists of globalization) inability to appreciate the 
extremely potent functions of state sovereignty (Brown, 2008; Wood, 2004; Agnew, 2005; 
but also and again Agamben, 1998), and its imperialistic tendencies (Harvey, 2003; many of 
the papers in Balakrishnan, 2003). The actual decline of the nation state, which, as Bigo 
suggests, is particularly apparent in the privatized segments of police and military 
bureaucracies (Bigo, 2008), does not correspond to its end. Nor does it correspond to the end 
of state sovereignty. The state in effect never was all-powerful and all-encompassing. As 
Thorup says, claims that take the decline of the nation state as a proof of its end often rely ‗on 
an exaggeration of the power of the modern state historically, where the theoretical definition 
as the legitimate and the effective monopoly of violence is taken to be an accurate description 
of its practices‘ (Thorup, 2006: 235; Foucault, 2003). Accordingly, to overestimate the power 
of the state and in particular of the United States when the limits of its actions, specifically of 
its military actions, are all the more evident (Mann, 2005; Kaldor, 2007), is certainly 
problematic. This view risks giving the state a too big role, while ignoring the important role 
                                                             
140
 Thus, for instance, the 1991 Gulf War, in which the United States used military power against Iraq, 
was, according to them, carried out ‗not as a function of [the United States’] own national motives but 
in the name of global rights‘ (2000: 180 emphasis original).  
141
 Whether Hardt and Negri‘s notion of ‗governmentality‘ is congruent with that of Foucault is, of 
course, another matter altogether. For a thoroughly negative answer, which rejects Hardt and Negri‘s 
notion of Empire tout court, see Rabinow and Rose, 2003. For a more sympathetic, but no less 
effective critique, see Toscano, 2007a. In both works, it is argued that Hardt and Negri‘s biopolitics is 
unsatisfactory to the extent that it ignores the capillary and subjectifying mechanisms of biopolitical 
‗sub-power‘. Nevertheless, I suggest that despite this evident problem, it is precisely their emphasis on 
the global that makes Hardt and Negri‘s theory of ‗governmentality‘ attractive, especially for an 
exploration of security practices like mine that is concerned with both ‗micro‘ 
(subjectifying/biopolitical) and ‗macro‘ mechanisms of power.   
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of other global non-state or nongovernmental organizations, self-determination movements, 
etc., and the fact that the state acts within a capitalist system that is itself  violent
142
 and 
governed by its own the exploitative,
143
 deterritorializing and all-englobing logic (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000; Reid, 2004). It is, for instance, interesting to note in passing that the US is in no 
better position today‘s to control the ‗global economy‘ than it was when the war on terror 
started almost 10 years ago;
144
 not to mention its non-effectiveness in policing ‗the excluded‘ 
and providing even the most basic security needs to the populations that it has invaded. The 
current economic recession and the proliferation of private military and security contracts in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan
145
 are testaments to American failures and further give credit to the 
idea that America‘s power is not independent from global dynamics nor its military from a 
capitalist order whose mechanisms of survival are in question (Balakrishnan, 2005).  
 
On the other hand, however, to downplay or deny, as Kaldor for instance does, the role that 
the state, especially certain states, have had and continue to have seems just wrong.
146
 It is the 
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 On the global violence of capitalism see, for instance, Luxemburg, 2003 [1913]. For a more 
contemporary take see, for instance, and again Harvey, 2003; see also Davis, 2006; Klein, 2007; 
Marazzi, 2010b. 
143
 Whether the exploitative logic of capitalism can be reduced to the process of ‗baring‘ of which 
Agamben speaks is also in doubt. It is surely the case that many workers (including children), 
especially those who do not benefit from workers‘ rights either because of their ‗illegal‘ or ‗low‘ 
status, are forced to live in inhuman conditions, which expose them to the threat of death (Cheah, 
2006; Davis, 2006). However, it is not ‗necessary‘ for workers to live in inhuman conditions or be 
exposed to the risk of death to be exploited. Even when workers appear not to be exploited, in reality, 
they almost always are. To give just an example: participants in the ‗informal economy‘, who appear to 
be ‗micro-entrepreneurs‘, in reality also ‗work directly or indirectly for someone else (via the 
consignment of goods or the rental of a pushcart or rickshaw, for example)‘ and are, if to varying 
degrees, exploited in the process (Davis, 2006: 180-181).    
144
 To say that the US is in no better position with regard to the ‗global economy‘ implies that one the 
of aims of the Bush administration was to control the global economy (Harvey, 2003:  Klein, 2007). 
However, it is important to point out that this is a contested view, ‗as testified by the spectrum of 
positions on the role of oil in the invasion of Iraq‘ (Toscano, 2007c: [n.p.]). Thus, for instance, you 
have those such as Kaldor (2007) who question whether oil was at all a reason to go to war against 
Iraq. Whilst others, like Klein, argue that the invasion of Iraq created the conditions ‗for its subsequent 
pillage‘  and notes that, several of the architects of the Iraq war no longer even bother to deny that oil 
was a major motivator for the invasion‘ (2008: [n.p.]). Although not as central to my thesis as the 
question of sovereign power, biopower and security are, the question of oil, and of general resources 
more broadly, is important and will be expanded upon in my analysis of the US NSSs.  
145
 The proliferation of private military and security contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan is well 
documented (see, for instance, Elsea and Serafino, 2007:  4; Howison, 2006: 7; Stöber, 2007: 126- 
131; Singer, 2003).
 
The utilization of private military and security contracts did not begin with the war 
on terror – private contractors were utilized in Bosnia and Kosovo, for instance, (Singer, 2003). But it 
does seem to be taking on a new dimension. Whereas before mercenaries were undisciplined 
individuals hired on an irregular basis, according to Singer (2003: 9), after the 1990s, Private Military 
Corporations (PMCs) started to become employed on a more regular basis. The present massive 
utilization of private contracts can also be seen as a novel phenomenon (Stöber, 2007: 128). 
146
 In treating the United States as an exception, or in her words as ‗the last nation-state‘ whose 
response to 9/11 is a ‗spectacle response‘ trying ‗to redraw the boundary between ―inside‖ and 
―outside‖, to identify a new ―other‖‘ but is destined to fail (Kaldor, 2003: 151), Kaldor underestimates 
the US actual power as well as other states‘ potential power.   
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geopolitical dimension, with its relations of force, that gets lost in approaches that do not take 
into consideration the unequal distribution of power in the international system – a 
distribution that while favouring certain states today could favour others tomorrow. As Elden 
suggests, territorial relations continue to be significant, even if the sovereignty-territory 
relation is being reconfigured (Elden, 2009).
147
 Apart from its hegemonic power, clearly 
visible when it comes to how the US was able to get the war on terrorism framework adopted 
by its allies,
148
 it is important to point out that, despite the present recession, the US remains a 
dominant, if not the dominant, economic player.
149
 It is true that a great deal of its economic 
power no longer comes from the manufacturing industry
150
  but from the world of finance – a 
world that given its precariousness is, and some would argue not surprisingly, in crisis 
(Harvey,  2003). As Harvey argues, the same financial power that enabled the US economic 
elite or upper class, with the help of the ‗neoliberal state‘ – which in this perspective is not 
seen as a passive spectator or victim of globalization
151
 – to assemble a great deal of wealth 
during the 1980s and 1990s seems to have contributed, together with the immense amount of 
spending to finance the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to US economic recession (Harvey, 
2004: [n.p.]; 2007). However, even though the US is no longer the dominant player in the 
world of production and ‗its‘ financial power is in crisis, it continues to remain very much 
dominant in military and nuclear terms. The United States has the largest defence budget in 
the world and it has continued to increase its military spending (even if mainly though 
borrowing) to finance the ‗global war on terror‘ (Perlo-Freeman et al., 2009: 179-190; 
Harvey, 2003; 2006b). These are facts that necessarily have had an impact when it came to 
decisions about whether to engage in the war on terror and how, and cannot completely be 
discounted when it comes to analyzing US security strategies that explicitly deal with how to 
contrast and combat terrorism. They also, surely, have influenced US allies, and in particular 
European states as well as the EU, when it came to take decisions in this respect.  
 
                                                             
147
 Elden says ‗[r]ather than a process of simple deterritorialization, there is a concomitant process of 
reterritorialization‘ (Elden, 2009: 177).   
148
 The fact that this framing was not always accepted, at least not in its entirety (see, for instance, the 
pronouncement of France against the Iraq war) does not disprove US influence. On the contrary, it 
highlights its hegemonic power. Willingly or unwillingly, other states, including EU member states, 
had to confront US decisions.            
149
 At present, the American economy is the largest national economy in the world, followed by China, 
which, however, many argues will ‗become (if it isn‘t already) the world‘s next superpower‘ (Johnson, 
2010: [n.p.]).  
150
 As Harvey says, ‗much of it has moved to East and Southeast Asia, and, of course, quite a bit is in 
Europe as well‘ (Harvey, 2004: [n.p.]). 
151
 This perspective would also be in line with Foucault‘s discussion of neo-liberal governmentality as 
prolongation of government (Lemke, 2002).  
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On a theoretical level, moreover, it seems simplistic to argue that because the imperialist aims 
of the Bush administration produced unintended effects it follows that the theory of Empire, 
which contends that we are in the presence of a new fully actualized world sovereignty, has 
been proved by facts. This argument tends to obscure ‗the kind of dialectical tension inherent 
in imperialism‘ between the state and the economy (Harvey, 2003; Callinicos, 2009; Cox, 
2004), which, as discussed below, Hardt and Negri do not fail to mention but fail to 
validate.
152
 Harvey defines imperialism as a contradictory fusion of ‗the politics of state and 
empire‘ [...] and the molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time‘ (Harvey, 
2003: 26 emphasis added; see also Arrighi, 2005). For Harvey, it is ‗uneven geographical 
conditions under which capital accumulation occurs and asymmetries that inevitably arise out 
of spatial exchange relations‘ that give rise to ‗imperialism‘ (Harvey, 2003: 31). Thus, when 
Negri says that ‗the markets might become the true obstacle for Bush‘ (Negri, 2003: [n.p.]), 
he is in part correct – in part because as Klein and other have observed markets do profit from 
wars – and de facto accepts that there is a tension between the territorial logic of the state and 
the logic of capitalist accumulation. However, in an attempt to defend his theory, he (along 
with Hardt)
153
 ends up smoothing out this contradiction, while ignoring continuities between 
previous and current imperial practices. I will return to the tension between the logic of the 
state and that of capitalism in a moment. But first, let me provide what I believe is a better 
way of conceptualizing the decline of the nation-state in the context of what appears to be a 
reaffirmation of sovereignty.  
    
In opposition to both ‗Hardt and Negri‘s claim that nation-state sovereignty has transformed 
into global Empire, and Agamben‘s thesis that sovereignty has metamorphosed into a world-
wide production and sacrifice of bare life (global civil war)‘, Wendy Brown suggests that 
sovereignty is best understood as migrating in two different directions at the same time 
(Brown, 2008: 251-252). According to her, ‗political sovereignty – as idea, fiction, or 
practice – is neither equivalent to the state nor merely in the service to capital‘ (Brown, 2008: 
257). Brown defines sovereignty as a ‗theological political practice‘ that is migrating ‗from 
the nation state to the unrelieved domination of capital on the one hand and god-sanctioned 
political violence on the other‘ (2008: 257, 252, emphasis original). For her, sovereignty is 
theological because it draws on God for political legitimacy.
154
 She says ‗[p]olitical 
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 This is a tension that Klein‘s ‗shock doctrine theory‘ also fails to validate.  
153
 See Hardt, 2003. 
154
 Note, however, that in this Brown seems closer to Agamben than she perhaps would like to admit. 
Although the claim that political sovereignty is theological in and throughout is counterbalanced by her 
noticing the failure of contemporary discussions of sovereignty to take into account ‗the power of the 
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sovereignty is never absent from [sic] theological structure and overtones, whether it is 
impersonating, dispelling, killing, rivaling or serving God‘ (2008: 260). This, she suggests, is 
evident in all major modern theories of sovereignty ‗from Hobbes to Connolly, passing 
through Abbe Sieyes, Jean Bodin, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau‘, and in how modern rulers, 
such as G.W. Bush – Brown also mentions the President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – 
draw on God to legitimate their power. Brown‘s ‗tentative suggestion‘, as she herself puts it, 
is that ‗political sovereignty‘s theological supplement becomes more manifest as sovereignty 
itself weakens‘ (2008: 261). According to her, many theories preoccupied with sovereignty, 
therefore, paradoxically and unconsciously, risk colliding with the effort of ‗a motley range 
of bellicose states [...] to revive and reassert a theologically contoured fiction about the 
autonomy of the political as it is overwhelmed by the economic, by the materiality of global 
capital and by the political rationality of neoliberalism‘ (2008: 251).  
 
The question therefore is: is it possible to be preoccupied with sovereignty without 
reasserting the idea of the autonomy of the political? Although not easy – the difficulty of 
going beyond what Brown calls the fiction of the sovereignty of the political is made evident 
not only by Agamben but by Brown‘s own cautious answer (Brown, 2008; see also note 144 
above) – if coupled with other understandings, Brown‘s own solution offers means for doing 
as such. By treating sovereignty as more than state-centred, one can attempt to analyse the 
movements of sovereignty – from the state to capital for instance, or from the state to other 
non-state or ‗state-like‘ actors such as the EU – while still being attentive to how state 
sovereignty is organized
155
 and organizes the space inside and outside the state (Brown, 2008: 
253). This means acknowledging how the US state required others to accept that normal laws 
no longer applied by the simple act of declaring a state of emergency, while still being able to 
analyse the specific ideological and discursive strategies beyond this declaration. It also 
means looking at how something like ‗the territorial logic of the state‘, as that which aims to 
control territory and populations (Arrighi, 1994: 36; see also Harvey, 2005: 132
156
) and 
which, as we shall see in a moment, is strictly connected to the generalization of the (state of) 
exception but is not the same thing, is at work in these strategies. Exploring how the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
demos to make laws for itself‘ (Brown, 2008: 252) and she does discusses democracy in other works 
(2006a), no such account is provided in the aforementioned essay.  
155
 On this, see Biersteker and Weber (1996). They too describe sovereignty as an ambiguous concept 
and further distinguish between ‗internal‘ and ‗external‘ sovereignty, where ‗‗internal‘ refers to the 
existence of some ultimately authority over a particular domain and ‗external‘ refers to the recognition 
of authority by others‘ (Biersteker and Weber, 1996: 2).  
156
 Harvey expands on Arrighi‘s territorial of the state. By terrirotorial logic, Harvey means ‗the 
political, diplomatic and military strategies invoked and used by a terrritorially defined entity such as a 
state as it struggles to assert its interests and accumulate power in its own right‘ (2005: 132). For how 
Harvey‘s use of this distinction differs from Arrighi‘s, see Arrighi, 2005: note 15.  
 68 
 
territorial logic of the state and what role it plays in the generalization of (the state) of 
exception is extremely important as it brings attention exactly to the geopolitical dimension I 
was emphasizing before through Schmitt. Although, as I have previously argued, the logic of 
exception is biopolitical and inexorably spatial, I suggest it would be mistaken to simply 
superimpose the sovereign logic of exception and the territorial logic of the state. 
 
Like the logic of exception, the territorial logic of the state does seem to involve the 
identification of a broadly defined ‗enemy‘. However, in both cases the dependency on the 
friend/enemy distinction is not always explicit. Thus, the logic of exception can be founded  
on security considerations that do not involve straightforwardly classified enemies (see, for 
example, logics of exception aimed at immigrants or other supposed threats that are not 
straightforwardly classified as enemies). At the same time, when it comes to the territorial 
logic of the state, the identification of an enemy becomes essential when a state or a number 
of states decide to go to war with another country but again is not strictly essential to the 
imposition of sanctions. Now, the wars waged in the name of defending democracy and 
freedom against the threat of terrorism, that is, the wars in Afghanistan and that against Iraq, 
did not appear to have as their aims explicit territorial conquest. As some rightly suggest, 
these wars, especially the Afghanistan one, were not just about oils and resources but about 
control of populations as well as strategic positioning and area of influence (see Harvey, 
2003; see also Zolo, 2006). But this does not mean that something like territorial logics were 
not involved. As Harvey suggests the territorial logic is also about the accumulation of 
power in its own right (Harvey, 2005). 
 
To this extent, although functional to the war on terror as premised on a state of exception, 
the territorial logic of the state follows its own imperial modality of operation as described 
above. Specifically, it follows an imperial mode of operation that is neither reducible to the 
state of exception nor to the logic of capital. Although de facto inextricable,157 the state and 
capital are also better conceptualized as distinguishable by ‗a (logical) difference in kind‘ 
(Toscano, 2004: 200). Though it is worth pointing out, following the likes of Tilly,
158
 that 
state‘s powers of coercion always has capital as its means (in the banal materialist sense that 
wars, especially imperialist ones, cannot be waged without financial power), the state is better 
conceptualized as an assemblage of relations, whose logics of power, whether ‗exceptional‘ 
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 As Arrighi points out, [h]istorically the capitalist and territorial logics of power have not operated in 
isolation from one another, but in relation to one another within a spatial-historical context‘ (Arrighi, 
1994: 34; Harvey, 2003; Callinicos, 2009).    
158
 See Tilly, 1990.  
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or territorial, are not completely subsumable to the logic of capitalism.
159
 The idea that the 
logics of state power are not completely subsumable to the logic of capitalism or exploitation 
enables an interpretation of the war on terror as reflecting state‘s sovereign, territorial and 
security/exceptional practices, which, although not disconnected from those enabled by 
neoliberal capitalism, are not isomorphic with the latter. It further enables an understanding 
of the generalization of the (state of) exception, as involving more than first envisaged by 
Agamben. The decision on the exception as well as the emphasis on a specific conception of 
security of which more will be said in the section below are essential to the generalization of 
the (state of) exception. However, it is clearly not enough for a state to declare a state of 
exception for the state of exception to become dominant. It is because of the specific position 
of the United States in the global economy and of its hegemonic power that it was able to 
wage a global war against terrorism. This dimension also needs to be taken into account in 
discussions that have as their aim an exploration of the US attempt to globalize the state of 
exception.   
 
1.9 The US and Biopolitical Security  
 
As Agamben says, the importance of security to the state is not new. ‗Security as the basic 
principle of state politics dates back to the birth of the modern state‘ (Agamben, 20001: 
[n.p.]). But: in what sense is security essential to the continuation of the war on terror broadly 
constructed? What type of security are we talking about here? Agamben‘s answers to these 
questions seem to rely on an under-appreciation of the transformation of security. His idea 
that security is the guiding principle of the state does not help to understand when and why a 
certain conception of security, that is, ‗human security‘ – which differs from but is not 
unconnected to ‗territorial security‘ – became a key plank US state.160 The analysis below 
provides a brief historical account of the development of the ‗new‘ regime or paradigm of 
security. This account will allow us to contextualize the emergence of biopolitical security in 
its relation to the US state – the initiator of the war on terror – and in turn to place US 
national security strategies as given in the 2002 and 2006 NSSs and as analysed in Chapter 3 
in the context of a broader shift of security developments.    
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 This would explain why, even though the US state was arguably attempting to control the global 
economy (Harvey, 2003: 19; for a counter-view see Kaldor, 2007), it could not.  
160
 Clearly, this line of questioning can also be fruitfully extended to other states, whose approach to 
‗biopolitical security‘ might in fact have developed somewhat differently, with different results. For an 
interesting article that move beyond the US case and examines contemporary strategies for managing 
biorisks in three European states: France, Germany and the United Kingdom, see Lentzos and Rose, 
2009. With respect to the European approach to ‗biopolitical security‘, see my analysis chapter on 
Europe.  
 70 
 
 
In line with Foucault, Agamben argues that it was during the second half of the eighteenth 
century, with the emergence of biopolitics that the paradigm of security reached its fullest 
development (Agamben, 2001). Moving on from this, Agamben suggests that to a situation 
where ‗what used to be one among several decisive measures of public administration until 
the first half of the twentieth century, now becomes the sole criterion of political 
legitimation‘ (2001: 1). And he warns us that security reasoning entails ‗an essential risk, a 
state which has security as its only task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can 
always be provoked by terrorism to turn itself terroristic‘ (Agamben, 2001: 1). However, 
although perhaps valid in general, these claims tell us little about the development of security 
in relation to the US state. A brief historical excavation of this shows two things. First, that 
the development of the US as a national security state emerged over a number of years after 
the Second War World and is the result of very specific political and ideological 
circumstances. Second, that the expansion of security from the domain of the state to other 
domains pre-dates the war on terror.  
 
As Hogan explains, the configuration of the US as a national security state materialized over 
a number of years after the Second World War, with Pearl Harbor (1941) signalling the end 
of the age of (political and military) ‗isolationism‘ (Hogan, 2000: 2).161 This finds 
confirmation in Neocleous‘s account of the origins of the term (national) security. Neocleous 
observes that it was at about that time that ‗security‘ began to replace ‗defence‘ on a 
consistent and continuous basis in US government discourse (Neocleous, 2008: 8). Neocleous 
goes on to recount how ‗the idea appeared so new that one Senator commented, ―I like your 
words ‗national security‘‖‘ (Neocleous, 2000: 8). More specifically, according to Hogan, the 
development of the US national security state emerged in the context of an ideological 
dispute between different views on how the United States could safeguard its security in the 
new post-war environment (Hogan, 2000: x, 1).
162
 On the one hand, there were those, mostly 
liberal democrats, who argued that because of the Soviet threat and of technological 
developments of the atomic bomb and long-range bombs, geographic isolation had become 
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 Although, as Hogan points out, isolationism did not prevent the US ‗from opening the door to Asia 
in the nineteenth century, from the internationalism that followed, and from the interventions of 1917 
[when the US enters War World One] and 1941 [it enters War World II]‘ (Hogan, 2000: 3). It also did 
not prevent individual US states, often with the complicity of US officials, to engage in trans-Atlantic 
slave trade until well after the slave trade was abolished. The bill signed by Jefferson was to take effect 
on 1 January 1808 but, as Du Bois shows in his 1896 doctoral thesis slave importations continued until 
around 1954 (there is some debates about Du Bois‘s figures) (Du Bois, 1999; Smith 1997: 227).  
162
 It is important to note that the ideological dispute itself started much earlier. In Hogan‘s words, ‗the 
battle between isolationism and internationalism, between unilateralism and multilateralism, is old as 
the country itself‘ (Hogan, 2000: 357).  
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obsolete; thus, it was necessary for America to take a new, more proactive approach to 
defence. On the other hand, conservative isolationists, mostly from the Republican Party, 
stressed the threat posed to the American ‗way of life‘ by militarism, standing armies, and 
centralized government. Hogan argues that this complex interplay of forces, which included 
economic factors and changes in the ‗international order‘, as well as, internal pressures and 
pressure from national security agencies, civilian officials, military leaders, and the executive 
and legislative branches,  culminated in the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine was fully 
encapsulated in the National Security Act of 1947 and National Security Council document 
NSC-68 of 1950 (Hogan, 2000: 12). Paramount to the doctrine was the containment of 
communism and of the Soviet Union.
163
 During the Truman years, national security was 
defined primarily in the military terms of ‗preparedness‘164 and ‗deterrence‘; although 
deterrence was sidetracked by the Korean War and ‗the new military buildup, together with 
the cuts in the Marshall Plan‘ (Hogan, 2000:  313). As de Larrinaga and Doucet aptly 
summarize, ‗[t]he initial use of the term ―national security‖ can thus be understood in the 
context of a new global order that saw US engagement in World War II in two theatres of 
operation, the invention of nuclear weapons and the deployment of a war machine of global 
reach‘ (de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008: 523). 
  
However, with ‗the end‘ of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, intellectuals 
both inside and outside the US started to envisage the possibility of ‗new‘ models of security. 
Scholars began to contest the notion that the state should be the only referent of security. 
They started to envisage the possibility of a type of security for which the referent was to be 
not only, or not simply, the state but ‗the individual‘ or ‗humanity‘ itself (see, for instance, 
Mathews, 1989; Buzan, et al., 1998). These authors argued that the proliferation of 
‗unconventional threats‘ (e.g., terrorism, technology, environmental degradation and 
migration), posed as much of a challenge as ‗conventional ones‘ (i.e., external and military 
threats), thus, security had to be conceptualized differently. Common to all these authors was 
the acceptance that the nation-state was, if not obsolete, in decline
165
 and that the security of 
people or what is commonly referred to as ‗human security‘ is, if not more, important than 
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 The NSC-68 states that ‗[t]he gravest threat to the security of the United States [...] stems from the 
hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR, and from the nature of the Soviet system‘ and 
emphases the need to drastically expand the standing conventional military forces of the United States. 
According to Gowan, it represents not just a quantitative intensification of pre-existing trends 
expressed by containment but a qualitative one (Gowan, 2004).  
164
 Lentzos and Rose (2009: 248) trace back the idea of preparedness ‗at least to the eighteen century‘. 
See Roosevelt, 1900.  
165
 This is something that Agamben also seems to accept and welcome to a degree. See ‗We Refugee‘ 
(1994). See also Means without End: Notes on Politics (2000b).  
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the security of territories (see also UNDP‘s reports, 1993; 1994166). Whereas during the Cold 
War period the concept of national security dominated the field of security analysis, with the 
end of the Cold War, ‗security‘ started to be conceived in terms of ‗the needs and well-being 
of people‘ globally (Duffield and Waddell, 2004: 2). In particular, it was in the mid-1990s 
that the term ‗human security‘ took hold (Thomas, 2007: 109).  
 
Drawing on Foucault‘s notion of governmentality, Duffield and Waddell (2004) see ‗human 
security‘ as a form of biopolitics that seeks to act on populations globally, thus passing the 
responsibility to protect people from the state to the international community. Though, 
according to other scholars working in the relatively new field of ‗critical security studies‘, 
the term remains controversial and subject to varying definitions,
167
 Duffield and Waddell 
perceive ‗human security‘ as something ‗positive‘, as representing a move from geopolitics to 
biopolitics beyond the state (Duffield and Waddell, 2004: 3168 emphasis added; see also 
Axworthy, 2001; Kaldor, et al, 2007). They define ‗human‘, ‗biopolitical security‘ as a type 
of emerging ‗global assemblage‘,169 whose function is the securing of populations through 
bringing together the existing practices, institutions and networks of sustainable development 
(Duffield and Waddell, 2004: 34; Duffield, 2005), and as ‗emblematic of the changed 
relations and governmental technologies that shape the post-Cold War security terrain‘ 
(Duffield, 2005: 1). What, according to Duffield and Waddell, has problematized ‗human 
security‘ – but also ‗made possible new forms of coordination and centralization‘ – is the war 
on terror (Duffield and Waddell, 2004: 2-3; see also Duffield, 2005; Jolly and Ray, 2006). 
More specifically, they argue that the war on terror has reversed the prioritization of ‗the 
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 The United Nations Development Program was the first international body to use and promulgate 
the formula ‗human security‘. It defines human security as ‗freedom from want‘ and ‗freedom from 
fear‘. That is, ‗safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression and; protection from 
sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily lives, whether in homes, jobs or communities‘ 
(1994: 23). For an analysis of the ‗enduring importance‘ of the UNDP‘s formulation to ‗human 
security‘ see, Duffield, 2004.   
167
As testified by the following reports: The Independent International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty report entitled ‗A Responsibility to Protect‘ (2001); The Commission on Human 
Security‘s report entitled, ‗Human Security Now‘ (2003); The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change report, entitled ‗A more secure world: our shared responsibility‘ (2004); the UN Secretary 
General‘s report entitled ‗In Larger Freedom‘ (2005). For a brief summary of all of these reports, see 
Jolly and Ray (2006). 
168
 Although it is important to point out that Duffield is also very critical of attempts to co-opt the 
human security discourse for ‗humanitarian‘ purposes (Duffield, 2010). He, moreover, acknowledges 
that ‗while the common definition of human security is prioritizing people rather than states, it can be 
more accurately defined as effective states prioritizing the well-being of populations living in 
ineffective states‘ and further suggests that human security, therefore, in reality ‗demands that states 
play a central rule‘ (Duffield, 2010: 122, 111).    
169
 The term global assemblage has also been used by the anthropologists Aihwa Ong and Stephen 
Collier (2005) and sociologist Saskia Sassen (2006).  
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security of people living within ineffective states (a key manoeuvre in human security)‘ to the 
prioritization of ‗the security of homeland‘ (Duffield and Waddell, 2004: 21).   
 
This vision of ‗human security‘ complicates a notion of security as simply state-centred 
linking directly to a Foucauldian conception of biopower. However, although insightful, the 
idea that it is the war on terror that has reversed prioritizations in terms of the security of the 
homeland versus the security of populations is questionable. Indeed, as Duffield and Waddell 
themselves and others
170
 have argued, processes of ‗securitization‘ have unquestionably 
increased and accelerated since the beginning of the war. Nevertheless, the extent to which 
these processes signal a radical break with, or a continuation and extension of previous 
conceptions of ‗security‘, including ‗human security‘, is something that needs to be assessed 
carefully. To argue that today‘s securitization processes, because of their emphasis on the 
security of homeland, signal a break with previous conceptions of human security is to be 
oblivious to the ways in which previous conception of national security were not completely 
indifferent to ‗biopolitical‘ concerns. It could be argued that the (bio)political ideal of 
development and the securitization of populations was an integral part of both Cold War and 
Post-Cold War ideology and practice. Clearly, the way in which these (bio)political ideals 
were framed by US officials, organizations, and intellectuals was different from how they 
were conceptualized by the UNDP reports and the like. Nevertheless, similarities can be 
detected. Thus, for instance, the first National Security Strategy
171
 formulated by the Clinton 
administration after the Cold War, although very much concerned with the security of the 
territory, placed a strong emphasis on ‗sustainable development‘ abroad.172 This seems to 
confirm that the security of the territory, although paramount, was not the US state‘s only 
concern during the Post-Cold War period. Both W.W. Rostow‘s ‗modernization theory‘ and 
US interdisciplinary area studies, a staple of State Department thinking and practice in the 
Cold War long before 1989, although from very different perspectives, were very much 
concerned with the (bio)political ideal of development and enabling the welfare of 
populations. Human security certainly participated in the broader redefinition of security that 
begun in the 1970s and 1980s. However, analyses that simply focus on US initial objection to 
human security (Jolly et al., 2009) disguise the direct and indirect role that the US has played 
in the process of redefinition of security and obscure the extent to which Washington has 
been able to mobilize the concept of human security for its own use.  
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 See, for instance, Jayasuriya, 2001; Huysmans, 2004. 
171
 See, the NSS, 1995. See also the NSS, 1998. 
172
  The document links sustainable development to four key elements: broad-based economic growth; 
the environment; population and health; and democracy (in the form of democracy promotion).   
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By shifting its referent to the individual or human, the ideal of human security introduces as 
threats a host of contingencies that were not previously understood as such, at the same times 
as, it defines, and enacts the human in biopolitical terms. According to de Larrinaga and 
Doucet, the target of human security ‗is to make live the life of the individual through a 
complex of strategies initiated at the level of populations‘.173 To this extent, the human 
security discourse can be seen as preparing ‗conceptually a form of life that is at hand for the 
mounting of proactive interventions of pre-emption and prevention‘ (de Larrinaga and 
Doucet, 2008: 528, 531). Therefore, although agreeing with Duffield and Waddell that the 
war on terror has  further problematized the notion of ‗human security‘ as given in the UNDP 
report of 1994, it could be argued that in reality ‗human security‘ was, and still is, integral to 
the construction of the US state in globalist terms.  
 
The brief historical account of security offered here shows that human security is not easily 
separable from the more general redefinition of security that started prior to the end of the 
Cold War in the US and that seems now to have reached a new dimension with the war on 
terror. Because ‗human security‘ is amenable to the strategic dimension of states, it seems to 
provide the perfect ideological supplement or rationale for targeting populations to prevent 
so-called emergencies – emergencies that the human security‘s discourse itself helps to 
define. In Larrinaga and Doucet‘s words, ‗[w]hat the discourse of human security does, 
whether broad or narrow, is to help define the exceptional circumstances that require the 
international community‘s intervention, whether on behalf of humanitarian imperatives as 
initially conceived or in the service of maintaining global order as made evident more 
recently‘. In turn, it ‗contributes to the labour of defining and authorizing when the 
suspension of conventional international law of nations can occur‘ (de Larrinaga and Doucet, 
2008: 532). To this extent, ‗human security can be understood as participating in the 
institution of a form of sovereign power insofar as it simultaneously operates within and 
outside the law‘ (2008: 532). De Larrinaga and Doucet, rightly suggest that human security 
helps ‗to constitute key elements of the state of exception‘ while preparing ‗the conceptual 
ground upon which such complexes [state and non-state actors, public and private 
organizations, military and civilian organizations] are bound up with instituting a form of 
global sovereign power‘ (533). They are, however, wrong to suggest that this form of ‗global 
                                                             
173
 In fact, de Larrinaga and Doucet show through textual examples, how the ‗initial deployment of the 
concept in the mid-1990s was subsequently accompanied by other efforts to theorize human security in 
ways that would be more amenable to the multilateral and middle-power approaches found in the 
foreign policy concerns of certain states‘. Thus, for instance, from ‗an understanding of threats that 
stem from a broad set of quotidian political, social, economic and environmental contingencies‘ in the 
2004 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility report shifted to what are deemed to be 
‗avoidable catastrophe[s]‘ (de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008: 526).  
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sovereignty‘ is unmoored from ‗the formal juridico-political sovereignty of any one state or 
coalition of states‘ (de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008: 533) because, in my view, this ignores 
the role of the US, its hegemonic and imperial power as described above.  
 
1.10 Europe: the Answer to American Power? 
 
In light of the perceived reassertion of American military and strategic power globally (see, 
for instance, Cox, 2003; Eland, 2002), a number of commentators, including Balibar (2004) 
and Timothy Garton Ash (2002; 2004), have looked to Europe for alternatives to US 
unilateralism. For Balibar in particular, although not a finished project and one that is in fact 
best left unfinished, ‗Europe‘ ‗can‘, or perhaps, we should say could have provided174 an 
alternative political and social imaginary in the present situation. Garton Ash and others, such 
as Kaldor, conceptualize Europe as a global political actor that has the ability to check and 
balance US power on the global stage. This section will assess these claims critically by 
considering practices of securitization in the war on terror, which allow us to see these 
conceptualizations in a different light. It is on the basis of this analysis that, in Chapter 4, I 
will further delve into how Europe is being reconstituted in practice through a discursive 
analysis of the European Security Strategy.  
 
Balibar has advanced the idea that Europe can represent ‗a new type of power‘ within the 
post-9/11 context in his book, We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational 
Citizenship (2004) and in particular in an essay called ‗Vanishing Mediator‘.175 Starting from 
the presupposition that ‗Europe is not something that is ―constructed‖ at a slower or faster 
pace, with greater or lesser ease‘ but a historical, unresolved problem without any pre-
established solution, whose ‘modes of inclusion and exclusion’176 are far from assured 
(Balibar, 1991: 7; 2004 emphasis original), Balibar argues against seeing Europe as given or 
fixed. Instead, he presents Europe as ‗vanishing mediator‘. In answer to calls from America 
for Europe to act in the context of today‘s changing relations – calls that, according to 
Balibar, go from asking Europeans to support or ‗check and balance‘ America in its projects 
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 See Balibar‘s latest reflections, 2010. 
175
 Other theoretical contributions could have been explored. However, I have decided to focus my 
discussion mainly to Balibar since his intervention is evocative and well-suited to a contrast with a 
document, the ESS, which shows how the European project is being (re)imagined in practice.   
176
 These are modes which for Balibar are directly linked to questions of migration and racism 
(Balibar, 1991; 2004). In his, 1991 article, titled ‗Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa: Racism and Politics 
in Europe Today‘, Balibar writes that discrimination is written into the very constitution of Europe 
(1991: 7). 
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to ‗helping‘ or mediating situations of crisis177 – Balibar suggests that Europe can assume a 
mediating or translating role because of its transformative potentials.  
 
The idea of vanishing mediation is Hegelian in origin. It is linked to Hegel‘s conception of 
dialectics and more specifically to his idea that it is through a process of mediation that two 
opposite or antithetical concepts (e.g. being and nothingness) are sublated into one (e.g. 
becoming) (Houlgate, 1998: 194). The idea has recently been revived by both Fredric 
Jameson and Slavoi Žižek.178 In a highly original interpretation of Weber, Jameson uses the 
idea to: 1) counter claims that understand Weber‘s anti-Marxism as a repudiation of Marxism 
as a whole;
179
 2) explain the passage from feudalism to capitalism (or the process of 
modernization or rationalization) in terms of a dialectic movement where a third element, 
called the vanishing-mediator (i.e., the ‗protestant ethic‘) ‗mediates‘ the transition between 
the two while creating the conditions for its own disappearing. Drawing on Jameson, Balibar 
employs the term to ‗critically assess the limits of Europe‘s capability to influence and 
mediate conflicts and historical processes‘ and explore the possibilities for Europe ‗to offer 
itself as an instrument that other forces in the world, aiming at a transformation of politics, 
could use and shape to cope with the [current] crisis‘ (Balibar, 2004). He sees the vanishing 
mediator as ‗the figure (admittedly presented in speculative terms) of a transitory institution, 
force, community, or spiritual formation that creates the conditions for a new society and a 
new civilizational pattern – albeit in the horizon and vocabulary of the past – by rearranging 
the elements inherited from the very institution that has to be overcome […]. It therefore 
creates the conditions for its own suppression and withering away. But without this 
―vanishing‖ mediation, no transition from the old to the new fabric of society would have 
been possible‘ (Balibar, 2004: 233). Balibar is aware that, in reality, Europe‘s current 
capacity to influence and mediate conflicts and historical processes is not that great. 
Nevertheless, he envisages ‗possibilities for Europe to use its own fragilities and 
indeterminacies, its own ―transitory‖ character‘ to effectively mediate in a process that might 
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 In particular, Balibar distinguishes between official or semi-official declarations and those from a 
number of ‗American liberal intellectuals‘. He himself only focuses briefly on ‗the official (or quasi-
official) ones‘ – those coming from the Bush administration and his former advisors, most of which 
were members of the now suspended PNAC (the role of PNAC in the formulation of the US NSSs will 
be discussed in Chapter 3) – and more extensively on those by Ackerman, Wallerstein, Garton Ash and 
Said (Balibar, 2003: 14).  
178
 The idea of ‗vanishing mediator‘ is Jameson‘s but is used by Žižek too for its ability to trigger 
change and its highly symbolic function. Here I will focus only on Jameson‘s interpretation of it as it is 
on this that Balibar draws for its interpretation of Europe. For an analysis of how Žižek uses the term, 
see Žižek, 2002; see also Dean, 2005. 
179
 For Jameson, Weber‘s Protestant Ethic is ‗explicitly directed against vulgar Marxism and against 
the economism of the Second International to which Engels had himself objected‘, and not Marxism as 
such (Jameson, 1988: 4).  
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bring about ‗a new political culture, a new pattern of politics as such, in our context of acute 
national and international crisis‘ (Balibar, 2004: 234).  
 
In particular, according to Balibar, Europe‘s colonial history and geography put it at the 
centre of insoluble conflicts, which threaten its own civil peace. At the same time, it is these 
same conflicts that give Europe the possibility to become something else than a nation (2004: 
39, 40). In other words, Europe‘s history puts it in a privileged position with regard to its own 
becoming. As opposed to seeing Europe as ‗lacking‘ because of its particularity as an entity 
with no absolute borderlines, Balibar sees in Europe the possibility for a ‗new type of power‘ 
(2004: 225). He says that rather than a ‗right of intervention‘, what we are confronted with 
today is ‗the ―fact of intervention‖ that is, interdependence‘.180 Thus, he suggests that rather 
than to try to ignore interventions as they take place, ‗we‘ – he is referring here to ‗European 
intellectuals‘ – should ‗organize and try to modify its consequences‘ (Balibar, 2004: 215). 
Balibar does not suggest that this process is an easy one, or that there are guarantees that 
Europe will succeed. However, Balibar is hopeful about Europe‘s future. He says that Europe 
is endowed with translating capacities
181
 capable of interpreting the world in ways which 
would be if not able ‗to transforming the world, then at least to influencing and orienting the 
processes of transformation that are taking place‘ (Balibar in Bialasiewicz and Galli, 2004: 
370). According to Balibar, what Europe needs is a model of collective security which opens 
the possibility of escaping the confrontation between ―terrorist‖ and ―counterterrorist‖ forces‘ 
(Balibar, 2004: 225-226, emphasis original); a model of security that does not reject the use 
of force but makes protection as opposed to fortification its priority. Balibar is here explicitly 
drawing upon the notion of collective, human security from the UN Charter,
182
 arguing that it 
must become a political and substantial, as opposed to a merely formal, goal (Balibar, 2004: 
226). He further suggests that this model must maintain ‗the possibility of at the same time 
actively fighting against injustice and combining the actions of intelligence and police 
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 Note, however, that the link between ‗the fact of intervention‘ and ‗interdependence‘ understood 
here as linked to new globalizing processes could be contested. As stated, this link seems to imply that 
interdependence produces or enables ‗the fact of intervention‘, whilst it could be argued ‗the fact of 
intervention‘ can be thought as independent from interdependence, as proved by the fact that 
interventions in other countries are not a new phenomena.   
181
 As a proof of this, Balibar says that ‗not even in India or in China—was it necessary to organize to 
the same degree the political and pedagogical conditions of linguistic exchanges‘ as in Europe 
(Balibar, 2004: 234). 
182
 In particular, Chapter I, Article 1: ‗The Purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain 
international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removals of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of 
justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which 
might lead to a breach of the peace‘. 
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services under legal control against terrorist networks, if their existence is proved‘ (Balibar, 
2004: 226). He adds that ‗there is no doubt in my mind that, in this respect, if we agree that, 
for various reasons, there is currently a special threat of ―Islamic terrorism‖ (or terrorism 
fuelled by fundamentalist Islamist ideology), the ultimate condition for an effective 
―counterterrorist‖ policy is an active commitment to democratic regimes emerging from 
within the Islamic world‘ (Balibar, 2004: 226). This is because, for Balibar, only those 
societies and places where Islam is an essential cultural reference will be able to ‗―uproot‖ 
Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism‘, although not without the assistance of the 
international community (Balibar, 2003b: 328).  
 
The idea that Europe should contribute to human or collective security is one that finds 
support among various scholars, from Biscop (2004) and Kaldor et al (2007), whose strategic 
internationalist EU-led model of Europe is certainly different from that of Balibar‘s, to the 
likes of Beck and Grande (2007), Habermas and Derrida (in Borradori, 2003), who also have 
very specific ideas of how to understand Europe. Thus, whereas Balibar relies on an anti-
strategic political model for which ‗power does not precede action but is rather its end result‘ 
(Balibar, 2004: 31; 2003b: 324), Kaldor relies on a ‗global model‘ (Glasius and Kaldor, 2005; 
see also Biscop, 2003), Habermas and Derrida on ‗supranational model‘ (Habermas and 
Derrida, 2003), Beck and Grande on ‗a cosmopolitan model‘ (Beck and Grande, 2007; Beck 
and Giddens, 2005; Held, 1995; Archibugi, 2004; Delanty and Rumford, 2005). However, 
despite their different conceptualizations of Europe/power, all these authors agree on one 
thing: living in an interdependent world makes it extremely difficult for any single state alone 
to safeguard its own citizens, let alone populations globally, not matter how powerful that 
state whence the need for global or collective security. According to Biscop, for instance, 
‗―9/11‖‘ has demonstrated that possession of the greatest military might on earth, including 
the most advanced technology, cannot by itself guarantee security‘ (Biscop, 2003: 10; also 
Kaldor, 2005; Habermas and Derrida, 2003). Europe, therefore Biscop says, needs to develop 
its own security strategy as opposed to simply rely on NATO (2003; see also Bailes, 2005). 
Interesting to note, however, that on the question of European military capacity versus 
NATO, an issue that member states have been discussing since the end of the Cold War, 
when dependence of Western Europe on US military capacity started to become less of a 
problem,
183
 divisions remain. The most recent tensions arose in 2003 when the idea of an 
independent planning and command EU headquarters was raised (see Reichard, 2006). 
Initially received with enthusiasm by most member states, including Britain – whose role in 
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 In the words of Gowan, military dependence actually ‗ended with the disappearance of the Soviet 
Union‘ (Gowan, 2004: 69). This, however, is debatable.  
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the war on terror has been principally directed toward defending and backing American 
foreign policy and decisions – the Franco-German plans suffered a set-back when US 
ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns described the EU policy as the ‗most significant threat 
to NATO‘s future‘ (Evans-Pritchard and Helm 2003: [n.p.] ). This provoked strong reactions 
with the then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw telling Britain‘s parliament ‗it was ―unacceptable‖ 
for the EU to try to assume a ―territorial defence‖ role‘ (Straw quoted in Marsden, 2003). The 
call here was for Europe to act as mediator within the ‗new wars‘; a call which, as Balibar has 
shown, finds its counterpart in America and which incidentally raises the question as to 
‗[w]hy address Europe in this case rather than, say, Russia, Japan, or China?‘184 (Balibar, 
2004). But it is also for Europe to have an independent role in international relations (Kaldor 
et al, 2005), which does not mean inevitably acting alone but taking ‗a stand for itself, even 
in the face of its oldest friends when necessary‘ (Bailes, 2005: 24; for an opposite view see 
Weiss, 2006
185
). Although these authors would not necessarily share Balibar‘s anti-strategic 
politics,
186
 nor would Balibar second their emphasis on strategy, they too see protection (as 
opposed to fortification, which however, they do not refuse in toto) as essential for combating 
violence, ‗terrorism‘ and its causes.  
 
In my view, this conceptualization of protection is limiting, since it ignores the way in which 
protection is not outside fortification but highly intertwined with it. Although as Bigo 
suggests, sealing borders is nearly impossible,
187
 the European Commission did initiate a 
number of securitization policies, such as those directed toward immigrants, whose aim is the 
protection of what the EU perceives as its borders. These policies are not outside of certain 
forms of power politics and, as de Goode and others have shown, understandings of 
(in)security and terrorism play a key part in constituting the ‗governmental identity of the 
European Union‘ (de Goode, 2008; Bigo, 2007a; 2007b; Bigo and Guild, 2005; Bigo, et al., 
2007; Huysmans quoted in de Goode, 2008) – we might say, in constituting it as ‗state-like‘. 
Furthermore, whether Europe is a power that counterbalances US power, or whether it can be 
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 Balibar asks this in relation to what he describes the call to Europe for ‗check and balance in order 
to countervail the American (super)power‘ as opposed to a demand for ‗mediation within the ―war of 
civilizations‖ that America is now apparently waging‘ (Balibar, 2004: 214) because, as observed 
above, he wants to keep opens the possibility for Europe to act as mediator. 
185
 Following very much what could be defined as a Kaganian and/or antidemocratic position, which 
justifies and perpetuates the hierarchization of the current international system and of the US as its 
leading actor, Weiss says that the EU is a weaker entity.  
186
 For Biscop too, for instance, Europe needs to develop a strong collaborative security relation with 
its Mediterranean partners, with whom it shares important political and economic interests (Biscop, 
2005). But he clearly does not share Balibar‘s anti-strategic politics. Biscop‘s emphasis is on strategy.  
187
 As Bigo says, ‗effective control of cross-border activities is nearly impossible in market-economy 
regimes which, in order to remain viable, have to keep their borders open to goods, capital and 
services‘ (Bigo, 2002; 2009b). 
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regarded as a ‗new type of power‘ in the present conjuncture is contestable since it fails to 
recognize that the EU is a partner of the US in the war on terror and it too has interests in 
Middle East (see Abraham, 2004). According to Abraham, the European-Mediterranean 
ensemble that Balibar proposes as ‗a laboratory for new relationships between ―developed‖ 
and ―developing‖ countries, and between cultures that have their religious roots in antithetical 
versions of the same monotheistic theology‘ loses its potential when confronted with ‗its 
Eurocentric, political underbelly‘ (Abraham, 2004: 10). Following Abraham‘s critique of 
Balibar‘s conceptualization of Europe for ignoring that at the present global conjuncture, we 
can argue that it is in the economic and political interest of Europe to take advantage of its 
geographical location to reach out to other cultures (Abraham, 2004: 11). Important aspects 
of the questions of security, US/EU relations and geopolitics are missing in all of the above 
analyses. As Abraham points out, for instance, in Iraq, US-based firms are not just in conflict 
with the government of Iraq over access to oil but they are also competing with European 
firms (Abraham, 2004: 12). This is an important point that challenges some of the (implicit) 
assumptions underlying the above understandings of Europe by bringing attention to the fact 
that the development of a European (as well as an American) security strategy is not 
independent from material and geopolitical factors and interests.  
 
Ultimately, the idea of Europe as vanishing mediator raises some paradoxes that are difficult 
to resolve. As Iveković asks, ‗[w]hat happens when the vanishing mediator has vanished? Is a 
self-suppressing subject still a subject‘ (Iveković, 2008)? In addition, is it plausible to think 
that Europe will renounce all forms of ‗power politics‘ to assume such a role? These 
questions cannot be ignored when approaching the question of how to understand the EU in 
its relation to the US. What kind of Europe is brought into being through the war on terror? 
What conception(s) of Europe are at stake in the war on terror, and through what discursive 
strategies and technologies is Europe being produced? My analysis of the European Security 
Strategy will attempt to answer these questions. The main aim of my analysis in Chapter 4 
will be to evaluate through a close analysis of the European Security Strategy whether the 
European Union conforms to expectations about its role as anti-strategic, counter-hegemonic 
mediating and/or multilateral power that underlines current political and philosophical 
analyses of the European Union. The focus on the EU will help move the discussion from an 
analysis of US sovereign power and its foreign and security strategy (which after all remains 
a state-centred discussion) to an examination of the EU, an entity whose foreign and security 
strategy is still very much in the making, but whose foreign and security strategy points to the 
constitution of Europe as ‗state-like‘.    
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CHAPTER 2 
Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
 
Chapter 2 will explain the methodological approach to data. It will make use of both 
Foucault‘s and Agamben‘s methodological insights critically to analyse specific political and 
ideological functions of selected documents. Employing Foucault‘s and Agamben‘s 
methodological prescriptions will benefit the analysis of the chosen documents in a number 
of ways. It will allow me to explore the methodological counterpart to the theoretical 
positions surveyed in the literature review. Focusing on their methodological insights will 
help me to raise questions about what appears to be Agamben‘s more totalizing approach and 
Foucault‘s attempt to move away from totalizing and universalizing accounts of power from 
a methodological perspective, in keeping with my own questioning about the relation of 
sovereign power and biopower. Although Agamben is only minimally interested in 
epistemological and methodological questions,
188
 and both Agamben‘s and Foucault‘s 
contributions to these types of question could be regarded as idiosyncratic and eclectic, I will 
show how their ideas can be used productively to analyse my chosen documents.
189
 This is 
not to suggest that there are no limitations to their methodological prescriptions. Where 
relevant to my discussions, I intend to say what these problems are as well as to challenge 
Agamben and Foucault‘s interpretative frameworks. In spite of these limitations, however, 
their ideas, in particular their notions of ‗paradigm‘ and ‗dispositif‘, remain highly valuable 
ways of thinking through current (in)security developments.   
 
In particular, the Agambenian concept of ‗paradigm‘, and the notion of ‗dispositif‘ as 
developed by both Foucault and Agamben, and how I intend to use them, will be fully 
explained in section 2.1. In this section, I will show that despite the problems that the 
Agambenian conception of paradigm and/or example raises, the notion of paradigm, 
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 Agamben sees these types of question as a ways of ‗sharpening knives when there is nothing left to 
cut‘ (2002: [n. p.]). However, he does deal with them in this same essay and elsewhere (see his short 
book on method, Che cos'è un dispositivo? (2006), translated by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella as 
What is an Apparatus? and Other Essays (2009), and The Signature of All Things: On Method (2009), 
an again short but rich reflection on method, which includes a longer version of his essay ‗What is a 
paradigm?‘). 
189
 Note that there are very few interpretations of Agamben‘s work from a methodological perspective 
to date. What one finds are scattered thoughts here and there (see, for instance, Ek et al., 2007: 11-12; 
Sinnerbrink, 2005: 258; Kalyvas, 2005: 115), with the more systematic work to date to be found in 
Mills (2008) and de la Durantaye (2009). On  Michel  Foucault‘s  reluctance  to  clearly  delineate  
a methodology,  particularly  with  respect  to  genealogy (the Archaeology of Knowledge [1969] 
(2002) is dedicated almost entirely to methodology) see, for instance, Meadmore et al.,  2000;  
Tamboukou,  1999.   
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including the paradigm of exception, can be used sociologically and empirically to question 
current security discourses. On the other hand, I will show how the idea of dispositif can help 
in the analysis of the US National Security Strategies and the European Security Strategy. In 
particular, the concept of dispositif helps to understand these documents – which I will 
specifically analyse through a close, critical discursive reading – as strategic and as part of a 
dispositif of security that is increasingly becoming dominant or hegemonic.  
 
In section 2.2, I draw from theories of critical discourse analysis to explain how and why 
these documents should be understood both as discursive in the Foucauldian sense of 
practices that create, as opposed to simply reflecting, certain security problems, and as 
ideological. As a matter of fact, even though in line with Foucault, I accept that epistemic 
practices and technologies of power are historically situated and contingent, I take issue with 
his rejection of the notion of ideology tout court (see also Hall, 1986; Newman, 2005; Zizek, 
2002). Foucault‘s understanding of the relation between power and knowledge permits to 
investigate how forms of knowledge are linked to and implicated with power, constituting 
what Foucault calls ‗regimes of truth‘. What I oppose, however, is the idea that some draw 
from this understanding: that all forms of knowledge are equal.
190
 As Foucault says, power 
understood here in the broadest way possible as ‗a complex strategic situation in a particular 
society‘ (Foucault, 1990: 93) is difficult to locate – since it is never simply in the hands of 
some and its effects are often unpredictable. On the other hand, however, to neglect the extent 
to which dominant states and ‗state-like‘ players, the US in particular, but also the EU to a 
less degree, set the frame of what is and what is not permissible in the war on terror would be 
mistaken. It would also be wrong to ignore the extent to which particular notions of security 
and exception might in fact reflect and reinforce certain geopolitico-strategic, economic, and 
political interests as well as the extent to which the US NSSs and the ESS are to be 
understood as ‗strategies pursued to change societies in particular directions‘ (Fairclough, 
2007: 54). Although, ultimately, the notion of ideology opens up more complex theoretical 
areas, of ‗truth‘, of the link between political and the exploitation of labour power, and of the 
                                                             
190
 Whether this understanding of the possibility of distinguishing between differential forms of 
knowledge is in contraposition to Foucault‘s understanding of power-knowledge is unclear, although 
my claim is that we need not necessarily see them as opposed. After all, even though Foucault was not 
interested in assessing whether discourses were actually true or false or in ‗trying to dissolve relations 
of power ‗in the utopia of a perfectly transparent communication‘ (Foucault, 1998: 18), he was 
interested in how certain discourses came to be taken as such. He moreover, explicitly says that he is 
‗not engaged in ―sceptical or relativist refusal of all verified truth‖, noting further: ―all those who say 
that for me truth doesn‘t [sic] exist are simple-mined‖‘ (Foucault quoted in O‘Farrell, 2005: 83). 
However, given that Foucault‘s understanding of power-knowledge does lead to misinterpretations 
(see, for instance, Putnam, 1981: 161; Merquior, 1985: 147; Habermas, 1987: chapters 9 and 10; see 
also Taylor, 1984: 152-83; Resch, 1992: 246; for a counter-view see Gutting, 1989), I felt it was 
necessary to make my own take on this clear.                 
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ways in which beliefs do or do not function to regulate certain social relations,
191
 than I will 
be able to go into in this chapter, I want to suggest that it remains important. A notion of 
ideology understood in terms of material and strategic interests as well as of cultural 
hegemony and its role in (re)producing certain power relations while constructing new ones 
will help to understand the relation between US and EU practices of security and why these 
practices take on certain specific forms.  
 
The last three sections will be dedicated to explaining the rationale for collecting these 
particular documents. In sections 2.3, I explain how and why these particular documents were 
chosen. Finally, in sections 2.4 and 2.5, I look more closely at the NSSs and ESS 
respectively. I explain how and why the documents were produced, who their audience is and 
what their political functions are. I, moreover, go into the details of how these documents will 
be analysed.     
 
Ultimately, the analysis that will be offered in Chapter 3 and 4 is to be considered as 
comparative and ‗non-statist‘ in both the political sense of being critical of the way in which 
the state-form is used to frame certain theories, and in the methodological sense of not 
focusing simply on the nation-state and of treating it and its sovereignty as universal and 
ubiquitous. It is to be considered as an analysis that sees (in)security developments as 
reflecting micro and macro mechanisms of biopolitical sub-power and sovereign power and 
as essentially constituting the context in which the global war on terror is being thought.  
 
2.1 Paradigms and Dispositifs 
 
In brief, for Agamben a paradigm is an archetype or a working hypothesis that serves to 
elucidate how ‗a wider set of problems‘ work, while a dispositif in both Agamben and 
Foucault‘s view is an apparatus of power that functions to control. Although questions can 
legitimately be asked about the assumed ability of paradigms to be both specific and general, 
and about the distinction that Agamben draws between the paradigm of exception and other 
paradigms or examples, I believe paradigms can be used sociologically to investigate how 
discourses of (in)security are articulated and inform the war on terror mechanisms of 
exception and biopower. On the other hand, the notion of dispositif as developed by both 
Foucault and Agamben offers means to understand these discourses as part of a security 
apparatus whose functions are both strategic and ideological.  
                                                             
191
 That is, the question of whether ideology and belief always precede forms of association among 
humans or whether certain social relations are unrelated to beliefs, ideas and interests and can only be 
retroactively rationalized.  
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Taking his cue mainly from Kuhn‘s conception of the paradigm as ‗a single element of a 
whole‘,192 Agamben defines a paradigm as ‗a concrete phenomenon‘, which ‗decides a whole 
problematic context‘ and ‗makes intelligible a wider set of phenomena‘ (Agamben, 2002: 
[n.p.]). The paradigm is a ‗model of functioning which can be generalized‘. It is a model or 
an archetype – but one that has its foundation in reality – that enables the philosopher to 
explain how a particular arrangement of power-relations works (Agamben, 2002: [n.p.]). 
Thus, for instance, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the Nazi camps are specific 
historical phenomena but, for Agamben, they are also ‗exemplary places‘ (Agamben, 1998) 
not necessarily because of the actual number of people who died in them
193
 but because they 
can tell us something about our present times. They reveal that the condition of total abjection 
suffered by their inmates was the ultimate result of a state of exception or emergency 
extended to an entire civil population, and that because of their being founded in law, which 
is to say, on law‘s constitutive suspension, there is the very real possibility that they will 
recur. Despite the need for specifying differences between different camps and defining the 
key features of contemporary camps, such as the specific ‗legal‘ and political processes 
through which they come to take a certain, specific form, places like Guantánamo seem to 
confirm Agamben‘s insights about the persistence of camps. We could say that paradigms are 
emblems used by Agamben for their power to ‗make intelligible‘ the problems that most 
concern him. They are both real, concrete phenomena and representative. They are not simply 
idealized forms of existing entities or phenomena. They themselves have existed and exist in 
a form that, according to Agamben, allows the philosopher to study the larger structure of 
power of which they are part, while drawing analogies between their past and present 
configurations; in a form that allows the theorist to see how precisely belonging to a 
particular structure of power takes place. They are models, not simply epistemological or 
methodological constructs, but exemplars that work by displaying the homogeneity of the 
particular set to which they belong. Paradigms are products of the state of exception, 
inasmuch as for Agamben, the state of exception is itself a paradigm, but a paradigm that 
                                                             
192
 Agamben notes that Kuhn has two definitions of the paradigm: the one given above, for which the 
paradigm is a common model or an example and on which Agamben mainly draws, and another, 
according to which the paradigm is the set of common practices that define a scientific discipline 
during a particular period of time (Kuhn, 1962).  
193
 In point of fact although, following Primo Levi, Agamben accepts that ‗the camp still remains an 
unicum both in its extent and in its quality‘ (Levi quoted in Agamben, 1999: 32), he wants to argue that 
the camp is a unicum or singularity that has a paradigmatic character. And in this Agamben is very 
much aware (see Agamben, 1999: 31-32) that he clearly distinguishes himself from many other 
theorists who treat such camps not as paradigmatic singularities, but as singularities whose uniqueness 
makes it impossible to compare it with other cases (see, for instance, Friedländer quoted in LaCapra, 
1998: 26; De Felice quoted in Traverso, 1998).  
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takes on a very precise, transcendental form. They are ‗extreme cases‘ that help to explain the 
regular or general by bringing to light the original character of the phenomena to which they 
belong.
194
 To go back to the example of the Nazi camps, we should note that, for Agamben, 
people interned in the Nazi camps were interned because they belonged to a particular ‗class‘ 
or group; although on the how and why these particular groups of people were selected, 
however prejudicially and arbitrarily, Agamben has little to say.
195
 What Agamben does tell 
us is that these people were interned following a logic of ‗exclusive inclusion‘ (something is 
excluded by means of its inclusion). Jews, Romani, disabled, etc., were all excluded from the 
juridico-political order by means of their inclusion in camps (thus, they maintained a relation 
to the rule in the form of the rule‘s suspension. In camps, the law applies without applying. 
That is to say, normal laws do not apply). According to Agamben, the same logic applies to 
contemporary examples. The exemplarity or paradigmatic character of the Nazi camps 
consists in making the logic that governs all camps evident.  
 
In his oeuvre, Agamben uses a number of paradigms or examples – most notably, the figure, 
drawn from Roman law,
196
 of homo sacer, the Muselmann, the camp, etc. – all of which are 
connected to the sovereign exception, which he singles out as a different type of paradigm. 
Agamben contends that whereas ‗the example is excluded from the rule not because it does 
not belong to the normal case but, on the contrary, because it exhibits its belonging to it‘ (it is 
excluded through the exhibition of its inclusion), the exception is included in the juridical 
                                                             
194
 The link between the extreme and the exception in the paradigm can be traced back to Schmitt and 
his reference to Kierkegaard in Political Theology (1985 [1922]: 15). Schmitt quotes the Protestant 
theologian Kierkegaard‘s understanding of the exception as that which explains ‗the general and itself‘. 
Kierkegaard says ‗[e]ndless talks about the general become boring; there are exceptions. If they cannot 
be explained, then the general cannot be explained‘ (quoted in Schmitt, 1985: 15).   
195
 This is another difficulty in Agamben‘s thought. The specific historical context (LaCapra, 2007: 
164-65, note 21; Norris, 2002) as well as the discursive or ideological mechanisms that allowed certain 
groups of people to be the recipients of practices of de-humanization as opposed to others are only 
dealt with by him in the abstract. In particular, see his discussion of ‗categories of modality‘ in 
Remnants of Auschwitz, 1999a: 146-148. 
196
 As noted in the previous chapter, Agamben makes use of various ‗figures‘ or images in his works. 
He never delves much on this, however, offering only scattered thoughts, at times, subsuming his use 
of historical figures under his conceptualization of the example, at others under that of dispositif, as in 
Profanations (2007: 59). Nevertheless, what is most evident is the importance of figures for 
Agamben‘s work. Despite being historically specific, a figure such as the Muselmann, for instance, is 
used as a basis for ‗transhistorical‘ reflections on (in)human conditions such as abjection. Note that we 
find a similar use of figures in authors such as Hardt and Negri (e.g. the figure of ‗the immaterial 
labourer‘ and of ‗the militant‘), with some Negrian and Agambenian figures overlapping (e.g. ‗the 
figure of the poor‘ and of ‗the refugee‘). Far from arguing that we should simply reject the use of 
figures or examples, I want to suggest that such a stance is more useful when accompanied by a socio-
historical investigation into the actual composition and ambivalences of these figures and examples. 
This is because there is more to ‗subjects‘ and ‗events‘ than real figures and examples, however 
representative, can tell us. For an interesting, ‗profanatory‘ take on the image as the site in which 
Agamben‘s ‘own fundamental gesture – the gesture of reversibility‘ or ‗of the moment when the 
danger coincides with the saving power‘ – is most clearly legible, see Noys, 2009. 
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order through its exclusion (Agamben, 2009: 24; see also Agamben, 1998; 2002). This seems 
to imply that for Agamben both the exception and the example are ‗original‘ in their own way 
(we will see in a moment how Agamben conceives the notion of origin); but that the 
exception has a unique status. Agamben explains that the exception and the example are 
situated in a symmetrical position with respect to each other; they form ‗a system‘ (Agamben, 
1988: 2). They ‗constitute the two modes by which a set tries to found and maintain its own 
coherence‘ or by which sovereign power structures itself (Agamben, 1988: 23). But, in 
Agamben‘s understanding, it is the sovereign exception, or more specifically, a decision on 
the exception, that acts as a presupposition. Like language whose presupposition is ‗the non-
linguistic‘ and with which language ‗must maintain itself in a virtual relation‘, so ‗that it may 
later denote it in actual speech‘ (1998: 20),197 ‗the nonjuridical‘ in the form of a sovereign 
exception is the presupposition of the law.
198
 In his words, ‗[t]he sovereign exception (as zone 
of indistinction between nature and right) is the presupposition of the juridical reference in 
the form of its suspension‘ (Agamben, 1998: 20–1, italics in original; see also 2005: 36, 39). 
This is because, as argued above, it is ultimately a decision on the exception that produces 
examples by determining both what counts as exceptional (and becomes exemplary in 
Agamben‘s understanding) and as normal. In this sense, Schmitt is right to suggest that ‗the 
exception is more interesting than the regular case‘ (Schmitt, 1985 [1922]: 15; quoted in 
Agamben, 1998: 16). It is through the sovereign‘s decision on the exception that the regular 
or rule is determined. But why does Agamben feel the need to distinguish between the 
exception and the example and not just between the exception and ‗the regular case‘? If, as 
Agamben suggests, ‗exception and example are correlative concepts that are ultimately 
indistinguishable‘ (Agamben, 1998: 22, emphasis added), there must be a more profound 
reason for distinguishing them at various points.
199
 
                                                             
197
 Benjamin‘s ‗paradoxical thought, [sic] that the very essence of language is fulfilled at the point 
where it no longer exists – in silence‘ is ‗key to Benjamin‘s theory of language‘ (Moses, 1989: 240) 
and seems to be again an important point of reference for Agamben.   
198
 Agamben is here drawing an analogy between language and law. He writes that ‗[t]he particular 
structure of law has its foundation in this presuppositional structure of human language. It expresses 
the bond of inclusive exclusion to which a thing is subject because of the fact of being in language, of 
being named. To speak [dire] is, in this sense, always to ―speak the law,‖ ius dicere‘ (Agamben, 1988: 
21).  
199
 An answer to this question can to be found in Agamben‘s reliance on philological concepts and 
ideas to explain historical-philosophical contexts. This is because Agamben sees philology and 
philosophy as ‗two inseparable faces of the same metaphysical project‘ (Agamben, 1998: 161). It is 
through a philological analysis of particular legal and political concepts – with his discussion of 
language being part of this enquiry – that Agamben is able to show a continuity between past and 
present forms of ‗inclusive exclusion‘ and arrive at philosophical and political conclusions about our 
present conjecture. Yet, not only is his establishing of a historical continuity between past and present 
contexts highly problematic, especially in light of Foucault‘s counter-history of ruptures and reversals, 
but the distinction between the exception and the example seems dubious for seemingly challenging 
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Following Benjamin,
200
 Agamben defines the notion of ‗origin‘ as ‗the unpresupposed 
principle‘ that remains hidden in the common usage of hypothesis. That is, although an 
historical category, the origin [ursprung] is not a point of empirical beginning or genesis. 
Instead, ‗origin refers to a history of a different type: not empirical history [...] but a type of 
essential history‘, in which ‗every original phenomenon possesses a uniqueness that 
differentiate it from the majority of phenomena‘ encountered in history (Wolin, 1994b: 96, 
97).
201 According to Agamben, the aim of the paradigm is not to go back to the origin of the 
phenomenon but ‗to show a phenomenon in its original paradigmatic character‘ (Agamben, 
2004: [n.p.]). He, therefore, suggests a study that uses paradigms or examples is a study 
without presupposed principles. It is a study that treats ‗the phenomenon itself as original‘ 
(Agamben, 2002: [n.p.]). This is an important point, which is worth pursuing. It relates to the 
question of a sociological versus a transcendental use of paradigms. But first, I would like to 
dwell further on how, while building upon previous conceptualizations of the paradigm, 
Agamben attempts to go beyond them.  
 
In line with Plato who, together with Aristotle and Kant,
202
 are important points of reference 
for him, Agamben sees paradigms not as already given but as singularities that become 
paradigms ‗by being shown beside the others‘ (Agamben, 2002: [n.p.]). That is to say, the 
paradigm is a singularity that acquires its paradigmatic status by being able to show that the 
logic governing such a paradigm can be applied to other similar cases (although whether the 
chosen case is itself paradigmatic as Agamben says, or its exemplary character is ultimately 
also related to the theorist‘s - in this case Agamben‘s - choices and preferences is an open 
question). The paradigm links a historical element in the distant past with a similar element in 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Agamben‘s own intuition about the unpresupposed or non-essential nature of paradigms, including the 
paradigm of the exception.   
200
 Benjamin says that ‗[t]he term origin is not intended to describe the process of which the existence 
come into being, but rather to describe that which emerges from the process of becoming and 
disappearance. [...]. Origin is not, therefore, discovered by an examination of actual findings, but it is 
revealed to their history and subesequental development. [...]. The concept of the origin is not, as 
Cohen holds, a purely logical one, but an historical one‘ (Benjamin quoted in Agamben, 1999: 156).  
201
 Benjamin refers to ‗the work of art‘ as original and authentic – where the category of authenticity is 
a central feature of the idea of origin for Benjamin – as that which ‗stands revealed as it will one day in 
the light of Messianic fulfilment‘ (Wolin, 1994b: 96). In a later time, however, Benjamin introduces 
another important idea: that of ‗dialectical image‘, in which ‗the course of history is frozen into an 
image in order thereby to demystify it‘ (Wolin, 1994b: 99). Agamben draws on both Benjaminian 
ideas to develop his notion of paradigm.   
202
 According to Agamben, Aristotle is the one who first theorizes the ‗paradigm as going from the 
particular to the particular‘ but his understanding is inadequate because he does not develop this point 
further. Kant rightly suggests that the paradigm or example is more knowable than the other singularity 
to which it is compared and which it is supposed to explain but does not explain why this is (Agamben, 
2002: [n.p.]).  
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the present to show how both – past and present elements – are governed.203 However, in 
contrast to Plato,
204
 Agamben suggests that rather than Ideas forming the basis or foundation 
of their copies (sensible, material things), a given phenomenon in its paradigmatic or 
analogical capacity – that is, in its capacity to show the logic governing both singularities – 
enables an understanding of the phenomenon itself as non-exceptional. In other words, a 
paradigm shows the phenomenon to which it is compared as a product of a decision on the 
exception that determines both the ‗exceptional‘ and ‗the normal case‘, making the distinction 
between the two indistinct. Thus, for instance, in the aftermath of 9/11, the use of emergency 
practices seem no longer merely ‗exceptional‘ but to have become a dispositif or ‗technique 
of government‘ to use Agamben‘s words.  
 
The question, however, is: can a paradigm do all this work by itself? Or is it in need of a 
supplement, that which in Agamben takes the form of a decision on the exception or an a 
priori? Through his paradigmatic method, which, according to de la Durantaye should be 
understood in light of Benjamin‘s ‗dialectical images‘ ‗where a moment of the past is not a 
simple element in a historical archive but a potentially dynamic means of understanding […] 
the present situation‘ (2009: 245), Agamben tries to move away from a traditional notion of 
causality. However, his attempt is only partially successful. It succeeds in linking the past to 
the present without succumbing to an idea of history as a mere series of causal connections. 
Nevertheless, it seems that in his philosophical search for ‗the hidden matrix‘ or ‗arcanuum 
imperii‘ of sovereignty (Agamben, 1998) – that which Agamben finds in the paradigm of 
exception and which explains, among other things, the taking place of being itself in the form 
of the homo sacer or Muselmann – Agamben cannot totally abandon the idea of historical 
continuity and thereby ends up reaffirming a Kantian understanding of causality as external
205
 
and of the a priori as essential. Could we not, in fact, consider Agamben‘s decision to treat 
the exception as presuppositional (see quotation above) and in this sense distinguishable from 
other examples as part of a transcendental gesture, i.e. as an assumption on how all things 
operate and ought to operate? In other words, my argument is that, even though Agamben 
                                                             
203
 In this Agamben follows Benjamin and, specifically, draws on his notion of ‗dialectic image‘ (see 
note 119 supra).    
204
 Note, however, that in his piece Agamben cites Goldschimdt‘s interpretation of Plato‘s Dialogues 
and Plato‘s use of the example/paradigm, which challenges conventional interpretations of his 
understating of the relation between ideas and things. Quoting Goldschimdt, Agamben notes how for 
Plato ‗sometimes the Idea acts as a paradigm for sensible things, but sometimes it is the sensible thing 
that acts as a paradigm for the Idea‘ (Agamben, 2002: [n.p.]). 
205
 The idea of causality as external is employed by Roqué to describe ‗Kant‘s belief that causality 
operates by means of external forces‘ and that this belief led ‗him towards theism‘ (Roqué, 1985: 126). 
Very simply and necessary reductively put, in the case of Kant the ultimate cause is God, in 
Agamben‘s case it is the state of exception.  
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lists the state of exception among his other paradigms, and further argues that his use of 
paradigms is non-presuppositional, thus, non-transcendental, in privileging the sovereign 
exception, he introduces an element of transcendence in his thought. When Agamben says, 
for instance, that it is ‗as if in order to ground itself the juridical order necessarily had to 
maintain itself in relation with an anomie‘ (2005 51; emphasis added), the anomie or 
exceptions here function as constitutive outside. When, furthermore, he says that ‗the state of 
exception is the hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity‘ and that ‗[t]he 
sovereign decision on the exception is the originary juridico-political structure on the basis of 
which what is included in the juridical order and what is excluded from it acquire their 
meaning‘ (2008: 33), he implies that the exception is foundational. I will come back to this 
problem of foundation later but let us first look at some other criticisms moved against 
Agamben‘s notion of paradigms or examples and at how he answers them.  
 
Apart from accuzations of transcendentalism (Norris, 2005; Kisner, 2007; Deranty, 2008; 
LaCapra, 2004), the other most common objection against Agamben‘s use of ‗historically 
singular phenomena‘ to construct, in his own words, ‗a large group of phenomena and in 
order to understand an historical structure‘ (Agamben, 2004: [n.p.]) is that it leads to 
oversimplification (Bigo, 2006a; Santiago, 2006; Neal, 2006).
206
 Agamben‘s  approach, it is 
therefore argued, risks ignoring differences between irreducible and distinct phenomena, for 
example between the Nazi camps and Guantanamo, or even more starkly, between Nazi 
camps and airports wards (Gregory, 2007; Santiago, 2006; see also Consonni, 2010); 
differences that his critics content cannot be explained through single paradigms. Here it is 
also worth noting the similarity between Weber‘s definition of the ideal-type as ‗historical 
individual‘ (Weber, 1949) – which, incidentally, also had to confront the accuzation that it 
was riding roughshod over differences (for instance, Fischoff, 1944: 61-77) – and Agamben‘s 
conception of paradigms.
207
 The main difference seems to be that whilst Weber explicitly 
argued that ideal types were just instruments, which the social scientist created to investigate 
the social world (Weber, 1949: 90), Agamben, in keeping with his notion of paradigms as 
                                                             
206
 Although none of these authors tackled Agamben‘s notion of paradigm, the criticisms they move 
against his theory for representing the victims of violence as detached from socio-historical 
frameworks of analysis and for failing to make distinctions between different sites of exceptions – in 
other words, for oversimplifying the phenomena he analyses – are both political and methodological.  
207
 The notion of ‗historical individual‘ derives from Rickert‘s (Rickert, 1986). Although there is 
considerable debate on the extent to which Weber‘s ideal types are influenced by Rickert‘s historical 
individuals (see, for instance, Burger, 1976; for a counter-view, Gerhardt quoted in Bruun, 2007: 45), 
it is interesting to note how both Agamben‘s paradigms and Weber‘s ideal types are susceptible to 
criticisms of oversimplification. We should also note that, although Rickert does not seem to be an 
important reference for Agamben, he certainly has read him and is appreciative of his understanding of 
value as negation (1998: 137). 
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‗unpresupposed‘ or as given and not as created, wants to sustain that paradigms are both 
abstract and concrete phenomena.
208
 In other words, he wants to maintain that they are not 
simply idealized forms of entities that exist, but they themselves exist, albeit in a particular 
representative or exemplary form. In a sense then, he wants to cross over the boundary 
between a methodological, epistemological, and heuristic use of paradigms, giving paradigms 
ontological status.  
 
In Signatura Rerum, a book on method written by Agamben in 2008, which includes a longer 
version of his lecture ‗What is a Paradigm?‘ (2002), Agamben responds to accuzations of 
simplification and transcendentalism, by reaffirming that his notion of paradigm is not to be 
considered as transcendental or transhistorical. He states that the paradigm ‗is a form of 
knowing, neither inductive, nor deductive, but analogical‘ (2008: 28). Whereas deduction 
goes from the general to the particular209 and induction goes from the particular to the 
general,
210
 analogical thinking is described by Juthe (2005) – a view shared by Agamben –  as 
a form of argumentation that goes from the particular to the particular without going via any 
universal premise (Aristotle quoted in Agamben, 2002: [n.p.]; Agamben, 2008: 29).
211
 He 
further suggests that ‗[t]he historicity of the paradigm is not in its being diachronic or 
synchronic, but in a combination of the two‘ (2008: 33), while repeating his previous claim 
that ‗the arche‘ or original character of examples is not presupposed but acquired (2008: 33). 
Contrary to how ‗sociologists‘ investigate the world, also sometimes relying on ‗paradigms‘ 
or ‗abstract categories‘ (see, for instance, Weber, 1949; but also Foucault quoted in 
Agamben, 2002;
212
 Marx quoted in Kain, 1991: 144; 1993: 144
213
), Agamben declares that 
                                                             
208
 In the sense of being both abstract and concrete, Agamben‘s paradigms are more similar to Marx‘s 
real abstractions; albeit in a form that is almost completely divested from any  reference to the notions 
of commodity form and of ideology, which are of primary importance to Marx. For different takes on 
the topic of real abstractions in Marx, see, for instance, Althusser, 1971; Sohn-Rethel, 1978; Finelli, 
1987; Echeverría, 1989; Žižek, 1989: Toscano, 2008a; 2008b.    
209
 Note that, according to Russell, however, deduction also goes from the general to the general, and 
induction goes from the particular to the particular, or from the particular to the general (Russell, 1912: 
58). In Russell‘s understanding, therefore, analogical reasoning would be a form of induction.   
210
 See Aristotle quoted in Chakrabarti (1995: 66). Other definitions of induction can be found. See, for 
instance, Mill, who, like Russell, argues that ‗inductive inference goes from particulars to particulars‘ 
but not ‗to a generalization‘ (Mill quoted in Lacey, 1976: 94). See also Peirce (1998).  
211
 For lack of time and space, I cannot address the literature on analogical reasoning here. For a brief 
but insightful understanding of how Kant, an important reference for Agamben, uses analogical 
reasoning in ‗the ubiquitous, but often overlooked form, of the ―as if‖ in his philosophy‘, see Caygill, 
1995: 86-87. There is also a vast literature discussing analogical reasoning in law. For avenues into 
these writings, see Scott Brewer, 1998. 
212
 Although he never provided an explicit discussion or definition of the paradigm, Foucault used 
many paradigms in his work (Agamben, 2002; Merquior, 1985). Agamben mentions the panopticon as 
an example of ‗a concrete, singular, historical phenomenon‘ that can be generalized as a model of 
functioning (Agamben, 2002: [n.p.]).  
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his use of paradigms or examples is not intended as ‗sociology‘ or ‗history‘ (Agamben, 2002: 
[n.p.]). Although how Agamben understands the term sociology is never clarified, it is 
plausible to think that what he means when he says that his use of examples is not to be 
regarded as a sociology or history is that he is not so much interested in empirical ‗details‘; in 
offering an empirical analysis of how certain phenomena have developed. Instead, what he 
wants to provide is a critique of Western politics as such using examples that show its 
intrinsic biopolitical dimension. This is possibly because Agamben thinks – following 
Heidegger – that metaphysical investigations of this type are in a sense more concrete and 
immediate than empirical research.  
 
However, even if we leave aside for the moment the problems of distinguishing between 
examples and the paradigm of the exception as analysed above and accept Agamben‘s stated 
opposition,
214
 given the strong causal connection between examples and paradigms
215
 there 
remain significant conceptual difficulties in explaining how paradigms or examples, as 
products of the state of exception, have the ability to explain different historical contexts. Put 
differently, how can paradigms as products of the state of exception be specific and general at 
the same time? This is especially problematic if the state of exception is conceptualized in a 
way that does not allow for different degrees of exception (again see Chapter 1). Of course, 
the use of analogy means that this difference is in a sense unimportant – for Agamben, what 
is important is that the logic that governs all modern examples can be demonstrated and thus 
scrutinized and criticized. However, if we accept that this difference is in fact significant, it 
means that paradigms have to be used carefully. Otherwise, analogical thinking, which makes 
use of paradigms (particulars) to understand very different historical phenomena, risks 
becoming reductive and falling into the circular reasoning whereby that which needs 
explaining is, despite the claim to the contrary, presupposed. Instead of serving as the 
explanations of the logic of specific phenomena, if used without attention to historical and 
sociological ‗details‘, the paradigm risks justifying the idea that all Western political 
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 Based on a reading of the Grundrisse, according to Kain, Marx also made use of ‗abstract 
categories‘, working them into paradigms, ‗to understand the actual world or its historical 
development‘ (Kain, 1991: 144). Although Kain‘s interpretation relies on an empiricist usage of the 
terms ‗abstract‘ as theoretical concept, which the Marxist conception of ‗real abstractions‘ challenges 
(see Althusser quoted in Toscano, 2008: 5; Finelli, 1987; for a counter-view see, Echeverría, 1989), the 
fact that Marx too used ‗abstractions‘, albeit as ‗active principle(s)‘, ‗set[s] of practices‘ (Kouvelakis, 
2003: 324), in his work seems rather uncontroversial. For a collection of essays that deals with the 
highly contested topic of Marx‘s method, see Rattansi, 1989. For an excellent introductory text, see, 
Bottomore, 1991, and in particular the section on dialectics.   
214
 An opposition that, as we have seen, Agamben himself implicitly puts into question when he goes 
on to mention ‗the state of exception‘ among his paradigms (2008: 33).  
215
 Although oikonomia (the latest of Agamben‘s paradigm) is not (see Agamben, 2007), all other 
paradigms (the camp, the Muselmann, the refugee, etc) are generated by the ‗state of exception‘.  
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philosophy and thought is governed by a single foundational logic of exception (Agamben 
1998: 35).
216
 In other words, it ends up implying that there is a historical-ontological 
continuity between past and present. The question of who decides on the exception is a 
political question that cannot be evaded. And, from a political perspective, one should indeed 
be able to distinguish between ‗the state of exception‘, or more aptly, between the sovereign 
decision on the exception and the products of this decision (where the state of exception is 
also a product of a sovereign decision). Yet, to invest the sovereign with absolute power, 
which it derives from the power to decide on the exception but which, in Agamben‘s 
understanding, goes beyond it in its ability to reduce ‗life‘ to bare life and to, in a sense, 
therefore, monopolize the question of power is disputable.
217
 It would also be erroneous to 
argue that the differences or discontinuities between today‘s state of exception and its 
manifestations and those of the past are insignificant. In this respect, it might be more useful 
to follow Foucault‘s own take on this who says that the duty of genealogy is not ‗to 
demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present, that it continues secretly to animate 
the present, having imposed a predetermined form to all its vicissitudes‘ (Foucault, 1977: 
146; more on genealogy below).   
 
Despite aforementioned problems, I suggest that paradigms remains useful for an enquiry 
into the contemporary politics of security but that, contrary to Agamben, they are most useful 
if employed sociologically. As Agamben himself suggests, a paradigm can be used both to 
understand specific historical phenomena and large-scale historical structures of power 
(Agamben, 2004a: [n.p.]). Therefore, paradigms are important for this thesis, whose aim is 
not simply an analysis of the mechanisms of power that inform the war on terror, but also of 
the structure of power that sustains them. The principal aim is to find out how discourses of 
‗security‘ are articulated and inform practices of exception and biopower undertaken in the 
name of war on terror, and how the US and EU – as structures of power that have a degree of 
autonomy but are not to be thought as completely independent from socio-economic relations 
                                                             
216
 Analogical reasoning is not, however, necessarily opposed to attention to details and differences 
between cases. Guarini argues that, in law, analogical reasoning includes ‗different types of analogical 
arguments‘, ‗often (but not always) [taking] the form of a disputed case being compared to an agreed-
upon case, and one interlocutor tries to persuade another that the disputed case should be treated the 
same as the agreed upon  case on grounds of similarity‘ (Guarini,  2004: 153, 166). 
217
 Following a non-canonical reading of Aristotle, Agamben argues that ‗the greatness of human 
potentiality is measured by the abyss of human impotentiality‘ and that ‗potentiality constitutively be 
the potentiality not to [do or be]‘ (Agamben, 1999: 182; 1998: 45). In other words, for Agamben, 
refusing to act – Agamben uses the term inoperativiness [inoperosità] – is the greatest ‗act‘ of 
resistance because it differentiates itself from, and thus is inimical to, sovereign power whose is 
instead dependent on a decision (to act). To imagine a constitution of potentiality that is freed from the 
principle of sovereignty, not simply in terms of being able to separate itself from it but of being truly 
autonomous and of taking up the challenge of mediation seems impossible for Agamben.   
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and interests – are themselves framed by these practices. To this extent, it is not unwarranted 
to use paradigms, and in particular the paradigm of exception, sociologically to investigate 
the specificity of today‘s state of exception by critically taking into account the actual actors, 
forces, and discursive strategies involved in its production.
218
 Agamben‘s use of paradigms is 
criticisable for failing to confront empirical specificities that could upset his understating of 
the state of exception, and for ultimately reinforcing a vision of history as continuous which 
Agamben explicitly rejects.
219
 Contrary to this, I believe paradigms can and should be used 
with attention to sociological, historical and discursive details, so as to avoid hasty and 
counter-productive generalizations. As a matter of fact, what I am concerned with here is not 
solely, not even primarily, a philosophical interrogation of mechanisms of power in the 
abstract. Instead, what I intend to provide is a sociological analysis of contemporary 
securitization discourses in a political key. That is to say, a theoretically-informed 
investigation of securitization strategies interpreted in a socio-political key; an interrogation 
of discourses of security and exception that uses and understands Agamben‘s ‗paradigms‘, 
including that of exception, not as given or inevitable but as historically specific; therefore, 
not only as unpredictable in their consequences but also, potentially at least, as changeable.  
 
Although whether Agamben intends his interpretation of Foucault‘s notion of dispositif as 
distinct from that of paradigm is never made explicit, I think there is enough evidence to 
think them as distinguishable. Again, as it was in the case of the example, but which is even 
more evident in the case of dispositifs, what distinguishes them for Agamben is their relation 
to the exception. And even though this distinction is far from clear-cut, I believe that the 
reading offered below is a persuasive interpretation of Agamben‘s notion of dipositif. 
Agamben derives his notion of dispositif from Foucault (Agamben, 2006). In a passage worth 
quoting at length, Foucault defines a dispositif as follows:  
 
What I try to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly 
heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative 
measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and 
philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the 
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 Agamben himself, although explicitly saying that his ‗analysis should not be confused with a 
sociological investigation‘ (2004a: [n.p.]), repeatedly uses paradigms to explain current political events 
and ‗discourses‘ (in particular see his discussion of Guantánamo Bay and of anti-terrorist legislations 
in his interview with Raulff, 2004a and in his State of Exception, 2003).  
219
 It is interesting to note, in fact, that the configuration of what appears to be as transcendental, ‗trans-
historical‘ paradigm (i.e., the paradigm of exception) seems to be in tension with both Foucault‘s 
understanding of history and with Agamben‘s own, at least as described in Infancy and History: On the 
Destruction of Experience (2007) (originally published in 1978) where he also puts forward a vision of 
history as discontinuous.   
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unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself 
is the system of relations that can be established between these 
elements. Secondly, what I am trying to identify in this apparatus is 
precisely the nature of the connection that can exist between these 
heterogeneous elements. […] between these elements, whether 
discursive or non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of 
position and modifications of function which can also vary widely. 
Thirdly, I understand by the term ‗apparatus‘ a sort of – shall we 
say – formation which has as its major function at a given 
historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The 
apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function (Foucault 1980, 
194-195, emphasis added).
220
  
 
Put differently, for Foucault, dispositifs are both discursive and non-discursive and emerge in 
response to some pressing needs. They are heterogeneous ensembles made of  ‗discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, 
scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions‘ (Foucault, 1980: 
194). In a similar way to how Agamben intends paradigms, according to Oksala, through the 
notion of dispositif, Foucault tries ‗to overcome the distinction between transcendental 
constitution and empirical, causal formation‘ (2008). In other words, a dispositif is an 
apparatus or regime of power, as well as a conceptual tool that Foucault uses to understand 
the connection and interplay between heterogeneous discursive and non-discursive elements 
of a certain set. As Ross puts it, the notion of dispositif ‗allows Foucault to join his analysis 
of the micro-disciplines that operate in specific institutional settings to ends that are tied to 
the management of life as such or more specifically of populations, and thus to a biopolitical 
map that structures the entire social field‘ (Ross, 2008: 64). According to Agamben, dipositifs 
act as universals of sorts in Foucault‘s thought (and this despite the fact that, as Agamben 
himself notes, Foucault ‗always refused to deal with general categories or mental constructs 
                                                             
220
 The term dispositif is derived from the French verb disposer: to arrange, to set, to lay out. 
Interestingly, it has been employed in different settings, with the military setting being a primary 
example. However, the word itself has no single direct English equivalent. When translated in relation 
to Foucault, it is rendered in very different ways ranging from ‗apparatus‘ as above  (Colin, 1980; 
Armstrong in Michel Foucault: essays, 1992; Han, 1998; Oksala, 2005; 2008), ‗discourse‘ (Robert 
Hurley in The History of Sexuality, 1998 [1976]), ‗deployment‘ (Rabinow in The Foucault Reader, 
1991), ‗grid of intelligibility‘ (Dreyfus and Rabinow,  1983), to ‗multilinear ensemble‘ or ‗social 
apparatus‘ (Deleuze, 1992). Other renditions can be found (see, for instance, Berardi who refers to 
dipositifs as semiotic engines ‗able to act as paradigm[s] of a series of events, behaviours, narrations, 
and projection modelling social reality‘ (2005)). Given that I am here concerned with how both 
Foucault and Agamben use the term and that the Italian equivalent of dispositif (i.e., dispositivo) is 
both phonetically and morphologically similar to the French one, I opted for the French term, except 
when already translated in other ways.  
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that he calls ―the universals‖, such as the State, Sovereignty, Law and Power‘) (Agamben, 
2006a; 2009: 7).   
 
Starting from the premises that dispositifs are not comprehensible outside the system of 
heterogeneous ensemble of relations of which they are part, in his Che cos’e` un 
dispositivo,
221
 Agamben redefines Foucault‘s dispositif as everything that ‗has the capacity to 
capture, to direct, to determine, to intercept, to model, to control, to assure gestures, conducts, 
opinions, and discourses of living beings‘ (2006a: 22). In an original reinterpretation, 
dispositifs, says Agamben, are not simply prisons, madhouses, the Panopticon, schools, 
confessions, factories, etc., ‗whose connection to power is in a certain sense evident‘. They 
are also singular mechanisms, such as ‗the pen‘, ‗computers‘, ‗mobile phones‘ and complex 
systems such as  ‗language‘, which Agamben suggests, ‗is, perhaps, the most ancient of all 
dispositifs‘ (2006a: 22). Agamben furthermore suggests that, in capitalist societies, there is a 
proliferation of dispositifs, to the point where they invest every aspects of social life. We 
could say that dispositifs, for Agamben, are devices whose connection to capitalism is not 
self-evident but remains very important. What capitalism does, just like religion did by 
declaring something sacred, is to remove something from ‗the free use of man‘ and in a sense 
transform it in dipositif. Dispositifs are, moreover, distinguishable from paradigms. A 
paradigm can be also a dispositif – Agamben offers the example of oikonomia222 and, as for 
paradigms, dispositifs always imply a process of subjectification, which is necessarily and at 
the same time a process of desubjectification. For Agamben, on the one hand ‗there are living 
beings (or substances), and on the other, dispositifs in which living being are increasingly 
captured (Agamben, 2006a: 21). However, while paradigms always introduce emergency 
and/or exception, dipositifs, such as the pen, do not necessarily do so, although others, such 
as language, do.  
 
To the extent that both Foucault and Agamben understand dipositifs as both discursive and 
non-discursive, the idea of dipositif is pertinent to the context of my analysis. Following 
Agamben‘s own understanding of the term, and Foucault‘s characterization of it in terms of 
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 Translated in English in 2009 by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella as What is an Apparatus? and 
other essays. 
222
For Agamben the term dispositif can be traced back to the Greek concept of oikonomia as the 
administration of the oikos (the home) and, more generally, management – a term which, according to 
Agamben, assumed a primary importance for the Fathers of the Church (Agamben, 2006a). According 
to him, Foucault‘s concept of dipositif (as well as Heidegger‘s Ge-stell) can be linked to this 
theological legacy; to oikonomia (Agamben, 2006a). In his book, Il Regno e la Gloria (2007), 
Agamben takes up a ‗painstaking and erudite investigation‘ into the different figures taken by the 
‗economy‘ in early Christian theology to develops his thesis that Trinitarian theology, Christology 
and angelology lay the groundwork for an economic theology of government that remains operative in 
the current dispensation of Western modernity. For a review and critique, see again Toscano, 2009.  
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both urgency and strategy, the documents chosen here can be understood as part of a 
governmental dispositif of security and as having themselves the capacity to capture, control 
etc and to produce new relations of power. The NSSs and the ESS can thus be themselves 
regarded as conceptual or ideological dispositfs223 and as part of a bigger, multi-faceted 
dispositif of security. The NSSs and the ESS have a strategic function in terms of setting the 
parameters of what is and what is not permissible in the post 9/11-context; they also respond 
to what they themselves qualify as an urgent need, encapsulated by the signifier ‗9/11‘ – this 
is especially true, for the former documents. Of course, there are differences between the first 
set of documents and the European Security strategy – their hegemonic power in this respect 
is clearly dissimilar. Nevertheless, all of these documents exemplify the type of security 
discourses being given voice today and are to be seen as discourses or practices that help to 
construct or reconstruct new state forms as ‗the point[s] of strategic codification of multitude 
of power relations‘ (Jessop, 2007a: [n.p.]; 2007b: 68). The idea of government or ‗new forms 
of state(s)‘ as strategic codification of power relations – an idea which according to Jessop‘s 
highly suggestive reading is to be found in Foucault himself – provides a bridge between 
biopower and a theory of sovereignty; between the problematic of  micropowers and of 
international politics/geopolitics. In this understanding, new forms of state(s) could 
themselves be understood as dispositifs, in the specific sense that they are ensembles of 
‗institutional forces acting in and thought the state‘ (Jessop, 1990: 270), and the discourses 
that they produce are to be understood as part of a dispositif of security that, as shown in 
Chapter 1, is increasingly becoming dominant.  
 
2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis and Ideology  
 
Drawing from critical discourse analysis (hereafter CDA), a methodological tradition which 
is directly interested in the study of discourses but whose emphasis is on the critical or on 
showing ‗connections and causes which are hidden‘ (Fairclough, 1992: 9), I explain why and 
in what sense the US NSSs and ESS should be understood as ideological. Following 
Foucault‘s insistence on historical specificity, I will argue that these documents, as 
exemplifications of the type of security discourses being given voice in the context of the war 
on terror, should be analysed as historically specific. But, contrary to Foucault‘s explicit 
rejection of ideology, I believe they should also be investigated as discursive securitization 
practices that reinforce certain hegemonic ideologies as well as being themselves 
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 Note that the term ‗conceptual dispositif‘ is used by Althusser in his essay ‗Ideology and 
Ideological Status Apparatuses‘ (1971) to explain how ideology influences subjects‘ behaviours, 
ultimately producing material effects. I will return to the question of ideology in the next section.  
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‗ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggle over power‘ (Fairclough, 1995: 
132). 
 
As a methodological tradition, CDA is not easily definable. It comprehends a plurality of 
theories and methodologies drawn from a number of traditions (see, for instance, critical 
linguistics, text linguistics, pragmatics), which researchers have developed and use in a 
variety of ways (see, for instance, Fairclough, 1989; Van Dijk in Wetherell et al., 2001; 
Wetherell, Taylor and Yates, 2001 among others). According to Van Dijk, ‗ready-made 
methods‘ are incompatible with CDA because CDA is a ‗perspective‘ on doing research 
which ‗focuses on social problems‘ and – in line with Foucault‘s  understanding of discourse 
– on the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power relations and of power 
abuse or domination (Van Dijk in Wetherell et al., 2001: 95, 96). The emphasis here is on the 
necessity ‗for a broad, diverse, multidisciplinary and problem-oriented CDA‘ (Van Dijk in 
Wetherell et al, 2001: 97), which will select its methods on the basis of a theoretical analysis 
of social issues (Van Dijk in Wetherell et al., 2001: 98). CDA stresses the importance of 
using diverse theoretical and methodological concepts. CDA‘s assumption is that ‗texts‘ 
should be studied following methods, which should be firmly grounded in ‗systematic and 
detailed textual analysis‘ (see, Fairclough 1995: 187) but with a strong attention to the ways 
strategies and processes of power and dominance are enacted and reproduced through these 
texts (also Van Dijk, 2003). According to CDA researchers, it is not enough to study texts on 
‗their own terms‘ but texts should be studied critically on the basis of theoretical insights 
with a view in exploring how the dominant forces in a society construct and reinforce 
discourses that favour their interests.  
 
As Kress points out, what sets CDA off from other kinds of discourse analysis and text 
linguistics, ‗as well as pragmatics and sociolinguistics‘ is its ‗overtly political agenda‘ (Kress, 
1990) and its emphasis on the relation between discursive practices and wider social and 
cultural structures, relations and processes (Fairclough, 1993: 135). The presupposition 
behind the emphasis on the political is that discourses do not simply reflect how the world is 
– in my specific case, how the US NNSs and the ESS respond to the problem of terrorism and 
security post-9/11 – rather that they help to construct certain ‗truths‘ about it. In other words, 
discourses are not neutral but have effects on social processes, social institutions, and the 
social world that are not just real (Fairclough, 1989) but construct particular understandings 
of the world and thus of how it should be governed by those in power. These discourses are 
part of what Foucault calls ‗regimes of truth‘ (Foucault, 1980), by which he means ‗the 
ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and special effects 
of power attached to the true‘ (Foucault, 1980: 132). For Foucault, truth cannot be separated 
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from knowledge and/or power nor can it become the basis for ‗true subjectivity‘. Truth ‗is 
thoroughly imbued with relations of power‘ (1980: 59-60), which means that there is no truth 
that is innocent of power relations, which transcends them. More specifically, Foucault‘s 
working hypothesis concerns ‗the reciprocal constitution of power techniques and forms of 
knowledge and of regimes of representation and modes of intervention‘ (Lemke, 2007: 2) 
where regimes of representation are also regimes of truth. This is why, against an arguably 
partial, but common, understanding of Marxist notion of ideology, Foucault argues, ‗[t]he 
problem is not changing people‘s consciousness – or what is in their heads‘ but the ‗regime of 
the production of truth‘ (1980: 133). 
 
In line with his understanding of power as intrinsically relational and his idea of reality as 
constructed and permeated by discourse, Foucault rejects the notion of ideology and offers 
three main reasons as to why he thinks ideology is an inadequate concept. Firstly, ideology 
‗always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth‘.224 
Secondly, it refers ‗to something of the order of a subject‘; a ‗humanist‘ order that Foucault 
vehemently rejects. Thirdly, it ‗stands in a secondary position relative to something which 
functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant, etc.‘ (Foucault, 1984: 
60). Rejecting both the existence of a universal rationality and of a given subject, Foucault 
cannot but argue against ideology in the canonical Marxist sense of the term. In his various 
essays and works, Foucault speaks of forms of knowledge as giving rise to new forms of 
subjects – for Foucault, ‗the subject‘ is an effect of power-knowledge – which further implies 
that ‗the subject‘ is not given but constructed and that the ‗superstructure‘ is not dependent on 
the infrastructure but has a degree of autonomy.  
 
This view, it is fair to say, is not unique to Foucault. The base/superstructure model has been 
contested by a number of people, including many Marxists themselves,
225
 from very different 
political perspectives (see, for instance, Bell, 1976; Fukuyama, 1992; Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985; Hardt and Negri, 2001; Jameson, 1991; Agamben, 2007; Balibar, 1994; Badiou, 
2005a), and on a number of counts, not just those offered by Foucault above. The critique 
                                                             
224
 Foucault is here referring to the opposition between ideology and science – an opposition explicated 
and defended with force by Althusser (Althusser, 1971) but contested by other Marxists, including 
Rancière (1985); see also early works by Stuart Hall, such as, ‗The Problem of Ideology: Marxism 
Without Guarantees‘ (1983). For Rancière, Althusser‘s defence of the science/ideology distinction fails 
to recognize that ‗the relation of science to ideology is one not of rupture but of articulation‘. It also 
constitutes a ‗complete distortion of the ideological struggle‘, and implies a will to scientistically know 
how and why the ‗masses‘ are caught in the grip of ideological misrecognition and to speak on their 
behalf (Rancière 1985: 116). For a defence, see Resch, 1992.  
225
 Indeed, according to Anderson (1976), much of Western Marxism is based precisely on getting rid 
of this rather wooden extrapolation from Marx; though there are critical contemporary Marxists, like 
Cohen (1978), who would still in some sense defend it. 
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moved by some feminists against orthodox Marxist theories for ignoring that women‘s 
oppression is linked to questions of ‗culture‘ to the extent that women are oppressed both as 
agents of production (as workers or workers‘ wives) and as ‗women‘ is a case in point (see, 
for instance, de Beauvoir, 1972 [1949]; Irigaray, 1985; Butler, 1993, 1998). At issue here is 
not only the question of ideology as only explicable in relation to the economic base, but of 
the plausibility of a deterministic model for which the base or the economic structure 
determines the superstructure; although whether Marx and Engels themselves attained to this 
simplistic model is questionable.
226
  
 
In particular, Foucault rejects what he perceives as ‗regulating‘ principles. Against notions of 
universality and historical continuity,
227
 he suggests that ‗nothing in man – not even his body 
– is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other 
men‘ (Foucault, 1977: 153: 351-69, 360). He says, ‗[t]he forces operating in history are not 
controlled by destiny or regulating mechanisms, but respond to haphazard conflict‘ (Foucault, 
1977: 154). In other words, for Foucault, history is not and cannot be governed by any single 
factor, such as the dialectic development of ideas (Hegel), ‗class struggle‘ (Marx) and/or 
sovereignty or the exception (Agamben) because ‗randomness‘ and discontinuity are ever-
present.
228
 As he explains, his genealogical analyses do not attempt to uncover how species 
have evolved or what their destiny will be. Rather, genealogy ‗identif[ies] the accidents, the 
minute deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, 
and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things which continue to exist and have 
value for us [. . .]‘ (1977: 146). Genealogy‘s preoccupation is to uncover moments of 
discontinuity without pretending that there are any underlying or regulating principles that 
could explain how history works because, for Foucault, ‗effective history‘ (a term he uses in 
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 This is a problem that has occupied, and continues to occupy, both Marxists and non-Marxists 
philosophers and political theorists. For a ‗rethinking [of] the problem‘ in terms of the ‗relative 
autonomy‘ of the state see Jessop, 1990: 101-104.     
227
 Although much Marxism has been based on criticizing false universalities and continuities – 
something which, however, Foucault does not seem to acknowledge – from a Foucauldian perspective, 
the presupposition of false versus true universalities – notably in Marx‘s view, the proletariat was a 
true universal class because it acted in the interests of the majority – is problematic.   
228
 Although it is fair to say that in all the aforementioned cases, this is clearly something of an 
oversimplification. Hegel‘s ‗objective contradiction‘ influenced the formulation of Marx‘s theory 
of history (Rockmore, 2002: 189) and it is well known that there exist many different interpretations of 
both Engels‘s and Marx‘s philosophies of history. In his later writings, moreover, Marx himself 
seemed to adopt two formulations to explain his historical materialistic thesis: one more overtly 
‗mechanistic‘ and ‗economistic‘ that sees revolution as inevitable and one more attentive to the 
working of ideology (Althusser, 1970). On the other hand, Agamben explicitly rejects a notion of 
economic as ‗causa prima’ (2007: 132) and of history as continuous (see his discussion in Infancy and 
History, 2007a [1993]). In his more recent work and interviews, moreover, he has shifted his attention 
from sovereign power to governmentality, arguing that ‗the arcane of modernity‘ is not sovereignty or 
the king but oikonomia as governmentality (Agamben, 2008a, 2007b). For some of the problems raised 
by this shift, see my literature review. 
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his discussion of Nietzsche) is history ‗without constants‘. In other words, an historical or 
genealogical account is effective for Foucault when it rejects ideas of system, continuity and 
origin. The task of genealogy is ‗to record the singularity of events outside of any 
monotonous finality‘ (1977: 139).229  
 
From the above, we can clearly see why from a Foucauldian perspective an understanding of 
sovereignty as always and already biopolitical is not acceptable. In Foucault‘s view, 
biopower and biopolitics are not universals aimed at replacing notions like State or civil 
society. They are historical categories aimed at describing a specific rationality, with all of its 
proper technologies and sui generis material effects (Toscano, 2008). This does not 
necessarily imply that biopower and biopolitics are unrelated to sovereign power or that the 
state has no biopolitical, securitizational dimension (Agamben, 1998). The main aim of my 
analysis is exactly to explore how the relation between sovereign power and forms of 
biopolitical power, together with what appeared to be as a strong reaffirmation of US state 
power, is constructed and sustained within these documents. However, it means that one 
should look at sovereign and biopolitical developments in their specific, contingent 
configurations. One should look at biopolitical, securitization developments, including those 
related to the war on terror, as historical phenomena whose connection to the state is to be 
discerned rather than presupposed.  
 
Foucault‘s ‗nominalist critique‘ (Foucault, 1991b: 186), which stresses the fact that power is 
‗immanent in all social relations, articulated with discourses as well as institutions, and 
necessarily polyvalent‘ (Jessop, 2007a: 35; 1990) allows one to treat discourses as social 
practices with real, often unpredictable, effects. However, whereas, in my view, Foucault‘s 
attempt to move away from mono-causal explanations of power and of history in which one 
factor is elevated to meta-historical status is to be welcomed, the same cannot be said for the 
abandonment of the problematic of ideology (see, for instance, Žižek, 1989; Balibar, 1991; 
1994). Without entering the more complex problem on whether Foucault‘s theory of power 
leads to epistemological relativism,
230
 I suggest that the following question cannot be evaded. 
Even if one accepts that forms of knowledge, to remain closer to Foucault‘s own 
terminology, are not completely dependent on material, economic factors, is not one justified 
                                                             
229
 Note that this is a view accepted by Agamben (see note above) but that his search for ‗the arkhé’ 
(origin) or ‗hidden matrix’ (or hidden force that operates in history) renders somewhat less convincing.  
230
 For a positive answer see, for instance, Taylor, 1984; Habermas, 1990. For a counter but critical 
view of Foucault‘s work for re-affirming that which he wanted to contest (i.e., ‗an objective gaze‘), see 
Newman, 2005: 177. For a more sympathetic view, see, for instance, Kumar, 2005a. See also footnote 
135 above and the discussion below, which, although not directly with the question of relativism, 
offers a view of why it is in my view necessary to discern between forms of knowledge.   
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in asking what enables some discourses to dominate over others and whether dominant 
discourses of security and exception reflect certain economic, material and geopolitical 
interests? Put differently, what I am suggesting is that the fact that all forms of knowledge are 
linked to power in the sense of constituting particular subjectivities (the terrorist, the subject 
of security, etc.) does not preclude some forms of knowledge to dominate over others. Nor 
does it eliminate the likelihood that elites and dominant players, such as the US, and, to a less 
degree the EU, will always try to maintain their economic interests and position of power. 
The fact that those interests might not be simply economic, or straightforwardly 
understandable in economic terms, but political, or exactly the same for all those involved,
231
 
that the attempt to preserve them might in fact result in instability and/or produce opposite, 
often indeed haphazard effects, is not the same as to say that they do not exist.  
 
It is my contention that discourses on and of security, such as those that will be analysed in 
Chapter 3 and 4, cannot be analysed as discourses that bear no relation to particular political 
hegemonic ideologies or ‗systems of ideas‘ (neoliberal, neoconservative, interventionist, 
imperialist, nationalist/globalist, racial, humanitarian etc.). Nor can we simply accept the idea 
that we live in a post-ideological world in which ideology is, justly perhaps, but solely used 
to demarcate the beliefs of ‗the Other of parliamentary democracy‘, as Toscano aptly called it 
(2006b), or, to use a much contested expression, ‗Islamofascism‘ as it is was labelled by 
George W. Bush, some journalists, and pundits (see, for instance, Bush, 2005; Hitchens, 
2007; Savage, 2005; Podhoretz, 2008). To do so means to accept the terms of these 
discourses and to fail to recognize that, as Althusser has pointed out, ‗one of the effects of 
ideology is the practical denegation [or disavowal] of the ideological character of ideology by 
ideology: ideology never says, ―I am ideological‘‘‘ (Althusser, 1971: 164, emphasis 
original).
232
 It also means avoiding the thinking of the ideational aspect of ideology or the 
aspect which refers, not to illusory ideas as such, but to ‗idealist‘ views. ‗[T]hat is, ―idealist‖ 
not in the ontological sense, but in the sociological, thereby indicating beliefs or theories 
about society that ignore or downplay the role of ―material‖, economic factors‘ (Mills, 2003: 
73; see also Lock, 1976; Balibar, 1973
233
).  
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 The EU, for instance, might have somewhat different interests than those of the US. EU member 
states themselves, moreover, have shown and continue to show differences in their approaches against 
‗the threat of terrorism‘.  
232
 Althusser uses this idea to explain: 1) that ideology has a material existence and ‗always exists in an 
apparatus, and its practice, or practices‘ (1971: 166) 2) the interpellation of ‗individuals as concrete 
subjects‘ (1971: 173).  
233
 Whereas Mills attempts to revalue the tem, both Lock and Balibar use idealist in the negative to 
refer to a conception of ideology that ignores contradictory (material) relations – ideology as false 
consciousness. However, in spite of this difference, the thrust of the argument is the same.     
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Although agreeing with Foucault that power relations do not simply reflect or realize the 
intentions of the powerful few (Kumar, 2005a: 8), nor are they simply conceivable in 
economic terms, diverging from him (and from Agamben, who does not explicitly deal with 
this question),
234
 my claim is that these strategic discourses do reflect and reinforce certain 
geopolitico-strategic, economic, political interests. The version of reality put forward in these 
documents, moreover, is certainly an idealized one – to adopt Marx‘s words, it gives ‗its 
ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones‘ 
(Marx and Engels, 1970 [1845]: 177). For instance, in this version of reality American 
greatness and its role in defeating fascism and communism is emphasized, while crucial 
historical facts, such as the history of slavery and of colonialism, which are fundamental to an 
understanding of the present, are denied. This is not to say that the ideas in these documents 
are to be considered as simply false. Indeed, as Agamben says, ideas used to justify the war 
on terrorism, such as the idea that ‗we‘ all share certain values – values that are not to be 
questioned and that presumably unite us all as in the now commonly used expression ‗our 
way of life‘ – are ‗so radically imbued in society that they are to be taken literally‘ 
(Agamben, 2006). They are abstract but real – ‗real abstractions‘ in Marxist terms – in the 
sense that they function concretely, or to adopt Foucault‘s formulation, they have real effects. 
Nevertheless, the ideas expressed in these documents are clearly not to be accepted on their 
own terms. They are to be analysed as ideological and as discursive practices that reflect the 
attempts of powerful players to set the standards of what is and what is not permissible; of 
what is to be secured and what does not even deserve to live. Contrary to Foucault who, as 
we have just seen, rejects the notion of ideology
235
 but also Agamben to an extent
236
 (also see 
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 As LaCapra says, ‗Agamben offers no sustained inquiry into the ideology and practice of 
perpetrators‘ (La Capra, 2007: 137).  
235
 Although it is interesting to note that despite his later explicit rejection of the notion of ideology, 
Foucault was less reluctant to use the term in the mid-1970s, when for instance he argued that ‗[t]he 
control of society over individuals is not conducted only through consciousness or ideology, but also in 
the body and with the body. For capitalist society biopolitics is what is most important, the biological, 
the somatic, the corporeal‘ (Foucault quoted in Hardt and Negri, 2000: 27). What this implies is that, 
for Foucault, the notion ideology retained some use; although he clearly was already critical of it and 
thought that biopolitics and ideology were to be kept separate. However, my contention would be that 
biopolitical practices themselves cannot be understood without references to the question of ideology 
because 1) the subject of biopolitics, i.e., the body or life, is also an idealized version and 
instrumentalized projection; 2) even though biopolitics cannot be reduced to the ‗who and where 
questions‘, these are questions that still need to be asked.    
236
 Although there is no sustained engagement with the question of ideology in Agamben, neither do 
we find a rejection of the term, which, on the contrary, is employed by him on more than one occasion. 
In The Open (2004c: 77), for instance, Agamben uses the term ‗humanitarian ideology‘ to describe the 
process by which ‗posthistorical humanity takes on its own physiology as the last impolitical mandate‘, 
at the same time as the traditional historical potentialities (poetry, religion and philosophy) that have 
kept the historico-political destiny of people awake  are eclipsed (2004c: 77). In Homo Sacer (1998: 
133), he further suggests that the ideology of contemporary NGOs seems able to defend life only in the 
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LaCapra in Calarco and DeCaroli, 2007: 137), I believe that that the question of the 
ideological underpinnings of these discourses and their placements within broader ‗systems 
of ideas‘ is a crucial one. By analyzing these discursive practices as practices of security and 
exception that are related to particular ideologies and are themselves ideological, in the sense 
of both reflecting and reinforcing certain power relations while being shaped by them, and of 
putting forward an idealized version of reality, this thesis hopes to provide a more convincing 
interpretation of how they are to be connected with Foucault‘s theory of biopower and 
Agamben‘s understanding of sovereignty.237 That is to say, it hopes to provide an 
interpretation that as opposed to simply accepting these discourses on their own terms 
challenges the ideological premises on which they are based, their idealized views, and some 
of their hegemonic effects.  
 
2.3 Selection of Documents and Analysis Related Procedures 
 
In this section, I discuss how documents were selected and the rationale for collecting these 
particular texts. Moreover, I provide further details of how documents were analysed, why 
looking at these documents is important and offers a way to go beyond ‗methodological 
nationalism‘. I will suggest that, although there is a sense in which Agamben himself 
challenges the idea that sovereign power corresponds to the territorial borders of the state, 
because, as noted in the previous chapter, when it comes to discussing how the state of 
exception functions, he only focuses on specific national cases, he ends up accepting 
‗methodological nationalism‘. My choice of documents and related analysis attempts to go 
beyond this by emphasizing how ‗the (state of) exception‘ is indeed becoming dominant at a 
national, as well as at European and international levels, and at how this mode of governing is 
generalized on a planetary scale through war, securitization practices and an 
instrumentalization of international law.   
  
Agamben‘s insight that the borders of sovereign power do not necessarily correspond with 
the territorial borders of states because, as Vaughan-Williams points out, in Agamben, ‗the 
concept of the border of the state is substituted by the sovereign decision to produce some life 
as bare life‘ (Vaughan-Williams, 2009: 116), is an important one. It represents a challenge to 
the inside/outside model of sovereignty for which the borders of sovereign power coincides 
with the territorial borders of states (Vaughan-Williams, 2009). However, it is fair to add that 
                                                                                                                                                                              
figure of ‗sacred‘ or ‗bare‘ life and, therefore, is complicit with the exclusionary logic against which 
NGOs purportedly struggle. 
237
 According to Kumar (2005a: 7), Foucault was also interested in uncovering ‗broader strategies for 
social control or domination‘ but not in tackling these types of questions directly.  
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it remains unclear whether this objective is fully and satisfactorily accomplished and not 
merely for the reason Vaughan-Williams offers, that is, the fact that Agamben‘s notion of 
sovereignty ultimately reintroduces a sense of interiority and exteriority, albeit throughout 
society (Vaughan-Williams, 2009). But also because in Agamben‘s oeuvre there is no 
discussion of other forms of the state or changing forms of sovereignty in relation to what he 
regards as the ‗basic principle of state politics‘: security. This is despite the fact that, as he 
himself suggests, security is never simply confined within the borders of states but finds its 
‗end in globalization‘ (Agamben, 2002: [n.p]. By looking at how security discourses are 
formulated by the US and the EU, I hope to provide evidences of how new forms of 
sovereignty are also being articulated through the discourses on the exception and security 
and how the question of biopolitics figures within them.  
 
After having tracked down a number of key policy documents that specifically deal with ‗the 
new threat of terrorism‘ and other security issues, a selection of three white papers, including 
the EU‘s white paper on security,238 were chosen for this research. They are: the ‗National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America‘ (2002; 2006), and ‗A Secure Europe in a 
Better World: European Security Strategy‘ (2003).239 The two US documents will be 
analysed together as part of my first case study, while the latter will form the basis of my 
second case study. These are all formal documents written from a governmental perspective 
after September 11, 2001. As argued in the introduction, 9/11 is taken as the date of reference 
for this thesis not because I accept the idea expressed in these documents that the 9/11 events 
mark the beginning of ‗a new era‘ but because of its acquired status as a phenomenon of 
international significance – a significance that is itself performed by documents of this sort, 
along with a virtually infinite array of different ones. I start from the presupposition that 9/11 
has been, and continues to be, instrumentalized to enforce certain types of warfare and 
securitization polices both at US national and at a European, international level.  
 
Other important documents, such as the ‗Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of 
Certain Terrorist Attacks‘ or the ‗Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act‘, commonly referred to 
as the USA Patriot Act both issued in 2001 (in September and October respectively) were 
also considered for analysis but discarded for two main reasons. Firstly, these texts were 
strictly legal and would have made comparison with the other chosen EU non-legal document 
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 Note that this is the first time that Europe has formulated a joint security strategy. It was drafted 
under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative Javier Solana.   
239
 Full references to the documents are provided in the bibliography. All three documents are public 
and easily accessible (e.g. through the Internet).  
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difficult. Secondly, although national legislation does sometimes apply to external affairs – 
the Patriot Act being a case in point, as it includes provisions to facilitate electronic 
surveillance by law enforcement and the FBI, which according to some authors, have 
potentially broader implications on phenomena such as e-commerce and Internet activity 
(Smith et al., 2002) – their scope of action is primarily national. This would have limited 
what could have been said in relation to how configurations or forms of sovereign power 
relate or are entangled with mechanisms of global biopower. Since the aim of this thesis is to 
go beyond ‗methodological statism‘ (i.e., the idea that the state and its sovereignty should be 
the main unit of analysis), without, nevertheless, discounting the force of law and the power 
of sovereign states, I have decided to opt for a twin focus on US and a European texts. 
Evidently, the selected texts are not a true representation of the full range of governmental 
narratives on security and terrorism. Nevertheless, in view of their breadth (these security 
strategies tackle both ‗conventional‘ or ‗traditional‘240 and ‗non-traditional‘ security 
questions) and of their character (one national and one international); looking at these 
documents will facilitate an analysis of securitization strategies that is not exclusively state-
centric.  
 
In selecting and analyzing these documents, I hope to clarify how the discourse on terrorism 
as exception, together with mechanisms of (bio)security and the discourses they mobilize, 
work at the national level and how they shape and ‗are invested or annexed by global 
phenomena‘ (Foucault, 2003: 31). More specifically, an analysis of these texts will help 
explain how exactly the leading state in the war on terror, namely the US, and the EU, an 
entity that is potentially comparable in power to the US241 (see, for instance, Rifkin, 2004; for 
a counter-view see Kagan, 2002) and whose relation to the former is arguably important, 
although clearly not straightforward
242, respond to ‗the threat of terrorism‘ and deal with 
questions of security post-9/11. Even if, de facto, a ‗European‘ security strategy is not yet 
fully developed and the EU is, at present, hardly comparable in power to the US, especially 
on militarily grounds, its actual ideological and strategic role in the war on terror is arguably 
not irrelevant and might also provide some clues on its future role in ‗post-9/11world‘. As 
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 I.e., questions that relates to defence; to the national security of the territorial state defined mainly 
in military terms (see Gärtner et al., 2001: 1). 
241
 Where the emphasis here is clearly on potentiality, considering also the difficulty in defining 
Europe and that ‗European institutions that represent the genesis of potentially unified European 
foreign and security policies are in an embryonic state whose further development is uncertain‘ 
(Coonen, 2006: [n.p.]).  
242
 On US-EU relations and how they have developed since 9/11, the literature abounds. See Balibar, 
2004; Garton Ash, 2004; Kagan, 2002. See also Lindstrom, et al., 2003; Gordon and Geramy, 2004; 
Serfaty, 2006; Smith and Steffenson in Hill and Smith, 2005; the House of Lords report ‗A fractured 
Partnership? Relations Between the European Union and the United States of America‘, 2003.  
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noted in Chapter 1, Agamben argues that, faced with the unstoppable progression of ‗global 
civil war‘, the state of exception increasingly becomes the parading of government in 
contemporary politics. Having already criticized the notion of ‗global civil war‘, the analysis 
of the aforementioned post-9/11 documents will help assess the validity of Agamben‘s claim 
against the background of Foucault‘s analysis of biopolitics and the latter‘s emphasis on 
forms of governmental power that seek to secure and preserve the life of populations. It will 
help elucidate if and how securitization mechanisms are becoming the norm in international 
foreign politics and the extent to which these mechanisms are subsumable to sovereign 
power, or instead are to be understood as related but not necessarily as one and same with 
sovereignty, as Agamben seems to be suggesting.  
 
As formal security foreign policy discourses, these documents offer insights into how the 
United States and the European Union respond to what they themselves define as the terrorist 
threat and other so-called security problems post-9/11. In particular, they provide clues on the 
ideal-construction of the problem of terrorism as emergency threat, in the US case, and as 
growing strategic threat in the European case, and the mechanisms of (bio)security 
established to combat it. They can be considered as examples – not in the Agambenian sense 
but in the more general sense as instances of ideological discourses – which, together with a 
number of security mechanisms, such as  anti-terrorist laws, surveillance equipments, etc., are 
part of today‘s global neo-liberal ‗regime of (in)security and terror‘; a regime that they 
arguably also help to construct and establish.
243
 As such, an analysis of these texts will help to 
shed light on how mechanisms of (bio)power relate to the paradigm of exception and regime 
of security as constructed by the US and the EU and how these mechanisms are sustained by 
certain ideological, strategic motifs, such as the idea that only people who share certain 
values ought to be protected. Whether there are specific differences in motifs between the US 
and EU and how these variations are to be understood is one of the questions this thesis aims 
to articulate and address.  
 
As mentioned above, the NSSs and the ESS are broad in their outlook, tackling issues of 
‗global security‘ not only in relation to the war on terror (also constructed as a global 
phenomenon)
244
 but also in connection to humanitarianism, democracy and freedom. As such, 
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 Note that in light of the fact that Foucault understands a dispositif as an ensemble consisting of 
discourses, institutions, regulatory decisions, laws, etc., we could, and, in fact, I have indeed spoken, of 
‗a security dipositif’  as opposed to ‗a security regime‘. Here, however, I have opted for ‗security 
regime‘ for the word regime seems to better capture the hegemonic dimension of this particular 
dispositf. In Foucault, the distinction between the term dispositif and regime is not clear-cut.    
244
 The terms ‗global war on terrorism‘ and ‗global struggle against violent extremism‘ – an expression 
soon dropped – are instructive in this regard.  
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they enable a number of questions to be asked that are important to an understanding of the 
construction of ‗(bio)sovereignty‘ and ‗biopolitical security‘ at both national and global level 
in relation to these issues and ideals. Accepting Agamben‘s idea that security is increasingly 
becoming a new paradigm of government, albeit with some qualifications (see chapter 1), I 
will ask how specifically does ‗(bio)securitization‘ emerge as a dominant global form of bio-
sovereignty and/or biopower in the post-9/11 context? What is the relationship between ‗the 
(state of) exception‘ and changing forms of sovereignty and sovereign authority? How do 
certain ways of speaking the truth about sovereignty, security and its objects come to be 
permissible and even compulsory in the present? In addition, how do these ways of speaking 
conform to and/or challenge Agamben‘s model of (bio)sovereignty and Foucault‘s 
understanding of biopolitics? Lastly, I want to ask how the conception of foreign policy 
presented in these documents fits in or challenges what some authors see as an imperialist 
project. 
 
My theoretically informed critical discursive analysis of the NSSs and the ESS intends to 
explore these questions. To do so, the analysis and interpretation of these documents will be 
based on the assumptions developed in the previous chapter, namely, that the relation 
between sovereign power and biopower is neither one of incommensurability nor one of 
homogeneity. Insofar as life is included in the mechanisms and calculations of the state 
through a decision on the exception, sovereign power is biopolitical (Agamben, 1998). 
Nevertheless, biopower is not reducible to sovereign power. As Foucault explains, practices 
of biopower carried out in the name of protecting life and health are ‗exercized from 
innumerable points‘ (Foucault, 1978: 94), in the sense that they involve an array of agencies, 
professionals and authorities considered competent to speak the truth of life, and thus, to act, 
on human beings (see also Bigo, 2008). As preliminarily suggested in Chapter 1, what unites 
biopower and sovereign power in the present are practises of global (bio)securitizations, 
which, apart from being integral to the construction of the US state in globalist terms, are 
connected to and annexed by geopolitical dynamics. The analysis will draw on this 
conceptualization and on the idea that a particular type of racism plays an important role in 
making the life of some (those classified as actual or potential terrorists) appear less worthy, 
and consequently, the exercize of killing (‗sovereignty‘s old right‘) possible in the war on 
terror. In analyzing the ESS, I accept and accommodate Foucault‘s idea that the state is but 
one location of political power. By comparing the US NSSs and the ESS, I will show exactly 
how sovereign power and forms of biopower are connected in practices of security. The 
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methodological rationale for comparing the US NSSs and the ESS documents can be 
summarized as followed: both the NSSs and ESS are foreign policy documents written after 
9/11 as answers to what they consider a changed environment; both deal with questions of 
security, in particular with what they regard as new threats (terrorism principally but also 
other types of ‗threats‘); both are written from a governmental perspective and as such offer 
means to understand the type of dominant discourses being produced today with respect to 
these issues (see also Chapter 1).
245
 
 
Against the accusation of ‗interpretative positivism‘, whereby linguistic data are used as a 
way of confirming decisions and interpretations already arrived at concerning the meanings 
of a text (Fish quoted in Hyatt, 2005), however, I will not simply rely on these and on the 
other concepts developed in Chapter 1 to interpret texts. I will also be attentive to themes and 
ideas that emerge from the documents themselves. This will allow a focus on contextual and 
processual elements (Walsh in Seale, 2001: 231) as well as a comparison between themes 
explored in Chapter 1, such as the idea that security is what links biopower and sovereign 
power, and emergent themes. The aim, however, is not to merely follow an inductive or data-
based method (naturalism), which would inevitably create the illusion that observations are 
free from theoretical presuppositions or that observations simply precede theoretical 
conceptualizations (Walsh in Seale, 2001: 231). A merely inductive approach would also 
contradict Foucault‘s methodological insights about the relation between power-knowledge. 
A data-based method presupposes that there are natural laws governing phenomena and that 
these laws can be apprehended by simply observing them. Accepting that knowledge is 
imbued with power implies rejecting the idea that there are essential, transhistorical and/or 
natural laws governing social phenomena. How social phenomena come to be known cannot 
be separated from what the phenomena is, therefore, conditions of knowledge, such as how 
certain ideas of security emerged over a period of time (see Chapter 1), are part of what one 
has to explore. Rather, the rejection of a merely deductive method and the defence of a 
sociological use of paradigms follows a concern for socially objective, ‗situated knowledges‘ 
(Haraway, 1991) as opposed to ‗epistemological relativism‘, on the one hand, and 
‗analogical‘ or transcendental thinking, on the other. It follows a concern for producing 
knowledge that is ‗objective‘ but not neutral. This is because, as Foucault argues, theoretical 
or analytical discourses cannot be neutral to the extent that they are ‗all permeated or 
underpinned by an imperative discourse‘ (Foucault, 2007: 17-18). However, what this means 
is not that one should accept that there are no possibilities for producing valid theoretical or 
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 On the appropriateness of comparing the US and the EU from a political and historical perspective, 
see Chapter 1 and 2. 
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analytical accounts of a phenomenon, or that, in order for a theoretical or analytical discourse 
to maintain a degree of effectiveness, the theorist, as Foucault says, has to ‗[n]ever engage in 
polemics‘ (Foucault, 2007: 4; 1997). Rather, as suggested by Foucault himself, a theorist 
should be attentive to the process of knowledge production (again see my discussion of 
security in the previous chapter), as well as, to the real forces involved in the production of a 
given phenomenon, without necessarily renouncing the possibility of taking sides and of 
producing valid knowledge from a committed, critical perspective.  
 
In this specific case, what I will provide is a socio-political analysis and critique of chosen 
texts based on a plausible account of the relation between sovereignty and biopolitics. It is 
my belief that sociologists should question dominant understandings of the world and what 
are seen as self-evident truths (Bell, 1993: 48) – such as the idea that the idea of the state as 
of protector of rights and of a ‗balance‘ between security and liberty – while, at the same 
time, trying to uncover hidden relations and structures of domination. Concurrently, they 
should strive to produce valid accounts of what it is that they are studying based on both 
theoretical and empirical ‗evidences‘ that do not downplay the complexity of the phenomena 
at hand, but do not reduce the object of analysis under question to it. In other words, 
sociologists should not use the idea of complexity as leverage against the very possibility of 
distinguishing between partiality and partisanship. Research is never neutral, never simply 
descriptive, or unrelated to systems of ideas. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that 
all research is partial in the sense of being biased. One can be openly partisan – that is, one 
can openly take sides – while at the same time being very much concerned with producing 
valid accounts of the phenomenon under investigation (for a counter-view, see Hammersley, 
2000).
246
 
 
2.4 Why the National Security Strategies? 
 
The formulation of a national security strategy on the part of the US is required by law. 
Specifically, the demand for these documents originates in section 603 of the Goldwater- 
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
247
 (Public Law 99–433; 50 USC. 
404a), which requests that the US President transmit to Congress annually ‗a report on the 
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 In his book, Hammersely explores various accounts of partisanship in social research. Although he 
would agree that not all are unconcerned with validity, he argues that ultimately all these accounts fail 
to address their internal inconsistencies, biases, and that only a Weberian or value-neutral perspective 
can obtain objectivity. Although I disagree with many of Hammersley‘s claims, his account of 
partisanship is very helpful in clarifying what is at stake in some of these debates.       
247
 The Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99–433–
Oct. 1, 1996; 50 USC. 404a). 
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national security strategy of the United States‘.248 Although National Security Strategies 
(hereafter NSSs) have no legal force of their own, according to Baker they do serve as a 
guidepost for agencies and officials drawing up policies in a range of military, diplomatic and 
other arenas (Baker, 2006). What this thesis is concerned with, however, is not to find out 
whether and how the documents influence policies or whether they are the result of policies 
(i.e., whether there is a reverse flow or feedback within the process of writing them); but to 
delineate their strategic, ideological and political underpinnings and effects.  
 
To begin with, we can affirm that the NSS documents‘ function is to outline what the major 
national security concerns of the United States are and how the US administration plans to 
deal with them at both a national and global level. Their aim is not to provide well-defined 
national guidelines for combating terrorism
249
 – and in fact, they did not specify the legal 
conditions for their implementation other than in a very vague and general sense
250
 – but to 
affirm the general framework for the management and administration of security post-9/11. 
Although the documents are complex in their articulation, with the geopolitical and 
socioeconomic levels of analysis intersecting and being superimposed on one another, the 
language used is quite straightforward, making them easy to read. These papers are strategic 
in the sense that they help to construct the problems of security as well as the framework and 
means through which they ought to be confronted. Thus, for instance, it is by codifying 
certain people as ‗extremists‘, that it becomes possible to exclude them from the political 
debate and to ‗include‘ them in camps like Guantánamo if caught. They are also strategic as 
they combine to produce the effects that they name, bringing to life a geopolitical imaginary 
mirroring and supporting the particular logics of the US-led war on terror. Specifically, what 
they intentionally generate (more on intentionality versus Foucault‘s emphasis on the 
strategic below) is a particular knowledge of populations and of how to manage and defend 
them, of the state (including so-called ‗rogue states‘), and of sovereignty, which in turn 
presupposes and constitutes relations of power, or, as is perhaps best described in this case, 
relations of ‗inclusive exclusion‘ and domination.  
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 Since 1986, 12 reports have been published; two during the 2
nd
 Reagan administration (1987, 1988), 
three by the George Bush Sr. administration (1990, 1991, 1993), six by the Clinton administration 
(between 1994-1999) (in Haine and Lindström, 2002), and two by the George W. Bush administration 
(2002, 2006). The current Obama administration has published its strategy in May 2010.  
249
 Some of these guidelines are defined in the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and 
specified in legislations, such as, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296). See also 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458), and the Protect 
America Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-055), among others.  
250
 There are only few references to specific legislations in the documents.   
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Drawing on Agamben‘s latest book Il Regno e la Gloria: Per una genealogia teologica 
dell'economia e del governo (2007), we can further suggest that the NSS documents are part 
of a ceremonial apparatus of political power. That is to say, their efficacy consists in being 
able to affirm themselves both ‗metapolitically‘251 and mediatically. In this book, whose aim, 
among others, is to explore the ways that power in the West has tended to take the form of an 
oikonomia (or of a governmental machine), the key question for Agamben is why power 
needs ‗glory‘ [gloria]. Power, says Agamben, needs glory because it is through the latter that 
it can build consent and, thus, survive. Using Agamben‘s ideas of consent as bounded up to 
power as glory, albeit in a different context, it can be argued that one of the implicit objective 
of these documents was to build consent by setting the parameters upon which ‗decisions‘ 
regarding security ought to be framed.
252
 Their aim was not simply to make the US 
administration‘s objectives known to the Congress but to make them known to and accepted 
by their allies. The way the US administration attempted to gain the consensus of their allies, 
however, was not simply, or even mainly, by persuading other states of the coherence of their 
foreign policy but by stating the limits of what was and was not negotiable in the fight against 
terrorism. In other words, NSSs are hegemonic in a peculiar kind of way. Their force, even 
though not exactly a force-of-law, consists in extracting compliance based on their ability to 
create a framework upon which decisions about foreign policy generally, terrorism and 
security specifically, are to be taken. It arises from their capacity to get their aims accepted by 
the Senate, to whom the documents are primarily addressed, and US allies, through 
persuasion (‗we are in this together‘) and rhetorical coercion (‗either you are with us or you 
are with the enemy‘).253 By declaring its right to engage in pre-emptive wars in the NSSs, the 
US forces its allies to choose, in the knowledge that this choice could have very much split 
them.   
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that these documents, although not perhaps widely read were 
amply discussed in many newspapers (and not simply US based)
254
 and have become the 
                                                             
251
 Note that the use of the adjective metapolitically bears no connections to Badiou‘s notion of politics 
as ‗truth procedure‘ as outlined in Metapolitics (Badiou, 2005b). It is used here in negative, more in 
Rancièrian terms (1995: 99), to designate a specific hegemonic mode of policing or ‗policy‘ that 
attempts to bring the people under the aegis of sovereignty. 
252
 It is not a case that the EU security strategy is conceived by some exactly as ‗the European answer‘ 
to the strategy of the United States (see, for instance, Reiter and Frank, 2004).  
253
 These are sentences used in speeches by George W Bush (quoted in Hirsh, 2002: 21), but similar 
rhetorical devices can be found in the NSSs. Thus, for instance, the NSSs presents the US as part of a 
bigger Western alliance, namely ‗the coalition of the willing‘, at the same time as it advocates 
preemptive war and unilateral warfare.  
254
 In the US see, for instance, Baker (2006) in the Washington Post, where he discusses the 2006 
National Security Strategy, in particular the role of preemption. Articles also appeared in the New 
York Times and the Washington Times. In the UK, the Guardian and the Times published many 
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focus of many theorists working in the areas of security, geography and international 
relations and law (see, for instance, Gray, 2002; Kristensen, 2006, Doyle, 2007).
255
 In the 
Washington Times (2006), Baker claimed that ‗[t]he White House gave advance copies [of 
the 49-pages National Security Strategy 2002] to The Washington Post and three other 
newspapers‘. This places these documents within the broader field of governmental 
propaganda. It shows how there was what could be called a strategic attempt, of which the 
NSSs were only but very important part, on the part of the US administration to influence 
public opinion, which, although not exclusively formed in the mainstream media, is 
undoubtedly influenced by it. A strategic attempt, which, it is plausible to assume had the 
effects it had also because of American hegemonic power. It was because of its hegemonic 
position that the United States was, arguably, able to get certain securitization discourses 
accepted. Whether a majority of people worldwide accepted the NSSs is clearly highly 
debatable.
256
 But they certainly found a broad consensus within the US, as confirmed by the 
Bush re-election in 2004, and among some of its allies, namely those of ‗the coalition of the 
willing‘. Were these documents written on behalf of a different state, for instance, it is not 
unjustified to assume they would not have had quite the same mediatic and political impact. 
Their massive impact justifies why we should look at them. 
 
This is not to say that the acceptance of certain ways of understanding and speaking about 
security is fully attributable to US hegemonic power. As I have argued in Chapter 1, it is also 
the result of a broader shift in understandings of security, which started at the end of the Cold 
War. Nevertheless, even though the ideas about security put forward in these documents are 
not exclusively American and, especially in their more radical exemplifications, may seem 
less plausible today, it is still important to analyse them closely. As argued above, the effects 
of these type of discourses are far from over, as the continuation of securitization policies in 
the forms, for instance, of criminalization of people – in particular migrants – and dissent, 
amply demonstrates (Toscano, 2009; Chang, 2002). Their pervasiveness, moreover, as 
discourses that rely on the proposition that ‗our lives‘ (i.e., the lives of citizens in Western 
                                                                                                                                                                              
articles mentioning and/or discussing the strategies. In Italy, the 2002 document was discussed in the 
Rivista del Manifesto (Portelli, 2002) and in la Repubblica (2002). Il Corriere della Sera (2005) 
published a speech by Collin Powell the then Secretary of State in which he explains the national 
security strategy of the United State, referencing frequently to the 2002 NSS. These are just a few 
examples.    
255
 See also the many reports of the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College at 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/topic.cfm?cat=5&year=2004. Those of Pagine di 
Difesa (an Italian site of international politics and defence) at http://www.paginedidifesa.it/index.html. 
Also see Yost, 2003.  
256
 Judging from the protests against the Bush administration‘s foreign policy held throughout the 
world in the months after the invasion of Iraq, the answer is unambiguously negative. 
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democracies) need to be under the control of state power and techniques of government and 
that all which constitutes a threat to them need to be eliminated, is something that needs to be 
taken very seriously. 
 
When analyzing the NSSs what needs to be considered is also who produced them and why. 
This is because, even though to put too much emphasis on intentions might risk losing sight 
on unintentional mechanisms or effects, following what Kumar refers to as an extreme ‗anti-
intentionalist‘ stance (i.e., a stance that does not take into account the intentions of those 
producing specific discourses) is never justified (see Kumar, 2005a: 7).
257
 Foucault‘s 
insistence that biopower is not simply identifiable with a person or group and about the 
necessity of analyzing power at the ‗micro‘ level in terms of governmental technologies is 
correct and to this extent Agamben‘s ‗grand‘ critical theory and his focus on sovereignty as 
always and already biopolitical risks undermining or contradicting this understanding. 
Nevertheless, my claim is that an understanding of the war on terror and of the securitization 
and exceptional practices that accompany it cannot leave out of consideration the ‗macro‘, 
geopolitical level and the reasons why the US decided to wage war and others important 
political actors to take part in it. From a geopolitical perspective, it is evident that the why 
question is linked to the question of imperialism broadly defined, and of how the US and the 
EU position themselves within the global economy. In this respect, the NSSs served a very 
specific dissimulating and mobilizing function. They are instruments of power used by one of 
the most, if not the most, powerful nation in the world to try to impose a certain vision of 
sovereignty, security, terrorism, and, ultimately, of the world itself.
258
 Evaluating how 
sovereignty is operationalized by the US administration and, by default, the US state (Weber, 
1995: 3), how the administration constructs security within them, and in what sense does this 
construction form part of the articulation of bio-sovereignty or biopolitics or both is one of 
the main aims of the analysis of the NSSs.  
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 Kumar attributes an ‗anti-intetionalist stance‘ to Foucault and argues that ‗[t]aken to the extreme 
such ‗―anti-intentionalist‖ strictures seem [to me] far from justified‘ (ibid).  
258
 Note that a non- ‗anti-intentionalist‘ stance such as mine is not the same as an individualist stance 
whereby individuals’ explanations are accepted as providing the true reasons for their actions. It would 
indeed be wrong to reduce phenomena to explanations in terms of the beliefs and psychological 
dispositions of the agents because, as Marx and Engels stressed, the particular environmental and 
socio-historical contexts in which people act is of fundamental importance, and so is their socio-
economic and political position in ‗global‘ hierarchies of power. Neither Foucault nor Agamben, 
moreover, are methodological individualists.  
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2.5 Why the European Security Strategy? 
 
In contrast to the US case, the formulation of a security strategy for ‗Europe‘ is not required 
by law. ‗A Secure Europe in a Better World‘ (2003) represents the first European Security 
Strategy (ESS) to date. It was adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003 as an 
attempt to develop a common strategic vision for the whole of the EU. Its force, moreover, is 
arguably different from that of the NSSs. Despite being a body whose authority already 
circumscribes those of the other member states in certain important respects, as argued in 
Chapter 1, the European Union as a cohesive entity still has limited power when it comes to 
certain matters. In particular, although the EU has considerably power on matters of trade, 
finance, currencies, employment and welfare, member states retain ultimate power over 
matters concerning security, defence and military action. This is not, however, to suggest that 
the EU power in matters of security and defence is unappreciable, as proved by the extension 
across Europe
 of ‗an enhanced policing capacity – one comprising a complex, ever-shifting 
mix of informal professional networks, inter-governmental
 
co-operation, and nascent 
supranational institutions (notably
 Europol)‘ (Loader, 2002: abstract; Bigo, 2000; Bigo and 
Guild, 2005). Its scope of action, moreover, is continuously being extended. According to 
Biscop, an academic directly involved in drafting of the ESS (Bossong, 2006), the importance 
of a European Security Strategy, the first of its kind, should not be underestimated (Biscop, 
2004; 2007). He notes, for instance, that the ESS document is omnipresent in EU discourse, 
in statements by European as well as other policy-makers, in the debate in think tanks and 
academia (Biscop, 2007: 3). And he adds, ‗[w]hatever the motivation [of member states], the 
important thing is that this [i.e., the development of a strategic concept] enabled the decisive 
step to launch a strategic debate in the EU, to translate policy practice into strategy‘; a debate 
which, according to him, ‗far exceeds the specific issue of Iraq‘ (Biscop, 2004b: 7-8).  
 
Pertinently, many authors working in the areas of international relations and security studies 
support the idea that the ESS is of significance. Despite accepting that the Iraq war was 
indeed a major factor for its development (Heusgen, 2004: 29), in line with Biscop above, 
they suggest that the reasons leading to the drafting of the strategy also had to do with 
specific internal and geopolitical considerations (although they do not frame it exactly in 
these terms).
259
 Specifically, what these authors argue is that the ESS cannot be understood 
outside of European unification process and ‗recent‘ US foreign policy. For them, the ESS is 
to be seen as an answer to the US doctrine in the context of a European security development 
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 See, for instance, Reiter and Frank, 2004: 2, 3; Biscop, 2004; Pullinger, 2007. 
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already in process.
260
 Although not exclusively a reaction to the NSS – to the extent that the 
development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) can be said to have started 
earlier
261
 – the impression that the ESS is to be understood as an answer to the NSS of 2002 
finds further confirmation in the fact that the ESS uses a similar language to that of the NSS 
both in terms of rhetoric and of concepts employed. Its function, moreover, is also arguably 
very similar to that of NSS documents. As for the NSSs, the ESS does not aim to provide 
detailed guidelines for action but to set out the very general ‗principles, priorities and modus 
operandi of how the EU intends to protect and promote its security‘ (Pullinger, 2007: 2). In 
the words of the former Director of the Policy Planning Unit of the Secretariat General of the 
Council of the European Union, Christoph Heusgen, who was also involved in the drafting of 
the document, the ESS ‗makes a common analysis of security threats and challenges and it 
delineates ways of dealing with them‘ (Heusgen, 2004: 30). To this extent, the ESS should 
also be considered as part of today‘s hegemonic dispositif of security.  
 
One of the main aims of the analysis with respect to the EU will be to evaluate how its 
constructions of security and ‗exception‘ compare to those of the US, as analysed in my first 
‗case study‘. How does the EU respond to the Bush administration‘s attempt to create what is 
in effect a ‗new‘ international order based on ‗exceptional‘ measures and pre-emption? Is 
there a role for pre-emption in the ESS? And if so, what is it? By drawing on my literature 
review and on analyses of European security discourses and policies, I will compare the EU 
and US strategies and evaluate if and how the former reinforces or challenges the latter‘s 
constructions of sovereignty and security. More specifically, I will analyse the EU strategy 
paying particular attention to how key concepts – such as that of sovereignty and security 
analysed in the previous ‗case study‘ – are constructed in the ESS. Is the idea of security 
proposed in the ESS the same than the one outlined in the NSSs? How does it differ? Does 
the ESS offer the same or a different idea of terrorism than the one we find in the NSSs? 
What understanding of sovereignty and exception does the ESS rely on? True, the EU is not a 
state. Nevertheless, considered in the context of Agamben‘s ‗generalized state of exception‘ 
on which I have offered my own original interpretation and expansion in Chapter 1, and 
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 In particular, Reiter and Frank name the drafting of a European constitution, whose process started 
in 2001 Europe but was later rejected by France and the Netherlands in referendums in May and June 
2005, whereas Biscop mentions the creation of the European-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 
1995 and of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the late 1990s. See also Algieri 
(2006: 133), even though, for him, the ESS document has to be considered less of an answer to the 
NSS than ‗a reference for the broad orientation of the EU as a global actor‘ (Algieri, 2006: 114).  
261
 A European Security Defence Policy can be said to have started with the Maastricht Treaty (1992) 
and a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) with the Treaty on European Union (1992). For 
more information on this, again see the European commission website at 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/s05002.htm where both treaties can also be found. 
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which has the potential of trespassing fixed national boundaries, the EU document provides 
an interesting case study. Not only, as previously argued, does the drafting of the ESS point 
to drives within the EU to construct Europe as ‗state-like‘, but the EU strategy cannot be 
dissociated from the US strategy for countering terrorism in the post-911 period. It has 
emerged as an answer to the US strategy, placing itself within the framework provided by the 
US administration at the same time as the ESS arguably has helped to expand this same 
framework in a specific way. The ESS will therefore be mined for insights into how Europe 
as a ‗cohesive‘ or ‗state-like‘ entity places itself in relation to the US, a sovereign state, and 
on how its own understanding of ‗sovereignty‘, security and war problematizes and/or 
reinforces US sovereignty, generally, and ‗the generalization of the (state of) exception‘, 
specifically. A comparative analysis of US and European security strategies will enable an 
evaluation of mechanisms exception, biopower and security, without reducing them to what  
Bigo calls, ‗a specific state of exception with one sovereign actor, one unique moment, one 
unique justification‘ (Bigo, 2006b: 50; see also Connolly, 2007). Importantly, against 
Agamben‘s notion of the exception as the product of the sovereign decision, Bigo argues that 
the exception should be analysed as ‗a specific form of governmentality‘ (2006c: 51) – a form 
of governmentality based on routine technology and surveillance. Whilst Bigo‘s 
understanding of the exception could be viewed as eliding the question of the (re)assertion of 
sovereign power in the contemporary context of the war on terror, it has the virtue of 
troubling an easy distinction between, on the one hand, the sovereign‘s right to kill and, on 
the other, governmental strategies to manage and protect life, without simply conflating the 
two. My own analysis of US and EU security strategies can also been seen as attempting to 
problematize this distinction; to offer evidence of how the persistence of sovereign power is 
enabled by practices of bio(security), and how sovereign power and biopower as a form of 
governmentality are entangled in practice. 
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CHAPTER 3 
US Quest for Global Power 
 
 
This chapter will be dedicated to the analysis of US National Security Strategies, 2002 and 
2006. By drawing on my theoretical framework, the chapter will analyse these securitization 
discourses not simply as strategies of (bio)power (Foucault, 2003) but as strategies of 
(bio)power that bear a specific relation to the US state and that attempt to create the 
conditions for the implementation of a generalized state of exception (Agamben, 1998, 
2005a). More specifically, it will trace how in the US NSSs a concerted effort is made to 
construct what I will describe as a ‗global (bio)security emergency-state‘, which I suggest 
acts as precondition for the generalization of the state of exception as well as being 
fundamentally imperial. The chapter will argue that there are many ways in which the Bush 
administration tried to globalize the US state to make it appear as that which guarantees 
people‘s security. In particular, it identifies five. Each of them will be analysed in subsequent 
sections.  
 
In section 3.1, I explore how references to the end of the Cold War and the discourse of anti-
totalitarianism, which help to create an image of America as morally superior, are essential to 
the construction of ‗a new historical phase‘. In turn, it is by claiming that what is happening 
is new; that we are in the presence of a new totalitarian threat that the US can justify its 
‗moral grammar of war‘ (Weber, 2006: 154) securitization and hegemonic role in the war on 
terror and claim a global role for itself. In this section, I will also look at how these discursive 
repertoires have started to develop during the late 1990s and are common to a whole set of 
people in US elites (and not only). The section will be the basis for the following discussion.  
 
The second, and, perhaps, most important way because it underpins all the remaining five, in 
which the US government attempted to globalize the US state is described in section 3.2. In 
this section, I will show how the construction of a ‗global people‘ or more specifically of 
‗freedom-loving people everywhere‘ (NSS, 2002; 2006) is functional to the configuration of 
the USA as a ‗global state‘. I argue that this construction involves processes of politicization 
and de-politicization, and that it is that which ultimately enables the US administration to 
claim normative control over populations and facilitates the distinction between ‗freedom 
loving people‘ and ‗enemies of freedom‘, which is discussed in section 3.3. In section 3.2, I 
will also show some of the contradictions implicit in the construction of a ‗global people‘ by 
drawing on both Agamben‘s understanding of ‗a people‘ and Schmitt‘s conceptualization of 
the state.  
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In section 3.3, I will discuss how the distinction between friend (‗freedom-loving people 
everywhere‘) and enemy (‗enemies of freedom‘) seemingly conforms to Schmitt‘s notion of 
the political and of the state as nationally bounded, at the same time, however, as it creates 
the conditions for the normalization and generalization of the exception (Agamben, 1998; 
2001; 2003; 2005a), thus, facilitating the establishment of ‗a new world order‘. By 
configuring the enemy as global and as the outside of law, the US government can claim the 
right to kill ‗terrorists‘ whenever and wherever they are in the name of protecting ‗freedom-
loving people everywhere‘. In the section, moreover, I will draw on Foucault‘s 
conceptualization of ‗state racism‘ to show that it is indeed ‗something akin to racism‘ that 
works to distinguish between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘, or to use Foucault‘s words, ‗to introduce a 
break into the domain of life within what must live and what must die‘ (Foucault, 2003). 
More specifically, I show that the structure of disavowal by which the US administration 
denies that ‗Muslims‘ are the object of policy discourse and practices when in actual fact they 
are is based on a form of racialization, which works by disassociating ‗good‘ from ‗bad‘ 
Muslims at the same time as Islam and Muslims generally are implicitly associated with 
terrorism. Moreover, I will point out that the association of Islam with terrorism started after 
the end of the Cold war (Philipose, 2007) and more specifically with the Clinton 
administration. 
  
In section 3.4, I will argue that even though within these strategies terrorism is given the 
greatest emphasis, the two documents make no fundamental distinction between types of 
problems. This, I suggest, is important. While it is by naming terrorism as the number one 
threat facing America that the US can engage in a war which appears to have no limits 
(permanent global warfare), it is by making no distinction between internal and external 
security, security and war, friends and strangers that the US can affirm its power over ‗life‘ 
itself in a biopolitical sense. 
 
In section 3.5, I will discuss how, although perhaps, not very successfully, the Bush 
administration tried to globalize the state and establish what I call a form of imperial 
extraterritoriality in practice. I will suggest that the US attempted to enforce its power 
globally through ‗unilateral war‘, which it justified through an appeal to international law and 
which is also, and at the same time, paradoxically, the negation of the rule of non-
intervention. I will offer two concrete examples of how exactly what I have called the 
‗unilateral internationalism‘ of the United States functioned at times when the law was ‗in 
force without significance‘. These are the decisions to go to war against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, and against Iraq. Furthermore, drawing on my discussion on imperialism, I will 
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question the extent to which these wars can be explained simply in terms of regression or of a 
coup d'Etat inside and against Empire (Hardt, 2004; Hardt and Negri, 2006).  
 
Finally, in section 3.6, I will expand on the theme of war and its relation to imperialism. I 
argue that, in the aftermath of September 11, the idea of permanent global warfare to be 
thought in order to defend security seems to have became the new driving force of US 
‗Empire‘ and that this has implications for international law in the form of an undermining of 
its main principle.  
 
3.1 Historical Periodization: A ‘New’ Phase 
 
The first way in which the Bush administration attempted to make the US state appear as that 
which could guarantee people‘s security and freedom (where security takes precedence over 
the former) was by presenting the war on terror in terms of signalling  a major break with 
preceding historical eras (this remains the case). Although highly contestable, this view gave 
legitimacy to claims ‗about an emergency situation, about the need to suspend the 
conventions of a politics as usual, about the necessity to wage a war, about the need to 
engage in a new confrontation between [new reconfigured] friends and enemies‘ (Bigo, 
2006:a [n.p.]). This section explores how references to the end of the Cold War and the 
discourse of anti-totalitarianism all help to achieve this goal by creating an image of the US 
as ‗the greatest force for good on this Earth‘ (Bush, 2004); as the best equipped state to 
confront what the documents term a ‗new totalitarian ideology‘ (NSS, 2002).262 What it 
shows is that these references help to construct an image of a benevolent, moral America that 
in turn legitimizes its self-assured securitization and hegemonic role in the war on terror. The 
section also looks at how these discursive repertoires are common to a whole set of people in 
US elites and traces their lineage back to the late 1990s. It was during the late 1990 that a 
particular neoconservative discourse, as developed by the members of the ‗think tank‘ PNAC 
and as that which informs securitization polices analysed here, emerged.  
 
                                                             
 
262
 The idea that the United States occupies a privileged position in the world has a long history. It can 
be traced back at least to de Tocqueville who, in Democracy in America (2000), argued that the United 
States was exceptional (where the word exceptional, however, assumes a different meaning than that 
given by Agamben – exceptional here means exemplary, unique) because of its democratic character. 
President Bush, it is fair to say, was not the only President who thought that the United States held a 
special place among nations. For instance, Regan (1974), Bush H. W. (quoted in McMahon, 2000: 
233) and the then not yet President Barck H. Obama (2007) among others, have all used an expression 
coined by Lincoln (1862) in the context of ‗giving freedom to the slave‘, to dub the US ‗the last, best 
hope of man on earth‘. On American exceptionalism, see, for instance, Lipset, 1996; Madsen, 1998; 
Ignatieff, 2005b. 
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There are many ways in which the war on terror is presented in both National Security 
Strategies (2002; 2006) as delineating ‗a new historical phase in the history of mankind‘ 
(2002). The most prominent one is by constant references to the end of the Cold War, which 
according to the papers also signifies the end of ‗totalitarianism‘, the triumph of ‗freedom, 
democracy, and free enterprise‘, and the beginning of ‗a new historical phase‘ (i.e., the phase 
of the war on terror). This historical phase, it is argued, is characterized by ‗new 
asymmetrical enemies‘ whose capabilities differ if compared to those of the previous one (the 
Soviet Union in this case) but whose goals, aspirations and determination make them 
particularly dangerous; ‗an imminent threat‘ (NSS, 2002: 15). Here are two examples from 
the documents themselves: 
 
The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and 
totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of 
freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: 
freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. In the twenty-first 
century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic 
human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom 
will be able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their 
future prosperity. People everywhere want to be able to speak 
freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; 
educate their children—male and female;263 own property; and 
enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are right 
and true for every person, in every society—and the duty of 
protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling 
of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages 
(George W. Bush, 2002: preamble). 
 
The United States is in the early years of a long struggle, similar to 
what our country faced in the early years of the Cold War. The 
20th century witnessed the triumph of freedom over the threats of 
fascism and communism. Yet a new totalitarian ideology now 
threatens, an ideology grounded not in secular philosophy but in 
the perversion of a proud religion. Its content may be different 
from the ideologies of the last century, but its means are similar:  
intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement, and repression (NSS, 
2006: 1).  
 
                                                             
263
 It is interesting to note how the adjectives male and female are here used. Firstly, they are used to 
reinforce the idea that education is a universal right. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, to 
implicitly re-affirm the idea held by the Bush‘s administration that all those embracing this ‗new 
totalitarian ideology‘ – later on named as terrorists – do not value their children‘s education, especially 
that of women. 
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From these paragraphs, we can see that the construction of the war on terror relies upon a 
very particular understanding of history and moral discourse. That is to say, a mythologized, 
romanticized and distorted historical and moral discourse for which the references to fascism 
and communism bear no contextualization whatsoever and are only mentioned to the extent 
that they enhance US symbolic power as a force of good. In these documents, fascism and 
communism are one and the same – they are both part of what these documents identify as 
totalitarianism.
264
  
 
Although not uncontested (Losurdo, 2002, 2004; Traverso, 2002; Guilhot, 2005; Žižek, 
2005b), the naming of fascism and communism as the totalitarian ideologies of the twenty 
century among both politicians and intellectuals is certainly not exceptional (see, for instance, 
Popper, 1963; Arendt, 1973; Furet and Nolte, 2001; Talmon, 1952
265
). It is well-known, for 
instance, that Arendt herself describes both fascism and communism as totalitarian ideologies 
and, to this extent, it can be argue, and certainly not without reason, that she sides exactly 
with the vision of history described here. Similarly Foucault, who never explicitly mentions 
‗totalitarianism‘ in his discussions, speaks about the Nazi sate and Soviet-state as 
representing, albeit in different ways,
266
 two manifestations of the transformation of racism 
into State racism or biological racism, in a sense also conflating the two. However, in authors 
such as Foucault and Arendt the conflation of the two is arguably mainly (although perhaps 
not exclusively)
267
 aimed at a denunciation of ‗technologies of (total) domination‘268 per se 
(Arendt, 1973; Foucault, 2003),
269
 whilst Agamben, although also very much concerned 
                                                             
264
 For a brief but insightful genealogy of ‗totalitarianism‘, which shows both how the term developed 
during the Cold War as an asset of propaganda for a specific idea of democracy against the threat of 
communism both internationally and domestically; and how in the words of the author it ‗facilitated 
complex political realignments‘, see Guilhot, 2005: 33-45. See also Traverso, 2002. 
265
In his The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, Talmon links the French Revolution and the Russian 
revolution in an anti-liberal continuum. For an excellent critique, see Losurdo, 2002.  
266
 Both in terms of the mechanisms employed by them to achieve such transformation (2003: 82-83) 
and of the situation to which they responded, which Foucault argues were indeed quite specific (2003: 
276). 
267
 On Arendt‘s shifting positions vis-à-vis the USSR, see Saunders, 1999; see also Losurdo, 2002. For 
a critical take on Foucault‘s anti-totalitarianism, see Christofferson, 1999; 2004.  
268
 The idea of ‗total‘ power or domination, however, is Arendt‘s not Foucault‘s. As previously 
outlined, Foucault‘s theory of power attempts to move away from a normative or sovereign 
understanding power (see Chapter 1). This explains the use of parentheses on my part.    
269
 Arendt in particular argues that totalitarian ideologies become so in their pursuit of total 
domination; thereby, implying that totalitarian solutions are not exclusive of these two ideologies – 
(her condemnation of ‗the development of totalitarian methods‘ in Israel is well-documented (see, for 
instance, Losurdo, 2004: 29)), with Foucault seemingly following Arendt on this. He says, ‗‗[...] in 
many respects, fascism and Stalinism simply extended a whole series of mechanisms that already 
existed in the social and political systems of the West‘ (Foucault quoted in Bertani et al., 2003: 276), 
implying, similarly to Arendt (1973: 459), that the deployment of equally violent mechanisms of 
power within ‗liberal societies‘ is also a real possibility. On this later point see also Agamben (1999, 
1988); although interestingly Agamben never mentions totalitarianism in relation to this. 
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about how and when power becomes totalizing, mentions totalitarianism only in relation to 
the Third Reich and Nazism. In these texts, instead, the naming of ‗totalitarianism‘ serves a 
very specific political and strategic purpose. It enabled the Bush administration to claim a 
global role for itself, which it would have otherwise found more difficult to affirm. 
Specifically, the naming of fascism and communism as the totalitarian ideologies of the 20
th
 
century and the reference to their end enables the positioning of the United States as the 
uncompromised saviour of what the documents refer to as ‗freedom-loving people 
everywhere‘, whose freedom, according to them, is threatened by a ‗new‘ but a no less 
dangerous ‗totalitarian ideology‘. It helps to create an image of the US as ‗a force of good in 
the world‘, whose objectives (‗rid the world of evil‘) and strategies (of which more will be 
said in the sections below) are to be accepted without or little question. By implying that the 
US is morally superior, this discourse also provides a solution to what Weber has identified in 
her discussion of post-9/11 films as ‗the aged-old problem of how to balance morality with 
security‘ (Weber, 2006: 117).270 It says, because of its history, or to put it in Perry Anderson‘s 
words, because the United State ‗had fought the good cause‘ (Anderson, 2005: 162), it is a 
more credible international actor. For this reason, it is more capable to deal with the questions 
of security in post-9/11 era – an era that the strategies see as threaten by a new ‗totalitarian 
ideology‘.  
 
Both from an historical and analytical perspective, it is interesting to note that this discourse 
did not emerge in a vacuum.
271
 Not only, as we have just seen, does it make use of familiar 
but contested ideas to project US power but we can note several resonances between this 
official narrative and the discourse presented by the members of PNAC (Project for the New 
American Century)
272
 – a neo-conservative ‗non-profit, educational organization‘, ‗whose 
goal‘, as stated on their website, ‗is to promote American global leadership‘. PNAC was an 
organization composed mostly by members of the Republican Party and the Bush 
Administration but also by some renowned scholars. Among others, it counted Dick Cheney, 
Richard Perle, former US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, Robert Kagan and Francis 
                                                             
270
 Weber is specifically referring to the ‗mythologized American WWII story‘ told in many of the 
films she analyses but I think her argument can be extended to the historical ‗narratives‘ analysed here.       
271
 The role played by ‗think tanks‘ generally, and the PNAC specifically, in the process of formulation 
of the NSS documents should not be underestimated. ‗Think tanks‘ of various types did play a role in 
their formulation as confirmed by the fact that issues addressed in these documents were discussed and 
published by major ‗think thanks‘ such as the above, but see also, for instance, the Center for Security 
Policy (CSP) at: <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/>. For a chronological exploration of the 
evolution and impact of ‗think tanks‘ on US foreign and domestic policy, see Smith, 1991. See also 
Guilhot, 2005.    
272
 The PNAC‘s official website can be found at: http://www.newamericancentury.org/. The account 
had been suspended in 2008. It is now up again, although its last input dates back to 2006.     
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Fukuyama
273
 and Paul Wolfowitz, who, already in the late 1991, during the Bush Snr. 
Administration, wrote a controversial document, the ‗Defense Planning Guidance‘,274 in 
which it was claimed that the US‘s role was ‗to show the leadership necessary to establish 
and protect a new order‘. The similarities between these two discourses – that of the National 
Security Strategies and the PNAC‘s discourse – are striking and they need closer attention. 
They seem to confirm that the war on terror has indeed ‗been implemented in a manner that 
articulates a pre-planned neo-conservative agenda […]‘ (Bormann, et al, 2005; see also, 
Wood, 2004: 160; Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 412; the BRussells Tribunal Commission‘s 
Conclusions, 2004
275
).  
 
Their shared statement of principles reads, ‗[h]aving led the West to victory in the Cold War, 
America faces an opportunity and a challenge […]. The history of this century [the 20 th 
century] should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership‘ (1997). This is 
in line with the National Security documents, whose emphasis on American leadership is 
analysed above, and so are many other reports written since the establishment of the PNAC in 
1997. As noted by Bialasiewicz et al. (2007: 410), ‗[p]utatively lying outside ―formal‖ policy 
networks, the Project from its inception has aimed to provide the intellectual basis for 
continued US military dominance – and especially the willingness to use its military might‘. 
The ‗Rebuilding America‘s Defense‘ (2000), for instance, maintains not only that ‗America 
should seek to preserve and extend its position of global leadership‘ but that it should seek to 
do so ‗by maintaining the pre-eminence of US military forces‘ – an idea again central to the 
National Security Strategy of the USA.
276
 Moreover, ‗The Right War for the Right Reasons‘ 
(2004: [n.p.]) report specifically treats the 20
th
 Century as that which ‗spawned the twin evils 
of totalitarianism‘. Again, as in the examples from the NSSs, it is through the reference to the 
end of the Cold War and the discourse of ‗anti-totalitarianism‘ that the idea of American 
global leadership and the consequent imperative to rid the world of its new alleged 
                                                             
273
 Fukuyama was among the signatories of a letter sent to Bush on September 20, 2001, which argued 
that ‗even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of 
terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in 
Iraq‘. However, soon later, he started to distance himself from this type of interventionist policy (see, 
for instance, Fukuyama, 2004; 2006).  
274
 The DPG also called for the US ‗to oppose European efforts to achieve a foreign policy 
independence‘ (Gibbs, 2009: 113). 
275
 The BRussells Commission is a network of intellectuals, artists, and activists who ‗denounce the 
logic of permanent war promoted by the American government and its allies‘ in the tradition of the 
Russell Tribunal – note the play in the name – set up in 1967 to investigate war crimes committed 
during the Vietnam War. ‗The BRussells Tribunal: Conclusions of the commission‘ are available at: 
<http://www.brussellstribunal.org/Conclusions.htm>. Of particular relevance here are conclusions 
number 2 and 6.    
276
 How the idea of pre-emption or pre-emptive war relates to the formation of a ‗global security state‘ 
is analysed below. See section 3.6. 
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totalitarian manifestation (terrorism) emerges. The reference to the end of the Cold War and 
the discourse of anti-totalitarianism is formative of the idea of American global leadership 
(Guilhot, 2005) and in turn legitimizes its self-assured, securitization, hegemonic role in the 
war against terrorism. America has no need of legal justification for its war, ‗for its record in 
defending democracy [and freedom] in the three decisive battles of the twenty century – the 
First World War, the Second World War and the Cold War – [gives] its de fact pre-eminence 
an ethical legitimacy‘ (Anderson, 2005: 162).  
 
Having established the main aims of the aforementioned historical ‗narratives‘, their 
connotative meanings and briefly looked at how these discursive repertoires are common to a 
whole set of people, I proceed to make a number of observations that I regard as fundamental 
for understanding the implicit assumptions that is behind the construction of the USA as 
‗global state‘.277  
 
3.2 The Construction of a ‘Global People’  
 
The construction of a global people or more specifically of ‗freedom-loving people 
everywhere‘ (NSS, 2002; 2006) is functional to the configuration of the USA as a ‗global 
state‘. It is through this construction that the imperative to secure ‗the people‘ is globalized 
(that is, it becomes global in its extensibility) and that the normative control over populations 
or a ‗global people‘ is established. It is also that which facilitates the distinction between 
‗freedom loving people‘ and ‗enemies of freedom‘278 (of which more will be said in section 
3.3). By drawing on both Agamben‘s understanding of ‗a people‘ and Schmitt‘s 
conceptualization of the state, this section analyses how this construction is achieved in these 
documents, while showing some of the contradictions implicit in it.   
As observed in Chapter 1, Agamben suggests that the term people is always split between 
‗The People‘ of the body politics and ‗the people‘ that do not have rights and are excluded 
(by inclusion) from politics (Agamben, 1998). Consequently, for him, the term people is 
intrinsically ambiguous because it refers to both the excluded and the politically included 
citizens. In this respect, it is interesting to observe that the ambiguity of which Agamben 
speaks is clearly detectable here. Within these documents, the naming of the American people 
functions exactly to exclude another set of people which, as we shall see, cannot be part of 
                                                             
277
 The concept ‗global state‘ was first used by Martin Shaw in his book Theory of the Global State: 
Globality as an Unfinished Revolution, 2000 to describe a new structure of global power, essentially 
Western, that emerged after the 1989. I use the term in a similar, although not identical, way – where 
the main difference between Shaw‘s notion of global state and mine is the relation (or non-relation in 
Shaw‘s case) of the latter to imperialism.  
278
 Bush used the expression ‗enemies of freedom‘ in his first Address to the Union after 9/11, 2001. 
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the same body politic on the basis that ‗they‘ do not share the same values of those that 
constitute it. Summarizing the objectives of the 2002 US NSS, the 2006 strategy states, [t]he 
security environment confronting the United States today is radically different from what we 
have faced before. Yet the first duty of the United States Government remains what it always 
has been: ‗to protect the American people and American interests‘ (NSS, 2006: 18; NSS, 
2002), clearly implying that the American people‘s interests are a priority and not the same as 
those of other people. On the other hand, however, what we can also observe is that those 
who constitute the body politic are not themselves, not even rhetorically,
279
 ‗sovereign‘ (i.e., 
the People)  as in ‗we the people‘ of the American constitution‘ but simply ‗objects‘ among 
others ‗objects‘ (i.e., other people) of sovereign power as the following sentences makes 
plainly clear:  
 
‗These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in 
every society—and the duty of protecting these values against their 
enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the 
globe and across the ages‘ (Bush, 2002: preface, emphasis added).  
 
‗The United States must defend liberty and justice because these 
principles are right and true for all people everywhere’ (NSS, 2006: 
2, emphasis added).   
 
Contrary to an understanding of people as ‗American people‘ (see quotation above), here 
there is a shift in the meaning of ‗the people‘ where the ‗the‘ of ‗the people‘ of the American 
constitution is replaced by ‗a freedom-loving people‘, which remains ambiguously linked to 
the nation, but is no longer sovereign. Within these documents, people are no longer that 
which founds sovereignty as in modern notions of popular sovereignty or of ‗the people‘ as 
the constituent power of ‗the state‘ (see, for instance, Rousseau, 1968 [1762]; see also Negri, 
1999). Instead, they are politicized – and concurrently de fact depoliticized – as part of a 
‗global people‘. In other words, they are constructed as the powerless subject of human 
rights, or freedom-loving interventionism, though they constitutively cannot act. They are 
part of a ‗global people‘, and as such, they always require the US military apparatus as their 
universal representative. From a notion of the people as that which constitutes the body of the 
citizens of the American constitution and its jurisdiction, these documents pass to a freedom-
loving people that remain vaguely linked to the nation (insofar as ‗they‘ – the American 
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 I say rhetorically because, as we have seen, for Agamben the concept of ‗popular sovereignty‘ is 
from its very inception (i.e., the French Revolution) always intrinsically ambivalent.  
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people and freedom loving people – all share the same values) but are everywhere to be 
secured. 
 
In truth, a notion of people as American people (or national people) was not completely 
rejected by the Bush administration; on the contrary. In line with Schmitt‘s understanding of 
‗the endeavor of a normal state‘ as outlined in my discussion of Schmitt in Chapter 1, the 
protection or security of ‗the state and its territory‘ (Schmitt, 1996: 46, 52)280 has always been 
one of the main priorities of the US government. ‗Ultimately‘, the 2002 document states at 
the end, ‗foundation of American strength is at home. It is in the skills of our people, the 
dynamism of our economy, and the resilience of our institutions‘ (2002: 31). However, in 
order to facilitate the construction of the United States as a ‗global state‘, the Bush 
administration also had to invent a ‗freedom-loving people‘ and to make them the object of 
biopolitical securitization discourses and practices. Fundamental to this construction of 
‗people‘ is an idea of freedom as potentially universal and of war as that which will 
eventually satisfy the conditions for it. More specifically, it is through the rhetoric of freedom 
that unpolitical or non-political people (both as national and global people) becomes 
politicized as ‗freedom-loving people everywhere‘ as opposed to people who ‗love only 
terror and violence‘. In Bush‘s words, ‗they hate us because we are free‘ (Bush quoted in 
Cornell, 2004: viii) and any attack on the United States was, for him, an attack on freedom in 
itself. Freedom, or what is in fact best regarded as a particular vision of it, that is, ‗economic 
freedom‘ in the particular sense of Western capitalist liberal democracy,281 becomes the 
means through which one set of people – freedom-loving people everywhere – is 
distinguished from another – enemies of freedom – and made the object of biopolitical 
security and violence.  
 
As it will be analysed in more details in the section below, the idea that there exists an 
‗American people‘ to be safeguarded against external threats282 seems to confirm Schmitt‘s 
understanding of the state as that which decides on the exception ‗and determines the decisive 
friend-and-enemy grouping‘ (Schmitt, 1996: 43). In actual fact, this conception is both 
                                                             
280
 ‗The protecto ergo obligo‘ [‗I protect therefore I am obeyed‘], says Schmitt, ‗is the Cogito Ergo 
Sum of the state‘ (1996: 52).    
281
 In the words of the 2006 strategy, ‗the liberty to create and build or to buy, sell and own property is 
fundamental to human nature and foundational to a free society‘. The document sees economic 
freedom as ‗a moral imperative‘ (NSS, 2006: 27). This reinforces the opinions of authors, such as 
Harvey, who have pointed out that it is ‗freedom, interpreted as freedom of the market and of trade, 
that subtends the US administration thinking and that the Bush administration in particular wanted ‗to 
be imposed upon Iraq and the world‘ (2006b: 9). 
282
 For an analysis of how this idealized self-portrait of contemporary US American-ness contrasts with 
‗the always fractured US and the plurality of citizens‘, see Weber‘s series of film ‗―I Am an 
American‖: portraits of post-9/11 US citizens‘, 2007.  
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confirmed and refuted. The decisionist element is clearly confirmed. However, these 
documents do not wholly conform to such a conception of the political in their naming of 
‗freedom-loving people everywhere‘ or a ‗global people‘ and effort to extend US sovereign 
power on a global scale. The attempt to create a global state is antithetical to Schmitt‘s notion 
of the political as developed in his The Concept of the Political (1996); although, as observed 
in Chapter 1, in his Nomos of the Earth (2003) Schmitt also pointed out what he saw as a 
tendency toward an America-centric world order. Thus, although seemingly reinforcing 
Schmitt‘s vision of the political as based on the distinction between the friend and the enemy 
to an extent, in their framing of the US state as global, the NSSs go beyond it. By framing the 
war on terror as a war which takes the globe as its field, it is waged in the name of a 
globalized humanity against a global enemy, the US attempts to extend sovereign power 
beyond the control of its own territorial boundaries in order to create the conditions for a new 
form of imperial extraterritoriality or nomos.  
 
In this section, what I have demonstrated is that the US relied on a vision of people as global 
to construct itself as a global state. I will now show how it configured the war on terror as 
premised on the friend/enemy distinction in a very specific sense, before proceeding to 
analyse other important ways through which the US administration attempted to globalize the 
US state as a precondition for the generalization of the state of exception. 
 
3.3 The Friend/Enemy Distinction 
 
This section further discusses how the distinction between friend (‗freedom-loving people 
everywhere‘) and enemy (‗enemies of freedom‘) seemingly conforms to Schmitt‘s notion of 
the political and of the state as nationally bounded whilst it creates the conditions for the 
normalization and generalization of ‗the (state of) exception‘ (Agamben, 1998; 2001; 2003; 
2005a). By configuring the enemy as global and as the outside of law, the US government 
can claim the right to kill ‗terrorists‘ wherever they are in the name of protecting ‗freedom-
loving people everywhere‘. The section, moreover, draws on Foucault‘s conceptualization of 
‗state racism‘ to show that it is indeed ‗something akin to racism‘ that works to distinguish 
between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘, or to use Foucault‘s words, ‗to introduce a break into the domain of 
life within what must live and what must die‘ (Foucault, 2003). More specifically, it shows 
that the structure of disavowal by which the US administration denies that ‗Muslims‘ are the 
object of policy discourse and practices, hides a form of racialization, which works by 
disassociating ‗good‘ from ‗bad‘ Muslims at the same time as Islam and Muslims generally 
are implicitly associated with terrorism. Moreover, it notes that the association of Islam with 
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terrorism started after the end of the Cold War (Philipose, 2007), and more specifically with 
the Clinton administration.  
 
As previously discussed in Chapter 1, according to Schmitt, the existence of a state must be 
understood through ‗the specific political distinction [...] between friend and enemy‘ 
(Schmitt, 1996: 26). To the extent that in these documents the war on terror is conceptualized 
as a war between friends and enemies, it implicitly seemingly conforms to Schmitt‘s notion 
of the political. However, as mentioned above in relation to the construction of a global 
people, the war on terror also operates at the level of populations and geopolitics, while 
adding what Žižek has called ‗a reflexive twist‘ to the concept of the political (Žižek, 2003). 
That is to say, by constructing the friend as ‗freedom-loving people‘ and ‗the enemy‘ as 
‗new‘ type of asymmetrical global enemy ‗with no positive legal status‘, it bypasses the 
international law which regulated relations between states since its inception (Žižek, 2003). 
At the same time, the war on terror is creating the conditions for the normalization and 
generalization of ‗the state of exception‘ as described in Chapter 1. Although the framing of 
the enemy in existential terms – they (i.e., the terrorists) do not share the way of life and 
values of the United States and of the ‗free world‘ – does implicitly correspond to Schmitt‘s 
understanding of it (see Schmitt, 1996: 51); its globalization also goes beyond this specific 
understanding of the enemy in some important respects. In this case, the figure of the enemy 
is not so much constitutive of the state as ‗the specific entity of a people‘ (Schmitt, 1996) or 
national people but of the state as ‗global state‘, consequently, of the state as the entity of a 
‗global people‘ as analysed in the previous section. It was on the basis that the US claimed it 
was acting in the name of a globalized people against a global enemy that it attempted to 
globalize its state and to make it appeared as that which could guarantee the global people‘s 
security.   
 
More specifically, in the ESSs, the enemy is not identifiable with a nation – although nations 
that support terrorism are also and most definitely enemies: ‗[t]he United States and its allies 
in the War on Terror make no distinction between those who commit acts of terror and those 
who support and harbor them, because they are equally guilty of murder‘ (NSS, 2002: 5; 
NSS, 2006: 12). The enemy is a ‗new‘ type of enemy ‗with a global reach‘ (NSS, 2006: 8). 
‗The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is 
terrorism – premeditated, politically motivated violence, perpetrated against innocents‘ (NSS, 
2002: 5). Among other characteristics, it is distinguished from the friend (i.e., the American 
state, its people and ‗freedom-loving people everywhere‘) by religious intolerance, its hate 
for freedom and democracy, its disregard for life and capacity to strike everywhere (NSS, 
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2002; NSS, 2006). Moreover, the 2006 document stresses the non-centralized nature of 
terrorists‘ networks and their reliance ‗on smaller cells to achieve their results‘ (NSS, 2006: 9).  
 
Contrary to traditional definitions of justus hostis or the legally recognized enemy (see 
Schmitt, 2003; also Douzinas, 2003); according to these documents, the enemy is someone 
with whom, by definition, one cannot deal. The 2002 document states, ‗[t]raditional concepts 
of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton 
destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death 
and whose most potent protection is statelessness‘ (NSS, 2002: 17). In other words, the 
enemy is configured as total enemy; as an enemy whose life is unworthy (Schmitt, 1996; see 
also Derrida in Borradori, 2003).
283
 It is constituted as an exception. It is the outside of law – 
terrorists, terrorist organizations and ‗states that harbor them‘ show ‗no regard for 
international law‘ (NSS, 2002: 14), thus, do not fall under the purview of protections afforded 
by it – with which the law must nonetheless maintain a paradoxical relation (see Agamben, 
1998; 2005a). By positioning the terrorist outside of law (national laws did not apply to it but 
neither did, according to the Bush‘s administration, international laws), the US, as that which 
decides on the ‗global exception‘, attempted to create the legal or extra-legal conditions for 
the internment and/or annihilation of those with whom it says it cannot negotiate. By 
configuring it as global enemy or exception, the US government could claim the right to kill 
the enemy in the name of protecting ‗freedom-loving people everywhere‘ wherever he/she 
was. Among others, the terrorist is a figure of ‗inclusive exclusion‘ in both the Agamben‘s 
sense of being inside and outside of (national) law (Agamben, 1998) but also in the sense of 
being included in the ‗international community‘ by being place outside of it (international 
laws do not apply to him/her). In the words of the 2002 document,‗[t]he purpose of our 
actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and 
friends‘ (NSS, 2002: 16, emphasis added). To this extent, it could be argued that there is 
nothing new about American foreign policy. However, by attempting to extend sovereign 
power in the name of protecting a ‗global people‘ (that which, as previously analysed and is 
confirmed here, is both national and global) from a specific global threat or a ‗globalized 
homo sacer‘, the US assumed for itself the right ‗to take life or to let live‘ (Foucault, 1999) 
whoever, whenever and wherever they were. In name of protecting ‗the global People‘ from 
‗global enemies‘, the sovereign has, or at least feel justified in assuming it has, the right to 
kill with impunity whoever and wherever it identifies as threat.  
 
                                                             
283
 In Schmitt‘s classic formulation: ―a total war calls for a total enemy‖ (as opposed to what Schmitt 
would consider as ‗real enmity‘) (Schmitt, 2003; 1996). 
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Drawing on my analysis of Foucault in Chapter 1, something else that is important to 
highlight is that although, within these documents, the enemy is not presented in strictly 
racial terms, the US administration did, however, rely on ‗something akin to racism‘ (Bell, 
2004) to distinguish between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘, or to use Foucault‘s own words, ‗to introduce a 
break into the domain of life within what must live and what must die‘. In particular, in these 
texts, this distinction is re-articulated in terms of a cultural clash between the US, its values, 
religious beliefs and way of life and ‗shadowy networks of individuals‘ and a small number 
of rogue states linked by hate, whose only aim is to bring violence and terror to the Western 
world because their ‗directives‘ – presumably religious ones – command them to do so 
(Bush, 2001a). Far from being explicit, however, the language chosen for this re-articulation 
of ‗racism‘ is carefully selected. These documents are for public consumption and written 
with a specific audience in mind. They are not a hasty response to 9/11. They are a calculated 
governmental strategic effort to convince the Congress in the first instance and America‘s 
allies that the war on terror is justified both in the specific sense that it is the only way to get 
rid of terrorism and in the more general moral sense of being just. This is why an effort is 
made to present the war on terror in a less straightforward manner. Thus, for instance, it 
appears that a civilizational view of the war on terror that opposes the West and ‗the Muslim 
world‘ is openly rejected by the documents. The administration was aware that such a view 
was problematic and would have been contested. Thus, the 2002 document says, ‗[t]he war 
on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations‘ (2002: 31) and it is interesting to note that the 
word ‗civilization‘ is not even mentioned in the 2006 document. However, even though the 
war on terror is not explicitly conceived in terms of ‗clash of civilizations‘ (Huntington, 
1996),
284
 what the statement that follows immediately after the aforementioned sentence 
suggests is that Huntington‘s theory of a ‗clash of civilizations‘ is ‗[p]art of the theoretical 
underpinning‘ of US policy-makers (Kepel, 2004: 62), at least to an extent. The sentence 
reads, ‗it [the war on terrorism] does reveal the clash inside a civilization, a battle for the 
future of the Muslim world. This is a struggle of ideas and this is an area where America 
must excel‘ (NSS, 2002: 31). What the idea of a ‗clash inside a civilization‘ implies is that 
one can draw an ideological and strategic line within the so-called Muslim world between 
‗good Muslims‘ and ‗bad Muslims‘ (Mamdani, [n.d.]). It functions by dissociating both 
‗civilized‘, ‗peaceful‘ Muslims and ‗freedom loving people everywhere‘ from the terrorists, 
the extremists who appear at this point beyond salvage, thus, killable. The 2006 NSS affirms 
that ‗[a] proud religion – the religion of Islam – has been twisted and made to serve an evil 
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 Incidentally, the sentence cited above could be a direct reference to Huntington‘s theory of the clash 
of civilizations.  
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end, as in other times and places other religions have been similarly abused‘ (2006: 10). It 
continues by saying that ‗[t]he strategy to counter the lies behind the terrorists‘ ideology is to 
empower the very people, the terrorists most want to exploit: the faithful followers of Islam‘ 
(2006: 11). These rhetorical moves tend to perpetuate modes of racialization that historically 
constituted Arabs and Muslims as inferior, albeit in a very specific way. On the one hand, 
there are those who have exploited Islam to serve destructive ends; on the other, there are 
those who need to be empowered by ‗us‘ – the US and ‗us‘, Westerners – for them to become 
able to contrast and expunge these elements. In other words, even as we are presented with a 
view of Islam that is not openly negative or explicitly racist, we are told that terrorists are 
Islamists, and that ‗the Muslim world‘ is incapable of controlling them sans the help of the 
West. Similarly to older modes of racialization that historically constituted Arabs and 
Muslims as strange, aberrant and inferior (Said, 1979), this ‗new culturalist‘ grammar 
endeavors to create a firm line between ‗good ‗and ‗evil‘ people where ‗evil‘ people are 
inextricably associated with Islam.  
 
Interestingly, it was during the Clinton‘s administration that ‗terrorism‘ and Islam started to 
become associated in policy discourses. As Philipose observes, since the end of the Cold 
War, ‗images of the Arab terrorist have been ubiquitous in US terrorism studies and in media 
representations, occupying a place in the US discursive imagination once reserved for those 
of the Soviet Union‘ (Philipose, 2007: 1054; see also Lipschutz, 1999). The National Security 
Strategy of 1998, for instance, states ‗US policies in the Middle East and Southwest Asia are 
not anti-Islamic […] US policy in the region is directed at the actions of governments and 
terrorist groups, not peoples or faiths. The standards we would like all the nations in the 
region to observe are not merely Western, but universal‘ (NSS, 1998). This implies that 
Western values are universal whilst Islamic ones are of a different kind, and that terrorism is 
indeed inside/part of Islam. In particular, what this quotation shows is that whilst the Clinton 
administration denies that ‗Muslims‘ are the object of policy discourse and practices, in 
actual fact ‗they‘ are and that this ideological move hides a form of racialization, which 
works by disassociating ‗good‘ from ‗bad‘ Muslims at the same time as Muslims are 
implicitly associated with terrorism.  
 
From what we could observe, this continues to be the case. As ‗the national security ideology 
framed the Cold War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that defined America‘s 
national identity by reference to the un-American ‗other,‘ usually the Soviet Union, Nazi 
Germany, or some other totalitarian power (Hogan, 2000: 17), today‘s global war on terror is 
also framed by reference to the un-American, un-Western ‗other‘. That is, a ‗racialized‘ 
homogenous, ‗non-centralized entity‘ that can be inside, as in the idea of ‗homegrown 
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terrorism‘ (NSS, 2006: 11), but exists outside of the nation in a very essential way: it does not 
share ‗American way of life‘ even when part of American society. This is because, as Bush 
made clear in his speech (see above), terrorist follow other directives. Terrorists follow the 
precepts dictated by Islam, albeit in a distorted way. What we can deduce from this is that, 
even as a racist view of ‗the enemy‘ is refused on the surface, what the framing of the war on 
terror as a struggle between the righteous citizens in ‗civilized nations‘ (NSS, 2002: 5) 
against ‗militant murderers‘ ‗deliberately targeting innocent civilians‘ (NSS, 2006: 12) is far 
from having abandoned a racializing ideology. More specifically, what this discourse seems 
to hide is a very specific form of racialization. A form of rationalization that while attempting 
to disavowing its most ‗racist‘ aspects, such as the explicit categorization of Muslims as 
aberrant, inferiors etc., it continues to perpetrate racializing symbolic violence through its 
‗us‘/‗them‘ vision and ‗clash inside a civilization‘ thesis. This same discourse also facilitates 
internment and killing with impunity by making it appeared justified.    
 
Having now analysed how the ‗war against terrorism‘ is premised on the friend/enemy 
distinction, which takes on a specific racialied form, before confronting the theme of whether 
wars fought in its name can simply be understood in terms of unilateralism, I will explore 
another important way through which the US administration tried to make the US appear as 
the guarantor of people‘s security. Particularly, I observe that even though within these two 
strategies terrorism is given the greatest emphasis, the documents make no fundamental 
distinction between types of problems relying very much on a notion of ‗human or 
biopolitical security‘ as analysed in Chapter 1.    
 
3.4 ‘Human’ or Biopolitical Security  
 
The construction of the war on terror as ‗global permanent warfare‘ against a global enemy, 
waged to defend people globally is not the only way in which the US administration tried to 
construct itself as a ‗bio-sovereign‘ global power. The extension of security to other domains 
is also an integral part of the construction of the US as a ‗global (bio)security emergency-
state‘. It is that which makes biopolitical securitization processes appear to be natural and 
just. Rather than a shift from a type of power centred on the sovereign and the security of a 
territory (national) to a biopolitical power that is distinguished from sovereign power and is 
centred on man-as-species (global) (Foucault, 2003: 279), in these documents, security is 
constituted both as a mechanism of state power and of biopower. It is both national - i.e., 
aimed at securing America‘s territory from external threats – and global – i.e., aimed at 
securi(tisi)ng the life of populations generally. 
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Although within these documents terrorism is clearly given the greatest emphasis,
285
 these 
papers make no fundamental distinction between types of problems. Problems or ‗threats‘ are 
presented together as part of what the documents call today‘s ‗new era‘ of ‗terrorist violence 
and chaos‘ (NSS, 2002: intro). They include but are not limited to ‗terrorist organizations‘ 
and ‗failing nations‘ or ‗rogue states‘, ‗proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, along 
with other advanced military technology‘ (NSS, 2002; 2006). They also comprise ‗shared 
health and environmental threats, such as the spread of HIV/AIDS‘,286 ‗piracy‘, ‗human and 
drug trafficking‘ and ‗natural disasters‘ (NSS 2002; 2006)287 – where, in the last instance, the 
emphasis is clearly on ‗natural‘ as opposed to ‗man-made‘ disasters.288 Moreover, both the 
2002 and 2006 documents make a case for ‗biological weapons‘ to be considered a global 
threat because ‗of the risks of contagion that would spread disease across large populations 
and around the globe‘ (NSS, 2006: 21). Thus, not only will ‗emergency management 
systems‘ ‗be better able to cope not just with terrorism‘ but with all hazards. ‗Our medical 
system will be strengthened to manage not just bioterror, but all infectious diseases and mass-
casualty dangers. Our border controls will not just stop terrorists, but improve the efficient 
movement of legitimate traffic‘ (NSS, 2002: 6-7). Also, the 2006 document informs us that in 
order ‗to protect the United States against bioterrorism‘, ‗a new comprehensive framework‘ 
called ‗Biodefense for the 21st Century‘ has been established (NSS, 2006: 19). A framework 
that, as  the Biodefense strategy itself
289
 explains, is needed because ‗[d]isease outbreaks, 
whether natural or deliberate, respect no geographic or political borders‘ and ‗fully integrates 
the sustained efforts of the national and homeland security, medical, public health, 
                                                             
285
 Note that it is mainly through it (and the threat of WMD) that these documents are able to affirm 
‗global/national securitization mechanisms‘ not simply as desirable but as an absolute necessity for the 
survival of what they refer to as ‗our civilization‘ as opposed to that of the ‗Muslim world‘. 
286
 Here we can see coupled the problem of HIV/AIDS with national security. For the problematics of 
this link, which is increasingly being drawn by not only politicians but also other important bodies, 
see, for instance, Garret, 2005. For an analysis and critique see Elbe, 2005a; 2006 and Ingram, 2006. 
See also Esposito (2004), which although not directly concerned with this, exposes how the link 
between politics and biology becomes transmutated into practices of biopower through the language of 
immunization.  
287
 Although it is important to note that there is a slight shift in emphasis between the two documents 
by which these problems – some of which are not even mentioned in the 2002 report, at least not in 
these terms – become even more fundamental in 2006. It is as if the effort to shift away from a notion 
of security as national to a notion of security as global is enabled and secured by simply naming a 
number of problems as ‗global threats‘; as threats that know no boundaries. 
288
 As matter of a fact, the documents do not mention ‗global warming‘ once. Given the Bush 
administration‘s stance on ‗climate change‘ and the Kyoto Protocol (for an overview of Bush‘s 
position see his letter to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts, 2001b) this comes as no surprise. 
It reflects the unwillingness of the administration to take ‗climate change‘ seriously and to think 
solutions that do not necessarily reinforce biopolitical global securitization by including it into ‗the 
new cross-border threats of the 21
st
 Century‘ as the editor of New Perspectives Quarterly envisages it 
(Gardels, 2002; also quoted in Cooper, 2006: 125). 
289
 President Bush signed the actual ‗Biodefense for the 21st Century‘ strategy in 2004.  
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intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement communities‘ (Biodefense for the 21st Century, 
2004).  
 
This merger of problems, of internal and external security, which, as I have demonstrated 
Chapter 1, started with the end of the Cold War is arguably that which helped to create the 
conditions for the affirmation of the US as a global protector. It asserts the US as that which 
can safeguard, maintain and bring order, which in a situation of chaos becomes a social, 
cultural, political and economic imperative, and protect its citizens as well as others by 
ending tyranny and promoting effective democracy. It creates a situation whereby there is no 
distinction – a distinction that the framing of global terrorism as the outside of law already 
blurred to an extent – between what would be considered by most security scholars as more 
traditional security threats (i.e. military external threats) and other types of problems, which 
pertain to the political, economic, and health domains. This framing of security produces a 
de-differentiation between internal and external security, that has as an effect the inscription 
‗of widely disparate phenomena‘ in ‗continuum of risks, threats and in-security‘ (Bigo, 
2006a: 15, 7, 11; 2001).
290
 In this way, the ideal distinction between security and war for 
which the police deals with strangers, and the military with enemies around which the nation-
state was based (Balibar, 2006) is here completely displaced as exemplified by this sentence: 
‗[o]ur border controls will not just stop terrorists, but improve the efficient movement of 
legitimate traffic‘ (NSS, 2006).‗Enemies‘ and ‗strangers‘ become one and the same (Balibar, 
2006;
291
 also and again Bigo, 2006a; Agamben, 2005a). At the same time, security is 
extended to cover the political, economic and health dimensions. A more traditional concern 
with territory becomes here explicitly coupled with a governmental concern with the well-
being of the population as a whole (Foucault, 2003) as if to prove that the two are not distinct 
but always somewhat coupled even if not explicitly so.   
 
Thus, although these documents never mention ‗human security‘ explicitly, to the extent that 
as we have just seen it is not simply the security of the territory but the life of populations to 
be their concern, we can say that they do incorporate a conception of biopolitical security 
within themselves. The object of these documents‘ securitization strategy is not simply the 
territory. What these documents appear to be concerned with is also the economic, health and 
                                                             
290
  Although Bigo‘s paper is about Europe, this particular aspect of his argument, I believe, can be 
extended  to the US in light of the fact that the dipositif of (in)security or Ban-Opticon dispositif (2008) 
of which Bigo speaks is not simply European but global.  
291
 Although, contrary to what Balibar seems to be implying in that text, it is unclear whether the 
conflation of security and war or, what in line with the above could also be seen as the extension of 
security to the domain of warfare and vice versa, underpins the decline of the nation state, and in 
particular of the US (see also Hardt and Negri, 2000). Or whether it is that which ultimately guarantees 
its survival, albeit in a transformed way (i.e., as a global (bio)security state).  
 135 
 
environmental security of US citizens and of ‗freedom loving people everywhere‘. In other 
words, even though not explicitly called as such, an idea of ‗human security‘, albeit a very 
specific one, is part of these documents‘ strategy of biopower. The idea of ‗security‘ 
proposed within these documents is very much linked to a notion of people as vulnerable and 
in need of protection. The 2002 NSS states, ‗[t]he characteristics we most cherish–our 
freedom, our cities, our systems of movement, and modern life–are vulnerable to terrorism. 
This vulnerability will persist long after we bring to justice those responsible for the 
September 11 attacks‘ (NSS, 2002: 31). It is also connected to an idea of the United States as 
the national/global security state that would guarantee their security. It is clearly not 
conceptualized as a project of ‗protection and empowerment‘ distinct from state security as 
quoted in various (but not all) reports on ‗human security‘. Specifically, ‗human security‘ 
appears in these documents as the vector and rationality that enables the US to act on 
populations. This strategic ideological move on the part of the US makes it difficult to see 
how ‗human‘ or biopolitical security can be rescued and/or disjoined from state‘s functions as 
proponents of human security argue. It is by strategically arguing that it works toward 
securing human beings overall that the US state can seek the control of territories and 
populations (as both economic resources and strategic possessions). This does not mean that 
in its biopolitical securitization capacity the state works on its own. As argued in Chapter 1, 
the apparatus of security has in many cases been privatized and/or relocated (see, for 
instance, Bigo, 2006a; Fraser, 2003). However, what the framing of political legitimation in 
terms of human security points to is how state power and security are interlinked in practice 
and how the state needs to maintain its monopoly over the final decision to be able to exert 
control over populations. Thus, for instance, although the mere existence of ‗private security 
contractors‘ makes it impossible to argue that the state exert full control over the means of 
security, it can be argued that these contractors, on which the US relies heavily, would not 
have gone to Iraq if the United Stated had not declared war in the first place. Processes of 
securitization related to the war on terror are premised on a sovereign decision about which 
humans (and states) are to be protected and which are not, and how best to protect those in 
need of protection. To this extent, they implicitly conform to a Schmittian vision of the 
political, albeit one considerably altered by the determination of the US to extent its 
sovereign power globally. 
 
Crucially, the construction of the USA as a national security state directly depends on 
presenting problems (military, environmental, health, WMD etc.) as security threats and 
terrorism as the new security threat par excellence. The presentation of terrorism as new, its 
securitization and militarization together with the securitization and militarization of these 
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problems enabled the US to present itself as the protector of its citizens and to give it 
legitimacy and strength. However, it also has another advantage. This configuration of 
terrorism as new global threat helped to construct the US not just as a national security state, 
whose role was the protection of its territory and people but as a global one, whose role 
exceeded that of the state. According to these documents, what constitutes the body politic is 
not simply ‗the people‘ (‗we the people of the United States‘) but a ‗global people‘. 
Consequently, the role of the state is not simply that of protecting its own people or citizens 
but peoples across the globe. The state has to protect ‗life‘ itself. ‗Freedom-loving people 
everywhere‘ and their biological life or ‗bare life‘ become the object of (state) security where 
biopolitical securitization is the means through which the coupling of biopower and sovereign 
power, security and ‗life‘ is achieved. 
 
3.5 A Unilateral Internationalism? 
 
The question about whether the war on terror is to be understood in terms of unilateralism 
and the extent to which these documents rely on this idealization is complicated but very 
important. It is important for two main reasons. On the one hand, it draws attention to the 
specific way in which the US administration tried to legitimate its ‗unilateral‘ decisions 
(Agamben, 2004). It was through an appeal to international law, which was paradoxically 
also and at the same time its instrumetalization, that the US attempted to legitimize its 
declared de facto ‗unilateral internationalism‘. This will be analysed through two concrete 
examples of how exactly what I call the ‗unilateral internationalism‘ of the United States 
functioned when the law was ‗in force without significance‘ (Agamben, 2004). These are the 
decisions to go to war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and against Iraq. On the other, it 
highlights the importance of tackling the question of state power but also and fundamentally 
the related question of imperialism, something which, as I have suggested in Chapter 1, 
Agamben does in a way that is not satisfactory.   
 
It is certainly the case that the US administration saw itself not just as under attack but also as 
the leading nation of the war on terror and that as such it believed it was justified in taking 
any steps, including unilateral ones, it regarded as necessary to prevent further attacks. This is 
reflected in the NSSs (2002; 2006). However, the NSSs also promote respect for the rule of 
law, close cooperation with other nations around the world that are committed to the goals of 
freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. In this respect, the 2006 document sees a slight 
change in language from the 2002 National Security Strategy, placing more emphasis on co-
operation and on inter-connectedness between states. Thus, for instance, whereas the 2002 
report mentions the UN only in passing in the preamble and in section IV, the 2006 document 
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dedicates an entire section to how to promote ‗meaningful reforms of the U.N.‘, especially its 
capacity ‗to advance the freedom agenda through tools like the U.N. Democracy Fund‘ (NSS, 
2006: ix). In the preamble to the 2006 document, moreover, Bush states,  
 
We must maintain a military without peer – yet our strength is not 
founded on force of arms alone. It also rests on economic 
prosperity and a vibrant democracy. And it rests on strong 
alliances, friendships, and international institutions, which enable 
us to promote freedom, prosperity, and peace in common purpose 
with others (Bush, 2006, preamble) 
 
This could be read in two ways. On a more positive note, this mild shift in emphasis between 
the 2002 and 2006 documents could be seen as entailing the possibility that a confrontation 
with the failures (never explicitly mentioned) of unilateralism was after all inevitable. In 
other words, according to this reading, the Bush administration recognising the limits of its 
foreign policy agenda, seeks a multilateral approach to ‗the problem of terrorism‘. However, 
another, perhaps darker, but more plausible reading, as confirmed by the arguments for pre-
emptive war within the 2006 document (again see section below), is also possible. Both 
internationalism and unilateralism are part of the same logic of security and exception and 
what in reality is being given voice to in these documents is not, or not simply, the 
‗international unilateralism‘ or, the ‗unipolarism‘ of the first Bush and Clinton 
administrations
292
 (see, for instance, Gowan, 2002; 2003
293
), but a sort of ‗unilateral 
internationalism‘. Namely, a ‗unilateral internationalism‘, or what the 2002 document 
instructively calls ‗a distinctly American internationalism‘ that reflects the union of ‗our 
values‘ and ‗our national interests‘ (2002: I), based, as it were, on the invention of ‗a 
coalition of the willing‘ and ‗a will of the world‘ as an afterthought to its declared 
unilateralism. A ‗unilateral multilateralism‘ for which terrorism, as an irreducible evil, 
becomes the means through which the USA‘s specific national security agenda is 
internationalized or generalized ; an agenda based on the (extra)legal use of pre-emptive wars 
against terrorists and states that support or harbour them.
294
 In this reading, the appeal to the 
                                                             
292
 This is not to say that there were not disagreements between the two administrations over foreign 
affairs issues – prime among them a disagreement over how American dominance in the world should 
be maintained (i.e., over the use of ‗hard‘ and/or ‗soft power‘). But that, despite these differences, the 
Clinton administration accepted the core concepts of the Bush Snr. administration‘s Defence Planning 
Guidance, which indicated that the great threat to US national security lay in regionalist unification 
moves among advanced industrial countries – in other words Europe and East Asia (Gowan, 2002). 
And in fact the Clinton administration was also ‗prepared to act alone‘ if the national interests of the 
United States were at stake, as stated in the NSS of 1995 (1995: 13).  
293
 For a different, more optimistic, perspective, see Appadurai (1999: 227); Hardt and Negri, 2000; 
2004. For an opposing view, see Rahman, 2002 and Huntington, 1996. 
294
 The 2006 document specifically names Syria and Iran as harbouring and supporting terrorism (NSS, 
2006: 9).  
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rule of law and international cooperation only facilitates the construction of the US as a 
global (bio)security state by attempting to make a de facto unilateralism accepted by its allies. 
That is to say, unilateralism and internationalism are both part of a specific national security 
agenda (the security agenda of the US government) that aims to expand its sovereign, 
imperial power globally. The 2002 document explicitly states, ‗[t]o contend with uncertainty 
and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and 
station within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access 
arrangement for the long-distance of US forces‘ (NSS, 2002: 29). ‗In today‘s globalized 
world‘ ‗the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing […] events 
beyond America‘s borders have a greater impact inside them‘ (NSS, 2002: 31). The 2006 
National Security Strategy moreover affirms, ‗[g]lobalization creates challenges and 
opportunities‘ (NSS, 2006: 23, 47). As a consequence, it is decided, America must protect 
itself as well as ‗maintain and expand its national strength‘, expand ‗free trade‘, ‗economic 
liberty‘ and the ‗free flows of ideas‘ (NSS, 2006: preamble, 28, 27, 25, 12, 7). A more 
explicit form of aggressive unilateralism is replaced by a somewhat less explicit, although by 
no means obviously less aggressive form.  
 
This interpretation also finds justification in the 2006 document‘s presence/absence of 
information regarding ‗multilateral institutions‘ and international treaties. Thus, for instance, 
as previously noted, the 2006 document does talk about the UN, whereas the 2002 report 
does it only in passing in relation to working with the UN and other nations in order ‗to 
provide humanitarian political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild 
Afghanistan‘ (NNS, 2002: 7). However, it cannot but be noted that in the 2006 document the 
UN is taken into account only in relation to its need for change. No consideration is given to 
this institution on its own merits.
295
 Moreover, whilst the report spends much time outlining 
NATO‘s security role in the war on terror, it does not even mention that within the context of 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy or CFSP,
296
 the European Union is also developing 
a common security strategy (see the European Security Strategy (2004) analysed in the 
following chapter). Finally yet importantly, even when various individual treaties or 
                                                             
295
 For a relatively brief but in-depth critical analysis on how the US has used the UN since its 
American inception in 1945 until now see, Gowan, 2003.  
296
 As stated in their website, the CFSP ‗was established as the second pillar of the European Union in 
the 1993 Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht‘. Its objectives, how they are to be pursued 
and the role of the European Commission in the CFSP can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm.  
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agreements, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
297
 are addressed directly, there is no sense 
in which the administration recognizes that these treaties are legally binding for all signatory 
members, including the US
298
 (which has been notably ‗lax on its commitment on nuclear 
disarmament, particularly with regards to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty‘299). On the 
contrary, the administration‘s legal outlook is determined by an instrumentalization of 
international law and legal institutions, which makes its declared internationalism or 
multilateral approach even more paradoxical.  
 
Concrete examples of this ‗unilateral internationalism‘, which show exactly how it functioned 
at times when the law was in force without significance (Agamben, 2004), would be both the 
war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan started in October 2001 and the war 
against Iraq, which commenced in 2003 (or rather was intensified
300
). Both military 
campaigns were decided by the USA and legitimized or pseudo-legitimized a posteriori by 
the UN. Despite early condemnations by some members of the Security Council, namely 
France, Russia and Germany, the war against Iraq was officially legitimized in 2003, exactly 
two months and two days after the war had started.
301
 In relation to Afghanistan, the situation 
is slightly more complicated but bears some similarities to that of Iraq. The initial attacks in 
Afghanistan carried out by American and British forces have never been officially 
legitimized by a UN Security Council resolution. However,  the Security Council has since 
authorized the establishment, initially for six months but later extended, of an International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan supported by NATO ‗to assist the Afghan 
Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas‘302 in 
actual fact sanctioning the mission mandate.  
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 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was signed in 1968 and came into 
force on 5 March 1970 – United Nations OPI. The Treaty is available at 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/index.html.   
298
 The 2006 document refers to the Non-Proliferation Treaty only in relation to Iran‘s violation of it 
(2006: 19).  
299
 See Ambassador Graham, 2006: 6. 
300
 According to Harvey, the conflict with Iraq ‗is of long-standing‘ (Harvey, 2003: 22; Balibar, 2008: 
377); Iraq was subjected to bombardments even during the Clinton administration. ‗On June 26, 1993, 
following a determination that Iraq had plotted an assassination attempt against former President Bush, 
President Clinton ordered a cruise missile attack against the headquarters of Iraq's intelligence service 
in order to send a firm response and deter further threats‘ as outlined in the 1995 National Security 
Strategy  (NSS, 1995: 11). 
301
 See resolution 1483 of the Security Council, which recognizes Britain and the United States as 
‗occupying powers under unified command (―The Authority‖)‘. For an important precedent of this see 
the Kosovo war discussed by Zolo (2006) and Anderson (in particular, see Anderson‘s chapter ‗Arms 
and Rights: the Adjustble Centre (2005: 144-177)), among others. 
302
 See resolution 1386 adopted unanimously in 2001, which does not in itself approve the use of force 
on the part of the USA (see, for instance, Ulfstein, 2003: 153; Greenwood 2002: 309), but can 
nevertheless been seen as pointing in that direction (again see Ulfstein, 2003). See also resolutions 
1413 (2002); 1444 (2002); 1510 (2003); 1563 (2004); 1623 (2005); 1659 (2006) and most recently 
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Moreover, that there is no sense of the limits of unilateralism within the 2006 paper is made 
clear by how the 2006 document describes what it calls the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. 
These are described in terms of successes rather than failures. Among the reasons why they 
are considered as such, the report cited the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi 
election. It added that ‗the ongoing fight in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist propaganda as a 
rallying cry‘ (NSS, 2006: 9). While with regard to Afghanistan, the strategy mentions the 
facts that Al-Qaida has lost its safe heaven and that women have been liberated.
303
 Now, that 
this is a very partial interpretation of facts, to say the least, is beyond doubt. No mention is 
made, for instance, about the number of people that have died during these wars
304
 or about 
the fact that in most cases women are no better off in terms of rights, and in some respects 
even worse, than before (see, for instance, Rawi, 2004a; 2004b; RAWA, 2004; Mahmoud, 
2004; 2006). Nor is it mentioned in the strategies that the US de facto broke international law 
as it did not have a Security Council mandate to attack Iraq (something to which I will return 
in the next section).   
 
What is important, however, is not so much the falsification or obfuscation of ‗reality‘, 
which, after all, is part of all ‗justificatory war rhetoric‘, but the idea behind it. That is, the 
idea that the USA as a ‗global security state‘ had the right to decide not only what constituted 
an acceptable and legitimate form of government for itself but to take the same decision for 
others and to impose it with force if necessary. This was based on the presupposition that 
‗America must continue to lead‘ by any means that it deemed were necessary. ‗The goal must 
be to provide the President with a wider range of military options to discourage aggression or 
any form of coercion against the United States, our allies, and our friends‘ (2002: ix). 
National and international laws became secondary to the implementation of this goal. In line 
                                                                                                                                                                              
1707 (2006), which sanctions the mission until October 2007. All United Nations resolutions can be 
found at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolutions. The ISAF‘s 
website is available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/  
303
 As a tangential note, it is interesting to note here how women become the object of security; they 
are those in need of protection for whom the war against the Taliban was waged. In other words, 
women become a justification for what the US has doubt a ‗humanitarian‘ war (Eisenstein, 2007: 23; 
Young, 2007: 133-136; Butler, 2004: 41). In a way similar to how it works in the post 9-11 films 
analysed by Weber, ‗the feminine‘ here functions as ‗the final necessary supplement to a meaningful 
answer to the question: ―What does it take to make a (moral) difference in the war on terror?‖‘ (Weber, 
2006: 88).  
304
 Without entering the politics of ‗the body count‘, which could be seen as perpetuating the structure 
of the ban in its reduction of peoples to numbers, it suffices to say here that a very great number of 
people have been killed. Balibar points out that ‗[t]he practice of ―zero death‖ war inaugurated in the 
Gulf and perfected in Kosovo implies an incommensurable difference between the human cost on the 
Westerners‘ side and that on the others (where casualties are above all civilians)‘ (Balibar, 2003: 38).  
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with Schmitt‘s interpretation of sovereignty, the president is here depicted precisely as he 
who decides on the state of exception (Schmitt, 1996; Agamben, 1998). What Agamben calls 
‗the paradox of sovereignty‘ finds in the Bush strategy its paradigmatic configuration and one 
of its most extreme extensions. In the sense that if it is true that the sovereign is always the 
one who decides on the state of exception, previously cases of exception, at least as described 
by Agamben, where limited to a particular state (as in the Nazi case, for instance). The 
sovereign had the power to create the law and the limits of the law but of a law that was 
nevertheless valid only within that particular state. What we seem to be witnessing in these 
documents is an attempt to extend US power spatially (at a global level) and temporally 
(possibly ad infinitum). ‗The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of 
uncertain duration‘ (Bush, 2002: preamble, emphasis added). Thus, it will ‗end in a way, and 
at an hour, of our choosing‘ (Bush quoted in the NSS, 2006: iii).  
 
In actual fact, the sustainability of this type of imperial discourse/practices in the long run is 
put into question (and not only theoretically). According to Hardt and Negri, for instance, 
‗[t]he necessity of the network form of power (thus) makes moot the debates over 
unilateralism and multilateralism, since the network cannot be controlled from any single, 
unitary point of command‘ (2004: 61). In particular, as argued in Chapter 1, Hardt and Negri 
suggest that a US-centered global order is not sustainable because it goes against the interests 
of other powerful nation-states and elites, which will eventually unite ‗to leverage their 
support to prevent further unilateralism and constant war‘ (Hardt and Negri quoted in 
Woodard, 2004: 124). This is a plausible reasoning – albeit one that seems to overlook their 
insights about the normality of war; of war as a ‗form of rule‘ (see section 3.6 below). 
Considering that neoconservative biopolitical securitization processes did not help the 
development/maintenance of capitalists‘ interests in a straightforward sense,305 an 
investigation of how the ‗new aristocracy‘ positions itself in relation to US ‗multilateral 
unilateralism‘ is worthty of consideration. One of the main aims of this research is exactly to 
see how what some consider a supranational institution and which according to Hardt and 
Negri is part of this ‗new aristocracy‘, i.e., the EU challenges and/or reinforces the US 
strategy. Incidentally, it is also interesting to note in passing (this being a problem that cannot 
be answered in full here but a question which would be worth developing), that the newly 
elected President Barack Obama explicitly rejects unilateralism as a mode of governing. In 
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 Despite its long-term intentions and the fact that certain groups, especially those who manufacture 
military products (including multinational corporation and private military subcontractors), those who 
smuggle them, privatized militias, security agencies etc, have indeed benefited from current military 
operations, the short-term economic effects of military actions are far from coherent (Mann, 2005); 
contradictory, we might say (Wood, 2004: 163).  
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his book The Audacity of Hope, Obama suggests that the failures of the war on terror ‗aren‘t 
[sic] an argument for reducing our involvement in international organizations, nor are they an 
excuse for unilateralism‘ (2006: 320). And although the extent to which this change in 
rhetoric will be accompanied by radical changes in foreign policy is doubtful,
306
 it points to 
the difficulties of sustaining a unilateralist stance of the kind proposed by the Bush 
administration.    
 
Also unclear is the extent to which the US strategy based on war, security and violence can 
be explained simply in terms of a ‗thirst for resources‘ on the part of the US (Harvey, 2003: 
30; Wood, 2004). Although I tend to agree with those, like Harvey, who argue that oil was a 
major factor (again Harvey, 2003: 19; Wood, 2004: 165), a ‗thirst of resources‘ is clearly not 
enough to explain the war on terror, not even the war against Iraq. If ‗oil‘, in fact, was the 
main reason for war, it could, and indeed has been argued, that the US foreign policy was 
anachronistic and counterproductive. Anachronistic: because based on the idea that the oil 
industry could be controlled by one nation or by a confederation of states (the ‗coalition of 
the willing‘, perhaps?) through military means despite its being already internationalized 
(Bina, 2004; Kaldor, 2007: 94). Counterproductive: because it relied on the belief that USA‘s 
military capabilities were enough to establishing and sustaining a new American Empire, 
whereas, according to authors such as Mann and Kaldor, for instance, they are not (Mann, 
2005; Kaldor, 2007; see also Hardt and Negri, 2004; Wood, 2004: 165). In particular, Kaldor 
argues that ‗states engaged in neo-modern militarism are still under the illusion that they can 
win militarily‘. Yet, the presence of ‗new wars‘307 put into question the ‗utility of modern 
military force‘ (Kaldor, 2001: [n.p.]). In her book on human security, she further suggests 
that ‗by stressing the importance of oil, the anti-imperialists endorse the realist justification 
for unilateral action‘ (Kaldor, 2007: 94). For Kaldor, oil was not a major motive for war 
because, if it was, the US would have pursued other, more suitable strategies to obtain it 
(2007: 94). While Kaldor‘s points as described here have the unintentional meirit of making 
evident the distinction highlighted in Chapter 1 between capital and the state, pointing to the 
fact that the state can in fact act in ways which are counterproductive, her thesis is ultimately 
                                                             
306
 So far, the Obama administration has maintained a similar stance toward terrorism to that of the 
Bush administration. Thus, for instance, whilst Obama has drawdown the number of troops from Iraq 
(although his statements so far have not touched on the question of a permanent military presence), the 
war in Afghanistan continues and has actually intensified under his watch (Prashad, 2009). When 
asked about Iran, moreover, Obama said ‗all options are on the table‘ to deal with it (Colvin, 2009). 
This seems to confirm that as explained below, ‗multilateralism‘ is not inherently beyond unilateralism 
but can easily become part of a certain hegemonic agenda. 
307
 That are, wars as a manifestation of the erosion of the nation-state under the impact of globalization 
based on a mixture of violence and massive violations of human rights usually promoting nationalist or 
religious causes (Kaldor, 2001). 
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unpersuasive. It wrongly implies that we can simply simply draw a line or distinguish 
between ideas and practices whilst, as she herself points out in the same paragraph, ‗illusions‘ 
do play a part when it comes to foreign policy agendas. In undermining economic motives, 
morevoer, Kaldor‘s account ends up taking the US administration‘s ‗good intentions‘ at face 
value. 
 
Furthermore, that today‘s wars can be simply controlled by a restructuring of a ‗new‘ and 
‗extended‘ form of ‗protectionforce‘ based on humanitarian laws whose major task is the 
protection or security of individuals worldwide rather than national security (Kaldor, 2001; 
2007) seems improbable. Thus, for instance, forms of ‗protectionforce‘, including so-called 
‗safe havens‘ and ‗humanitarian corridors‘ (Kaldor, 2001) are explicitly refuted by the US 
administration that makes denying terrorists ‗safe havens‘ one of its priority308 (NSS, 2006). 
In turn, those ‗safe heavens‘ are in themselves rather questionable for they can be considered 
as ‗spaces of exception‘, in the same way as ‗refugees camps‘ are (Agamben, 1997), whose 
progression from zones of safety to zones of (in)security and violence is a very real 
possibility. After all, as Rahola suggests, ‗it is on the basis of an international in loco 
presence that it is possible to refuse or not permit refugees from other countries, avoiding the 
principle of non refoulement stipulated by the International Statute for refugees 1951‘ 
(Rahola, 2006: 42, note 3).
309
 According to Toscano, ‗despite the salutary reminder of the 
failure of the geopolitical imaginary when it is faced by non-state actors and criminal political 
economies‘ (2007c), Kaldor‘s and similar approaches fails to consider that American ‗grand 
strategy‘ is already framed in terms of global ‗biopolitical security‘ (see above). They also 
ignore the fact that ‗multilateralism – understood in terms of the coordination of dominant 
governments, corporations, international organizations and so-called civil society – is a very 
determinate product of Cold War and post-Cold War unipolarity, specifically in terms of 
―democracy promotion‖ as part of a certain hegemonic agenda‘ (Toscano, 2007c). In other 
words, as the analysis above reveals, ‗multilateralism‘ is not inherently beyond unilateralism 
but can be made to ideologically work in the name of a certain image of the world in which 
certain governments, organization etc. dominate while others do no (which, however, is not 
to the same as to say that debates over unilateralism and multilateralism are unimportant). 
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 As Elden notes, ‗the use of the term ―safe haven‖ is revealing here, as it parallels ideas of 
humanitarian safe spaces‘ (Elden, 2007: 826).  
309
 Simply put this means that if there is already an existing humanitarian aid programme located in 
their country of origin, such as so-called ‗safe havens‘ and/or ‗humanitarian corridors‘, refugees can be 
– and as a matter of fact have been – denied entry in other countries. As examples of this Rohola cites 
Kosovo, south Afghanistan, Sebrenica and North Iraq (Rahola, 2006: 48). There are other examples 
(see Fitzpatrick, 1996; Hathaway & Neve, 1997). 
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Incidentally, this brings us back to my former point about the war on terror being 
continuative as well as discontinuative of polices that preceded it. 
 
In ultimate analysis, to overstate the (military) power of the American ‗global (bio)security 
state‘ is misleading. First, it risks ignoring that, as contended in Chapter 1, the state and 
capital, although very difficult to dissociate, are not completely isomorphic. States also act 
following their own territorial and securitizing biopolitical logics. Second, it risks eliding the 
fact that, as Kaldor correctly emphases, American power might not be as effective as 
generally believed, not least because, according to her, military force is unsuitable to achieve 
political goals. Third, it ignores the ‗resolve‘ of people to resist (Gowan, 2002) – because, 
contrary to what President Bush, who constantly used the word in his speeches, seemed to 
think, ‗resolve‘ is not an exclusive quality of the American people. On the other hand, 
however, to underplay the US strategy and to simply read the war on terror as ‗regressive 
crystallization of the emergent global state‘ (Shaw, 2001: [n.p.]) and the war in Iraq as a coup 
d’état inside and against Empire (Hardt, 2004) is also problematic. Against critics who 
argued that Hardt and Negri‘s theory of the end of imperialism had been disproven by facts, 
Hardt attempted to explain the war on terror generally, and the war with Iraq specifically, in 
terms of regression; of ‗usurpation of power‘ within the existing ruling order (Hardt, 2004; 
see also Shaw, 2001). Although with some reservations, my analysis seems to confirm their 
critics‘ insights. The ‗global state‘ is also and most definitely an imperial one. In particular, 
what the analysis of these documents shows is that, although arguably with limited success, 
the US was trying to establish a ‗new international order‘. Establishing a ‗new type of 
imperial extra-territorial (bio)power‘ through a mix of aggressive (e.g., unilateral, pre-
emptive war) and ‗consensual‘ or hegemonic practices is clearly an implicit aim we find 
expressed in these documents. To this extent, the war on terror is best understood in terms of 
both regression in its more overt militarism and state-centrism and of continuation of 
neoliberal policies (Harvey, 2003; Brown, 2008).  
 
3.6 From Deterrence to Global Pre-Emptive War 
  
As noted briefly above, pre-emptive war is an important means through which the US 
attempted to affirm its ‗unilateral internationalism‘. To the extent that both the 2002 and 2006 
national security strategies explicitly include a pre-emptive war doctrine,
310
 it is worth 
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 It is worth noting, however, that the ‗Wolfowitz Doctrine‘ as formulated in the Defense Planning 
Guidance of 1992 already advocated preemptive attacks against foreign nations. As Bellamy Foster 
points out in relation to the 2002 National Security Strategy (but the same argument could easily be 
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looking more closely at this and how these documents frame pre-emption. What I will show 
here is that, in the aftermath of September 11, permanent global warfare in the name of 
security was becoming a new driving force of US ‗imperialism‘ – whether it still is, I believe, 
is something that merits careful discussion; unfortunately, for obvious reasons, it cannot be 
discussed here. I furthermore discuss the implications of this for an understanding of 
international law, and in particular of article 51 of the UN Charter, which clearly sets that 
states cannot use pre-emptive force except in cases of an imminent attack.     
 
As previously noted, if compared to the 2002 document, the 2006 NSS seems to place a 
somewhat greater emphasis on working with allies and declares diplomacy to be its ‗strong 
preference‘ in tackling the threat of weapons of mass destruction (2006: 23). Yet, this 
penchant is not followed through. In section V, ‗Prevent Our Enemies from threatening Us, 
Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction‘, the 2006 NSS states that a 
government has a duty to defend its citizens. And it adds that ‗even if uncertainty remains as 
to the time and place of the enemy‘s attack‘, ‗under long-standing principles of self 
defense‘,311 the United States will take unilateral action to defend itself because ‗anticipatory 
action‘ or ‗the logic of pre-emption‘ is better than ‗the risk of inaction‘ (2002: 15; 2006: 23). 
The idea of ‗pre-emptive war‘ is here justified by an appeal to an ‗inherent right of self-
defense‘, which is directly borrowed from Article 51 of the UN Charter. Article 51 stipulates 
that nothing ‗shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations‘.312 The NSS embraces such a 
concept but with two additional considerations. The first is that anticipatory self-defence be 
made against a hypothetical threat or a danger as opposed to an actual attack. The second, a 
consequence of the first, is that the logic of pre-emption is not limited but unlimited in 
application and duration because if ‗they‘ can strike anywhere and at anytime, then ‗the US‘ 
                                                                                                                                                                              
extended to the 2006 NSS), the formulation of it (them) is (are) arguably modelled after that defence 
paper (Foster, 2006).  
311
 It was the then United States Secretary George Shultz during the Regan administration who first 
argued for the use of force against terrorists in other nations and ‗states that support, train and harbor 
terrorists or guerrillas‘ (Shultz, 1986: 206). This question, about which there was, and still is, 
disagreement in international law, regarding whether states may respond with force if they are 
subjected to a terrorist attack originating within the borders of another state, was brought back to the 
fore after September 11. For a legalist analysis of this issue, see Ulfstein (2003); Garwood-Gowers 
(2004); Cassese (2001) among others. 
312
 In full, UN Charter Article 51 states: ‗Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in 
order to maintain or restore international peace and security‘. The UN Charter can be found at 
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml> 
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must be able to project its military power anywhere and at anytime. As stated in the 2002 
document, ‗[w]e must adopt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities of today‘s 
adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means‘. 
Thus, it is argued that ‗[t]o prevent or forestall such hostile acts by our adversaries, the 
United States will, if necessary, act preemptively‘ (NSS, 2002: 15).313 According to both 
documents, in fact, terrorists are always potentially ready to strike – an imminent threat. 
Consequently, the only way that the US administration thinks it can maintain peace and 
security is to prevent ‗them‘ from attacking ‗us‘. ‗In the new world we have entered‘, Bush 
tells us, ‗the only path to peace and security is the path of action‘ (Bush, NSS 2002: 
preamble). 
 
But what are the consequences of conceptualizing the ‗new world‘ as constantly in a state of 
threat? According to Cooper, this understanding sets ‗a radically new formulation of law that 
found the legitimate use of violence on ―our‖ collective apprehension of the future, however 
uncertain, rather than the predictive calculus of risk‘ (Cooper, 2006: 14).314 A use of law that 
undermines the main principle of the UN Charter that sets that states are not legitimated to 
use pre-emptive force except in cases where there are clear warnings or visible evidence of an 
imminent attack, allowing the United States to exempt itself from the (international) 
framework of law, while demanding compliance by others. Paraphrazing Zolo, the principle 
of self-defence was intended as an exception to the more general role sets out in the Charter 
that qualifies as aggression the ‗threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state‘ independently of any possible justa causa (Zolo, 2006: 
97; Article II(4); also O‘Connell, 2002: 4).315 In Agamben‘s words, which, nevertheless, it is 
fair to note, are here applied to international law in a way that would seem to contradict 
Agamben‘s conception of the state of exception as founded on a ‗non-relation‘ to national 
                                                             
313
 Again it is interesting to note that the idea that perceived dangers have to be eliminated at their 
roots, before they materialized was first proposed by Kagan and Kristol in 2000 (2003: 12). This 
approach is based on the belief that the conditions of danger ‗may be significantly ameliorated through 
the vigorous application of American power and ideals‘ (Kagan and Kristol, 2003: 65). 
314
 Cooper‘s focus is on the official US defence doctrine as delineated in a number of discourses and 
practices, in which, Cooper shows, the logic of securitization goes even a step further. She argues that 
what is being articulated there ‗is a profoundly new strategic agenda where war is no longer waged in 
the defence of the state (the Schmittian philosophy of sovereign war) or even human life (humanitarian 
warfare; the human as bare life, according to Agamben) but in the name of life in its biospheric 
dimension, incorporating meteorology, epidemiology and the evolution of all forms of life, from the 
microbe upwards‘ (Cooper 2006: 17-8). I think Cooper is essentially right. My only reservation is with 
her choice of adverbs. I think that the idea that this new US strategic agenda is no longer waged in the 
defence of the state and human life but of life in its biospheric dimension is too strong. In other words, 
I do not believe it is necessarily a problems of choosing between these two options because actually 
from the point of view of the US all these options were on the table.  
315
 For a critical but opposing views on this issue see, for instance, Benhabib, 2002; Falk and Krieger, 
2002.  
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law, the exception becomes the rule. As Agamben says, ‗[t]he normative aspect of law can 
thus be obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental violence that—while 
ignoring international law externally and producing a permanent state of exception 
internally—nevertheless still claims to be applying the law (2005a: 87). Most legal scholars 
in fact would agree that even when a state has suffered an ‗armed attack‘ triggering its right 
of self-defence, it is not given carte blanche to respond with whatever degree of force it 
wishes. Governing the right of self-defence are the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality (Garwood-Gowers, 2004: 6; see also O‘Connell, 2002: 4; again Cooper, 2006: 
13). Instead, the doctrine of pre-emptive warfare ‗assumes that the only way to survive the 
future is to become immersed into its conditions of emergence, to the point of actualizing it 
ourselves‘ (Cooper, 2006: 14). Because, as the 2006 document confirms, ‗we cannot afford to 
stand idly by as grave dangers materialize‘ (NSS, 2006: 23). According to the US 
administration, peace and security can only be achieved through acting preemptly if 
necessary. In other words, without war there can be no peace and no security (the two are 
coupled as if they were one and the same). War, in Hardt and Negri‘s words, ‗becomes the 
general matrix for all relations of power and techniques of domination, whether or not 
bloodshed is involved. War has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed 
not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life‘ 
(Hardt and Negri, 2004: 13). To paraphrase Schmitt, ‗permanent global warfare‘ is, or, at 
least, seems to have become, the ‗new‘ matrix of the nomos (also Agamben, 2005a: 2, 87; 
Hardt and Negri, 2004). This is not to suggest that all of today‘s conflicts are the result of, or 
related to, the war on terror or to be understood in terms of ‗global civil war‘ (for a critique of 
this see Chapter 1). It means that the war on terror risks making ‗the condition of war‘ 
permanent and to expand the logic of exception beyond the state.  
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CHAPTER 4 
EU (Bio)Securitization Answer to the war on terror 
   
 
The extent to which security has become a paradigm of governing and how this affects the 
European Union is not often taken into consideration in debates about the ESS, the first 
European security strategy to date. As we have seen, expectations concerning the role of 
Europe as counter-hegemonic or multilateral power seem to underline current (policy) 
analysis of the European Union generally and, as we shall see, of the ESS specifically which, 
when considering the US NSS in relation to the former, tends to focus on differences between 
the two while downplaying their similarities.
316
 I, on the contrary, will make evident 
differences and similarities between the two documents analysed above and the ESS, posing 
particular attention to the way in which the EU frames the question of security at the same 
time as it is itself framed by it. Here we have the first European security strategy to date 
whose ‗architectural‘ configuration seems far from being a new type of power as outlined, for 
instance, by Balibar.
317
 One of the aims of the chapter is to show how exactly the EU as a 
structure of power is being constructed through the discourse of security – this discourse is, 
of course, only one of the many discourses through which the EU is being constituted but one 
that is increasingly dominant. It is also to demonstrate how this construction challenges 
and/or reinforces relations of domination at the macro-geopolitical level and at the level of 
subjectivities.  
 
In this chapter, I will trace how the idea of Europe as ‗vanishing mediator‘ as analysed in 
chapter 1 places itself when confronted with that given in the ESS – a strategy, which, as we 
have seen, according to most authors already represents an alternative security framework to 
the US NSS. The chapter will ask: does the ESS represent the EU as a ‗new type of power‘? 
Does it really represent a security alternative to US NSSs? To what extent and how 
specifically does EU‘s security framework differ from that offered in the US NSSs? Through 
a close exegesis of the ESS, the chapter will demonstrate that in the post-9/11 context far 
from being constructed as a ‗new type of power‘ (Balibar, 2003a; 2003b, 2004a) or from 
providing a security alternative to the US NSSs, in the ESS, Europe is being framed not very 
dissimilarly from how the US is framed in the NSSs. That is to say, it is being framed through 
a model of (bio)power that has as its stated goal the protection of peoples – peoples that in 
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  See, for instance, Biscop, 2005, Bailes, 2005, Glasius and Kaldor, 2005.  
317
 Note that Balibar himself would in all probability argue that the ESS is not representative of the 
type of model of Europe he had in mind. Nevertheless, the ESS offers a good case study to be 
compared to Balibar‘s model. As the first security strategy to date, it explicitly tells us how the EU 
intends to address global and regional security challenges. 
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becoming the object of (bio)power are concurrently politicized and depoliticized
318
 – and 
whose specific securitization action extends to all those instances that could put their ‗life‘ at 
risk, first and foremost terrorism. The chapter is divided in three main sections. 
 
In section 4.1, I will argue that the framing of Europe in terms of global security actor with 
military and civilians capabilities must both be seen as an answer to the US and in terms of 
the EU‘s own objectives. It points to the persistence of a certain conception of the political as 
a sphere of sovereignty – something which Balibar would probably agree with but which is 
difficult to square with his understanding of Europe as ‗new type of power‘. Far from being 
constructed as ‗vanishing mediator‘, in the ESS, ‗Europe‘, or at least the EU, is presented as a 
unified global actor with specific objectives and a coherent, credible and effective foreign and 
security policy.   
 
In section 4.2, I will show that, as for the previous two but especially the 2006 NSS strategy, 
what one finds in the European document is an understanding of security as the vehicle 
through which social problems, including economic ones, are to be read, comprehended and 
ultimately tackled. Security is extended to cover every domains of ‗life‘ and becomes that 
through which Europe is to be governed. To this extent, I suggest there are no main 
differences between the NSSs of the United States and the Security Strategy of the European 
Union. Furthermore, I provide evidences of how, in accepting the logic of security, the EU 
also accepts and reaffirms the discursive premises of the war on terror and the state of 
exception on which the war on terror is ultimately based. 
 
Finally, in section 4.3, I will discuss what I believe can be counted as the main difference 
between these strategies, that is, their conceptualizations of terrorism. I argue, however, that 
in spite of the different conceptualization of it, or perhaps because of it, far from representing 
a radical break with US foreign policy as suggested by some commentators, the ESS political 
rationality or Polizeiwissenschaft cannot be set apart from that of pre-emptive warfare of the 
NSSs as analysed in my previous chapter. As for the previous sections, I will draw on themes 
developed in Chapter 1 to argue my case.   
 
4.1 The Persistence of a Certain Conception of the Political 
 
Far from constituting a ‗vanishing mediator‘, the construction of Europe as structure of power 
in the ESS takes a very specific path. In the ESS, Europe is presented a global (security) actor 
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  As opposed to post-politics (see Žižek‘s discussion of biopolitics in Welcome to the Desert of the 
Real, 2003), which seems to imply that biopolitics is non-political, I think this type of politics is best 
characterized as concurrently politicizing and depoliticizing politics; a politics that relies on specific 
forms of politicization to depoliticize its ‗objects‘ (or ‗objectified subjects‘).  
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and differences between members states are implicitly played down. Europe is presented as a 
bounded entity – we might says as ‗state-like‘ – and as an entity whose boundaries are very 
much already decided. This points to a certain conception of the political as a sphere of the 
Sovereign‘s sovereignty (as opposed to the ‗sovereignty of the people‘).   
 
Like the NSSs, the ESS, ‗A Secure Europe in a Better World‘, refers to the ‗post Cold War 
environment‘ as an increasingly complex one; a time of both opportunities and dangers for 
which ‗the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked‘ (2003: 2; 1 – 
more on the dissolution between internal and external security in section 4.3). To this extent, 
there are no main differences in how these strategies configure today‘s situation, the 
depiction of which relies in both cases on the presupposition of American (military) 
dominance and on the idea that we are in the presence of new global security threats. In the 
language of the 2002 NSS, ‗[t]he United States possesses unprecedented—and unequalled—
strength and influence in the world‘ and enjoys ‗a position of unparalleled military strength 
and great economic and political influence‘ (2001: 1). In the words of the ESS, the end of the 
Cold War has ‗left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor‘ (2003: 1)319 
(with the word ‗military‘ qualifying in what sense the United States is to be seen as a 
dominant actor). References to so-called new threats, especially and foremost terrorism 
abound in both documents. However, it is interesting to note that after acknowledging the 
military importance of the US, the strategy goes on to say that ‗no single country is able to 
tackle today‘s complex problems on its own‘ (2003: 1; 13). Only by ‗acting together the 
European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world‘ 
(2003: 13) – other countries are mentioned only in passing in the strategy.320 In the European 
strategy, the US is portrayed as a very important global player but so is the EU. The EU is 
depicted as a global (securitization) actor whose contribution to both ‗dealing with the 
threats‘ and ‗in helping realise today‘s opportunities is indispensible‘ (2003: 14).   
 
In the first line of ESS, we find stated, ‗[a]s a union of 25 states with over 450 million people 
producing a quarter of the world‘s Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of 
instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player‘ (2003: 1) – with 
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 In the first draft of the document, this sentence appeared to complement the above: ‗no other 
country or group of countries comes close to its capability‘. This has been removed from the official 
final draft. The provisional draft come be found at Statewatch.  
320
 In particular, the strategy mentions in passing Japan, China, Canada, India and ‗all those who share 
our goals and values‘ as potential strategic partners and Russia as ‗an existing international partner‘ 
(2003: 14, 8). The ESS also talks about the need for engaging more intensively with Mediterranean 
states and for providing cooperative contributions for solving the Israeli-Arab conflict. However, it 
does not specify what this ‗engaging‘ would entail. 
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the word inevitably reinforcing the idea that its global role is natural and necessary.321 The 
document continues by saying given the ‗increasing convergence of interests‘, ‗Europe 
should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better 
world‘ (2003: 1). In particular, the strategy claims that although ‗the European Union has 
made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis Management‘, if it is ‗to 
make a contribution that matches our potential‘, it needs ‗to be more active, more coherent 
and more capable‘ (2003: 11). The strategy refers to globalization as having increased ‗the 
scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs‘ and ‗European dependence – 
and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information 
and other fields‘ (2003: 2). However, it adds, ‗[e]ven in an era of globalization, geography is 
still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed‘ 
(2003: 7). Europe‘s task is ‗to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the 
European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean‘ and to develop a credible foreign 
and security policy that builds on previous successes – the document mentions the Balkans as 
the best illustration of European achievements (2003: 8). ‗Through our concerted efforts with 
the US, Russia, NATO and other international partners‘, it continues, ‗the stability of the 
region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict‘ (2003: 8).322 
 
The affirmation of Europe as a cohesive global (securitization) actor with a foreign and 
security policy based on both military and civilian capabilities is to be read both in terms of 
the US attempt to construct and enforce a global bio(security) state as analysed in Chapter 3 
and of Europe‘s own global hegemonic objectives. As argued in my methodology, it would be 
wrong and quite naive to see the ESS simply as an answer to the NSS of 2002. Not only has 
Europe economic and political interests in the Middle East – something which Balibar seems 
to underplay in his description of Europe as vanishing mediator but that others like Abraham 
emphases (in Chapter 1) – which might not necessarily go hand in hand with those of the US. 
In addition, debates among member states around issues of security and defence precede the 
war on terror and the drafting of the 2002 US NSS. Already in 1992, the Treaty of 
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 Interestingly Berenskoetter draws on this quotation to argue that the ESS assumes that the EU‘s 
‗―global player‖ status is defined through numbers not ideas‘ (Berenskoetter, 2005: 77). Berenskoetter 
says, ‗[d]espite an unspecified promise to ―promote its values‘‘‘ and ‗despite aims such as global 
poverty reduction, the ESS clearly lacks the missionary spirit found in the NSS‘ (76). He argues this to 
oppose Kagan‘s idea of the US as realist because ‗mired in history‘ and of the EU as based on 
idealism, thus, ‗beyond power‘ (Kagan, 2002: 11). However, what Berenskotter fails to take into 
account is that in reality both documents are based on a mixture of ‗realism‘ and ‗idealism‘, which 
incidentally raises the more philosophical question of whether realism and idealism can be neatly 
distinguished and opposed (see also my discussion of Kaldor in the previous chapter in relation to 
reasons for the Iraq war).  
322
 For a contrasting view, see Zolo, 2002, especially Chapter 5 ‗The consequences of the War‘. See 
also Balibar, 2004a. 
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Maastricht
323
 affirmed that the European Council ‗shall define the principles of and general 
guidelines for the common foreign and security policy‘ and in 1995, a first limited324 attempt 
to draft a distinctive European security strategy was undertaken within the framework of the 
Western European Union (WEU)
325
, which resulted in the Common Concept.
326
 Prior to that, 
it was the European Political Cooperation (EPC), introduced informally in 1970 in response 
to the Davignon report and formalized by the Single European Act with effect from 1987 that 
provided the basis for consultations between the Member States in foreign policy matters.
327
 
And although there was no distinctive security strategy for ‗Europe‘ (thus, the quasi-total 
consensual view on the European Community (EC), which was established in 1958, as 
‗civilian power‘328) at the time, what this shows is that the question of how the European 
Union as a cohesive entity should respond to ‗security threats‘ is one that European member 
states have been grappling with since the establishment of the WEU.
329
 As Bailes suggests, 
‗insofar as the political dictate of the day in the spring of 2003 was for the EU to orient itself 
vis-à-vis this US vision, and to achieve a united statement on points of agreement or 
                                                             
323
 The Maastricht Treaty (formally,  the Treaty on European Union (TEU)), which was signed in 
February 1, 1992 but came into force in November 1, 1993, established the European Union (EU), with 
EU citizenship granted to every person who was a citizen of a member state. It led to the creation of 
what is commonly referred to as EU‘s three ‗pillar‘ structure, the European Community (EC), the 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and  provided 
the blueprint for Europe‘s economic and monetary unification. The Treaty can be found at the 
European NAvigator http://www.ena.lu/. For a critique of the Treaty see, for instance, Bigo and Guild, 
2005; Balibar, 2004a. 
324
 The document limited itself to an assessment of EU‘s military capabilities and the identification of 
partners for cooperation and ultimately proved to be politically unfeasible ‗because of divisions 
between the Member States‘ (Biscop, 2004: 11).   
325
 The WEU was established in 1948 on the basis of the Treaty of Brussels of the same year, with the 
accession of West Germany and Italy in 1954 (see the The Paris Accords  and the related Modified 
Brussels Treaty) and later of Spain, Portugal and Greece. It was based on mutual defence commitments 
among its full members. In reality, as suggested by Bailes, it only ever managed to carry out some 
small-scale police and de-mining missions, although it also provided a coordination framework for 
European naval operations in the Persian Gulf in 1988–90 and in the Adriatic Sea in 1993 (Bailes, 
2005: 3, note 5). A brief historical account of the WEU can be found at the European NAvigator 
(ENA) http://www.ena.lu/. See also the WEU Internet site at URL http://www.weu.int.  
326
 For an analysis of the Common Concept, see Biscop, 2004: 12. 
327
 For analyses into the development of a European foreign policy from what can be broadly defined 
as a social constructivist approach see, for instance, Tonra and Christiansen (ed.) 2004; Bretherton and 
Vogler, 2005.   
328
 See, for instance, Duchêne, 1972. See also Manners and Whitman, 1998; Sjursen, 1998. For 
opposing views see Galtung, 1973; Bull, 1982. The former saw the emergence of the EC as a 
‗superpower in the making‘. The latter regarded the notion of civilian power as ‗a contradiction in 
terms‘. In particular, for Bull, the power of all so-called civilian actors, such as Europe, is always 
conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states (1982: 151). For a 
similar argument with an ‗American twist‘ see Kalgan, 2002. Kagan sees Europe as an actor whose 
(Kantian) power is conditional upon American military power. His position can be summarized in one 
sentence: ‗[...] Europe‘s rejection of power politics ultimately depends on America‘s willingness to use 
force around the world against those who still believe in power politics‘ (2002: [n. p.]).  
329
 For a more extensive account on the procedural antecedents of a common European security 
strategy, see Bailes, 2005: 6-8. See also Biscop, 2005.  
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difference with the USA, the NSS could certainly be seen as a major ―source‖ document for 
the ESS—and it was clearly uppermost in the minds of the original drafters‘. However, she 
adds, ‗some of the meaning of the ESS may be lost if it is not also analysed as an outgrowth 
of the EU‘s own doctrinal development and experience, and as a commentary on purely intra-
European debates over priorities and governance‘ (2005: 13). This, surely, is an important 
point. The ESS should  be read in terms of reinforcing and consolidating EU‘s global role in 
the current international system against accusations of irrelevance and weakness (see, for 
instance, Kagan, 2002; Ignatieff, 2008
330
 – see also the NSSs themselves which, as I 
suggested in Chapter 3, mention Europe only in passing). It also should be understood in 
terms of an effort on the part of European states to represent Europe as a cohesive entity, 
whose role in the war on terror is far from unimportant.  
 
This is not to say that the cohesiveness of Europe in matters concerning security and foreign 
affairs is assured. Just the opposite is true. There continues to be substantial national divisions 
within the EU on how to deal with problems of security and international crises. The 
Georgia-Russia conflict of August 2008, as an example that goes beyond the war on terror 
and which incidentally, according to some, raises questions about the feasibility of framing 
today‘s environment as ‗post-Cold War environment‘331, seems a case in point.332 
Depending on the government of the day, moreover, individual member states have tended to 
take somewhat different approaches to the war on terror and so-called security problems, with 
countries at times going far beyond the directives provided by the EU (see Neve et al, 2006). 
Neve et al give as an example UK policies on preemptive detention – although, interestingly, 
according to Statewatch (2005), ‗what is happening in the UK is indicative of other, wider, 
developments‘.333 But the argument could easily be extended, for instance, to Italian polices 
on immigration, such as  the fingerprinting of Roma – or Gypsy – people  (initially applied 
                                                             
330In the ‗The Transatlantic Culture of Freedom‘, Ignatieff argues that European economic and cultural 
power is offset by strategic weakness (2008: 4).  
331
 See, for instance, Kaldor, 2005. Kaldor, quite rightly in my view, extends this line of thinking to 
include ‗the war on terror‘. And even though her account of the Cold War as ‗imaginary‘ and the war 
on terror as ‗real‘ is misleading –  during the Cold War there were plenty of ‗proxy‘ wars – her 
characterization of the logic driving US‘s foreign policy as, in part at least, informed by Cold War 
thinking seems correct (see also Stokes, 2003; Chomsky, 2003).  
332
 See, for instance, Poland‘s, but also Britain‘s, calls for a tougher stance against Moscow as opposed 
to the more ‗muted‘ response, initially at least, on the part of other European countries such as 
Germany, France, but also Italy. One explanation for this is EU‘s dependency on Russian energy 
(Stobart and Rotella, 2008; see also the NSS itself: 3). But this clearly is not all there is to it. Other 
reasons for EU‘s divisions have to be found in the different historical trajectories of these countries and 
their different outlook on NATO-Europe partnership.    
333
 See the Statewatch report, 2005. See also Paye, 2004. According to Paye, an important feature of 
recent anti-terrorist laws is ‗that, contrary to previous legislations, they do not longer stem from 
relatively autonomous national initiatives, but are being put forward by international bodies such as the 
G8, the European Council, or the European Union‘ (2004: [n.p.]).  
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also to children)
334
 and the implementation of the policy of ‗respingimenti‘ (or deportation of 
asylum seekers back to Libya before they reach the Italian coast).
335
 What this shows is that, 
as de Goede suggests, Europe as a union of countries is not easily reducible to practices of the 
European Union (de Goede, 2008) and that there continues to be divisions within the Union 
on how to deal with defence and security problems (see also Callinicos, 2010). Nevertheless, 
despite disagreements among member states about how to deal with defence and certain 
‗security‘ issues, all of them seem in agreement about the necessity of a common European 
security strategy as the drafting of the ESS demonstrates. The ESS is the first common 
European security strategy to date, which is of significance in itself, and one of first EU texts 
to be threat-driven (more on this in section 4.2). The ESS even talks of ‗unity of command‘ 
(2003: 12) – an expression which seems to resonate with the proposal by some member states 
in 2003, in particular France and Germany, to create an independent EU military planning 
cell and headquarters (see Chapter 1). In the ESS, moreover, the EU/NATO relationship is 
not prominent. The ESS speaks fondly of NATO – it is mentioned four times in total, very 
briefly three times and somewhat less sketchily toward the end when the question of building 
a ‗more capable Europe‘ arises. In particular, in the strategy NATO is depicted as an 
important expression of the transatlantic relationship (2003: 9) – which, as Biscop suggests, 
implies that it is not the sole one (Biscop, 2004 : 22). As such, it can help ‗enhance the 
operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership 
between the two organizations in crisis management‘ (12). This seems to corroborate my 
thesis that the ESS is to be read both in terms of the US NSSs and of Europe‘s own 
hegemonic objectives and desire to delineate its own modes of operation in relation to 
security and defence. Moreover, in presenting Europe as a bounded political entity for which 
‗geography is important‘, the ESS performs an essential (i.e., essential from the point of view 
of its drafters) task. It constructs the EU as an entity endowed with power seeking to advance 
its own interests
336
 and to make itself secure from external threats. In the words of the ESS, 
‗[t]he increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity 
of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor‘ (2003: 1).  
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 Note that these practices were exacerbated by the Berlusconi government but they did not actually 
start with it. An emergency decree to facilitate expulsions was passed by the previous Romano Prodi‘s 
government in November 1, 2007. (Decreto Legge, no 181). It is also interesting to note that although 
initially condemned by the European Union (la Repubblica, 2008; see also the Directive 2004/58/EC 
of the European Parliament and the Council on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States), the practice of 
fingerprinting were later approved by the EU (see again la Repubblica, 2008). For an analysis, see Dal 
Lago, 2008. 
335
 Again see Dal Lago (2009) for an analysis. He calls the practices of ‗respengimenti‘, practices of 
‗preventive deportation‘ for which the role of the police is central.   
336
 The strategy uses the words interest(s) 8 times in total.  
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The idea of a coherent, effective and credible ‗European‘ foreign and security policy based on 
both military and civilians capabilities unquestionably, reminds to a state-like structure of 
power.
337
 As Allen and Smith suggest, it would be difficult to conceive of Europe as an entity 
properly endowed with military capabilities with no central political authority (Allen and 
Smith in Rhodes, 1998: 46). On the other hand, there is a sense in which civilians capabilities 
themselves cannot be understood outside of the state-form, especially when framed in terms 
of ‗police‘ and ‗border police officers‘ (see the ESS, 2003; see also the Ministerial 
Declaration on Civilian Capabilities, 2005). Now, what this means is not that the EU is 
simply the same as a state. As argued in Chapter 1, Europe is clearly not a state in the 
traditional or Weberian understanding, nor is it a state in the Schmittian sense of it. At 
present, not only it lacks the monopoly over the means of violence, which remains in the 
hands of the EU member states and it clearly has no say over the final decision. But, again as 
we have seen in Chapter 1, according to Balibar, the EU also undercuts traditional territorial 
sovereignty and, for him, ‗the very possibility of representing the border‘ (also Mezzadra and 
Neilson, 2008; Bigo, 1998). Nevertheless, the framing of Europe as a bounded entity,
338
 
whose primary role is the securitization of the European people (of which more will be said 
in the sections that follow), is telling. It points to the persistence of a certain conception of the 
political as a sphere of sovereignty, which is understood here in the negative sense of term, as 
a sphere in which peoples only count to the extent that they can be included in it, where the 
decision to be included or excluded is dependent on a ‗sovereign-type‘ decision. To this 
extent and in this specific respect, as opposed to contribute to a radical reshaping of world 
politics – something which Balibar would very much welcome – Europe appears to be 
shaped, at the same time as it helps maintain, the existing structure of power.  
 
4.2 Biopolitical Security ‘Reloaded’ 
 
As mentioned in section 4.1, according to most authors, the ESS offers an alternative 
approach to security than that given in the 2002 US NSS
339
. Even though in its infancy, 
authors such as Biscop, Bailes but also Kaldor et al, see the ESS as providing exactly the 
model of security that is needed today. This is questionable. As we shall see in section 4.3, 
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 On this, see also Boedeltje and van Houtum‘s discussion of the European Neighborhood Policy 
(ENP), 2008. For a contrasting view, see Manners, 2002.    
338
 The ESS mentions enlargement. It says ‗[e]nlargement should not create new dividing lines in 
Europe‘ (2003: 7). However, not only it mentions it only in passing but enlargement itself suggests a 
fixed, if not permanent boundary.  
339
 I analyse this also in light of the 2006 US NSS, which, it is fair to say, was not available to many of 
these authors at the time when their comparative analyses were carried out.   
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the ESS and NSSs depart from each other in some respects. However, in these authors there 
is a tendency to overestimate differences between these strategies while downplaying their 
similarities and the extent to which a certain vision of security as biopolitical security de 
facto provides the rationale for the war on terror.   
  
Biscop suggests that the ESS offers ‗a reference framework for day-to-day policy-making [...] 
and it guides the definition of the means – i.e. the civilian and military capabilities – that need 
to be developed‘ in order to tackle the security challenges of our times (Biscop, 2007: 1: 152; 
2006: 1; see also Kaldor et al, 2007). In particular, authors such as Biscop, see the ESS as 
providing a different model of security than that given in the US NSS of 2002. Although they 
recognize that in their enunciation of threats the EU and the 2002 US NSS are similar, they 
emphasize differences in severity and framing of threats (Berenskoetter, 2005) and in the way 
in which these documents respond to them as a sign of Europe‘s increase distinctiveness and 
awareness of the importance of its own-shared values and objectives. More specifically, it is 
the general reference to ‗the rule of law‘ (and in particular to the UN Charter), ‗human 
rights‘, ‗fundamental freedoms‘ and ‗effective multilateralism‘ that is perceived by them as 
providing a different and it is fair to add better, solution to the security problems of our times. 
These authors see the ESS as providing an alternative strategic framework to the US NSS; 
although not one necessarily and wholly incompatible with (again see, Bailes, 2005; Biscop, 
2004, 2007; see also Faust and Messner, 2004; Berenskoetter, 2005). The ESS, they argue, 
reflects a move away from securitization understood in militaristic terms toward a more 
holistic or comprehensive approach to security (Biscop, 2005; Bailes, 2005; Berenskoetter, 
2005).  
 
This emphasis on differences is in part probably due to the vagueness of the European 
document itself, which is the result of a compromise between the various member states, 
whose consensus on certain issues, as the examples given above demonstrate, is not given 
(see also Geoffrey, 2006; see also Leonard and Gowan, 2004
340
). However, it could also be 
attributed to an unwillingness on the part of these authors to acknowledge the extent to which 
a certain vision of security – i.e., ‗human‘ or biopolitical security – is common to both the 
2002 US NSS and the ESS and in fact comes to sustain the war on terror. Like in the NSSs, in 
the ESS, security is extended to cover almost every aspects of ‗life‘, from more traditional 
security problems, such as regional conflicts, to poverty and terrorism. The ESS states, ‗[t]he 
post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and 
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 Although, according to Leonard and Gowan, in the end it may be exactly Europe‘s common 
strategic and diplomatic positions that may become grounds for consensus (2004: 7). 
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external aspects of security are indissolubly linked‘. In particular, the strategy argues, 
‗[f]lows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy 
have brought freedom and prosperity to many people‘ but have also increased ‗European 
dependence – and so vulnerability – on an  interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, 
information and other fields‘ (2003: 2). It further suggests that today‘s threats are ‗greater 
than we have known‘ (2003: 6). This is why, it is disputed, it is important not to ignore them 
and for Europe to take an active role in defending ‗its security‘ and promoting ‗its values‘ 
(2003: 6). In the ESS, moreover, security is understood as ‗the precondition of development‘ 
– where ‗development‘ is intended mainly in economic terms (as both the preceding 
paragraph and the one that follows make clear) – and as that which creates the conditions for 
a better world (as given in the title to the document). ‗Conflict‘, the ESS continues, ‗not only 
destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters 
investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and 
regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty‘ (2003: 2). The imperative, 
therefore, becomes that of defending society (Europe in particular) from external (above all 
from terrorism and WMD
341
 but also from state failure and organized crime
342
) and internal 
threats, terrorism in particular (more on terrorism as internal threat in section 4.3), through a 
number of instruments as outlined in section 4.1. The ESS also includes in its list of 
‗challenges‘343 systemic problems, such as ‗poverty‘, ‗AIDS‘344 and other ‗new‘ unspecified 
‗diseases‘ (2003: 2).  
 
As hinted above, it is precisely this understanding of security that is perceived by some as 
moving away from the idea of it given in the 2002 NSS. The expansion of security to other 
domains is seen by authors such as Biscop and Kaldor as challenging a state-centric model of 
security and as conforming to a model that takes as its object not the state but individuals, is 
based on human rights, and is ultimately more inclusive. What, however, these authors fail to 
recognize is that firstly, as argued in Chapter 1, the blurring of internal and external security 
is not unproblematic as, in turn, it leads to a blurring of the distinction between police 
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 To note that in the first draft of the document, WMD was defined as ‗the single most important‘ 
threat for which deterrence would fail if in the hands of ‗small groups‘ (quoted in Quille, 2004: 424). 
The ESS now describes WMD as ‗potentially the greatest threat to our security‘ (2003: 3). 
342
 These elements – WMD, state failure and organized crime – are all unsurprisingly directly linked to 
terrorism in the strategy.  
343
 It is interesting to note the use of the word ‗challenges‘ to distinguish between ‗challenges‘ and 
what the ESS perceives as ‗threats‘. The title to that paragraph is: ‗the Security Environment: Global 
Challenges and Key Threats‘. Also noteworthy is the fact that despite this apparent distinction there is 
in reality a substantial conflation of the two in their being understood in terms of prevention and liked 
to questions of security.  
344
 For an analysis of the issue, see Elbe, 2005b.  
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actions and war (see Balibar, 2003, 2006; also Bigo, 2005). As Bigo says, ‗it makes obsolete 
the conventional distinction between one constellation of war, defense, international order 
and strategy, and another constellation of crime, internal security, public order and police 
investigations‘. It leads to what he calls a ‗field of in-security‘, which is ultimately ‗neither 
reducible to the national political field, nor to a level between two nations, or even to the 
European level‘ (Bigo, 2008: 28) – a point which is central to my own understanding of the 
EU as part of a ‗global (bio)security state‘. Secondly,  they ignore the fact that is on the basis 
of similar justifications than those given in the NSS(s) that the EU defends its need for a 
European Security Strategy – where the object of security shifts from the American people to 
Europeans but does not exclude what I have called in my previous chapter a ‗global people‘. 
Even though the ESS does not refer to a ‗global people‘ specifically, it clearly is not solely 
directed to Europeans. In the ESS, references to the strategy‘s global dimension abound. The 
ESS explicit said scope is that of protecting citizens living in European countries first and 
foremost. But it also sees and identifies Europe as most definitely capable of making ‗an 
impact on a global scale‘, as the ESS itself argues in its conclusive paragraph (2003: 14). 
Thirdly, these scholars underplay the extent to which ‗human‘ or ‗biopolitical security‘ is in 
reality common to all three documents and especially to the ESS and the 2006 NSS, which 
incidentally raises the question about the effects of European ideas on conceptions of security 
and the configuration of the US NSS of 2006. Could not some of the changes in emphasis 
between conceptualizations of security offered in the American national security strategies of 
2002 and 2006 (see Chapter 3) be seen in terms of an attempt on the part of the US to offer a 
more ‗Europeanized‘ version of it? This slight but nevertheless noticeable shift in emphasis 
between the 2002 and 2006 NSSs could arguably be understood as an attempt on the part of 
the Bush administration to offer a vision of security that was even more in line with 
conceptions of ‗human security‘ as outlined in Chapter 1. Although, ultimately, there is no 
way of knowing for sure (at least on the basis of evidences gathered here alone), what is clear 
is that there is a shift to a certain vision of security at both US national and European levels345 
and that ‗European‘ ideals as understood here are to an extent functional to US and EU‘s 
configurations of themselves as securitization entities.  
 
More precisely, what the analysis of these documents has made evident is that a certain 
understanding of security is essential to the construction of US self-image as a ‗global 
(bio)security state‘ as well as to Europe‘s self-representation as a ‗global bio-securitization 
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 A shift that in line with authors such as Agamben (2004), Huysmans (2006), Bigo and Guild 
(2005), Reid (2007), Aradau, (2004) and Buzan, (2006), I argue has not started with ‗the war on terror‘ 
but has patently accelerated because of it.  
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actor‘. Biopolitical security is that which makes both the US and Europe in its self-
representation in the ESS appear as the guarantors of people‘s security in the war on terror. 
As analysed in Chapter 3, the construction of a global people and of global threats provided 
the US administration with the rationale to act on populations globally. It was in the name of 
securing people globally that the US waged a war against terrorism whose scope of action 
seems unlimited. But security and terrorism are also central to Europe‘s self-representation. It 
is on the basis of similar conceptions of security than those employed in the 2002 NSS that 
the ESS is able to presents itself as a powerful, global actor. Apart from ‗global warming‘, 
which is however mentioned only in passing in the strategy,
346
 and the addition of organized 
crime,
347
 there is not much difference in how these documents conceptualize security. In the 
same way as the extension of security to other domains was an integral part of the 
construction of the US as a ‗global (bio)security state‘, so is the presentation of problems 
(military, environmental, health, terrorism and WMD etc.) as security threats for the EU. It is 
by presenting problems as global threats that the EU establishes itself as an active global 
player, whose role is indispensable. By reproducing the idea of security as mechanism of 
biopower, the ESS does less to challenge the US attempt to enforce a ‗global (bio)security 
state‘ than to reproduce its logic(s). As opposed to moving away from it, the idea of 
comprehensive security or ‗human security‘ seems to reinforce the ideological premises and 
the mechanisms of biopower and exceptions on which the war on terror is based. Human or 
biopolitical security is that which ultimately creates the conditions for the implementation of 
securitization preventive policies in the context of the generalization of (the state of) 
exceptions. By adopting this idea of security, the EU, although with some hesitations
348
, 
includes itself, i.e., it becomes an active participant of new imperial political (dis)order (Joxe, 
2002), in its representation of itself as global actor whose main function is the protection and 
securitization of people.  
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 Global warming is mentioned parenthetically twice in the strategy (2003: 3; 10); once in relation to 
‗effective multilateralism‘ and to ‗competition for natural resources – notably water‘; competition 
which, according to the document, ‗is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in 
various regions‘ (2003: 3). The document recognizes the link between global warming, competition 
and migration but completely fails to engage with it. Also unclear from the framing of the question is 
the extent to which the ESS considers ‗migratory movements‘ to be a challenge or a threat as there is 
no further clarifications of this in the document; although the explicit association of migration with 
turbulence (a word with clear negative connotations) and security does seem to substantiate the latter 
option.    
347
 Interestingly, however, ‗organized crime‘ is mentioned in the NSS of 2006, which seems to confirm 
a certain ‗European‘ influence.  
348
 Here differences between how states have dealt/deal with the question of terrorism and security in 
general are arguably important.   
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In line with Zagato, it can be argued that within the European juridical framework, those 
results that cannot be achieved through the direct use of the state of exception ‗can in part be 
obtained through the transformation of security into strategic objective‘ (Zagato, 2007: 
296
349
). In the ESS, sovereignty is not simply redefined from the state to ‗international 
community‘ (see the ESS) but, as it was in the NSSs, ‗sovereign‘ power is supplemented by 
specific biopolitical forms of power or securitazing forms of power whose dissemination is 
dependent on both juridical and non-juridical instruments. Both the example offered by 
Zagato, i.e., immigration policy (Zagato, 2007; Bigo, 2005), and counter-terrorism policy, 
such as practices of extraditions, financial surveillance, data retention, borders policing and 
asset freezing enabled by ‗mutual legal assistance with the USA‘ (ESS, 2003: 6; see also the 
EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005) are cases in point – with the two polices [immigration 
and counter-terrorism polices] actually overlapping in some important respects.
350
 What this 
suggests is that, although by no means the same, European and American modes of governing 
rely on similar mechanisms of power to control and regulate spaces, states, and persons 
judged as dangers and threats to security.  
 
Indeed, as de Goede suggests, it is plausible to suggest, that ‗a collapse between Europe and 
the US as distinct entities of governing is effected through anti-terror measures‘ (de Goede, 
2008: 163; see also Paye, 2007). This is particularly evident when it comes to policies such 
as, asset freezing, transfer of passengers data (PNR) and extradition – an extradition 
agreement between the EU and the US was signed on 6 June 2003
351
 – of which de Goede 
speaks, which effectively subject all European citizens to the laws and exceptional measures 
of the US(A). In particular, according to Paye, extraditions accords ‗insert European citizens 
into the American system of exceptions to the law. They reveal a true imperial structure in 
which the US executive has the right to determine the exception and make it the basis of a 
                                                             
349
 Zagato also speaks of both of ‗indirect‘ and ‗direct‘ use of the state of exception and seems to 
further distinguishing from a securitization move on the part of Europe. However, in my view, this 
distinction in relation to Europe and in the aforementioned context is confusing. There is no clear 
distinction between the ‗transformation of security into strategic objective‘ and ‗the indirect use of 
state of exception‘. The transformation of security into strategic objective is precisely that which 
enables an indirect use of the (state of) exception on the part of the EU.  
350
 See also the Declaration on Combating Terrorism (2004). The Declaration states ‗[i]mproved 
border controls and document security play an important role in combating terrorism‘ (2004: 7). 
But  borders policing and the use of intensive technologies of biometrics and shared databases are also 
use to manage, control and deter ‗illegal‘ immigrants. When it comes to agencies, such as, the 
European Borders Agency (Frontex) and databases, such as, the Schengen Information System 
(SISI/SISII), and the Visa Information System (VIS) the same pattern applies. For a critical analysis of 
these databases, see Bigo and Guild 2005; Broeders 2007.  
351
 As Paye says, within the context of extradition accords, any resident of a member state of the 
European Union suspected of terrorism could be handed over to American authorities and subjected to 
their arbitrary decisions.  
 161 
 
new legal order‘ (Paye, 2007: [n.p.]). But it also is noticeable when it comes to how issues of 
security are framed within the ESS. As mentioned above, like the NSSs, security problems 
are framed in terms of human or biopolitical security where biopolitical security becomes that 
which prepares the way, conceptually at least, for an idea of ‗life‘ that is at hand for the 
mounting of proactive interventions of pre-emption and prevention. Differences between 
American and European counter-terrorism policy do exist. But what the analysis of the ESS 
makes evident is the pervasiveness of biopolitical security and the difficulties of separating a 
politics of security from one based on a logic of exception within the context of the war on 
terror. It further suggests that security is becoming a dominant paradigm of governing and 
legitimation (on this see also Dillon, 2007). Although clearly not simply through it – as Friis 
and Murphy argue, the EU has ‗to carve out a legitimacy strategy which is not 
unidimensional but compromises several sources of legitimacy‘ (2000: 299352; see also 
Brown in Chapter 1) – in the ESS, security is the main source of authority. It is that which 
frames how Europe is being (re)constituted. 
    
To this extent, the fact that the ESS refrains from using the term war on terror
353
 (the strategy 
also avoids the term enemy -  more below) although welcomed by some (see, for instance, 
Bailes, 2005) is, unfortunately, of relatively little significance (see also Neal, 2009 in my 
introduction). Especially when considered in the context of the generalization of (the state of) 
exception as described in Chapter 1 and 2, it is difficult to see how simply abandoning the 
language of war, while accepting a framework of preventive action, can have a real impact. 
Considered in light of Schmitt‘s presupposition that sovereignty must not be identified with 
the presence of a monopoly of violence – a monopoly that is increasingly shared with other 
nonsovereign and/or ‗petty sovereigns‘ organizations, such as private organizations354 – but 
with the monopoly to decide on the exception, a question can be asked about the effects of 
biopolitical security on ‗state‘ power. Do the ‗transnationalization‘355 and expansion of 
security to other domains as represented both in the ESS and the NSSs really challenge 
                                                             
352
 According to Friis and Murphy, this is because ‗that which increases the legitimacy of the EU in 
one Member State‘ might ‗do exactly the opposite in another‘ (2000: 299).  
353
 The Council of Europe prefers to talk about ‗fight‘ as opposed to ‗war‘ against terrorism (see the 
official website of the Council of Europe for examples); an expression which has been taken up by 
many commentators and politicians. Note, however, that attempts to recast ‗the war on terror‘ as a 
‗struggle against violent extremism‘ started with the Bush administration (see Schmitt and Shanker, 
2005)  
354
 The privatization of security is recognized by the ESS strategy itself. At page 5, we find stated, 
[t]aking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability 
of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, the weakening of the state system and the 
privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed‘ (emphasis added). 
355
 See the growing role of multinational actors, such as Europe, as well as of the police and private 
firms. 
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states‘ capacity to decide on the state of exception or in fact reinforce it? To note, however, 
that this is not so much a claim regarding the essential nature of the state (Schmitt, 1988; 
Agamben, 2004), which, as argued in Chapter 1, in line with Foucault and others, I prefer to 
think of as not having ‗an essence‘. If it was, moreover, it would not have been possible to 
extend this discourse on sovereignty to the Europe Union, which in the ESS is constructed as 
a ‗state-like‘ but is clearly not a state. Nor is this a claim about power itself, whereby power 
ends up being conflated with sovereign power. But it is a more ‗pragmatic‘ point about the 
way in which ‗human or biopolitical security‘ is being used to legitimize practices of 
exception at national and European levels and has been used by the United States to exempt 
itself from international law and courts of law and to monopolize and use violence against all 
those that were, or were presumed to be, against ‗them‘356. It is a claim about the way in 
which human or biopolitical security is not merely complementing but redesigning or giving 
new meanings to states (see also MacFarlane and Khong, 2006: 265
357
), state sovereignty, 
and ‗new‘ state forms such as the EU.  
  
Europe‘s self-representation as a global bio-securitization actor depends on depicting 
problems in similar terms than those used in the NSSs. That is to say, in terms of ‗global 
threats‘ – although, as we shall see, the ESS‘s emphasis on terrorism as internal threat also 
plays a major role in constructing a certain image of Europe. The construction of security 
problems as new global threats enables the transformation of Europe into a global security 
actor whose main task as securitization actor becomes the prevention of threats and regulation 
of populations. This self-representation depends on presenting America as unable to deal with 
today‘s threats on its own. However, this is less about undermining America power (whose 
role as a dominant actor is emphasized in the strategy) than about emphasizing Europe‘s own 
capability for enforcing security globally. By treating security as that which ‗must be 
defended‘ (ESS, 2003: 6), the ESS asserts a global (bio)securitization role for Europe, which 
includes but is not limited to preventing/combating terrorism at the same time as it redefines 
sovereignty from the state to the state-like EU.  
 
This redefinition of sovereignty, which is enabled by the affirmation of security as one of 
Europe‘s main tasks, does not necessarily correspond to the demise of national interests – the 
EU can be quite accommodating in these regards. It does not automatically challenge the 
generalization of the logic of exception whereby ‗dangerous‘ individuals are under the 
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 In the words of Bush, ‗either you are with me or you are with the terrorist‘ (Bush, 2001).  
357
 MacFarlane and Khong argue that the focus on ‗human security‘ is not about transcending or 
marginalizing the state but ‗ensuring that there are international mechanisms that can fill the gap ad 
interim and redesign states‘ that do not fulfil their duty to protect (2006: 265).  
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constant surveillance of ‗the state‘. In taking up a securitization global role, the EU accepts 
and reaffirms the discursive premises of the war on terror and of the state of exception on 
which it is ultimately based. Despite Schimitt‘s attempt to preserve the State as the only 
legitimate founder and operator of the exception, what this means is that if the conditions are 
created for its implementation, the exception can exceed its original ‗legitimate‘ founder, 
investing a number of states and actors, among which we can count the EU, which willingly 
subject themselves to it in order to preserve their power. 
 
4.3 Continuing American War by Other Means? 
 
In the ESS, terrorism is constructed as a dangerous phenomenon, both as a global and a 
European phenomenon. It is constructed both as an internal and external security threat. 
Authors such as Berenskoetter see the naming of terrorism as an internal threat as a 
welcoming move on the part of Europe for rejecting ‗the externalization approach of the Bush 
administration‘ (Berenskoetter, 2005: 81; Rhodes, 2003). However, leaving aside the fact that 
the framing of terrorism as an internal phenomenon is not exclusively European
358
 and that 
‗internalization‘ and ‗externalization‘ are not two mutually exclusive approaches, what these 
authors fail to consider are the limits of the European approach to terrorism. On the one hand, 
they fail to understand the ways in which the construction of ‗enemies‘ as internal threats 
naturalizes them at the same time as it depoliticizes them. On the other, they fell short to 
acknowledge the extent to which rather than representing a radical break with US policies, 
Europe‘s understanding of terrorism relies on a political rationality or Polizeiwissenschaft,359 
which while disavowing the terminology of war, could be seen as continuing American war 
by other means.   
 
As we have seen in the previous section, in its naming of threats, the European strategy 
follows the framework provided by the 2002 NSS almost exactly. The only notable difference 
is in relation to terrorism. Even though the ESS places terrorism at the centre of his security 
strategy, there are some important differences on how it frames it if compared to how it is 
constructed in the NSSs. In the ESS, terrorism is treated as a ‗growing strategic threat‘ that 
‗seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies‘ (2003: 3). The document 
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 Since the beginning of ‗the war on terror‘, many countries have adopted its language to crack down 
on so-called ‗internal terrorists‘. See for instance Pakistan, China, Russia. In accordance to Balke, we 
could say that ‗[t]he exclusion that results from the mere functioning of the globally operating social 
systems is thus ―passed on‖ to the local level‘ (Balke, 2007: 17). 
359
 Foucault defines Polizeiwissenschaft as ‗a system of regulation of the general conduct of 
individuals whereby everything would be controlled to the point of self-sustenance, without the need 
for intervention‘ (1994: 30).  
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links terrorism to religious extremism and speaks of Europe as ‗both a target and a base for 
such terrorism‘ (2003: 3). As in the NSSs, terrorism, or more specifically what the ESS calls 
the ‗most recent wave of terrorism‘ as to implicitly point out that terrorism is not a new 
phenomenon in itself
360
 – its newness allegedly being given by its religious extremism, 
dynamism and globality – is presented as a new dynamic threat, whose scope and capacity for 
action is global and whose power is negative and destructive. In the words of the ESS, 
terrorism ‗puts lives at risk‘; terrorists ‗are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive 
casualties‘ (2203: 3). The ESS adds that ‗terrorist movements‘ are ‗well-resourced, connected 
by electronic networks‘361 (2003: 3). In this respect, there are no main distinctions in how 
terrorism is conceptualized in the ESS as compared to the NSSs. However, despite the 
capacity of terrorists to kill on a massive scale, the fact that ‗European countries are targets 
and have been attacked‘362 (3) and the possibility for terrorist groups to ‗acquire weapons of 
mass destruction‘ (4), this time, contrary to the NSSs, the ESS never uses the term ‗enemy‘. 
In the ESS, terrorism is not treated as something that cannot be dealt with. Nor is the terrorist 
treated as the enemy or as a military threat. Instead, in the European strategy terrorism is 
presented as a dangerous phenomenon that has both global and local dimensions – it is both 
external and internal – and that requires a mixture of means to combat it (2003: 7). In the 
words of the strategy, ‗[i]n contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the 
new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires 
a mixture of instruments‘. In particular, ‗[d]ealing with terrorism may require a mixture of 
intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means‘ (2003: 7). 
 
This has led some commentators to argue that the perspective underlying the discussion of 
terrorism in the ESS is more ‗inclusive‘ and multidimensional; therefore, evidently 
distinguishes itself from the one-dimensional offered in the NSS(s) (see Berenskoetter, 2005: 
80; see also Monar, 2008: 211- 214). In particular, according to Berenskoetter, ‗[b]y 
suggesting that causes for terrorism may also reside within European societies, the ESS 
clearly contrasts the externalization approach of the Bush administration‘ (2005: 81). In his 
words, it acknowledges that terrorism ‗is not exclusively linked to the intention of ―bad‖ 
actors‘ outside of the Western world, as in the NSS, but ‗emerges from multiple factors‘ 
(2005: 80, 81), which includes ‗pressures of modernization, cultural, social and political 
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 Most European countries had experienced ‗terrorism‘ prior to 2001 (Monar, 2008: 214; Bigo, 
2006a).  
361
 Not surprisingly, in the ‗Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – 
Providing Security in a Changing World‘ (2008), cyber security appears as central to the prevention of 
terrorism.  
362
 Note that the strategy was written before the Madrid and London bombings.  
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crisis, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies‘ (ESS, 2003: 3). 
However, if, on the one hand, the development of an account of the causes of terrorism 
seemingly helps to challenge the idea that terrorists are inherently dangerous, hateful and 
murderous, I suggest that its ‗internalization‘ also has some negative effects. The 
internalization of terrorism implies that terrorism is not to be understood just as 
confrontational or, in Foucault‘s words, in terms of a ‗military relationship of confrontation‘, 
but also as intrinsic to society and thus as ‗natural‘ (if not exactly in terms of a ‗biological 
relationship‘ to the life of the social body) (Foucault, 2003: 255). In the ESS, there appears 
not to be a re-articulation of racism as cultural clash between two opposite ‗ways of life‘ as 
given in the NSSs. Or perhaps, the re-articulation is only much less explicit than in the 
NSSs.
363
 However, following my discussion of how, in Foucault‘s terms, ‗racism‘ functions 
in terms of establishing a distinction between those who must live and those who can be 
killed in Chapter 1,  it can be argued that, as ‗part of our own society‘, here it is terrorism that 
takes the place of racism. As ‗part of our own society‘, terrorism functions in terms of 
establishing a relationship of war between ‗our life‘ or the ‗life‘ of those living in European 
countries and that of the terrorist or religious extremist (Foucault, 2003). In other words, as 
opposed to challenge the ‗externalization‘ approach of the USA, by naturalizing terrorism 
‗internalization‘ reproduces mechanisms of power based on ‗inclusive exclusion‘.  
 
Drawing again on Foucault but this time on his timely essay ‗About the Concept of 
Dangerous Individual‘, we could say that terrorism signals the existence of an inherently 
dangerous element – that is, more or less dangerous – in the social body (1994: 178). 
Terrorism is the dangerous element in the sense of having negative or damaging effects as 
well as of threatening the very existence of the community. In the words of Solana, the 
person responsible for the drafting of the ESS, ‗[t]errorism is an existential threat‘364 (Solana, 
2004: [n.p.]). Terrorism is a criminal threat, vaguely linked to ‗organized crime‘ (2003: 4, 5, 
13; see also the Council of the European Union, 2005: 6), whose actions are both radical and 
unjustifiable but whose status is not clearly legally defined. Interestingly, the ESS is not the 
only European official document that lacks a definition of terrorism. The Framework 
Decision on Combating Terrorism is also unclear when it comes to specifically defining the 
status of terrorism. Although, contrary to the ESS, the Framework Decision does provide a 
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 For instance, the ESS states that terrorism ‗seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our 
societies‘, which indeed implies that ‗our societies and values‘ are different from ‗theirs‘. 
364
 One cannot but note the Schmittian overtones here. According to Schmitt, ‗[n]o programme, no 
ideal, no norm and no expediency confer a right to dispose over the physical right of other men‘ 
(Schmitt, 1996: 48). The only thing that does is a threat to one‘s own existence. In Schmitt‘s own 
words, the enemy is ‗motivated by an existential threat to one‘s own way of life‘ (1996: 49). 
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very broad definition of its socio-political nature and a legal framework for fighting it, 
according to most authors, its scope of application is rather ambiguous (see, for instance, 
Dumitriu, 2004: 598; see also Symeonidou-Kastanidou, 2004; Sorel, 2003; de Goede, 2008). 
 
Put differently, terrorism is depicted as both existential and criminal threat and its actions 
criminalized but a clear legal definition of it is lacking. What this creates is a situation of 
ambiguity. It produces a situation in which the status of the terrorist is suspended between 
legality (the terrorist is a criminal) and illegality (not only is the terrorist not ‗an enemy‘ but 
his/her status is never clearly defined); between a domain of law and one outside the law 
(legal means are not enough to contrast it, the strategy explicitly tells us); between a 
Schmittian conception of terrorism as existential threat and a criminological conception for 
which terrorism is made equivalent to crime. Interestingly, however, as we have observed in 
Chapter 1, according to Schmitt when ‗the adversary is no longer an enemy but an outlaw, a 
disturber of the peace‘, what we are confronted with is not a form of (state) politics firmly 
rooted in the friend/enemy distinction or the paradigm of war. In Schmitt‘s framework, the 
state is and in fact ought to be the basic political entity of ‗the political‘. Instead, we are 
confronted with a different type of politics. That is to say, a politics of imperialism that while 
disavowing the language of war accepts that military means are necessary. To paraphrase 
Foucault, within this model, the terrorist ‗appears as a juridically paradoxical being. He has 
broken the pact, he is therefore the enemy of society as a whole‘ (Foucault, 1999 [1977]: 89–
90). Because the terrorist is a threat to Western society and values, the EU accepts that 
terrorism is a priority that needs to be dealt with a number of instruments and measures.
365
 
 
Now, the difficulty in placing the kinds of concerns that define the ‗strategy‘ within a realist 
or Clausewitzian understanding of interests has also to be considered. The ESS disavowal of 
the language of war is also probably related to what Balibar calls the ‗post-bellic‘ character of 
Europe (see Balibar, 2004: 222)
366
 and the ideals that subtend to it. Certainly, major 
economic and political interests in the Middle East played an important role when it came to 
decisions about foreign and security policy (see Abraham, 2004: note 14). But Europe‘s 
actions cannot simply to be explained in terms of ‗economic imperialism‘ (see discussion of 
Schmitt in Chapter 1) – divisions between member states, political, strategic and ideological 
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 See not only the ESS (2003) but also the Declaration on Conbacting Terrorism (2004) and 
European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005) and the EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism. 
366
 In particular, Balibar notes that one of the historical experiences that contributed to shaping 
contemporary Europe was that of ‗tragedy‘ – the tragedy of ‗civil wars‘ that ‗devastated the European 
community of peoples. In turn, he argues, this ‗lesson‘ gave its deep roots to what he calls, following 
Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, a ‗―transnational public order (not reducible to a form of moral 
―pacifism‖) that contradicts the ―Clausewitzian‖ equivalence of the ―means‖ of war and the ―means‖ of 
politics‘ (22).  
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issues also play a part. What is clear, however, is that even though the ESS does not promote 
anticipatory or pre-emptive war, it does not reject it. On the contrary, the embracement of 
securitization polices such as the ones mention above
367
 and the promotion of ‗preventive 
engagement‘368 in the ESS challenge ‗the widespread assumption that preemptive security 
practice is specifically American and is either widely resisted, or very reluctantly followed, 
by Europe‘ (de Goede, 2008: 175). Although relying mainly on a criminological model 
whose practical horizon tends to be one of policing and appears to be unrelated to war and 
enmity, EU‘s understandings of security and terrorism in reality are connected and enmeshed 
with logics of war (and with open wars too) – Afghanistan being a case in point. This 
enmeshment renders difficult to see how in the present Europe challenges a ‗Clausewitzian‘ 
model of politics and raises the question of the extent to which, reversing Clausewitz‘s 
famous dictum, the politics of the European Union is in fact the continuation of American 
war on terror by other means. This does not mean that we can simply understand the politics 
of the European Union in the war on terror in terms of continuation of American war both for 
the reasons given above and because this would ignore moments of hesitation and back and 
forth movements of the European Union. Nevertheless, what this ‗Clausewitzian‘ idea 
questions are interpretations of US foreign policy as determined by political and economic 
interests and of Europe as simply driven by principled ideals. Not only there is a sense in 
which ‗principled ideals‘ are somehow functional to the war on terror, which has been 
initiated by the Bush administration but which, as I have suggested here, continues in 
European Union practices of security. But economic and political interests themselves are not 
separable from ideas nor, as argued above, is ‗Europe‘ beyond or above them. 
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 See also what calls, ‗the financial war on terror‘, which enables security action, such as economic 
terror sanctions, ‗on the basis of evidence that is not designed to hold up in court‘ – evidence from 
intelligence sources, often from US intelligence (2008: 173).  
368
 The ESS sees ‗preventive engagement‘ as indispensible to ‗avoid more serious problems in the 
future‘ (ESS, 2003: 11). 
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CHAPTER 5 
Toward a Global (Bio)Security Emergency-State 
 
 
We cannot deny that the idea of generalization of the (state of) exception presented here 
diverges in many respects from the ones given by Agamben and some of his interpreters. For 
a start, this thesis has considered the state, and in particular the United States of America, not 
simply as a locus of the enacting (or suspension) of law, but as a securitizing, imperial power 
whose practices of exception go beyond a legal register. It was because of the US‘s ability to 
decide on the exception and the consequent passing of laws, such as the Patriot Act, which de 
facto created the conditions for the suspension of law, that Agamben has substantiated his 
claims about a new legal order characterized by a permanent state of exception or what he 
sometimes refers to as a ‗global civil war‘. However, what this thesis has demonstrated is that 
the paradigm of exception cannot be reduced to the enactment of laws. By analyzing different 
securitizations strategies, two produced by the US, a state and imperial power, and one by the 
EU, which is not a traditionally defined state, this thesis has shown how these strategies 
themselves, and the ideas or constructs that subtend them, contribute to the operationalization 
and generalization of the (state of) exception. Moreover, whilst the existing literature has 
tended to deal with the most problematic issues of Agamben‘s theory, such as his tendency to 
engage in epochal rhetoric, in the abstract or to apply it to US ‗legal‘ or extra-legal 
developments, no sociological study to date has focused primarily on comparing US and EU 
security strategies on the legal, geopolitical and social terrain. By comparing securitization 
strategies produced by the leading nation-state in the war on terror, whose sovereignty can be 
broadly conceived in Agambenian terms, especially when it comes to decisions about ‗the 
enemy‘, and the EU, which while challenging ‗statist‘ ideas of sovereignty in theory, in 
practice reaffirms the political as a sphere of sovereignty through its self-image as outlined in 
the ESS, this thesis has contributed to an understanding of the state of the exception, even as 
it has called some aspects of Agamben‘s theory into question. In particular, it has challenged 
the idea that the generalization of the (state of) exception is simply equivalent to the 
increasing use of emergency legislation in various countries or explainable through the notion 
of ‗global civil war‘. Without shying away from problematic aspects of his theory, this thesis 
has explored the kind of empirical complexity, which is often missing in works that do not 
take into account the interplay between imperial practices and practices of exception, as well 
as to confront the importance of international law, war, and discourses of security in the 
operationalization of the (state of) exception. By critically employing Agamben‘s and 
Foucault‘s insights on sovereignty and biopolitics, and other concepts such as those of empire 
and imperialism drawn from other critical theorists though an exegesis of these security 
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strategies, this thesis has provided a better conceptualization of the (state of) exception in 
terms of how the US and EU conceptualize it and what are the mechanisms that allow its 
generalization.  
 
Starting from a critical exploration of biopolitics and sovereignty in the works of both 
Agamben and Foucault, through a theoretically informed discursive analysis, this thesis has 
examined three securitization strategies related to the war on terror with a view to exploring 
the extent and the specific manner in which the exception and security have become 
entangled post-9/11. In particular, it has analysed three security strategies, which were 
purposively chosen because they did not neatly fit into Agamben‘s theory. Not only are these 
documents not strictly ‗legal‘ (i.e., they are not legislative but foreign security policy 
documents that serve as guideposts and whose function is primarily strategic or ideological) 
but the European one is not conceived as being representative of any one State but of the 
European Union itself. This has allowed an understanding of these discourses which while 
accepting some of Agamben‘s most critical insights goes beyond ‗methodological statism‘ or 
his tendency, following Schmitt, to treat the state in its national form as the main object of his 
juridico-political, philosophical inquiry.
369
 Concurrently, this thesis has questioned the neat 
distinction between the US and EU that most current approaches to security tend to assume, 
both in terms of applying Agamben‘s theory of the exception to the former and Foucault‘s 
theory of governmentality to the latter and of seeing the ESS in opposition to the 2002 NSS. 
By comparing US and EU security strategies, which it has treated as very important examples 
of the type of securitization discourses being given voice today, this thesis has provided a 
theoretically-informed understanding of how exactly the exception is operationalized/generalized 
in the context of the war on terror.  
 
More precisely, what the analysis of the two NSSs has demonstrated is that, as Agamben 
suggests, the exception is indeed essential to an articulation of sovereignty at the national 
level. It is through this articulation that the US tried to secure its status as a powerful state as 
well as to legitimize a global leading role for itself in the war on terror. However, as 
suggested by the Foucauldian framework of biopolitics and state racism, what my analysis 
also has shown is that far from being reducible to sovereign (state) power, the continuation of 
the war on terror as framed in the US documents (i.e., as permanent global warfare) also 
relies on other mechanisms of power. It appears that the continuation of the war on terror 
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 As mentioned in Chapter 1, in his latest book Il Regno e la Gloria, Agamben gives signs that he is 
starting to think beyond the question of sovereignty and more particularly about the question of the 
‗economy‘, although how successfully is an open question. Also unclear is whether the book goes 
beyond ‗methodological statism‘. 
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relies on mechanisms of (bio)security (note the importance of ‗human security‘ to both the 
US NSSs and the European document) which, working ‗at the local, micro and lowest level‘ 
(i.e., at the level of subjectivities), are ‗annexed by global phenomena‘ (i.e., by the US and 
the EU as globalizing ‗states‘) to become those that legitimize the transformation of the state 
of exception into a kind of endemic activity. My conceptualization of the state of exception 
has not simply challenged an idea of ‗sovereignty‘ as entirely founded on the exception, 
pointing to the centrality of security to its operationalization. It has also made evident how 
the generalization of the (state of) exception and its entanglement with ‗human‘ or 
biopolitical security work in practice. It has demonstrated how in a sense we pass from a 
‗technical‘ state of exception, intended as that which states use to contrast alleged 
emergencies or threats to national security, to a global, emergency-state, whose politics, 
combining the logic of exception with that of security, are both racializing and imperialist. 
  
As indicated in my literature review, Agamben sees the decision on the exception as central 
to contemporary biopolitical developments enabled and/or related to the war on terror. 
According to him, the state of exception is that which enables governments to act upon the 
lives of peoples or, more precisely, to reduce ‗life‘ to bare life, and is also that which allows 
governments to expand their (bio)power over the globe presently. He talks about a 
‗generalization of the state of exception‘ to indicate the pervasiveness of these mechanisms of 
(bio)power or ‗inclusive exclusion‘ at the global level and their constant expansion; an 
expansion which crucially, as Agamben himself suggests but leaves somewhat undeveloped, 
is characterized by the centrality of security.
370
 However, although not central to my own 
analysis, as I have explained in Chapter 1, this raises, among other conundrums, the question 
of whether constitutional law is the same as international law. Whilst Agamben seems simply 
to conflate the two, other legal theorists draw attention to the fact that there are certain basic 
human rights obligations that cannot be suspended even in times of war or other public 
emergencies. The examples of how human rights legislations have been used to try to 
counter-balance the power of the state to curtail civil liberties and people‘s freedom that I 
have offered in Chapter 1 are cases in point. The fact that the suspension of rights can be and 
has been challenged through an appeal to rights, clearly, does not answer the Agambenian 
question of why in practice they are everywhere regularly suspended. But it does challenge 
his thoroughly negative view of rights. More relevantly still, what my analysis has shown is 
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 See Chapter 1, section 1.9, where Agamben‘s claim that security has become the state‘s basic task 
is discussed in some details in relation to the development of ‗human security‘ as that which ‗seeks to 
act on populations globally, thus, passes the responsibility to protect people from the state to the 
international community‘.    
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that the theme of emergency is essential to a conceptualization of US and EU (bio)politics 
and of war as given in the US NSSs (i.e., as permanent global warfare). However, it has also 
revealed that ‗the generalization of (the state of) exception‘ is somewhat different from the 
version promulgated by Schmitt and further developed by Agamben where the concepts of 
state and its existence, sovereignty and (juridical) order are keys. The conception of the state 
we are presented with in the US NSS documents is not a traditional but clearly a ‗new‘ one. 
No longer a nationally bounded state, the US presents itself as a global (bio)securitization 
actor whose powers when it comes to decisions about what constitutes and how to deal with 
the exception go behind what is permitted in international law, giving rise (nominally at least) 
to what I have called a ‗global (bio)security emergency-state‘.  
  
It is important to remind ourselves, however, that although for both Schmitt and Agamben the 
concepts of the state, sovereignty and (juridical) order are important, it would be wrong 
simply to superimpose Schmitt and Agamben in this regard. As again shown in Chapter 1, for 
Schmitt, it is on the basis of a presupposition of the concept of the political as political 
decision on the friend (and the enemy) that he arrives at the concept of the state as ‗he who 
decides on the state of exception‘. For Agamben, by contrast, it is the decision on the 
exception itself that is fundamental and although decisive, the political entity (i.e., the state) 
only makes possible a certain type of negative politics, or better biopolitics. That is to say, a 
form of politics based on the right to decide what life is worth living. Agamben‘s emphasis is 
on the limitations and ultimate negative power of sovereignty as embodied in the state. The 
state is not that which opens the way to a new type of politics as envisaged by Agamben. For 
Agamben, the capacity of the sovereign to decide on the exception is based on a paradoxical 
impossibility, seemingly accepting that there is a continuous and progressive decline of the 
Nation-State and its sovereignty – something which he seems to welcome (on this see also 
Schmitt; although, as we have seen, Schmitt welcomes it for totally different reasons). Thus, 
he suggests that to regard the capacity of the sovereign to decide positively as Schmitt does is 
to ignore, or better still to accept, the intrinsic paradoxicality of sovereignty (both in the sense 
of being based on an impossibility and of setting boundaries between what is inside and what 
is outside of the political) as essential to a theory of the autonomy of the political. On the 
contrary, Agamben‘s conceptions of politics and of ‗coming community‘ are arrived at 
through the problematization of sovereign power and consequent, if theoretical, displacement. 
His politics is clearly anti-statist, with his notion of the political calling for a radical 
overcoming of every form of sovereignty and law.  
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Nevertheless, I have suggested that in reality Agamben‘s theory is not completely satisfactory 
with regard to the problematization of the state form in contemporary societies. More 
specifically, my claim is that although Agamben provides sufficient ‗empirical‘ evidences to 
support his assertion that the state of exception is becoming the (main) paradigm of 
government, where the word government here stands for state government, he fails to explain 
how different forms of the state or sovereignty contribute to and are framed by the 
generalization of the exception. Does this mean that even as he attempts to displace it, 
Agamben still rely on a Schmittian conception of the political? Although perhaps not in the 
strong sense of ignoring the factual decline of the nation-state, especially its inability to deal 
with processes of ‗globalization‘ (migration in particular) or of being incapable of thinking 
beyond the state in the abstract, his theory, I have argued in Chapter 1, does ultimately 
remain caught within a spatial/temporal statist framework. By analyzing how the EU, a non-
state in the traditional sense, is instrumental in the generalization of the exception, this thesis 
has complicated Agamben‘s understanding of sovereignty as well as his understanding of 
security and law. 
 
Crucially, what I have demonstrated through my analysis of the US NSSs and ESS is that 
both the US as a state and the EU are conducive to the generalization of the exception. I have, 
moreover, suggested that whereas the US did so directly by deciding on the exception as that 
which enabled it to declare war against terrorism and indirectly through human security, it is 
through the latter that the EU attempts to achieve what it cannot through the direct use of the 
state of exception. To this extent, it can be argued that far from being replaced by a logic of 
security, the paradigms of security and exception are in fact coextensive. But they are 
coextensive not in the absolute sense of being one and the same – as Agamben‘s 
understanding of sovereignty as biopolitical or of biopolitics as the originary activity of 
sovereignty implies – but in a more Foucauldian sense of working in concert, in a sense 
complementing each other, toward what does indeed looked like a ‗new‘ world (dis)order and 
whose effects are far from over. In other words, while Agamben is correct in saying that in an 
indefinite state of emergency or war, the state of exception tends to become the state of 
normality, and also to suggest that there is a generalization of the paradigm of security, I 
contend that his arguments are not qualified enough to permit an understanding of the 
complex way in which practices of exception and security are entangled. Through my 
sociological analysis, I have provided empirical evidences of how a certain conception of 
security as ‗human‘ or biopolitical security is increasingly becoming the basic principle of 
both US state and EU activity, but also as itself relying on and establishing ‗a network of 
power‘. That is to say, a network of power which includes private agencies, whose role has 
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been analysed in some details by Bigo (2008) among others, police forces such as border 
police patrols and surveillance dipositifs, and that, as Hardt and Negri say, transcends the 
boundaries of any one state but is not as decentred and amorphous as they suggested in their 
book Empire.371 It is not that this network of power is dependent on the US but the US 
remains central to it. The war on terror provids the framework throught which the US tries to 
(re)affirm its power to decide, while expanding its influence and fostering a world order 
under its hegemony.  
 
It is through the decision on the exception, exemplified by the decision on ‗the enemy‘ 
(global terrorism) – where the enemy or total enemy is representative of the outlaw whose 
life is unworthy – and what are the best means to combat it (‗legal‘, securitization, and 
warfare means, the US) that the US asserted itself as a global power and affirmed itself as 
the leading state in the war on terror. What my analysis of the NSSs has shown further is that 
the characterization on which this decision relies (i.e., of the President as the one invested 
with the authority to decide on how to deal with the enemy) in fact depends on a paradoxical 
appeal to the law. More precisely, it depends on an appeal to international law, and in 
particular, to the inherent ‗right of self-defence‘ as set out in Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
which in reality ultimately undermines the main principle of the Charter that poses 
limitations to the use pre-emptive force only to attacks that are proved to be imminent. By 
acting in ways which are inimical to it, the US attempted to exempt itself from the 
international framework of law, while simultaneously and paradoxically demanding 
compliance by others. Through an appeal to the right to self-defence, the US tried to give 
legitimation to its de facto unilateralism – a unilateralism whose specific logic and 
‗limitations‘372 I have explained in my analysis of the NSSs – and justify a doctrine of pre-
emptive warfare whose aim is, in the words of the NSSs, ‗to prevent attacks‘. In other words, 
behind the appeal to international law, there seems to lie an instrumentalization of it in an 
attempt to fit the needs of a US-dominated world order as opposed to a world in which all 
states are equally bound to the Law of Nations (or jus gentium)  (Zolo, 2006; see also 
Kelsen, 1945). Thus, the documents could affirm without hesitation that the US ‗speak[s] out 
                                                             
371
 This is discussed in some details in my literature review in relation to Agamben‘s notion of 
sovereignty and in my analysis in relation to the question of unilateralism vs. multilateralism.  
372
 As argued in my analysis following again Hardt and Negri‘s point about the necessity of the 
network form of power, whether the type of unilateralism given in these documents can be sustained in 
the long run is unclear – where especially problematic is its relation to global capital and as integral 
part of the network of power. Moreover, Obama‘s (qualified and ambivalent) rejection of it seems 
indeed to point to its unsustainability; although whether ‗multilateralism‘ (and the multilateralism of 
the new administration specifically) is necessarily beyond unilateralism is also open to questions for 
the reasons given in my discussion of it in Chapter 3.  
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against abuses of human rights‘, promotes democracy and supports their development in 
other countries (see section 3 of the 2006 NSS) whilst failing to provide any indication of 
how it intended to comply with international laws, and, in particular, with the jus gentium. 
On the contrary, the NSSs explicitly tell us that the US will do all that is in its power to 
defend Americans and not be impaired ‗by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose 
jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept‘ (NSS, 2002). They 
further suggest that the US will defend the peace ‗by fighting terrorists and tyrants‘ 
whenever and wherever they are. This seems to confirm Agamben‘s claim that ‗Bush is 
[was] attempting to produce a situation in which the emergency becomes the rule and the 
very distinction between war and peace (and between foreign war and global civil war) 
becomes impossible‘ (Agamben, 2005a: 22).  
 
However, what the analysis of the documents has also intimated is that whereas it was 
through a decision on the exception that the US affirmed itself in the war on terror, this is not 
all there is to it. Its generalization – as that which ultimately guarantees the continuation of 
the war on terror – also relies on other mechanisms of (bio)power, which are difficult to place 
within an Agambenian understanding of sovereignty as biopolitical. It relies on mechanisms 
of (bio)security that are operationalized somewhat differently from the logic of exception, 
which does not mean, however, that they are unconnected to it. They, in a sense, permit the 
generalization of the (state of) exception in the form of what I have called a ‗global 
(bio)security emergency-state‘, whose primary enabler is the US but of which Europe is part, 
without being reducible to it. This is because they do not simply work through a logic of 
‗inclusive exclusion‘ whereby the sovereign decides to reduce some life to bare life. But we 
may argue relying on Foucault, they are aimed at securing the ‗life‘ of populations generally. 
They work more insidiously, through mechanisms of surveillance, for instance. They work by 
creating a ‗security continuum‘ (Bigo, 1996) in which not only ‗internal‘ and ‗external‘ but 
also ‗enemies‘ and ‗strangers‘ become indistinguishable; a continuum in which security, 
intended here in the Foucauldian sense of a governmental concern with the well-being of the 
population as a whole (Foucault, 2003), becomes entirely coupled with ‗external‘ security as 
that which deals with enemies. 
 
In the specific, it is not simply by declaring who or what the enemy is, and more importantly, 
what are the best means to combat it that the US tries to affirm itself as global protector in the 
eyes of the American people who it claimed to be protecting. As I have demonstrated in 
Chapter 3, to do this the US also needed to construct an ‗unprotected global people‘ whose 
‗freedom‘ allegedly also depended on its willingness to protect them. It is through the 
construction of what the NSSs dub as ‗freedom-loving-people‘ around the world that the 
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imperative to secure ‗them‘ is globalized (that is, it becomes global in its extensibility) and 
the normative control over populations is established.
373
 It is by claiming that it can control 
all those instances that put the lives and welfare of these people (i.e., ‗freedom-loving 
people‘) at risk that the US globalizes its sovereign power and legitimizes imperial, 
racializing securitization practices – where, however, the gap or ‗scarto‘, to adopt Agamben‘s 
words, between what the US claims to be able to do and what it does in actual fact is the 
more evident.
374
 (To take only one example, the invasion of Iraq is nothing if not a 
biopolitical disaster, where not even the most elementary biopolitical duties of occupying 
forces (sewage, hospitals, electricity etc.) were adequately dealt with. Bioinsecurity seems to 
have been the norm in that domain). To this extent, biopolitical (in)security or the extension 
of (in)security to the political, economic, and health domains is constitutive of the articulation 
of US sovereignty. In other words, the US asserts itself as a ‗global (bio)security state‘ 
because it both presents itself as morally superior, as that which can decides on the 
friend/enemy distinction and as that which can guarantee people‘s security – where ‗the 
people‘ are here understood as both national and global. Thus, my claim is that in the NSSs, 
security is constituted both as a mechanism of state power and of biopower. While still 
relying on a Schmittian understanding of the political as based on the state of exception, the 
NSSs also go beyond it in their in their naming of a ‗global enemy‘ to combat, a ‗global 
people‘ to defend and effort to extend US sovereign power on a global scale through 
biopolitical (in)security. In the NSSs, we are presented with a state that emerges from the 
interplay of practices of exception and security; that has human as opposed to territorial 
security as its main referent and point of legitimation, and is ready to use emergency 
legislation and pre-emptive warfare means in order to deal with what it perceives as 
emergencies or threats and extend its power over the globe.   
 
On the other hand, the framing of Europe in terms of global (bio)security actor also points to 
the persistence of a certain vision of the political as a sphere of sovereignty at the same time 
as it goes beyond a vision of sovereignty as simply based on a state of exception. In 
particular, the framing of Europe as a bounded entity with both military and civilian 
capabilities signs a willingness on part of European states to configure Europe as a state-like 
structure of power. However, far from being simply intrinsic to how the US frames itself, 
what the analysis of the ESS proves is that human or biopolitical security informs European 
foreign policy also. In the ESS, what we have found are similar understandings of security 
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 For the importance of the ideal of freedom to this construction, see Chapter 3.  
374
 A gap which, as Bigo suggests (although he does not use these same exact terms), Agamben seems 
to foreclose by seemingly ‗accepting that what they [i.e., those of the Bush administration] say is what 
they are [were] doing‘ (Bigo, 2009: 7).    
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and terrorism as those employed in the NSS of 2002 and of 2006.
375
 That is, an understanding 
of security as the form through which Europe and the people living within it but also all 
others, with the exclusion of terrorists and/or criminals whose actions threaten their very 
existence, are to be governed and of terrorism as the dangerous element that needs to be 
contrasted. Furthermore, what the analysis of the ESS has also made evident is that the 
transformation of security into a strategic objective coincides with an indirect use of ‗the state 
of the exception‘. In other words, if in the NSSs, it is both though a ‗direct‘ use of the state of 
exception
376
 and the employment of biopolitical mechanisms that the US affirms its own 
sovereignty, at the European level, where no state of exception is/can be declared,
377
 human 
or biopolitical security is that through which Europe affirms its own ‗sovereignty‘. To put it 
differently, it is on the basis of a similar conception of security as that employed by the US 
NSSs (i.e., a conception of security as a form of governmentality that is directly related to 
sovereign power as exception) that the ESS is able to present the EU as a powerful, global 
actor. In turn, it is by presenting itself as gloal (bio)securitiation actor that the EU acts as 
‗indirect‘ mediator in the war on terror. Human or biopolitical security is not only central to 
the US‘s self-construction as a ‗global (bio)security emergency-state‘ – a state which I have 
tried to demonstrate is fundamentally imperial. But it is also that which enables the 
participation of the EU in the war on terror in a policing function, which far from 
representing a security alternative to US NSSs, in reality seems to create the conditions for 
the continuation of American war on terror.  
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 For the differences between UN NSSs and the ESS especially in relation to terrorism, see my 
analysis in Chapter 4. 
376
 I.e., both in terms of declaring the state of exception in the technical sense (see the Patriot Act) and 
of investing the President with the authority to decide what are the best means to combat the enemy, 
even if that means going against international laws (see above).    
377
 As pointed out in Chapter  4, not only are there limitations to what Europe as bounded entity can do 
in terms of foreign policy (member states are responsible for their own territorial defence and only they 
as national sovereign state can declare a state of emergency in the technical sense) but the post-bellic 
character of Europe clearly plays a huge role on this issue.   
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